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ABSTRACT 
Horizontal relationships between subsidiaries within an MNC are rarely shown on an 
organisation chart but the interactions along this dimension are critical to the 
achievement of an MNC’s global operations and strategic activities. Different 
interaction logics of social relationships and economic exchanges in horizontal 
relationships induce simultaneous competition and collaboration between the 
subsidiaries.  
Collaboration and competition is a business reality in inter-subsidiary relationships as 
they collaborate to share resources and knowledge, but ultimately compete for 
resources, customers and profits. While much research has focused on the effects of 
internal collaboration, and to a lesser extent internal competition, on organisational 
performance, little is known about the antecedents of competition and collaboration and 
the interplay of simultaneously occurring interactions. By focusing on one or the other, 
any understanding of the inherent tensions between the two is overlooked.  
This research explores the coopetitive nature of the inter-subsidiary relationship using a 
qualitative approach within three MNCs, where internal competition and collaboration 
are more salient. Data were gathered from 98 semi-structured interviews with top and 
senior management, top management focus groups and a body of secondary data 
including internal reports, policy documents and external publications, among others, 
has been referenced.  
The study makes three key contributions. First, by extending Luo’s (2005) theoretical 
model of intra-MNE coopetition, the study identifies additional respective antecedents 
of competition and collaboration. Second, the study locates inherent tensions arising 
from inter-subsidiary coopetition and explicates how the tensions are managed by the 
HQ and subsidiaries using spatial, balancing and assessing mechanisms and specific 
interventions. Third, the study offers an empirically-based model of inter-subsidiary 
coopetition  with a more dynamic and temporal set of multiple relationships among the 
subsidiaries within the MNCs. Management implications include that senior 
management teams be aware of the opportunities and constraints of promoting a culture 
of collaboration while simultaneously fostering inter-subsidiary competition through 
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internal accounting policies and incentive systems, and that the capability of senior 
managers to work effectively within dual organisational structures be developed and 
incorporated into executive development programmes.  
Keywords: competition, collaboration, intra-MNC coopetition, tensions, dynamic  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 outlines the aim of the study which 
encompasses a statement of personal interest underpinning the research and an 
introduction to the research problem. Section 1.2 discusses the key characteristics of the 
study. Section 1.3 introduces the overall thesis structure and concludes the Introduction 
chapter.  
1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY  
This study aims to empirically explore the simultaneous interactions of competition and 
collaboration between subsidiaries within a multinational context. It specifically focuses 
on the antecedents of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration; the dynamics of 
when and where competition and collaboration simultaneously occur; and the 
management of inherent tensions, resulting from engaging in both types of interactions. 
The study positions subsidiary and subunit interactions in a wider internal and external 
context. It proposes a model that primarily contributes to the literature on simultaneous 
inter-subsidiary competition, collaboration and coopetition. The following two sections 
explain the interest underlying this study and outline the research problem. 
1.1.1 Personal interest  
The general interest driving this study is the awareness, balance and management of 
inherent tensions in the interunit interactions of collaboration and competition within 
complex, multinational organisations.  
In the late 1990s, my then MNC employer, like many others, began to focus on 
collaborative opportunities with other external organisations through strategic alliances 
and joint ventures; this extended to emphasising greater collaboration within the 
company. This decision to focus on collaboration resulted from the organisation’s 
transition into a global matrix design, and as the regional VP, Organisational 
Development, I was tasked with the responsibility of making this happen. Throughout 
this process, certain assumptions were made: collaboration was (i) natural (ii) beneficial 
for the organisation and (iii) would create a ‘nicer’ and ‘better’ place to work.  
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However, by focusing on fostering collaborations across the newly created global 
matrix structure, we neglected undercurrents created by interunit competition. We 
targeted one type of interaction, that between regions and business units. However, I 
began to question whether we were encouraging collaboration or in fact, fostering 
internal competition.  
My curiosity regarding the dynamics of intra-organisational collaboration and 
competition was further sparked by a paragraph I came across, which remains in my 
personal ideas folder. Regrettably, the source remains unknown.  
“On the one hand, there is an assumption that collaboration is the natural order of things 
and therefore, there is little need to invest in developing the skills and knowledge 
needed for successful collaborative working. On the other hand, there is the fact that the 
collaborative structures, largely voluntary, are standing on a sub-structure which is still, 
at heart, competitive and based around autonomous institutions.” 
While this appears to be more directed at an inter-organisational level of analysis, at the 
time of transition to the redesign and the changing nature of subsidiaries in the regions, 
it was very salient to me.  
These concurrent experiences, and later independent consulting assignments, fuelled my 
interest in the present study on how collaboration benefits can be achieved while 
managing internal competition to create positive tension to achieve both synergies and 
efficiencies from the numerous interactions and relationships between subsidiaries 
worldwide. I wondered if it was possible to understand how appropriate levels of 
competition and collaboration can be achieved. 
I have chosen to investigate the phenomenon of simultaneous competition and 
collaboration within the context of a multinational organisation. This is because, among 
other factors, it is where I first experienced the dilemmas and tensions managers faced. 
Moreover, as an organisational development practitioner for over 25 years, it is a world 
I am deeply familiar with.  
The aim of my research is to contribute a greater understanding of inter-subsidiary 
collaboration and competition by identifying the antecedents and content of interactions 
between competition and collaboration. It also attempts to provide an understanding and 
possible explanation of how subsidiaries simultaneously compete and collaborate while 
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managing subsequent tensions, if any. Further, this study explores interventions 
corporate or subsidiary managers apply to mitigate or heighten tensions. Addressing 
questions of this nature has advanced my research interest, which is to identify ways to 
mitigate destructive behaviours and minimise the subsequent waste of organisational 
resources (financial, operational or human), resulting from excessive or insufficient 
collaboration and/or competition among multinational company subunits. 
1.1.2 Research problem  
Value is created from the structure and behaviours associated with competition and 
collaboration inside the organisation (Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004). While the 
coexistence of competition and collaboration among multinational firms has been 
extensively studied (see Bengtsson, Eriksson and Wincent, 2010, 1999; Gynawali, 
Singal and Mu, 2009; Padula and Dagnino, 2007) much less attention has been focused 
on collaboration and competition between units within complex and heterogeneous 
multinational organisations (Luo, 2005; Walley, 2007). Although Birkinshaw, Hood and 
Young (2005:246) noted that “the relationships between subsidiaries and their sister 
plants in other countries are a fascinating blend, in that they rely on one another for 
transferring ideas and ways of working, but ultimately they are in competition for new 
investment and/or even in some cases for survival”. As competition and collaboration 
represent different forces in a horizontal relationship, it is important to understand 
when, where and to what extent both are present and how their coexistence can generate 
positive outcomes for the multinational firm.  
Multinational corporations (MNC) rely on their subunits for global operations and 
strategic activities, including global expansion (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991; Birkinshaw, 
Hood and Jonsson, 1998). Indeed, the social relationships and economic exchanges 
between subsidiaries within an MNE induce competition and cooperation between their 
subunits (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). This duality is a source of tension (Luo, 2005) in 
resources flows, operation coordination and unit differentiation in terms of identities 
and roles within the MNC.  
As an element of duality, collaboration between different business units within an 
organisation has been on the organisational and academic agenda for many years and 
has gained renewed attention, given that organisations have become more complex, 
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internationalised and diverse (Schruijer, 2006). New opportunities to create competitive 
advantages are based on the organisational units’ ability to successfully collaborate by 
sharing knowledge and jointly developing new products and services (Hansen and 
Nohria, 2004). Moreover, companies that can stimulate and support interunit 
collaboration to leverage their dispersed resources will gain advantages that may arise in 
the future.  
However, the practical application of collaboration seems to more difficult than its 
theoretical conception. Not only is collaboration difficult to achieve between 
subsidiaries within multinationals (Friesl and Silberzahn, 2012; Zander and Kogut, 
1995), but it is also poorly understood (Hansen and Nohria, 2004). Therefore, renewed 
emphasis is being placed on collaboration in the academic literature (Schruijer, 2007).  
However, the literature fails to adequately address inherent or perceived competition in 
subsidiary relationships in organisational systems. It is this contradictory duality of 
simultaneous competition and collaboration and their interplay that form today’s 
complex reality. It appears to be a business fallacy that organisations drive either 
competition or collaboration. In fact, the strategic issue is not to choose between 
competition or collaboration but to manage the tension between the two, given that the 
traditional view of measures that enhance competition tend to jeopardise collaboration 
and vice versa.  
Chen (2008:296) clearly states the concern as follows: 
“In the absence of a formal framework for different conceptualizations of the 
competition–cooperation interrelationship, the tendency among researchers is to fall 
back into polarization. And as a result, rather than assume a range of dynamic interplay 
between competition and cooperation, the inclination in research is still, largely, to 
dichotomize the two concepts and to regard them as independent and oppositional, or 
paradoxical. If we move outside the conventional frame of reference of the common 
competition–cooperation conception, might we discover that two separate, even 
seemingly parallel, “lines” eventually converge? Competition–cooperation research can 
be advanced, we believe, if it transcends existing conceptualizations to explore fully the 
complexity and richness of competition–cooperation interdependence and interplay.” 
While antecedents of internal competition and collaboration are proposed, field research 
is limited to subsidiaries within MNCs. Before analysing the dynamics of their co-
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existence, I explore the factors, interventions and mechanisms that foster (or hamper) 
both inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition.  
The study primarily focuses on the inter-subsidiary interactions of competition and 
collaboration, as indicated by the dark solid lines in Figure 1-1. The relationship 
between corporate/parent HQ and individual subsidiaries is well documented (for 
example: Gupta, 1987; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995) 
(lighter dotted lines) with less focus on the impact of HQ on the inter-subsidiary 
relationship. This study also captures HQ’s influence on the inter-subsidiary 
relationship (dark dotted line).  
 
Figure 1-1: Research focus on inter-subsidiary relationships  
1.1.3 Research questions  
The primary research question that has been the driving force behind this study is: 
How, and why, do subsidiaries simultaneously compete and collaborate?  
The three supplementary questions that will be answered are as follows:  
Sub Question 1: What is the content of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration?  
Sub Question 2: What factors influence inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration?  
Sub Question 3: How do subsidiaries manage the inherent tensions from simultaneous 
competition and collaboration?  
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1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY  
This section outlines the study and provides preliminary insights into the key features, 
establishing the link between the aims and structure of this study.  
1.2.1 Thesis outline  
The structure of this study is divided into three parts. 
Part I - Literature review  
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on competition, collaboration and coopetition. 
The review identifies a lack of empirical research that elucidates the antecedents of 
intra-organisational coopetition. Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 review the key terms used in 
the literature and their interpretations in the context of this study. I investigate the 
complex relational phenomenon of collaboration and reference cooperation because 
studies investigating horizontal relationships between subsidiaries often use the terms 
interchangeably and synonymously. Sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 presents the use of 
Luo’s (2005) integrated model of interunit coopetition within an MNE to structure an 
analysis of the literature on internal competition, collaboration and coopetition at the 
subsidiary level within the context of multinational organisations. Finally, this chapter 
includes an overview of the theoretical perspectives adopted in previous studies and 
concludes with a discussion of the shortcomings in the reviewed literature.  
Part II – Research approach and results  
Chapter 3 details the research strategy used in this study. This includes a review of the 
philosophical perspective adopted and this study’s implications. I outline the research 
design and practical methods used to conduct the fieldwork, including a detailed 
description of how the analysis was conducted.  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the findings from the three case organisations, EngConsult, 
EventCo and PhotoCo in two parts. The first part of each chapter describes the case 
organisation at which data were collected. The primary purpose is to provide contextual 
insights into the relationships between the subsidiaries in each case. The second part of 
each chapter presents the within-case findings in the following format: the nature of the 
relationships among the subsidiaries; the determinants and content of inter-subsidiary 
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relationships; internal structures, processes and practices; and the focus of inter-
subsidiary collaboration and competition.  
Chapter 7 presents the cross-case synthesis of the within-case findings for the three 
organisations, utilising the same format adopted for each case organisation, with the aim 
of addressing sub-questions 1, 2 and 3 of this research.  
Part III– Discussion and conclusions  
Chapter 8 returns to the literature and aims to identify the key findings on how and why 
subsidiaries compete and collaborate, in addition to presenting an augmented model of 
inter-subsidiary MNC coopetition which encapsulates the different inter-subsidiary 
relationships and consequent tensions. The discussion focuses on the process of 
assessing and balancing the inherent tensions in coopetitive interactions and those 
triggered by other internal or external factors. 
The key findings are as follows:  
(i) Top management commitment and the pursuit of profit maximisation were salient 
determining factors of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration, including 
external, organisational, subsidiary and individual manager characteristics.  
 (ii) Inter-subsidiary coopetitive relationships are dynamic, not static.  
(iii) By disaggregating the subsidiary, greater granularity of the location of the tensions 
was possible. 
(iv) Not all tensions are intolerable and require ‘sorting out’. However, intolerable 
tensions can be managed, and intentionally created, through interventions and 
mechanisms to adjust the dynamic to the appropriate proportion of competition and 
collaboration in the relationship. Management adjudication was critical. 
(v) Intolerable tensions predominantly arise from the competitive aspect of the 
relationship.  
I conclude this chapter with suggestions for future research and the study’s limitations. 
Finally, Chapter 9 draws the study together by reiterating the research problem and 
summarising the study and its key contributions to the literature on horizontal inter-
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subsidiary relationships within a multinational context, along with a discussion of its 
practice implications. 
1.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed this study’s background and aim. It also elucidated the origin of 
my interest in the topic and presented the research problem and questions. Finally, it 
outlined the structure of the thesis along with the content of each chapter.  
 
 
 9 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter outlines the development of the research questions. First, I review the key 
constructs from the literature and provide definitions used in this study. I then draw on 
relevant literature that forms the foundation of the proposed study. Competition and 
collaboration are presented as the two main types of inter-subsidiary interaction, with 
the construct of coopetition representing the combination of the differing levels of 
competition and collaboration. Subsequent sections in the chapter summarise the 
content, determinants and existing theoretical explanations of inter-subsidiary 
interactions of competition and collaboration. The literature review concludes with a 
summary of the argument, explication of the scope of the inquiry and statement of the 
research questions.  
2.2 DEFINING KEY CONSTRUCTS  
Prior to any empirical research, it is essential to define and clarify the key constructs 
(Foss and Nielsen, 2010; Suddaby, 2010). Therefore, in this section, I provide the 
definitions of competition, collaboration, and coopetition which this present research 
uses to conduct a more thorough exploration of the content, determinants and dynamics 
of the coexistence of competition and collaboration. 
The related, but different, terms of cooperation and coordination are also briefly 
discussed to minimise the risk of ambiguity. Furthermore, the relationships and 
interactions are delineated and subsidiaries are defined.  
Definitions of the key terms at the intra-firm, subunit and intra-organisational group 
level are less frequently observed in existing literature reviews. Economics and strategic 
management literature predominantly focuses on competition and collaboration between 
firms, i.e. inter-organisational, and subsequent differentiation of performance, as 
opposed to their antecedents. The emerging concept of coopetition is also 
predominantly researched at the inter-organisational level (Walley, 2007). However, 
rather than simply underpinning the different relationships between firms, coopetition is 
as fundamental to relationships within organisations.  
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The natural assumptions of organisations are that individual subunits are assumed to 
engage in cooperation and collaboration, whereas organisations focus on competition. 
Until recently, academics and managers did not appear to acknowledge that 
organisations and their subunits can engage in both collaboration (cooperation) and 
competition. What requires further understanding is how and what enables 
organisational units to simultaneously engage in collaboration and competition and 
perhaps, the fundamental question of why? 
In the social psychology literature, the fact that individuals and groups are capable of 
both competing and collaborating (Deutsch, 1949) has been recognised for decades. We, 
as humans, have the capacity to compete as well as collaborate (Loch et al., 2006; 
Geraudel, 2014). Groups, like individuals, can interact with each other, either 
competitively or cooperatively. They compete to achieve goals for themselves and 
collaborate for joint achievements or to mutually solve problems.  
2.2.1 Collaboration  
Collaboration is perceived to be a much more complex and demanding process than 
cooperation, as desired outcomes can be specified and the distribution of future returns 
can be negotiated between parties (Miles, Miles, and Snow, 2006; Zineldin, 2004;   
Himmelman, 2001; Jassawalla and Sashittal, 1998). The Oxford Dictionary of English 
(2010) defines collaboration as the “action of working with someone to produce 
something” which is more focused on joint outcomes, and noticeably, used in the 
strategic alliance literature at the inter-organisational level. However, it is clear from the 
extant literature (for more definitions of collaboration, see Table A-1: Definitions of 
collaboration) that not all authors apply this more ambitious distinction to differentiate 
collaboration from cooperation in their research. Collaboration has also been defined as 
“working together on a common task or [providing] significant help to each other” 
(Hansen, 2009), which easily accommodates the definition of cooperation.  
To distinguish collaboration, the focus of this study, from cooperation, a brief 
understanding of the construct cooperation is provided. Cooperation is defined as an 
orientation that reflects a spirit of willingness of one unit to work with another unit 
(Payan, 2007). Several studies examine cooperation (see Smith, Carroll and Ashford, 
1995) as distinct from collaboration. However, the preference for the use of one term 
 11 
over another and their subsequent interchangeable use in the literature has been linked 
to the negative connotations of a collaborator during World War II (Mintzberg, et al., 
1996). 
Nevertheless, findings of cooperation research are being extended to studies that aim to 
examine collaboration (see e.g. Tjosvold and Tsao, 1989). However, without empirical 
support, these are only extrapolations and require clarity to fully understand the 
concepts and implications of their findings.  
The importance of specifying the level of analysis at which the construct was originally 
used, in addition to seeking empirical evidence of applicability and feasibility at 
multiple levels, is important to understand applicability to the actors (organisation, 
group and individual) under study. The terms themselves can also be operationalised 
quite differently.  
Surprisingly, the term cooperation, as distinct from collaboration, is also used 
synonymously with a further construct, coordination (Payan, 2007). Payan concludes 
that it is necessary to consider cooperation and coordination as two separate but related 
issues in managing inter-organisational relationships. Cooperation is defined more as 
the orientation to work with another organisation but not inherently leading to 
coordination. Gulati, Wohlgezogen and Zhelyazkov (2012) who recently explored 
cooperation and coordination, agree with the separation of the constructs as two facets 
of collaboration across the strategic alliance cycle. Both terms are recognised as the key 
determinants of collaborative success between alliances, although research places more 
emphases on cooperation, specifically partners’ commitment and alignment of interests. 
In the context of inter-organisational collaboration, less attention is given to 
coordinating aligned incentives of self-interested firms, sustaining commitment and 
preventing opportunistic behaviour as in cooperation (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) and 
more to the mechanisms of bringing together partner contributions. As a result, the 
focus of coordination has shifted to creating structures and relationships that enable 
partners to work together across boundaries. This has applicability to the current study 
wherein an MNC is viewed as similar to inter-organisational networks (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1990), in which alliances are sought within the boundaries of the organisation 
to pursue the achievement of objectives and new opportunities.  
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In this study, I use the term collaboration as defined by Martin and Eisenhardt (2010): a 
“collective activity by two or more business units within a multi-business organisation 
to create economic value” (p.265). In modern multinationals, subsidiaries are 
questionably autonomous and independent, even when the MNC is viewed as an 
internal market with high levels of autonomy and internal competition (Chandy and 
Tellis, 1998). Collaboration has become the commonly used phrase in today’s 
organisations by which to achieve synergies that exist in interdependent multinational 
organisations (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1989).  
The chosen definition of collaboration reflects interactions between organisational units 
within the boundaries of multinational company, with a focus on joint outcomes; this 
starkly contrasts the narrower definition of cooperation which excludes a more focused 
purpose. Nevertheless, an exploration of the structural and relational aspects of 
collaboration between subsidiaries (Gulati et al., 2012) is not limited by this definition.  
There are few cases wherein collaboration, as opposed to cooperation or coordination, 
has been defined at the intra-organisational level. It is almost as if the term is so 
common that it does not need definition. Drawing on a social network perspective, Tsai 
(2002) operationalises collaboration as knowledge sharing between business units, 
where again, collaboration and cooperation appear to be used interchangeably 
throughout the paper.  
The majority of definitions of collaboration in the reviewed literature are process 
oriented (see Table A-1). Within the strategic alliances frame of reference, Bengtsson 
and Kock (1999) perceive collaboration as a horizontal relationship, a notion that will 
also be taken forward in this research as a way of bringing geographically dispersed 
subsidiaries together, in addition to structural mechanisms necessary to forge linkages 
in value-creating synergies. 
I reiterate that the definition I adopt in this paper defines inter-subsidiary collaboration 
as a collective activity by two or more subsidiaries within a multinational organisation 
to achieve economic value (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). 
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2.2.1.1 Value 
It is opportune here to take a brief moment to address what is meant by the term ‘value’, 
as value (creation) is a desired outcome of both inter-subsidiary interactions of 
collaboration and competition.   
The term value incorporates both value in use and value in exchange. Value, however, 
is an elusive term (Vargo et al., 2008). Part of its elusiveness stems from the two 
general meanings of value that have been embedded in economics: (i) value in 
exchange, a goods dominant logic, and (ii) value in use, a service dominant logic, which 
reflect different ways of thinking about value and value creation (Vargo et al., 2008).  
Accordingly, use-value refers to the specific quality of a new job, task, product or 
service as perceived by users in relation to their needs, such as the speed or quality of 
performance on a new task, or the aesthetics or performance features of a new product 
or service (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000). Such judgements about use-value are both 
subjective and individual specific. The second type of value, exchange-value, Bowman 
and Ambrosini (2000) define as either the monetary amount realised at a certain point in 
time, when the exchange of the new tasks, good, service or product takes place or the 
amount paid by the user to the seller for the use-value of the focal task, job, product or 
service.  The accounting notion of value i.e. the monetary worth of an asset, good sold, 
or service rendered, and similar to the term ‘exchange-value’, captures and records 
where value is created and retained within the MNC.  
Lepak et al., (2007) broaden the definitions of value in use and value in exchange 
definitions beyond the original organisational level of analysis of Bowman and 
Ambrosini (2000) to include multiple levels of analysis, thereby extending the terms to 
individual and subsidiary level interactions. Economic value is typically created by 
subsidiary interactions that generate increased revenues or reduce overall operating 
costs from exploiting economies of scale or scope (see Appendix H).  
2.2.2 Competition  
The concept of competition is amply explored in the economic and strategic 
management literatures, again, predominantly at the inter-organisational level. In 
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economic theory, competition is described as a direct rivalry
1
 between firms for the 
possession of an object that is not easily divisible or the achievement of an exclusive 
outcome (Burke, Genn-Bash and Harris, 1988). Competition is the activity or condition 
of striving to gain or win something by defeating or establishing superiority over others. 
In the strategic alliance literature, for example, Das and Teng (2000:85) view 
competition as “pursuing one’s interest at the expense of others” (see Table B-1: 
Definitions of competition). 
Competition is also stated as “a dynamic situation that occurs when several actors in a 
specific area (market) struggle for scarce resources, and/or produce and market very 
similar products or services that satisfies the same customer need” (Osarenkhoe, 
2010:203). Birkinshaw and Lingblad (2005) describe intra-firm competition as a state 
wherein there is duplication or an overlap of activities within the boundaries of the firm. 
This relatively new conceptualisation of competition extends the more traditional 
concept of rivalry to scarce resources (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2001) and 
opportunities (March, 1991).  
Internal competition between organisational units has focused on competing with one 
another for financial, human and physical resources (Birkinshaw, 2005). Knowledge is 
perceived to be an intangible resource (Ensign, 2004; Grant, 1996) and competition can 
exist between interacting organisational units in the process of acquiring and utilising 
knowledge (Tsai, 2002; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 
1998).  
In addition to describing competition as an interactive process, conflicting and rivalling 
relationships between competitors can emerge in competition (Bengtsson and Kock, 
2000), where competitors are actors who share an interest in some of the same resources 
(Ingram and Yue, 2008).  
The definition I adopt in this paper defines inter-subsidiary competition as “rivalry 
among subsidiaries (business units or divisions) for current and potential product, 
                                                 
1
 Traditionally, rivalry has focused on competition between actors, whereas competition relates to a task. 
The term may also reflect the unit of analysis. Moreover, the literature does not target relationships 
between firms (Porter, 1980) or individuals (Kohn, 1986; Johnson and Johnson, 1989, Pfeffer and Sutton, 
2000). Also see Maurer (2011) for more on rivalry and competition.  
 15 
markets and technologies, and for organizational resources” (Khoja, 2008:12; Chandy 
and Tellis, 1998) and is extended to include “parallel or overlapping activities inside the 
boundaries of the firm” (Birkinshaw, 2001a).  
2.2.3 Coopetition  
Coopetition can be defined as "a mindset, process or phenomenon of combining 
cooperation and competition" (Luo, 2005: 72) (see Table C-1). Bengtsson et al. (2010) 
develop the construct of coopetition relationships by conceptualising two different 
approaches:  processual and contextual (see Figure 2-1) which are suggested to be more 
reflective of the different ontological assumptions regarding ‘things’ versus ‘processes’ 
(Langley, et al., 2013).  
The original concept of coopetition was used to describe the value net of both 
competitive and cooperative relationships that influenced the behaviour of different 
levels of actors within the industry network (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). As 
such, the network of external firms consists of both cooperative and competitive 
relationships creating an environment where coopetition, i.e. competition and 
cooperation, coexist within the network. 
 
Figure 2-1: Contextual and processual coopetition (adapted from Bengtsson et al., 2010)  
 
In the contextual approach, studies tend to describe the competitive and cooperative part 
of the relationship as divided between the actors. This gives rise to a coopetitive 
‘context’, but not a coopetitive ‘interaction’ (Bengtsson et al., 2010). Both forms occur 
within the organisation (Tsai, 2002). The narrower processual view of coopetition allows 
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for the study of the coopetitive interactions, inherent tensions and dynamics within the 
relationship (Bengtsson et al., 2010) which Luo (2005) does not pursue. According to 
Gnyawali et al. (2007), the dynamics of coopetition can only be captured when 
coopetition is defined as a relationship between the same actors that simultaneously are 
involved in collaborative and competitive interactions with each other.   
However, the context view was also seen to be of relevance in understanding the nature 
of the overall relationships existing between the subsidiaries within the MNC. The 
multiplicity of relationships became the context for coopetition which provided 
structural preconditions that supported or restricted the coopetitive interaction 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010).   
Notwithstanding these two approaches to coopetition, it is important to comment on the 
concepts in relation to each other as this has implications for both conceptual 
approaches. If the two concepts are traditionally viewed as diametrically opposite and 
imagined as each occupying one end of a continuum, for example, as strong competition 
and collaboration, to a degree, they define each other: if competition is strong, then 
cooperation is weak.  
An alternative view portrays the concepts of competition and collaboration as related but 
distinct and separate concepts, such that relationships, occurrences and intensities of 
competition increase or decrease independent of those of collaboration. While 
collaboration is the pursuit of mutual interests and common benefits in alliances, Das 
and Teng (2000) view competition and collaboration as opposing forces within an 
alliance. Their paper supports the view that collaboration is not a trade-off to 
competition (Payan, 2007). These two forces significantly differ in both philosophy and 
spirit and can also be viewed as a paradox (Lado, Boyd and Hanlon, 1997).  
This conceptualisation of opposing forces allows for an expanded exploration of the 
interplay between the two concepts, which was previously unnecessarily limited by the 
continuum approach. This approach may have greater relevance at the unit, group or 
individual actor level. At the firm level, firms previously thought of as not able, or 
indeed unwilling, to both compete and collaborate at the same time without collusion, is 
a subject that can be fruitfully explored.  
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The alternative orthogonal view (Padula and Dagnino, 2007) and processual view 
suggests that coopetition develops through mutual interaction between two or more 
entities (Bengtsson et al., 2010) at both the inter-organisational (Bengtsson and Kock, 
2001) and intra-organisational levels (Luo et al., 2006; Tsai, 2002). To pursue the 
processual approach and for coopetition to exist at an intra-organisational level, 
Bengtsson et al. (2010) posit that relationships need to contain both competitive and 
cooperative elements. It is not sufficient, as in the contextual approach, for Actor A to 
have competitive relationships with B and Actor B to have a collaborative relationship 
with C. A must have both a collaborative and competitive relationship with B, albeit in 
different activities. To further illustrate, (organisation, group or individual) A and B 
would compete for scarce resources and collaborate on new product development.  
To assess the nature of the coopetitive relationship, however, it would also be necessary 
to understand whether the two actors perceive themselves to be in competition with 
each other or the extent to which they collaborate with each other.  
As such, Bengtsson et al. (2010:200) define coopetition as “a process based upon 
simultaneous and mutual cooperative and competitive interactions between two or more 
actors at any level of analysis (whether individual, organisational or other entities).” 
This concept is distinct from relationships between units that are solely competitive or 
even the use of the concepts of competition and collaboration, because it is the 
interaction of the two and the dynamics generated that set aside the concept of 
coopetition. Both processual and contextual approaches are referenced in this study as 
multiple relationships and interactions exist across the many subsidiaries within the 
multinational company, providing contextual conditions within which coopetition can 
be explored.  
2.2.4 Subsidiary  
To explore coopetition, I focus on subsidiaries as the organisational unit. The term 
‘subsidiary’ is used liberally in international business literature and unfortunately, often 
left without a precise definition that allows the identification of the organisational unit 
that is being referenced. Table 2-1 presents the existing definitions.  
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Table 2-1: Definitions of subsidiary 
Authors   Definition of subsidiary  
Birkinshaw (1997)  Any operational unit under the control of the other company  
Birkinshaw and Pedersen (2009)  An individually separate and distinct value-adding activity  
International Accounting Standard 27 
(2009)
2
  
A business entity, including an unincorporated entity such as 
a partnership, which is necessarily controlled by another 
business entity, also known as the parent  
The definition by the International Accounting Standards Board is not applied in this 
research as the subsidiaries within the three companies are wholly owned by the MNC, 
with the exception of the US subsidiary in the professional services firm, which is 51% 
owned.  
Birkinshaw (1997:207) defines subsidiary as “any operational unit controlled by the 
MNC and situated outside the home country.” This research also includes subsidiaries 
located in the home country and therefore, extends Birkinshaw’s definition to include 
operational and domestic units. The home country, and HQ, of the three case 
organisations is England, UK. I also consider a subsidiary as a collective actor.  
As a collective actor, the subsidiary has multiple actors that might impact on the 
relationship. While this research focuses on the horizontal relationship between 
subsidiaries, subunit informants are also interviewed to obtain a holistic understanding 
of the influences of competition and collaboration below the corporate/parent HQ.  
Parent organisations and their dispersed subsidiaries that operate under a common 
umbrella are increasingly important parts of the modern business landscape (Harzing 
and Feely, 2008). I recognise that multiple levels of subsidiaries exist within the MNCs 
and thus, have chosen to distinguish corporate/group-level subsidiaries from those 
reporting into the corporate-level subsidiaries. I refer to the corporate/group-level 
subsidiary as a strategic business unit (SBU). SBUs report into the group HQ and are 
                                                 
2
 IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements Available at http://www.iasplus.com/en-
gb/standards/ias/ias27 (Accessed 8 September, 2014) 
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parents of those subsidiaries operating in multiple countries as part of that business that 
report into them.  
This is best illustrated by Figure 2-2 which distinguishes the multiple levels of 
subsidiaries operating within the MNCs of this study. This study welcomes greater 
clarity of the subsidiary level as the parent role of the corporate HQ can demonstrate 
differences from that of corporate HQ’s subsidiary. Although the research on inter-
subsidiary relationships is limited, focal subsidiary interactions have been explored in a 
single global unit within an MNC (see Luo, 2005).  
In corporate financial management terms, an SBU is a business unit (BU) within the 
overall corporate entity and is distinguishable from other BUs because it serves a 
defined external market where the management can conduct strategic planning in 
relation to products and markets (Arnold, 2005). Goold and Campbell (2002:99) 
provide a similar definition. A SBU or self-contained business refers to units with the 
following characteristics:  
 “market focused: responsible for serving specific customer segments  
 autonomous: having a general manager (or management team) with substantial 
autonomy to make decisions that impact on the results of the unit; and, 
 profit accountable: generating revenues and costs from serving the target segments, 
and hence able to measure profitability, for which the SBU’s management is held 
accountable.”  
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Figure 2-2: Inter-subsidiary relationships 
By differentiating an SBU and subsidiary as two different hierarchical levels, it is 
possible to provide a greater understanding of the context of inter-subsidiary 
interactions. This may also allow the study to extend beyond horizontal relationships 
and consider vertical relationships of coopetition between the ‘subsidiaries’.  
While much research has been conducted on the relationship between HQ and focal 
subsidiaries (Child, 1973), few contributions exist on inter-subsidiary relationships. The 
question here is, ‘What influences the nature of the relationship between two 
subsidiaries within a multinational corporation?’ It is anticipated that the 
corporate/parent HQ influences not only the focal subsidiary (Luo, 2005; Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1998) but also the interactions and relationships between the subsidiaries 
within the MNC.  
2.2.5 Relationships and interactions  
Relationship and interaction elements of behaviour are distinguished by the dimensions 
of focus and time (Burt, 1983). Interactions, which comprise both exchange and 
processes, refer to the here and now and form the dynamic aspects of relationships 
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1987), where the two logics of competition and collaboration 
collide and require balancing (Das and Teng, 2003). Bengtsson et al. (2010:200) 
propose that coopetitive relationships develop over time through the “simultaneous and 
mutual cooperative and competitive interactions between two or more actors at any 
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level of analysis (whether individual, organisational, or other entities).” The analysis of 
such a processual view, as described in Section 2.2.3, can benefit from a longitudinal 
exploration of resultant relationships. Nevertheless, some insight into the gradual 
development of current relationships can be provided by the informants on the basis of 
memory and recall.  
Direct interaction (or even physical presence) is not considered a necessary condition 
for the existence of a relationship. In fact, the prerequisite is that the actions of one 
actor, e.g. in a network of organisational units within an MNC, may impact on the 
outcomes and actions of another (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959:10; Thompson, 1967:54-
55). 
2.2.5.1 Competition-collaboration relationships  
Murnighan (1994:107) refers to both competition and collaboration as “the basic 
elements of interaction.” Furthermore, if inter-unit relationships are conceptualised as a 
type of interaction, or flow, between the nodes in a network, the interactions are limited 
by their movement, dependent on whether the subsidiaries maintain a competitive 
and/or cooperative relationship with each other (Maurer, 2011). 
Greater interdependence in subsidiary activities requires numerous linkages in terms of 
exchanges of products or services and flows of knowledge. The interactions between the 
parent and subunits or peer subunits comprise strategic links, i.e. “flows of production 
inputs and value creation activities” (Luo, 2005:71), which have been posited to consist 
of simultaneously functioning collaborative and competitive ties (Tsai, 2002).  
While much of the recent research predominately focuses on collaborative links, few 
studies have investigated competitive links (Luo, 2005). Even more notable by its 
omission is the investigation of the interaction effect of both competitive and 
collaborative linkages between subsidiaries within MNCs, with the exception of Tsai 
(2002) and Luo’s (2005) conceptual study of coopetition between foreign subsidiaries in 
an MNC. 
Since I examine the interplay between competition and collaboration in coopetitive 
relationships, it is important to consider the position of the focal subsidiary in each 
dimension as dynamics can be observed when they act in relation to another subsidiary. 
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A relationship also refers to “the relative position of two entities on some underlying 
dimension” (Easton and Araujo, 1994:67). A further consideration is that the 
interactions and subsequent relationships are not assumed to be symmetrical (Tsai, 
2002), creating an additional dynamic in the relationship. 
2.2.5.2 Horizontal relationships  
Considerable research has been conducted on the nature and importance of interactions 
between HQs and their subsidiaries (Luo, 2005; Goold and Campbell, 2003). However, 
limited research investigates the relationship between subsidiaries and their internal 
peers. Horizontal relationships have not been examined to the same extent as their 
vertical counterparts at an intra-organisational level. Although HQ–subsidiary and inter-
subsidiary relationships have distinct managerial implications (O’Donnell, 2000:542), 
much attention is focused on the former. Horizontal relationships differ from vertical 
ones within firms (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000) as they tend to be less focused on the 
concepts of power and authority (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990:607). Recent theoretical 
perspectives indicate that, far from being a centralised hierarchy, an MNE is an 
interdependent network of subunits (O’Donnell, 2000; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990) of 
loosely coupled nodes, characterised by their unique resource and capability profile 
(Cerrato, 2006). Therefore, greater lateral linkages are required and form a part of 
relationships among subsidiaries (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995:739).  
Similar concepts of linkages are used in MNC network models and do not differentiate 
between ‘relations/ relationships’, ‘flows’, ‘linkages’ and ‘interdependencies’ (see the 
summary table of the various forms of ‘connectors’ in Appendix H:Sources of synergy 
and unit connections).  
Horizontal relationships between competitors at the inter-organisational level can take 
various forms. In addition to competition, collaboration and coopetition, the fourth 
relationship is coexistence (Bengtsson and Kock, 1999), where only communication 
activities, such as informational and social or economic exchanges, take place between 
two firms. Bengtsson and Kock’s case study showed that a firm can be involved in four 
types of horizontal relationships at the same time. This finding has not been extended or 
explored at the inter-subsidiary level.  
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2.3 CATEGORISATION OF THE LITERATURE   
Table 2-2 categorises the literature by construct, i.e. competition, collaboration and 
coopetition at the subsidiary or business unit and divisional levels. The construct of 
cooperation was discussed in line with the literature on coopetition, which extended the 
literature review in this domain. Relevant literature was sourced from the fields of 
strategy, organisation behaviour, industrial marketing, international business, sociology, 
economics and accounting.  
For literature pertaining to additional organisational units, i.e. the functions and 
departments, see Table D-1. Numerous empirical papers relate to cooperation and 
collaboration as mechanisms of cross-functional teams that facilitate interunit 
collaboration (Allred et al., 2011; Le Meunier-FitzHugh and Piercy, 2007). The 
categorisation identified further areas for research: (i) intra-organisational (inter-
unit/subsidiary) competition and (ii) intra-organisational coopetition, at multiple levels 
of analysis.   
Relevant literature pertaining to inter-organisational horizontal relationships, for 
example, strategic alliances and networks, is broadly referenced to provide insight into 
the nuances for inter-subsidiary relationships.  
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Table 2-2: Categorisation of literature on intraorganisatonal competition, collaboration 
and coopetition  
Organisational 
Units 
Intraorganisational  Competition Intraorganisational  Collaboration Intraorganisational   
Competition & Collaboration 
Coopetition  
Subsidiary/ 
Business Unit/ 
Division 
Empirical  
Burgelman (1983) 
Phelps and Fuller (2000)  
Birkinshaw (2001)  
Houston, Walker, Hutt and Reingen 
(2001) 
Kalnins (2004) 
Birkinshaw, Hood and Young (2005) 
Fong, Ho, Weng and Yang (2007) 
Becker-Ritterspach  and Dorrenbacher 
(2009) 
Gammelgaard (2009)  
Taylor (2010)  
Bruggen and Luft (2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical  
Tjosvold and Tsao (1989) 
Vizjak (1994)  
Zander and Kogut (1995)  
Liedtka (1996)  
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000)  
Rauser (2002) 
Goold and Campbell (2003)  
Hansen and Nohria (2004) 
Hattori and Lapidus (2004)  
Persaud (2005)  
Hansen, Mors and Lovas (2005) 
 Zhao and Luo (2005) 
Sanders (2007)  
Kretschmer and Puranam (2008)  
Boussebaa (2009) 
Hansen (2009)  
Koulikoff-Souviron and Harrison 
(2010)  
Martin and Eisenhardt (2010)  
Rank and Tuschke (2010) 
Friesl and Silberzahn (2012)  
Klimkeit (2013)  
 
Empirical  
Eccles (1983) 
Bartlett and Ghoshal(1989)  
Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson (1992) 
Fauli-Oller and Giralt (1995) 
Chandy  and Tellis (1998)  
Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) 
Martin and Eisenhardt (2001)  
Tsai (2002) 
Maurer (2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Theoretical  
Birkinshaw and Lingblad (2001) 
Creane and Davidson ( 2004) 
Birkinshaw and Lingblad (2005)  
Cerrato (2006) 
Ziss (2007)  
Khoja (2008)  
Mol and Wijnberg (2011)  
 
Theoretical  
Grant (1996)  
Ensign (2004)  
Singh (2005) 
Blomqvist and Levy (2006) 
Barner-Rasmussen and Bjorkman 
(2007) 
Hansen and Birkinshaw (2007)  
Gnyawali, Singal and Mu (2009) 
Hinds, Liu and Lyon (2011)  
Gulati et al. (2012)  
 
Theoretical  
Cox, Mann and Samson (1997)  
Eisenhardt and Galunic (2000)  
Luo (2005) 
Weiss and Hughes (2005)  
Loch, Galunic and Schneider (2006) 
Walley (2007)  
Tidstrom (2008)  
Li, Ferreira and Serra (2009)  
Foss, Husted and Michailova (2010)  
Bengtsson and Kock (2014) 
Carayannis, Depeige and Sindakis 
(2014) 
Dahl (2014) 
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2.4 INTER-SUBSIDIARY COMPETITION, COLLABORATION, 
AND COOPETITION    
Competitive and collaborative interactions between organisational units (i.e. 
subsidiaries, divisions, SBUs and functions) are common practice within multinational 
organisations.  
The categorisation of the literature would suggest that more empirical research is 
warranted to validate the concepts expressed in recent theoretical papers on internal 
competition (Fong et al., 2007) and  coopetition (Walley, 2007). Table 2-2 presents 
recent literature that explores both intra-firm competition independently and as a 
component of coopetition. Intra-firm competition is an issue of growing importance in 
multinational companies as a result of merger and acquisition activity. Duplicate 
resources leading to excess capacity and overlapping markets, products and 
technologies contribute to competition within MNCs (Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dorrenbacher, 2009).  
MNCs are also recognising the need for their autonomous subsidiaries to integrate and 
collaborate more and, in addition to technology, are putting in place formal mechanisms 
such as performance management processes to encourage collaborative behaviour and 
develop collaborative capability and collaborations (Vangen and Huxham, 2003). While 
formal mechanisms can enable collaboration given the explicit articulation of roles and 
expectations, the processes cannot force subsidiaries or individual leaders of units to 
collaborate (Mintzberg et al., 1996). Collaboration is fundamentally a process of 
communication (Kanter, 1994) and not a task that can be made mandatory (Mintzberg et 
al., 1996).  
However, competition and collaboration are traditionally viewed as antithetical and 
often at opposite ends of a continuum (Tsai, 2002). This orthodoxy leads to the 
exploration of only one construct in isolation of the other (Walley, 2007). Statements 
are presented and questions posed as either/or options: “Which is the better investment 
internally? Do I encourage rivalry or foster cooperation; competition or collaboration?” 
(Schrage, 2007:32). 
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In instances where both constructs are acknowledged as coexisting, a competitive focus 
typically treats collaboration as interference. Johnson et al. (2006) reference the concept 
of ‘cutthroat cooperation’ to describe the situations in which subunits that switch from a 
competitive to cooperative reward structure still resemble subunits that are more 
competitive than cooperative in nature. In contrast, a collaborative focus might 
emphasise a win-win structure, even though the potential for competition is evident, 
given the different interests of the units involved (Bengtsson, Eriksson and Wincent, 
2010). In the strategic alliances literature, Hamel (1991) revealed instances of 
collaborating subunits simultaneously engaging in competition and termed this type of 
interaction ‘collaborative competition’.  
Multinational companies that can stimulate and support interunit collaboration to 
exploit their geographically scattered resources typically earn future advantages 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1988). Conversely, other empirical studies suggest that 
competitive links between subunits facilitate value-creating opportunities for an 
organisation (Kalnins, 2004; Taylor, 2010; Tsai, 2002). According to Walley (2007), 
the coexistence of internal collaboration and competition between units in an MNE (i.e. 
inter-subsidiary coopetition) serves as a future source of advantage for the firm. 
The literature of coopetition has more recently been extended to include a more meso-
level perspective, i.e. between organisational units inside the same organisation 
(Walley, 2007). Well-known examples of intra-organisational coopetition are evident in 
the public domain. HP desk and laser jet printing technologies evolved in two different 
market niches and for several years, competed for the same customers while jointly 
developing common product components to meet long-term goals (Eisenhardt and 
Galunic, 2000). General Electric’s global research and development (R&D) unit uses 
rivalry to stimulate innovation between aircraft engineer teams at the detailed design 
stage, without disrupting the culture of collaboration necessary to produce results 
(Ferrari, 2010). These examples demonstrate that interunit collaboration and 
competition are not mutually exclusive; I adopt this perspective in investigating the 
factors and interventions influencing the coexistence and simultaneous occurrence of 
both competition and collaboration and the consequent inter-subsidiary relationships 
within the context of multinational organisations. In other words, subsidiaries seek 
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synergies through internal collaborations while competing for resources and 
opportunities (Luo, 2005; Tsai, 2002).  
2.5 INTER-UNIT COOPETITION WITHIN AN MNE  
Luo (2005) offers a unique and integrated framework of intra-MNE coopetition, i.e. 
inter-subsidiary coopetition. Drawing on the combination of the content and 
determinants of competition and collaboration for a focal subsidiary within an MNE, he 
described four types of subsidiaries. He distinguished between (1) aggressive demander 
(high competition and low cooperation) (2) silent implementer (low competition and 
low cooperation) (3) ardent contributor (low competition and high cooperation) and (4) 
network captain (high competition and high cooperation). For each type, the 
characteristics and implications were analysed from both a subsidiary and HQ 
perspective. While not directly focusing on inter-subsidiary relationships, the valuable 
framework provides initial insight into how and why subsidiaries interact with others in 
certain ways. The integrated framework is informative, although it does not provide 
guidance on how to implement coopetition such that people can work consciously in 
this new type of organisational dynamic (Fang, 2006).  
Previously, on an inter-organisational level, Lado et al. (1997:119) recognised that a 
conceptual framework that could be used to guide managerial practices in striking a 
balance between competition and cooperation was lacking. Their similar taxonomy was 
founded on resource-based, game and socioeconomic theories which distinguished 
between competitive, monopolistic, cooperative and syncretic rent-seeking behaviour. 
By adopting antecedents, behaviours and consequence paradigms (Skinner, 1971), their 
focus, in contrast to Luo’s (2005), was on the behavioural, rather than structural, aspects 
of competition and cooperation among firms. 
Luo’s (2005) selected determinants of competition and cooperation are limited to 
factors relating to the internal configuration of MNEs, such that managers can more 
easily observe these elements and therefore take action. The literature, summarised in 
Sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, proposes additional determinants of inter-subsidiary 
coopetition, specifically social and relational determinants. In addition to highlighting 
specific determinants, Luo (2005) identified four systems within the organisational 
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infrastructure which strengthen efficiency and synergy outcomes from interunit 
coopetition. 
2.6 CONTENT AND DETERMINANTS  
2.6.1 Content of competition  
Under the coopetition scheme, Luo (2005) proposes that subunits compete for parent 
resources and support, system position and market expansion.  
Intra-firm competition between subsidiaries occurs when there are scarce HQ resources 
such as capital, technology, equipment, specialised human resources (HR), training, 
knowledge and information (Luo, 2005). Since most of these resources are scarce, 
competition for access to them occurs among subsidiaries (Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dorrenbacher, 2009; Fong et al., 2007; Tsai, 2002). A counter intuitive perspective is 
that while sharing activities between organisational units may result in complementary 
effects, these benefits may be limited because tangible resources do not offer potential 
for multiple or simultaneous use. In fact, it is fully imaginable that competition over 
common resources could emerge between organisational units (Ensign, 2004).  
Competition among subsidiaries can also occur to improve or defend their system 
position within the intra-organisational network. Following Nohria and Ghoshal (1997), 
modern MNCs, as noted in an earlier section, are viewed as a differentiated network in 
which the role and power position of subsidiaries largely varies with different 
emphases, whether on tasks that are performed (White and Poynter, 1984) or different 
levels of strategic autonomy that subsidiaries might possess (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 
1995). Changes to the subsidiary’s areas of responsibility, i.e. mandate change (Kalnins, 
2004) and charter overlap of duplicate activities (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005; 
Hansen, 2009) are two other instances in which internal competition occurs. Galunic 
and Eisenhardt (1996:256) define an organisation unit’s charter as “the business, or 
elements of the business, in which a division/unit actively participates and for which it 
is responsible within the corporation.” 
Birkinshaw (2001a:113) identifies only two categories for internal competition between 
subsidiary units, i.e. for a charter and customer. The author does not appear to treat 
competition for internal parent resources with the same importance as internal 
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competition for access to resources required for external customers. Tsai (2002) found a 
positive effect on sharing knowledge with units that competed with others for market 
share rather than with those competing for internal resources. This contradicts a 
previous understanding that individuals would block the initial sharing of knowledge, 
specifically between individual sales people competing for customers (Brown, Cron and 
Slocum, 1998), and that the perceived competitive value of knowledge in collaborative 
contexts makes individuals reserved in sharing important knowledge (Ghobadi and 
D’Ambra, 2012). To further expand internal competition at the individual level, the 
obtaining (or maintaining) of status, recognition and remuneration is an important 
determinant.  
Rugman and Verbeke (2001) proposed the concept of potential competition among 
MNE subsidiaries, induced by capability gaps among them. Fong et al. (2007) 
empirically confirmed that the reduced resource (e.g. physical plant) and capability (e.g. 
operational) gap between Chinese subsidiaries (China and Taiwan) elevated the level of 
competition between subsidiaries in the two locations owing to the survival threat to the 
Taiwanese subsidiary.  
While customer competition is the most obvious form of competition between firms, it 
may also exist in the internal market (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001) for intermediate 
products, charters or capabilities. Several conceptualisations of internal competition 
neglect the external dimension of cannibalisation, which is a term used in the marketing 
literature to describe multiple overlapping products, brands and channels in a 
marketplace (Birkinshaw, 2001a).  
2.6.2 Determinants of competition 
Little recognition is given to the antecedents of internal competition, with the exception 
of Birkinshaw (2001a). Far more studies exist in the strategy literature on the impact of 
internal competition on performance. In general, it is agreed that inter-firm competition 
as a phenomenon is accepted and well researched (e.g. Baum and Korn, 1996; Echols 
and Tsai, 2005). Here, competition is classically viewed as the way firms interact within 
the same industry (Porter, 1980). The empirical phenomenon of intra-organisational 
competition is not well recognised, even by companies that engage in it (Khoja, 2008), 
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possibly because intra-organisational competition is often negatively viewed by 
practicing managers. 
Luo (2005) proposes three determinants of competition: local responsiveness, capability 
retrogression and market overlap. To respond and adapt to host country conditions or 
strengthen the unit’s capabilities, the focal subsidiary must compete with other units for 
additional resources from the parent. External competition for the customer is created 
when other units are present in the same market as the focal subsidiary. Additional 
factors from the empirical literature are summarised in Table F-1, and factors from the 
conceptual literature are discussed below.  
Phelps and Fuller (2000) present a synthesis of academic studies in the disciplines of 
management, economics and sociology that provide extensive evidence that divisions 
compete with each other. They also provide a taxonomy of intra-MNE competition, 
depicting the origin of competition as either parent or affiliate-led and the nature of 
competition as being open or managed, where open competition approximates market 
costs or prices and managed competition is more a result of non-market transactions 
(227).  
Empirical studies of interunit competition indicate that internal competition is fostered 
by HQ to discourage external rivals from entering the market (Kalnins, 2004) and as a 
mechanism to rationalise capacity within multidomestic structures (Phelps and Fuller, 
2000). Fong et al. (2007) confirm the existence of internal competition resulting from 
Rugman and Verbeke’s (2001) proposition that competition within MNEs is a result of 
a capability gap. By contrast, Taylor (2010) explores the relationships between internal 
competition and new (and existing) technology and suggests that internal competition 
may play a larger role than the current literature intimates. He provides evidence from a 
field study on new-technology product development in high-technology firms, which 
“provides a model of innovation that illustrates an endogenous process of internal 
competition” (Taylor, 2010:23). Inter-subsidiary competition over internally available 
knowledge is critical in the adoption of new technologies (Taylor, 2010). As new 
technology is developed, existing technology groups aims to gain a deeper 
understanding of it and its impact on their own products.  
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A subsidiary that is more central in terms of strategic importance to the parent company 
is more powerful than subsidiaries that take a more peripheral position (Phelps and 
Fuller, 2000). Similarly, the higher the strategic importance the focal subsidiary has for 
the parent company, resulting from unique resources, the more the network of 
subsidiaries depends on this focal subsidiary for those resources (Fong et al., 2007). 
This position can create tension and competition for access to the central subsidiary’s 
resources.  
Li et al. (2007) propose that the structural factors of centralisation, reward system and 
network ties drive the potential for inter-subsidiary multimarket competition, 
originating from the overlap of products, technologies and market portfolios between 
subsidiaries.  
Birkinshaw and Lingblad (2005) propose environmental and organisational 
determinants of intra-firm competition and suggest that increases in environmental 
equivocality (i.e. market changes) and market heterogeneity (i.e. product variety) lead to 
competition, while industry maturity results in cost (price) reduction competition.  
Organisationally, increases in the decentralisation of decision making and fungibility of 
unit capabilities intensify competition in the area of potential charter overlap and 
expansion (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005). Normative integration would, however, 
temper the competition level between the subsidiaries as there is a willingness to accede 
to charter changes if the subsidiaries perceive the changes to be beneficial to the firm’s 
broader interests (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005). 
Luo (2005) posits that an incentive system is imperative to promoting internal 
competition among foreign subunits and that it is the primary mechanism that drives up 
country managers’ motivation for continued rivalry for corporate resources and market 
expansion. Eisenhardt and Galunic (2000) advocate letting competition flourish and 
rewarding self-interest through unit performance, especially when there is uncertainty 
about how the market will evolve. Hill et al.’s (1992) empirical study suggests that 
focusing bonus pay on divisional performance and allocating funds for investment on 
the basis of a division’s performance reinforces the incentive to maximise divisional 
performance. In this scenario, “the internal ethos of such organisations is explicitly 
competitive rather than cooperative” (Hill et al., 1992:506).  
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Luo (2005) differentiates between inter-subsidiary competition for parent resources (and 
corporate support) and system position (Luo, 2005). His terminology draws attention to 
the fact that internal (or parent) resources are of primary interest when investigating 
inter-subsidiary competition; resources procured from outside the parent company tend 
to evoke less competition among subsidiaries (Maurer, 2011).  
Although resource competition is an issue at all three levels of aggregation, there are 
differences with respect to where these resources are obtained from and who may 
possibly allocate them. Studies have accounted for internal resource competition 
between SBUs by adopting an internal market perspective (Cerrato, 2006; Birkinshaw, 
2001b; Halal, 1994; Hennart, 1993; Williamson, 1975; Arrow, 1964; March and Simon, 
1958). 
In a decentralised firm, SBUs are profit centres that develop and market their services to 
other internal SBUs. The effectiveness of internal transactions between units can 
influence the goal of providing value to the customer (Mills and Ungson, 2001). Internal 
transactions for services between divisions are typically horizontal (between divisions 
on the same level). This may give rise to a transfer pricing system between two units by 
which the units can seek to maximise their own profit and revenue targets to achieve 
their divisional objectives and organisational rewards. A transfer price is “a charge by 
one division (transferring division) to another division (receiving division) within the 
same organisation” (Terzioglu and Inglis, 2011:85). The pricing mechanism regulates 
resource allocation and in the case of professional services firm (PSF), the knowledge 
associated with those resources.  
Cerrato (2006) conceptually explores and theoretically builds on Birkinshaw’s (2001a) 
model of MNCs as an internal market for intermediate products, mandates and functions 
or capabilities. Cerrato (2006) posits that intra-firm competition among subsidiaries is 
influenced by a range of factors, such as the characteristics of the subsidiary’s 
resources, the past performance of the subsidiary, the degree of autonomy given to the 
subsidiary and, finally, whether there is frequent and open communication between a 
subsidiary and its parent company. 
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2.6.3 Benefits and drawbacks of inter-unit competition  
While scarcity is a core concept in both internal and external competition, the ‘need’ for 
internal competition of any kind is challenged (Rosen, 2009; Kohn, 1986) and the word 
itself is often labelled as ‘bad’. The negative consequences of too much intra-firm 
competition are cited as resource duplication, strategic incoherence, turf wars and 
infighting among subsidiaries, and bad public relations and as such, need to be 
controlled or mitigated (Becker-Ritterspach and Dorrenbacher, 2009; Birkinshaw, 
2001). However, insufficient internal competition implies that the organisation may fail 
to benefit from new opportunities in emerging markets or technologies (Birkinshaw, 
2001). Birkinshaw posits three primary benefits from internal competition which relate 
to enabling flexibility to manage uncertainty, innovation from ‘rocking the boat’ by 
challenging old practices and beliefs and individual motivation to muster the unit for 
greater performance to address a competitive threat (Khoja, 2008; Birkinshaw, 2001). 
Positive outcomes are reported in the areas of efficiency (Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dorrenbacher, 2009), control and greater organisational performance (Hill, et al., 1992), 
new product development (Gammelgaard, 2009; Taylor, 2010), the lowering of market 
entry by rivals (Kalnins, 2004) and stimulation of entrepreneurial activities (Ferrari, 
2010; Becker-Ritterspach and Dorrenbacher, 2009). Pressure to develop additional 
capabilities in the areas of bargaining power, lobbying and strategic issue selling 
(Gammelgaard, 2009) also results from internal competition between subsidiaries.  
These costs and benefits of internal competition have to be carefully balanced against 
one another. Senior executives benefit from gaining a better understanding of the costs 
and benefits of internal competition so that it can be used in a more judicious manner. 
2.6.4 Content of collaboration 
The present literature on intra-organisational collaboration identifies that collaborations 
among subsidiaries in MNCs occur in various situations: combining and reconfiguring 
resources for new product development and innovations (Allred et al., 2011; Hansen, 
2009; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001); sharing or transferring knowledge with other units 
(Boussebaa, 2009; Gnyawali et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2006; Luo, 2005; Tsai, 2002; 
Martin and Eisenhardt, 2001) and in both internal and external supply chain 
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relationships (Koulikoff-Souviron and Harrison, 2010; Mena et al., 2009; Sanders, 
2003). Similarly, the strategic alliance literature summaries three areas: (i) exchange (ii) 
sharing of resources (human, financial, knowledge (as a special case of resource) and 
physical) and (iii) joint development of technology, products and services (Ang, 2008).  
Luo (2005) proposes that a focal subsidiary cooperates in operational, organisational, 
financial and technological areas, although the focus of cooperation is primarily on 
sharing knowledge (e.g. technological knowledge, managerial knowledge and more 
indirectly, experience, routines and capabilities). Little emphasis is given to sharing 
more tangible resources, such as equipment relocation or human resource redeployment, 
which remain key aspects in most industrial manufacturing companies and PSFs. 
2.6.5 Determinants of collaboration  
Despite the large number of studies that discuss the importance of collaboration 
between units in organisations, surprisingly, little research has been dedicated to the 
understanding of factors influencing collaboration. This also holds true for the concept 
of cooperation (see Smith, et al., 1995).This section discusses the antecedents of 
collaboration. Studies that address the issue of collaboration specifically appear in the 
operations and supply chain, new product development and marketing literatures.  
Most empirical studies on collaboration are essentially focused on collaboration 
between organisations and its influence on organisational performance. Hansen’s (2009) 
empirical contributions, among others’ empirical contributions (Koulikoff-Souviron and 
Harrison, 2010; Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010; Rank and Tuschke, 2010; Mena et al., 
2009; Zhao and Luo, 2005; Tsai, 2002; Luo et al., 2006), are all the more important 
because of their singular focus on collaboration within the organisation and the 
consideration of collaboration antecedents.  
There is only scant empirical evidence that highlights the determinants of inter-
subsidiary cooperation or collaboration. Tsai’s (2002) empirical investigation of 
different coordination mechanisms, i.e. centralisation and informal lateral relationships, 
on knowledge sharing as a form of collaboration among competing units found that the 
association between coordination and intra-firm knowledge sharing was strengthened by 
external market competition. Tsai (2002) pointed out that formal hierarchical structure, 
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in the form of centralisation, has a significant negative effect on knowledge sharing, 
which is in contrast to Li et al.’s (2007) proposition that HQs with strong control over 
inter-subsidiary relationships have the ability to convert competitive pressures into 
cooperative ties. Tsai, however, focuses his study on BUs rather than subsidiaries, and 
his work does not explicitly comprise an international dimension (2002). Importantly, 
the author does not offer a set of propositions that help explain interunit cooperation and 
competition in a balanced manner as competition is regarded as a moderating factor 
only.  
Zhao and Luo (2005) examine antecedent factors influencing knowledge sharing. Their 
empirical study validates the factors of strategic interdependence and technological 
linkage with peer subsidiaries, which are supported by intranet infrastructures, incentive 
systems and knowledge encapsulation.  
Smith et al. (1995) conclude that a wide variety of psychological and structural factors 
and trust have relevance to predicting cooperation. Psychological determinants include 
similarity in partners’ values, the perceived status and legitimacy of partners and the 
perception that interactive procedures are just. Structural determinants comprise the 
number of partners in a relationship, the extent of prior social ties as related to perceived 
reliability and predictability, and the social context in which cooperation occurs.  
Trust is also a key factor in collaborative relationships. It is typically built upon 
repeated interactions and contact among individuals, who over time develop mutual 
expectations and obligations (Coleman, 1990). Tsai’s (2000) results confirmed that 
related BUs with high mutual trust in MNCs are more likely to form collaborations. 
Persaud (2005:416) found that “the more [R&D] personnel and managers trust each 
other, the more likely they are to establish close social networks and to collaborate with 
their colleagues in dispersed locations around the world.” Rich social networks (e.g. 
more formal and informal relationships that have mutual trust) increase the formation 
and performance of cross-BU collaborations (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010; Hansen, 
1999; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Additionally, Ellinger et al. (2006) found, albeit at the 
cross-functional level, that the levels of collaborative behaviour may be influenced by 
manager’s attitude toward the other function.  
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At an interpersonal level, friendship has been found to enhance cooperation and mutual 
trust by reducing the hazards of opportunism and the need for elaborate formal 
governance structures (Granovetter, 1985). Consequently, the feelings of friendship 
between top executives can be expected to positively influence their collaborative 
interactions. Rank and Tuschke’s (2010) investigation of collaborative relationships 
among a firm’s upper echelons argue that perceived influence as well as friendship 
between any two managers can enhance the likelihood of the two managers 
collaborating with each other.  
Furthermore, collaborative behaviour is built upon a culture of trust (Lado et al., 1997; 
Tsai, 2000). By communication and frequent interaction through corporate sponsored 
programmes, exchange visits, rotation of expatriate managers and interunit transfers 
(Persaud, 2005; Hansen and Nohria, 2004), subsidiaries are likely to become aware of 
opportunities to build trust and collaborate (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998).  
From an internal configuration perspective, Luo (2005) specifies several determinants 
that increase the levels of cooperation between subsidiaries: strategic interdependence 
as determined by global integration, technological linkage and a focal subsidiary’s 
dependence on another unit for its technology and a wholly owned subunit form rather 
than a partially owned one to reduce transaction costs from greater centralisation and 
standardisation.  
Gnyawali et al., (2007) propose that the greater the subsidiary units proximity in terms 
of culture, beliefs, and access to information about each other, the greater the likelihood 
that the focal subsidiary will collaborate with the subsidiary. Thus, rich social networks 
comprising formal and informal relationships increase the formation and performance of 
cross-BU collaborations.  
Several empirical studies are consistent with the predictions of corporate-centric 
collaboration which indicate that goals and firmwide incentives for SBU executives 
(Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986) and centralised decision making (Hill et al., 1992) are 
correlated with the higher levels of cross-BU collaboration, which are in turn related to 
improved performance. 
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Alternatively, in the case of a decentralised structure and autonomy, subsidiaries will 
collaborate in accordance with organisational norms and values (Hansen, 2009). The 
willingness of a corporate venture capital (CVC) unit to collaborate is higher when the 
unit is structurally positioned within a corporation (Rauser, 2002). In the situation 
where subsidiaries are realigned to capture emerging market opportunities, Houston et 
al., (2001:31) suggest that further research can examine the structural and strategic 
processes that organisations employ to promote cross-BU collaboration.  
Gnyawali et al.’s (2007) conceptual paper on the factors that motivate inter-subsidiary 
collaboration (measured as knowledge ties) proposes that the greater the subsidiary 
units’ proximity to each other in terms of culture, beliefs and access to information (i.e. 
culturally and technologically similar), the greater the likelihood that the focal 
subsidiary will collaborate with another subsidiary. Their propositions extend to 
external environmental scenarios. Certain scenarios can motivate subsidiaries to 
collaborate to address the challenges of strategic vulnerability, for example, new 
companies entering the market or new laws in the host country. Proactively, a 
subsidiary will collaborate to enhance its competitive position; reactively, the subsidiary 
will collaborate to try and compensate for its strategic vulnerability. 
Another group of studies highlights the importance of standardised operations and 
practices to support distributing work across boundaries. In this respect, several authors 
indicate that HR-related processes such as global career paths, international project 
staffing and training in intercultural aspects are conducive to collaboration among 
subsidiaries (Holtbrügge and Mohr, 2011). Research also suggests that companies must 
find a balance between the implementation of corporate-wide, uniﬁed processes that 
enable cross-border shifting of work packages and necessary local adaption in terms of 
specialised roles and responsibilities (Holtbrügge and Mohr, 2011; Goold and 
Campbell, 2000; Malnight, 1996). To this effect, the collaborative work of country 
subsidiaries also requires shared knowledge on processes, products and services. Thus, 
ensuring subsidiary managements’ broad access to information and data of strategic 
signiﬁcance is crucial to generate common ground and enable subsidiary collaboration 
(Subramaniam and Venkatraman, 2001). 
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Interventions, while not determinants, are enablers. HR practices (Koulikoff-Souviron 
and Harrison, 2010; Hansen, 2009), technology (Stank et al., 2001) and learning 
interventions (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010) were found to be enablers of collaboration 
between organisational units. Collaboration needs to be constantly reinforced by senior 
management, even when corporate values encouraging collaboration are in existence 
(Koulikoff-Souviron and Harrison, 2010; Chen and Tjosvold, 2008).  
Factors influencing subsidiary collaboration and competition that have been identified 
in empirical studies are summarised in Table F-1. 
2.6.6 Benefits and drawbacks of inter-unit collaboration    
The literature emphasises the positive contributions of both internal competition and 
collaboration. Only a brief mention is made of the negative consequences of 
collaboration. Hansen (2009) cautions managers on the potential cost that too much 
‘undisciplined’ collaboration carries.  
Cross-BU synergies (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000), in the form of cost savings and 
increased revenues, are reported as outcomes of intra-organisational collaboration 
(Boussebaa, 2009; Hansen and Nohria, 2004). Collaborative advantages (Hansen, 2009; 
Mena et al., 2009), resulting from more effective BU collaborations (Rank and Tuschke, 
2010), collaboration capability (Liedtka, 1996) and the recombination and 
reconfiguration of resources (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010) are all sources of value 
creation for a firm.  
Learning occurs as an outcome of collaborations in the form of acquired knowledge on 
markets and technologies. Also, because of a greater appreciation of functional 
orientations resulting from cross-unit collaboration, colleagues are viewed more 
favourably (Allred et al., 2011).  
The collaborative benefit from knowledge sharing refers to the collective use of shared 
knowledge in pursuing common interests, whereas competitive benefits refer to the use 
of shared knowledge for private gains in an attempt to outperform partners (Khanna et 
al., 1998).  
 39 
A positive outcome of collaboration feeds back as a potential input and strengthens a 
given relationship (Das and Teng, 2000). Partners expect positive outcomes of 
collaboration and are therefore, more likely to engage in long-term relationships, a 
phenomenon which is called ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984) in experimental 
economics. I suggest that individual characteristics and social dynamics change during 
this process and over the duration of a long-term relationship.  
Innovation can be achieved through either collaboration or competition. For example, as 
a result of interunit competition, new technology is integrated into existing products 
through competitive enquiry (Taylor, 2010) and also through the combination and 
cross-pollination of ideas which occur when knowledge is transferred through BU 
collaborations. 
The major hurdles of collaborative relationships seem to be related to the availability of 
resources, the nature of resource exchange between units, and the efficiency of 
governance mechanisms of such exchanges (Rauser, 2002). 
The factors that influence the choice of competition and collaboration are unclear. 
Historical or contextual factors or a leader’s personal predisposition towards 
competition or collaboration may influence which approach is adopted.  
2.7 INFRASTRUCTURE  
In addition to the internal configurations of coopetition, Luo (2005) proposed that the 
‘organisational infrastructure’ of intranet, incentive, encapsulation and coordination 
systems created by HQs were needed to help maximise the consolidated benefits of 
efficiency and synergy from coopetition. These four systems simultaneously enabled 
inter-subsidiary competition and cooperation.  
Studies (see Houston et al., 2001; Hill et al., 1992) have noted that creating structural 
configurations to support both collaboration and competition within the same 
organisation is difficult. Moreover, there is little understanding of how to manage the 
resulting tensions, although authors (Luo et al., 2006; Tsai, 2002) argue that it is 
important for subunits to pursue both cooperative and competitive strategies. Indeed, 
Birkinshaw et al. (2005) claim that the blend is easy to achieve as it is no different from 
collaborating closely with colleagues with whom you are competing with for a 
 40 
promotion. However, they are not explicit about where and how the inherent tensions 
are managed. How dual structures and internal configurations of competition and 
collaboration are achieved remains unclear owing to the lack of empirical investigation.  
2.8 AREAS TO EXPLORE FROM LUO’S FRAMEWORK  
Except for Zhao and Luo’s (2005) contemporaneous study, which specifically focused 
on knowledge sharing with peer subsidiaries, Luo’s (2005) integrated framework of 
coopetition remains empirically unvalidated. A closer inspection suggests a number of 
aspects for possible development. First, market and environmental conditions that 
impact on the subsidiary are not explicitly accounted for in Luo’s model, although they 
may partially explain why various subunits have different levels of cooperation and 
competition and thus, different identities of coopetition from their corporate members.  
Second, since the internal and external context and conditions change, and subsidiaries 
themselves evolve over time, the levels of collaboration and competition for a focal 
subsidiary are also likely to change. Thus, a subsidiary may not stay in a specific 
quadrant of the typology but may move dynamically with time. This dynamism is 
missing from an essentially static model. There is no indication of the factors that 
trigger movement or an indication of the resultant direction.  
Third, a subsidiary within an MNC may have distinct and separate relationships with 
other subsidiaries in the same MNC. A focal subsidiary with multiple relationships may, 
therefore, simultaneously occupy different quadrants (i.e. differing levels of competition 
and collaboration) in the framework, depending on the nature of the focal subsidiary’s 
relationships with each of the other subsidiaries. This notion is supported by Bengtsson 
and Kock (1999) who identified different types of coopetitive relationships (i.e. 
competition, cooperation, coopetition and coexistence) between firm competitors. 
Bengtsson et al. (2010) subsequently explored interorganisational coopetitive 
relationships.  
2.9 CONTENT OF COOPETITION  
The concept of coopetition has found far less consideration at an intra-organisational 
than an inter-organisational level. Few authors have adopted a balanced view of 
competition and collaboration between subunits. Instead, they have focused on either 
 41 
competition (Williamson, 1975) or collaboration (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1986) in 
interunit relationships. Further, there is a lack of systematic studies on the various 
types of coopetition, including that between corporate subsidiaries when considering 
the international dimension of an MNC (Fang, 2006:436). 
In Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.4., I have broken down the two constructs of coopetition and 
focused on the determinants and content of each concept separately, both within a 
coopetitive environment and within either a competitive or collaborative environment.  
Dividing the coopetitive relationship into its distinct elements is important to understand 
the coopetitive relationship (Bengtsson et al., 2010a). However, there remain two issues 
relating to the characteristics of subsidiary relationships and the nature of MNC strategy 
and impact on the relationships that have been identified under Luo’s coopetition 
system but not discussed.  
2.9.1 Coopetitive relationships  
According to Luo, “each type [of subunit] has unique normative environments or 
conditions that justify the level of cooperation and competition consistent with its 
identity,” (Luo, 2005:88).  
2.9.1.1 MNE strategy  
In the context of coordination, Luo (2005: 87) makes explicit reference to the effect of a 
company’s strategic orientation towards inter-subsidiary relationships, when proposing 
that “cooperation will increase, and competition will decrease, if an MNE adopts a 
global strategy (i.e. relative standardisation across national markets, allowing strategic 
and operational control by the headquarters).” With his propositions, Luo provides 
important indications for the identification of both structural and strategic influencing 
factors. He suggests that global integration versus local autonomy has an impact on 
inter-subsidiary relationships as does the extent to which technologies and 
responsibilities are distributed across the organisation.  
Furthering this notion, the conceptual work of Li et al., (2007) draws on organisational 
design and strategy implementation literature to suggest that subsidiaries’ competitive 
and collaborative relationships are influenced by an MNC’s international strategy as 
well as certain structural characteristics—the role of the HQ, inter-subsidiary social 
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communication and the reward system (Li et al., 2007). Competition is conceptualised 
as multimarket competition, where (divisional) products meet in the same market 
Kalnins(2004), as well as rivalry for parent resources, market commonality and 
undefined responsibilities (Li et al., 2007).  
Interestingly, Maurer (2011) draws certain parallels between Luo’s (2005) four types of 
situations or identities within the MNC and Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998) typology of 
multinational companies, again suggesting a link between MNC strategy and inter-
subsidiary relationships. The ‘aggressive demander’ depends on corporate support to 
develop its country-specific capabilities (multinational company) demonstrating high 
competition and low cooperation. The ‘silent implementer’ produces and sells 
standardised products in his host market (global) where there is low cooperation and 
competition. The ‘ardent contributor’ is equipped with distinctive resources and 
knowledge (international company) in cases of high cooperation and low competition. 
Finally, the network captain, high in unit competition and cooperation and being 
considerably autonomous yet interrelated with its peers, has both local responsiveness 
and global integration duties (transnational company) (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998:68-
70; Luo, 2005:82-84).  
“Contrarily, competition will increase, and cooperation will decrease, if an MNE 
employs a multidomestic strategy. The duality of cooperation and competition is more 
salient under a transnational strategy than under a global or multidomestic strategy” 
(Luo, 2005:87). It is worth mentioning that the second part of this statement contrasts Li 
and Ferreira’s proposition of competition between highly interdependent subsidiaries 
being relatively weak (2003:12). The authors of the two papers do agree, however, that 
competition is expected to be high under multinational strategy and low under global 
strategy.  
Finally, the author accounts for the possibility that the propositions developed might 
change depending on the stage of internationalisation of the firm (Cerrato, 2006:273). 
Some agreement seems to exist on the fact that the role of HQ and an MNC’s 
international strategy impacts on the relationship between subsidiaries.  
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2.9.1.2 Criteria for coopetitive relationships 
Zineldin (2004:781) proposes seven criteria for a mutually beneficial coopetitive 
relationship between firms. The criteria have potential application to intra-firm 
coopetitive relationships as, above all, any individual or organisational relationship does 
with interaction and with exchange. Both Zineldin (2004) and Bouquet and Birkinshaw 
(2008) acknowledge that implementing a coopetition strategy is not easy, and is the 
most complicated game to play internally as it involves relationships, interactions, 
attitudes, motives, behaviour, needs, actions and satisfactions (Zineldin, 2004).  
2.9.1.3 Shaping relationships  
Processes shaping inter-SBU relationships are those of mixed-mode bargaining (Eccles, 
1983). Mixed-mode bargaining processes between business units are a consequence of 
their simultaneously competitive and cooperative relationships. Because of the 
emphasis on systems to measure quantitative results, subsidiaries have an incentive to 
win at the expense of others. Structural interdependence, however, acts as an incentive 
for each subsidiary to be concerned with the performance of the other as it affects total 
corporate results.  
These bargaining processes combine distributive bargaining of the competitive types 
with integrative bargaining of the cooperative types. Integrative and mixed-mode 
bargaining processes are complex and require that the managers involved have 
sophisticated conflict resolution skills. They also increase stress which, if excessive, can 
hamper performance.  
2.9.1.4 Individual actor and coopetition  
“Coopetitive relationships are like a contract in a win/win situation. This contract is 
made concrete because of individual features and inter-individual linkages,” (Geraudel 
and Salvetat, 2014:24)  
Competition and cooperation have been investigated at the individual level with regard 
to how the individual manager will make his decision to collaborate or compete in each 
interaction. Geraudel and Salvetat (2014) partially investigate this question by analysing 
the disposition of managers to compete and collaborate as a function of their centrality 
to the network and their personality traits. Their study was conducted among managers 
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(as business students) in the context of the managers competing and cooperating with 
each other in group work projects. They conclude that some managers are able to create 
cooperation through common interest between competitors on the basis of their 
centrality in the network and a personality trait of agreeableness.  
2.9.1.5 Emotions in coopetitive relationships  
A growing number of studies on emotions recognise that emotions are a natural part of 
organisational life but emotions are often discounted as irrational (Fineman, 1996). 
Whether an actor decides to compete or cooperate, or both, is certainly a question of 
reasoning and calculation, but the role of emotions in this decision process is often 
ignored, and in rational choice theory in general (Muramatsu and Hanoch, 2005).  
Loch et al. (2006:218) interestingly explore the question of individual choice to 
collaborate or compete from a different perspective: “We have argued that emotional 
algorithms have become programmed through evolution and those, collectively, help us 
to manage the dilemma of taking care of ‘me vs. we’.”  
Theories of emotion do not target the question of ‘me vs. we’ of competition versus 
collaboration within a group. However, Loch et al. (2006) show how they work together 
as a system to regulate group behaviour, balance each other and so, in as far as 
unrestrained competition or unquestioning cooperation may be destructive, and to help 
stabilise and improve functioning. The tension inherent to these opposing modes of 
behaviour, which at any given moment may pose tricky questions and painful emotional 
struggles for individuals, is in fact a natural consequence of human evolution. In 
general, balancing emotional algorithms was favoured because competitive or 
cooperative algorithms, working in isolation, would have been disadvantageous. 
Raza-Ullah, Bengtsson and Kock (2014) take the emotional lens further by exploring 
the role of positive and negative emotions in the emotional ambivalence felt by 
individual and collective actors in coopetitive relationships. They conceptually establish 
that a moderate level of tension, wherein both conflicting emotions are in balance, 
results in superior coopetitive performance.  
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2.10 EXPLAINING RELATIONSHIPS OF COMPETITION AND 
COLLABORATION  
In this section, I briefly outline the theories from the extant literature and assess their 
potential contributions to explaining simultaneous inter-subsidiary relationships of 
collaboration and competition. More importantly, “it is important to reiterate a point 
that is often lost in debates about the relative merits of particular theoretical approaches: 
no single perspective or approach (network analysis and exchange theory included) can 
explain all social and cultural phenomena” (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992:124).  
2.10.1 Multiple theoretical perspectives  
The theoretical perspectives of competition and collaboration are difficult to combine 
into one theoretical perspective to explain coopetitive relationships between actors 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010a). Relevant studies are minimal as the common approach has 
been to focus on either the competitive or collaborative aspect of the interunit 
relationships (Tsai, 2002) and by doing so, simplify the reality that conceals the 
complex interrelationships (Lewis, 2000).  
The potential of theory to help explore the notion of coopetition is reflected in Yami et 
al.’s (2010) comment that acknowledges there are many descriptive studies of 
coopetition, mostly at the inter-organisational level; however, they are short on theory. 
At the inter-organisational level, Clarke-Hill, Li and Davies (2003) propose a multi-
paradigm approach, applying strategic positioning, the resource-based view and game 
theory to assist in exploring the paradox of competition and collaboration.  
Identifying common factors that are valid for both competition and collaboration can be 
important to see how each theory might contribute to both elements and how they might 
influence the relationships that occur between the subsidiaries. This, however, is not the 
focus of this current research and provides an opportunity for more detailed exploration 
and explanation in a subsequent review of this study’s findings.  
Table 2-3 summarises the economic and organisational theories applied in the extant 
empirical and conceptual literature to explain collaboration and/or competition between 
organisational units. Additionally, a table explicating specific theories and potential 
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reasons for application to the study of coopetitive inter-subsidiary relationships within 
an MNC is shown in the Table G-1. 
As the notion of scarcity is prevalent in the studies of competition, the theoretical 
perspectives offered by economics theories prevail to explain intra-firm competition. 
However, these more traditional economic and strategy concepts, which are primarily 
based on a competition hypothesis, can be challenged and complemented by the models 
of symbiotic relationships, the ecology of economic systems, co-evolution and 
complementarity (Faulkner and de Rond, 2000) and a sociological, structural 
perspective (Burt, 1992).  
From a structural perspective, every organisation is a network (Podolny and Page, 1998) 
connected by ties of exchange and reciprocity (Powell, 1990). These ties or linkages 
between the organisational units (subsidiaries) can therefore be competitive (Burt, 1992) 
or collaborative (Tsai, 2002).  
Cooperation is an organisational problem for all forms of organisations (Grant, 1996) 
and one that requires the reconciliation of conflicting goals among organisational 
members. Cooperation has been the emphasis of most economic theories of 
organisation. Both transaction cost and agency theories regard the primary 
organisational problem as the incompatibility of individual goals, with focus on internal 
structure and governance.  
The summary table of the applied theories to intra-organisational competition, 
collaboration and coopetition (see Table 2-3) shows that evolutionary theory (Campbell, 
1965) is an emergent theory that has also been applied in the conceptual studies of 
competition (Loch et al., 2006; Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2001) as well as empirical 
studies on collaboration (Boussebaa, 2009; Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000). Co-
evolutionary theory may partially explain the adaptation of organisations over time as a 
result of the developing and changing interactions of competition and collaboration 
between organisational units.  
Game theory has not specifically been included as it is predominantly experimental and 
mathematical simulation oriented. Furthermore, conflict theory (Rahim, 2002), which I 
perceive to address the outcome of competition, does not provide insight into the 
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antecedents of competition or collaboration. However, for example, dispute resolution 
may be relevant in terms of how a subsidiary or HQ manages the tensions that emanate 
from inter-subsidiary coopetition.  
2.10.1.1 Contingency and paradox perspectives  
Contingency theorists focus on what constellation of organisational factors contributes 
to organisational success. Several contingency factors such as strategy, size, task 
uncertainty and technology, which are characteristics of the organisation, are influenced 
by the external environment in which the organisation is located. Contingency theory 
examines internal elements, and subsequent interactions adopted by business units, and 
how they ‘fit’ the external environment.  
 It explores selection conditions among competing demands such as collaboration and 
competition. Contingency models, in general, are challenged by Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dorrenbacher (2009:204) as incapable of explaining the many disruptions, 
inconsistencies and organisational oxymorons that surface in the process of intra-firm 
competition.  
Alternatively, paradox studies adopt an approach to tensions arising from disparate 
demands by exploring how organisations can simultaneously attend to competing 
demands (Smith and Lewis, 2011:381). The organisation needs continuous efforts to 
meet multiple divergent demands (Lewis, 2000; Cameron, 1986). The paradox 
perspective which considers a “both/and” approach and specifically addresses the notion 
of tensions in holding both opposing forces has applicability to this study.  
2.10.2 Conclusion on theoretical approach   
From the existing literature, there is no one single theory that is compatible with both 
collaboration and competition to investigate relationships of inter-subsidiary 
coopetition. However, a dualistic lens, as adopted in the paradox framework for 
exploring this complex phenomenon, may enable a more comprehensive understanding 
of their coexistence and interplay (Graetz and Smith, 2008; Gupta and Govindarajan, 
2006; Lewis, 2000).  
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Table 2-3: Theories and perspectives applied in research (Source: Author) 
Theoretical  
Perspectives    
Inter-unit Collaboration  
Contextual Focus        Authors 
Of Theory 
Inter-unit Competition  
Contextual Focus        Authors 
Of Theory 
Inter-unit Coopetition/ Collaboration & Competition  
Contextual Focus of Theory     Authors 
 
Transaction cost 
theory  (TCE)  
  
Governance 
modes/mechanisms 
Martin and Eisenhardt, 
2010   
Market based  
mechanisms  
Cerrato, 2006   Joint venture failure 
(interfirm)  
Park and Russo, 1996 
    Chandy and Tellis, 
1998 
Emotions: individual self 
interest    
Loch et al., 2006    
Mena et al., 2009    Bruggen and Luft, 
2011 
    
Social exchange 
theory (SET)  
CVC/BU 
collaboration  
Rauser, 2002             
Agency theory   Governance 
modes/mechanisms 
Rauser, 2002  Collective action   Houston et al., 2001  Agency  and stewardship 
(interfirm) 
Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003   
Contingency theory   Mechanisms - 
information flow  
DeLuca and Atuahene-
Gima, 2007  
Overlap  Khoja, 2008      
Game theory       Mergers, games  Creane and Davidson, 
2004 
Interest and goal congruence 
(interfirm) 
Dagnino and Padula, 2002 
        Knowledge sharing  Ghobadi and D'Ambra, 
2010 
Resource based view 
(RBV)  
Dynamic capability  Allred et al., 2011     Knowledge sharing  Tsai, 2002  
Dynamic capability  Blomqvist and Levy, 
2006 
        
  Hansen, 2009  Internal market  Cerrato, 2006      
  Rauser, 2002  Resource scarcity   Fong et al., 2007     
  De Luca and Atuahene-
Gima, 2007 
        
  Liedtka, 1996          
  Luo et al., 2006         
Knowledge-based  
view (KBV) 
Resources 
availability   
Qureshi et al., 2006 Resource scarcity  Gammelgaard, 2009      
  Rauser, 2002 Organisational 
learning  
Cerrato, 2006        
Knowledge(info) 
sharing integration  
DeLuca and Atuahene-
Gima, 2007  
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Theoretical  
Perspectives    
Inter-unit Collaboration  
Contextual Focus        Authors 
Of Theory 
Inter-unit Competition  
Contextual Focus        Authors 
Of Theory 
Inter-unit Coopetition/ Collaboration & Competition  
Contextual Focus of Theory     Authors 
 
Knowledge 
exchange - ties  
 Gnyawali and Park, 
2009  
        
Relational view  Relationships 
(inter/intra)   
Mena et al., 2009           
Resource 
dependence theory   
    Resource scarcity: 
survival  
Fong et al., 2007      
Social network 
theory (MNC)  
Resource exchange   Martin and Eisenhardt, 
2010   
Lobbying for parent 
attention   
Gammelgaard, 2009    Coopetition game  - power  Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2008 
    Knowledge exchange  Tsai , 2002 
      Interfirm: power and  
dependence  
Bengtsson and Kock, 
2000 
Friendships  Rank and Tuschke, 
2010 
  Centrality and personality 
traits  
Geraudel and Salvetat, 
2014 
Knowledge 
exchange MNC  
Gynawali et al., 2009     Social structure of 
coordination   
Tsai , 2002  
          Luo et al., 2006 
Knowledge sharing 
MNC  
Hansen et al., 2005         
Institutional theory  Human resources 
flow/ exchange  
Boussebaa, 2009          
Social capital: 
social identity theory 
Resource exchange   Barner-Rasmussen and 
Bjorkman, 2007   
Patterns of social ties  
- charter  
Houston et al., 2001     
Co-evolution theory     Boussebaa, 2009 Between resources  Birkinshaw and 
Lingblad, 2001 
Coevolving  Bengtsson and Kock, 
2000 
      Coevolving  Eisenhardt  and Galunic, 
2000 
 
    Emotions  -individual  Loch et al., 2006   
Organisational 
politics  
    Mandate charter 
change   
Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dorrenbacher , 2009  
Power  Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2008 
    Power, network and 
KBV  
Gammelgaard, 2009     
      Luo, 2005         
Goal 
interdependence 
theory 
Goal 
interdependence - 
western values  
Chen and Tjosvold, 
2008 
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Theoretical  
Perspectives    
Inter-unit Collaboration  
Contextual Focus        Authors 
Of Theory 
Inter-unit Competition  
Contextual Focus        Authors 
Of Theory 
Inter-unit Coopetition/ Collaboration & Competition  
Contextual Focus of Theory     Authors 
 
Social 
interdependence 
theory 
    Perception of goals as 
interdependent  
Baer et al., 2010      
Structural adaptation 
theory  
        Changing mindset  Baer et al., 2010  
Competitive 
advantage 
    Resource availability  Birkinshaw et al., 2005     
Paradox  
dialectical thinking    
        Paradox  Chen, 2008  
        Dialectical view  Chen, Xie and Chang, 
2011 
Organisational 
learning  
Global change: cost 
efficiency 
Friesl and Silberzahn, 
2012 
Internal market MNC  Cerrato, 2006     
Mutual forbearance      Multimarket contact  Kalnins, 2004     
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2.11 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE AND IMPLICATIONS  
In contrast to traditional scientific enquiry which categorises phenomena into ‘either/or’ 
concepts (Lewis, 2000), this literature review encompassed the individual literatures of 
both interunit collaboration and competition (and coopetition) within multinational 
organisations.  
By bringing both constructs of competition and collaboration together in one literature 
review, it has revealed that the concepts are often independently investigated and 
viewed as two contrasting perspectives (Dagnino and Padula, 2002:5). Alternatively, the 
intra-organisational ‘coopetition’ literature acknowledges the internal dynamics 
between competition and collaboration from a ‘both/and’ perspective, i.e. it recognises 
the existence of internal competition while collaborating.  
While the focus on one construct and its antecedents and outcomes is invaluable, the 
impact on subsidiary interactions and outcomes necessary to create (and not destroy) 
value cannot be fully assessed without examining them from a more systemic 
viewpoint.  
However, the literature is still ambivalent on the nature of the collaboration–
competition relationship. Are competition and collaboration two ends of a continuum 
and therefore, mutually exclusive (Tsai, 2002) or are they two different orthogonal 
aspects of organisational behaviour? As the literature reveals, the absence of 
competition largely differs from proactive collaboration (Schruijer, 2006). Are they 
competing or complementary aspects of organisational decisions and actions (Graetz 
and Smith, 2008)? Are the constructs of competition and collaboration one side of the 
same coin or are they orthogonally different?  
Empirical evidence, nevertheless, demonstrates that collaboration and competition are 
simultaneously present between business units (Tsai, 2002) and their oppositional 
tendencies form a duality. This duality (Lewis, 2000:773) or “dualities-sensitive 
approach does not attempt to resolve or eliminate contradiction, but instead encourages 
a complementary interplay between the two processes or states” (Graetz and Smith, 
2008:271). Instead of the conventional and divisive ‘either/or' approach to managing 
competing forces, the dualities concept recognises the merits of both sides of the duality 
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continuum. In Luo’s (2005:72) conceptual study, he advances the notion of internal 
competition and cooperation as a duality and that duality “has become a major 
challenge for multinational enterprises that seek to manage their intra-organisational 
knowledge flows, internalise globally coordinated operations, and differentiate various 
subunits.”  
Several examples emerge from the literature to support this paradoxical view of 
competition and collaboration: a decentralised organisational configuration can enable 
both competition and collaboration (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005; Martin and 
Eisenhardt, 2010). A group identity that fosters collaboration over time, and is essential 
to successful collaborations, also encourages competition through the formation of a 
divisive ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Loch et al., 2006).   
It is this contradictory duality of collaboration and competition and their interplay that 
form the complex business reality. It appears to be a business fallacy that business 
practices are driven by competition or collaboration. The strategic issue is not to choose 
between competition and collaboration but to manage the tension between the two 
(Clarke-Hill et al., 2003).  
The influence of context may be underappreciated (Johns, 2006) or insufficiently 
explored in the extant intra-organisational competition and collaboration literature. I 
previously referred to studies which examined the relationship of the environment and 
organisational structure, where instability in the external environment favours less 
specialisation and formalisation, increased lateral communication and team work and 
decentralised decision making when pursuing a strategy of efficiency and flexibility 
(Cibin and Grant, 1996). The strategy–structure link has been insufficiently pursued in 
the literature on intra-organisational competition and collaboration, specifically in terms 
of how the organisation prefers the subunits to behaviourally execute the stated strategy 
(i.e. corporate culture).  
Formal goals were used to generate competition between the business units. The nature 
of the goals, i.e. interdependent goals, have a more positive influence on collaboration, 
whereas independent goals have a more positive influence on competition (Tjosvold, 
1988). If the business unit goals were independent of the other business units and hence, 
did not suggest or potentially require interaction with the other units, competition would 
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increase. This happens if the situation is looked at independently of collaboration. 
However, competition may also provide the impetus to collaborate with another 
business unit to access specific information or resources to compete (Taylor, 2010). 
This is one of the paradoxes that require further investigation when analysing the 
interaction of competition and collaboration within multi-businesses across semi-
autonomous, independently goaled business units. 
Socialisation mechanisms are predominantly used to facilitate a common culture to 
promote collaboration between subsidiaries. Socialisation mechanisms are rarely 
utilised in the competition literature. By establishing a group identity through the use of 
norms, values, and a shared vision at the business unit level, an identity over time is 
created that eventually those who are ‘non-members’ are perceived as competitors 
(Houston et al., 2001). Interventions used to facilitate cross-business interactions, such 
as team meetings and informal social gatherings, are deployed to promote collaboration 
within the organisation. The paradox exists in that the collective grouping, which is 
important to have collaborations succeed across the organisation, is the very mechanism 
that not only encourages collaboration but also fosters competition over time.  
The literature reveals interventions and mechanisms that influence interunit 
collaboration and competition in certain contexts, resulting in organisational outcomes. 
While interventions and structural mechanisms may be part of the solution in our 
understanding of facilitating both competition and collaboration, the evidence suggests 
that both internal and external contextual factors shape the business unit decision to 
compete or collaborate with other business units.  
Business units simultaneously compete and collaborate with their peers in multinational 
organisations as they attempt to operate in complex and diverse environments. The 
interventions and mechanisms can provide managers with an awareness of the structures 
and management levers available to support collaboration and competition within the 
organisation.  
However, the literature fails to address how the structures and processes support the 
coexistence of competition and collaboration between business units as two alternate 
means of producing similar outcomes such as innovation. More empirical research is 
needed to investigate the interplay of competition and collaboration at the intra-
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organisational level. Collaboration is acknowledged in this review as difficult to achieve 
and in need of an array of interventions to facilitate its occurrence. On the other hand, 
interventions to control or manage competition were evidenced.  
The review confirms the challenges faced by management in understanding how to 
apply the various factors which facilitate both competition and collaboration, depending 
on the internal and external environmental situations. The achievement of an optimal 
balance is an obvious but allusive choice, seemingly requiring constant attention. 
Enough collaboration is sought to forge the integration necessary, for example, the 
development of innovative products, while sufficient competition can provoke the 
exploitation of those ideas to create added value for an organisation.  
The adoption of an organisational level of analysis also prevented studies from shedding 
light on the role of individual-level contingencies on collaboration and competition, 
despite the fact that subsidiaries relationships are built at an interpersonal level (Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). In fact, Luo (2005) identified that an individual manager’s 
perspective would enhance the understanding of MNE coopetition.  
2.12 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
As a result of the review of the literature presented in this chapter and drawing on the 
shortcomings in the literature, the following research question and three sub-questions 
are proposed:  
‘How, and why, do subsidiaries simultaneously compete and collaborate?’ 
Sub Question 1: What is the content of inter-subsidiary competition and 
collaboration?  
Sub Question 2: What factors or processes influence inter-subsidiary 
competition and collaboration?  
Sub Question 3: How do subsidiaries manage inherent tensions from 
simultaneous competition and collaboration?  
The proposed questions serve as the research question for the three case studies, which 
are introduced in Chapter 4.   
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3 CHAPTER METHODOLOGY  
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The first two chapters of this thesis introduced the research problem and contextualised 
it in the extant literature, from which the research question emerged. This chapter 
outlines the approach taken and methods used to address the research question, 
providing the rationale for the selections as well as their limitations.  
The first section 3.2 addresses the philosophical approach adopted and argues the case 
for a critical realist perspective. Drawing on the approach and perspective, the next 
section 3.3 describes the research design and proposes a qualitative methodology. The 
third section 3.4 describes the process of data collection and the final section 3.5, 
provides a detailed account of the data analysis process.  
3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
“A central focus for researchers within management and organizational sciences is 
producing knowledge about human action and activities in organizations” (Sandberg, 
2005:41). The type of knowledge and strategies deployed to produce knowledge is 
influenced by management researchers’ personal experiences and expectations that 
shape their thinking (Chia, 2002). Each researcher, therefore, comes with an implicit set 
of assumptions that justifies their different individual orientations. Blaikie (2007:3) 
accords these different orientations as “paradigms which are broad philosophical and 
theoretical traditions within which attempts to understand the social world is 
conducted.” These philosophical orientations are defined through the researcher’s 
ontological assumptions about the nature of reality and their epistemological 
assumptions about how knowledge of this reality can be obtained.  
The ontological assumptions about the nature of social reality are frequently reduced to 
two opposed, mutually exclusive categories: idealist and realist (Blaikie, 2007). An 
idealist perspective assumes that the external world is mere appearances and has no 
independent existence apart from our thoughts, whereas a realist assumes that both 
natural and social phenomena exist and are independent of the activities of the human 
observer (Blaikie, 2007).  
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For the realist researcher, objects of investigation such as an ‘organisation’ and its 
‘structure’, ‘culture’ and ‘strategy’ exist and act, for the most part, independently of 
their observers or the individual actors themselves (Chia, 2002). Hence, they are 
considered quite amenable to systematic analysis and comparison in the same way as 
natural phenomena. Knowledge is, thus, advanced through the process of theory 
building in which new discoveries of the nature of reality are cumulatively added to 
what is already known.  
How the researcher obtains this knowledge is correspondingly related to their 
ontological assumptions. Epistemologically, a similar dichotomy exists between 
positivism and interpretivism. Positivism assumes that the realist researcher is a sort of 
‘spectator’ of the object of enquiry and that knowledge is generated only from 
observable phenomena. Theories should be tested in a hypothetico-deductive fashion as 
in the approach taken in the natural sciences. However, this approach ignores the 
subjective dimension of human action. The prime objection to positivism is that it fails 
to account for the social world, which is constructed through meanings and practices 
predicated on them (Hughes, 1991). 
Anti-positivism, or interpretivism, assumes that knowledge can only be created from the 
viewpoint of individuals who live and work in a particular culture or organisation. 
Interpretivists assume that each of us acts in situations and makes sense of what is 
happening on the basis of our experience of that situation and the memories and 
expectations we bring to it. This means that there may be many different understandings 
and interpretations of reality, and interpretive epistemology that lead researchers to use 
methods designed to access meanings created by others and describe how they come to 
make those meanings. However, I am aware that our understanding of others is filtered 
through our own experiences and therefore, I can never be objective about the 
interpretations made by others.  
 “For interpretivism, the social reality is regarded as the product of its inhabitants; it is a 
world that is interpreted by the meanings participants produce and reproduce as a 
necessary part of their everyday activities together.” (Blaikie, 2010:99). 
From a realist position, interpretivism amounts to relativism in that it promotes the 
belief that truth, meaning and knowledge are not universal but are relative to the context 
 57 
in which they are produced. Meanwhile, from an interpretivist perspective, positivism 
amounts to determinism as it leaves little room for choice because human nature and 
action are causally determined.  
Dissatisfaction with the two extreme philosophical perspectives and the perceived over-
determinism of positivism and the total relativism of interpretivism lead to various 
different philosophical stances aimed at addressing positivism within the organisational 
and management field (Symon and Cassell, 2012).  
The philosophical stance of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978) attempts to navigate a 
middle course through the extremes of positivist and interpretivist (also referred to as 
constructivist) epistemologies. Critical realism sees positivists as being blind to context, 
personal meaning and individual interpretations and they see social constructionists as 
being too subjective and relativist (Neuman, 2006). “Most phenomena in the social 
world are too rich to be understood adequately by any single person or perspective.” 
(Van de Ven, 2007:14). Therefore, critical realism consists of numerous perspectives 
which share an objective, realist ontology that presupposes the existence of a reality ‘out 
there’ and the ability of a theory to capture partial aspects of that reality (Van de Ven, 
2007). Sayer (2000) describes critical realism by starting with the realist ontology of 
Bhaskar (1978) and then incorporating an interpretative thread (Blaikie, 2007).  
My philosophical perspective is grounded in the critical realist perspective (Archer, 
2010; Bhaskar, 1978), which sees the natural and social worlds as complementary and 
mutually informing expressions of the same underlying reality. The ontological 
assumptions of critical realism and epistemological assumptions of relativism inform 
my approach to the present research into how and why subsidiaries simultaneously 
collaborate and compete within multibusiness organisations.   
3.2.1 Critical realism  
Ontologically, critical realism (CR) is based on the following basic assumptions: 
existence of an independent reality; a stratified ontology comprised of structures, 
mechanisms, events, and experiences; emergent powers dependent upon but not 
reducible to lower-level powers; and an open systems perspective (Bhaskar, 1975, 1986, 
1998; Collier, 1994; Danermark et al., 2002; Sayer, 1992).  CR-based research focuses 
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on answering the question of what the components and interactions within this reality 
must be like in order to explain the occurrence of a given set of events (Bhaskar, 1975). 
Contemporary critical realism is largely attributed to the ideas of British philosopher 
Roy Bhaskar (1978:13), whose primary question regarding ‘understanding reality’ was 
“What properties do societies and people possess that might make them possible objects 
for knowledge?” An ontological focus on what produces events (or in this case 
experiences or interactions) rather than events per se is central because as critical realist 
researcher Margaret Archer (1995:1) explains, critical realism views society as 
“inseparable from its human components because the very social phenomena is 
achieved through revealing the mechanisms that produce them.” 
Critical realism sees reality as composed of three overlapping domains: empirical, 
actual and real (Bhaskar, 1978; Collier, 1994). Empirical reality includes all possible 
events, observed or not, and the domain of ‘real’ is the expression of the processes, 
causal mechanisms and structures that generate actual events and empirical experiences 
and can only be investigated in its tendencies: “Real structures exist independently of, 
and are often out of phase with, the actual pattern of events […] I will argue that what I 
will call the domains of the real, the actual and the empirical are distinct […] The real 
basis of causal laws are provided by the generative mechanisms of nature. Such 
generative mechanisms are, it is argued, nothing other than the ways of acting of things. 
And causal laws must be analysed as their tendencies” (Bhaskar, 2008:3).  
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Table 3-1 summarises Bhaskar’s domains of reality. Importantly, from a critical realist 
perspective, the ‘real’ is not fully knowable through scientific research but is 
“concerned with the generative mechanisms that produce actual events manifested in 
empirical sensations” (Mutch, 2010). The task of social scientists is, therefore, “to 
uncover these mechanisms and so approach better understanding, albeit that such 
understanding is always provisional, reversible and corrigible” (Mutch, 2010).  
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Table 3-1: Bhaskar's (2008) domains of reality  
 Domain of Real Domain of Actual Domain of Empirical 
Mechanisms  X   
Events X 
X 
 
Experiences  X 
X X 
Bhaskar’s critical realism rejects the determinism and reductionism that are inherent in 
the regularity model. He ascribes causal power to human agency, i.e. an actor’s reasons 
for acting can play a role in causing that action (Collier, 2005; Outhwaite, 1987). Yet, at 
the same time, explanations cannot be reduced solely to human intentionality and 
agency, because human actors operate with already existing social structure (Welch et 
al., 2011). Social structures condition our actions, yet through our actions, we 
(re)produce these very social conditions. Explanatory accounts, therefore, need to 
encompass human intentionality—the articulated reasons of social actors—as well as an 
actor’s position in social structure. An underlying argument of critical realists is that the 
perspectives of social actors and their accounts of events as research participants are 
fallible. While I disagree with this perspective in that personal accounts are not 
necessarily ‘incorrect’ but project a certain view of their reality, the importance of 
analysing lay accounts is a key element of critical realism. Hence, while human action is 
inherently meaningful and purposeful, a causal explanation cannot be built solely from 
an actor’s own understandings and interpretations.  
“Human meanings and intentions are worked out within the frameworks of these social 
structures - structures that are invisible, but none the less real...social phenomena, such 
as language, decisions, conflicts and hierarchies exist objectively in the world and exert 
strong influences over human activities because people construe them in common 
ways” (Miles and Huberman, 1994:4). 
An expansion on Bhaskar’s critical realism by Margaret Archer and her morphogenetic 
approach offers us more in its formulations of the relationship between agency and 
structure (Mutch, 2010:509). Relating to the importance of concepts such as 
‘stratification’ and ‘emergence’, critical realism holds that reality is “stratified, with 
phenomena emerging from a particular level, but not being reducible to that level. That 
is, once [a phenomenon has] emerged, it has properties that are proper to it as a system 
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at that level and reducible to biological components. In such emergence, time is of 
central importance. The consequence is that the methodological injunction is to 
construct analytical narratives in which the unfolding of events over time is the key to 
the isolation of causal mechanisms” (Mutch, 2010:509; [italics added]).  
The concept of a morphogenetic cycle described an analytical approach to the study of 
social life and attempted to reconcile the traditional dichotomy between agency and 
structure (e.g. Giddens, 1984) using the concept of ‘social interaction’ (see Figure 3-1). 
As Archer (1995:91) explains,  
“[...] every morphogenetic cycle distinguishes three broad analytical phases consisting 
of (a) a given structure (a complex set of relations between parts), which conditions but 
does not determine (b), social interaction. Here (b) also arises in part from action 
orientations unconditioned by social organization but emanating from current agents, 
and in turn leads to (c), structural elaboration or modification-i.e. to a change in the 
relations between parts where morphogenesis rather than morphostasis ensued.”  
 
Figure 3-1: Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic cycle  
In her more recent works (Archer, 2007; 2003; 2000), in the spirit of critical realism, 
Archer focused on uncovering mechanisms that bring humans into collision with the 
structures that other humans have created, and that both constrain and enable their 
actions (Mutch, 2010:509). The recent centrality of debates within organisational theory 
on the interplay of structure and agency (see Giddens, 1984), whether in the form of 
duality or dualism is prevalent in research relating to interunit interactions, leading to 
relations of competition and collaboration (e.g. Dagnino and Padula, 2002). In Archer’s 
view, structure and agency must be held apart to analyse the unfolding relationship over 
time. While the primary focus of the research is not on the relationship between agency 
and structure, their importance remains a common thread in both intra-organisational 
competition and collaboration research.  
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By understanding the social and cultural structures that form the context of subsidiary 
[A] and the socio-cultural structures that form the context of subsidiary [B], the 
emergent interaction may provide insights into the explanation for differing 
combinations of competitive and collaborative relationships between the subsidiaries.  
Consistent with the critical realist perspective, the inter-subsidiary relationship 
represents my main unit of analysis. The unit of observation and data collection for the 
study is the account provided by the subsidiary actors. The actors reside within a 
subsidiary and recount their interactions of collaboration and competition with other 
subsidiaries. The account is based on their recall of their interaction and the context and 
structure leading up to and surrounding that interaction.  
3.2.2 Epistemological foundations  
Going beyond the investigation of regularities to explore the underlying tendencies or 
powers to act in a particular way is called epistemological neo-realism (Blaikie, 2007). 
Blaikie states that “neo-realism accepts that knowledge of structures and mechanisms is 
always tentative. Knowledge obtained of the domain of the empirical, and the models 
that are produced to discover structures and mechanisms must be regarded as tentative 
(transitive) rather than absolute”, as not only are we impacted, and limited, by what we 
are able to both see and interpret, but it is also impossible to engage in research in a 
theory-neutral manner, as argued by Layder (1998).  
Critical realist ontology and its acceptance of epistemological relativity (Archer, 2010) 
would seem to support the investigation of both constructs of interunit competition and 
collaboration, which traditionally have been approached from two different ontological 
and epistemological positions. Bengtsson et al., (2010) highlight that inter- and intra-
firm competition has mostly been studied with objective ontology and positivist 
epistemology, while research exploring inter- and intra-organisational collaboration has 
used more interpretative approaches.  
In my thesis, I build on the relativist epistemological foundation to ‘tentatively’ explore 
how intra-organisational theories of competition, collaboration and coopetition can shed 
light on how business units both compete and collaborate with each other within the 
same organisation. I do so using empirical knowledge gained by focusing on the 
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(coexistent) instances of interunit competition and collaboration, as perceived and 
experienced by subsidiary business unit managers within three multinational 
organisations.  
Figure 3-2 highlights the ontological principles and epistemological assumptions that 
subsequently inform my research strategy, which I discuss in the following section. 
Although critical realism does not offer methodological tools, nor privileges specific 
tools (Saka-Helhout, 2014), the tenets of CR ontology (see Section 3.2.1) informed the 
primary methodological and analytical choices undertaken in the research. The 
methodological assumptions and choice of methods and analysis used in the study, 
referred to in Figure 3-2, are discussed in Sections: 3.3- Implications for the research 
design; 3.4 - Data collection and 3.5 - Data analysis. 
  
Figure 3-2: Influence of ontological principles on methodology and analysis 
3.2.3 Research strategy   
Blaikie (2010) recommends the selection of a research strategy or ‘logic of enquiry’ to 
ensure a consistent and valid approach to answer research questions. A key task for 
 64 
critical realist researchers is not only to uncover structures or mechanisms but also to 
understand how these are activated, depending on different contextual factors (Blaikie, 
2010). The research explores the phenomenon of simultaneous relationships of 
competition and collaboration (i.e. coopetition) between the subsidiaries in three 
multinational organisations and how they manage inherent tensions between the 
subsidiaries, resulting from these interactions and longer-term relationships.  
Critical realism challenges the possibility of a purely inductive or deductive process of 
theory development (Welch et al., 2011:748). Both abduction and retroduction are 
analytical tools used in critical realism (Danermark et al., 1997). Retroduction is a 
“mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them” (Sayer, 1992: 107). The retroductive 
research strategy, which is applied “to discover underlying mechanisms that, in 
particular contexts, explain observed regularities” according to Blaikie (2010: 87), is 
consistent with my critical realist philosophical perspective and research objectives. In 
seeking to understand how subsidiaries simultaneously compete and collaborate and 
manage inherent tensions resulting from interaction between subsidiaries, I attempt to 
understand the mechanisms subsidiaries use to balance the coexistence and 
simultaneous relationships of both collaboration and competition. An orthodox 
interpretive approach was considered unsuitable given my intention to derive tentative 
explanations from understanding how these relationships occur and exist 
simultaneously.   
I believe the selected research strategy offers two unique advantages over other possible 
approaches. First, in contrast to the abstract and detached nature of the inductive and 
deductive research strategies, the critical realist stance allows me to explore the patterns 
of the managerial reality of everyday life in multinational organisations. Second, in 
contrast to the inductive or deductive approach, the constructionist version of the 
retroductive strategy enables me to adopt a ‘bottom-up’ rather than a ‘top-down’ 
approach by presenting descriptions and understanding that reflect the social actor’s 
point of view rather than entirely adopting the researcher’s viewpoint (Blaikie, 
2010:90).  
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Unlike abductive inference, the theoretical frame is the starting point at which 
retroductive inference can be employed. There are five strategies that can be used to 
facilitate the employment and description of retroductive inference, regardless of 
whether the research is in line with critical realism (Danermark, 1997): counterfactual 
thinking, social and thought experiments, studies of pathological cases, extreme case 
analysis and comparative case studies.  
In comparing different cases, the researcher can determine what (X) is and the 
mechanisms that must be in place for it to occur by identifying the different qualities 
and structures that are involved in different situations. 
Although competition and collaboration coexist within an organisation, the constructs 
are often independently investigated, paying little attention to the dynamics created by 
their coexistence between the subsidiaries within the multinational organisation. The 
extant literature is unclear on how subsidiaries relate and respond to structures that 
promote competition, while culturally and structurally, the organisation demands greater 
collaboration between organisational units. Whereas strategic management and 
international management literatures recommend that organisations reap benefits from 
both competition and collaboration, how this can be achieved between differing logics 
remains unclear, particularly between subsidiaries within MNCs. 
Critical realism is relatively tolerant with respect to different research methods (Sayer, 
2000). A more intensive case research method is adopted and one which captures the 
contexts and experiences of the individual actors who recount their perceptions and 
experiences of inter-subsidiary relationships of competition and collaboration.   
3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The implications of the critical realist view of reality are the foundations upon which 
critical realist–based epistemology and methodological practices are built. However, not 
only is it important to ensure these practices are consistent with the critical realist 
ontology, it is also necessary to consider the consistency of the research design with the 
state of prior relevant theory.  
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3.3.1 Methodological fit  
 The concept of a ‘methodological fit’ (Edmondson and McManus, 2007, see Table 3-2) 
suggests that in studies where the body of literature has established constructs, and the 
research questions propose relationships between the established constructs and is more 
fitting of a description of the intermediate stage of prior theory and research. However, 
while certain relationships have been established in the context of either interunit 
collaboration or competition through quantitative research (for surveys, see Luo et al., 
2006; Persaud, 2005; Tsai, 2002) and provide some insights into when and how 
competition and collaboration occurs between subsidiaries, the focus has mainly been 
on competition and collaboration as independent variables with regard to performance 
of the firm rather than as dependent variables.  
Both theoretical and empirical studies that have investigated only internal collaboration 
or competition are prevalent. That said, authors (see Khoja, 2008; Fong et al., 2007; 
Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005) acknowledge that empirical studies of internal 
competition are few and far between and as such, agree that the domain of internal 
competition remains underexplored between organisational units. Furthermore, the 
reviewed literature on the coexistence of intra-organisational competition and 
collaboration and ‘coopetition’ is an understudied topic. 
Despite the increased number of publications (see Figure 3-3), the coopetition field 
remains in need of development and additional research to extend our current 
knowledge (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2010a; Gnyawali and Park, 
2009; Morris, Kocak, and Özer, 2007; Walley, 2007).  
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Figure 3-3: Published articles on coopetition from 1994 to 2012 (Source: Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2014:181)  
The investigation into the coexistence of constructs and their interplay, tensions and  
balance remain at the nascent stage of prior theory and research at the inter-
organisational level (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014), particularly between units within 
organisations. Therefore, my research will qualitatively pursue the topic of enquiry.  
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Table 3-2: Edmondson and McManus (2007) archetypes of methodological fit  
State of prior 
theory and 
research  
Nascent  Intermediate  Mature  
Research 
question  
Open-ended inquiry 
into the phenomenon of 
interest  
Proposed relationships 
between new and 
established constructs  
Focused questions and/or 
hypotheses relating to existing 
constructs  
Type of data 
collected  
Qualitative, initially 
open-ended data that 
need to be interpreted 
for meaning  
Hybrid (both qualitative 
and quantitative)  
Quantitative data; focused 
measures where extent or 
amount is meaningful  
Illustrative 
methods to 
collect data  
Interviews, observations 
and documents or other 
materials from field 
sites relevant to the 
phenomena of interest  
Interviews, observations 
and surveys obtaining 
material from field sites 
relevant to the 
phenomena of interest  
Surveys, interviews or 
observations designed to be 
systematically coded and 
quantified to obtain data from 
field sites that measure the 
extent or amount of salient 
constructs  
Constructs and 
measures  
Typically new 
constructs; few formal 
measures  
Typically, one or more 
new constructs and/or 
new measures  
Relying heavily on existing 
constructs and measures  
Goal of data 
analysis  
Pattern identification  Preliminary or 
exploratory testing of 
new propositions and/or 
new constructs  
Formal hypothesis testing  
Data analysis 
methods  
Thematic content 
analysis coding for 
evidence of constructs  
Content analysis, 
exploratory statistics 
and preliminary tests  
Statistical inference and 
standard statistical analyses  
Theoretical 
contributions  
A suggestive theory; 
often an invitation for 
further work on the 
issue or set of issues 
identified by the study  
A provisional theory; 
often one that integrates 
previously separate 
bodies of work  
A supported theory that may 
add specificity, new 
mechanisms or new boundaries 
to existing theories  
3.3.2 Qualitative case research  
Qualitative research is conducted because a problem (or issue) needs to be explored 
(Creswell, 2013:47). Qualitative research is also used to follow-up quantitative research 
and helps explain the mechanisms or linkages in causal theories or models. These 
theories provide a general picture of trends, associations and relationships, but they do 
not tell us about the processes that people experience, why they responded as they did, 
the context in which they responded and their deeper thoughts and behaviours that 
governed their responses (Creswell, 2013:48). Qualitative research is used to develop 
theories when partial or inadequate theories exist for certain populations and samples or 
existing theories do not adequately capture the complexity of the problem being 
examined, as in intra-organisational coopetition. Qualitative methods enable the 
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observation of everyday life “through interpretative frameworks, to get close to the 
context of the study and to reveal unfolding social processes” (van Maanen, 1979:522). 
My research approach adopts the qualitative comparative case study. Several CR 
researchers have identified the case study method as the best approach to explore the 
interaction of structure, events, actions, and context to identify and explicate causal 
mechanisms (Ackroyd, 2010; Dobson, 2001; Easton, 2010; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). A case study “involves investigating one or a small number of social entities or 
situations about which data are collected using multiple sources of data” (Easton, 
2010:119) which is not dissimilar to the Yin’s more positivist approach to a case study 
“as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003:13).  
Multiple case studies were chosen to enable comparison not only between inter-
subsidiary relationships but also across three varied forms of multinational 
organisations, which typically fits a more positivist epistemology (Easterby-Smith, 
2012). I follow an intermediate position which has been particularly developed from 
Kathy Eisenhardt’s work (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989), which 
draws inspiration from both the positivist and constructionist positions. 
Multiple-case designs have distinct advantages and disadvantages in comparison to 
single-case designs. While single case studies can richly describe the existence of a 
phenomenon (Sigglekow, 2007), multiple cases studies typically provide a stronger base 
for theory building (Yin, 1994) because the propositions are more deeply grounded in 
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2010). As such, the evidence from 
multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and therefore, the overall study is 
regarded as more robust (Herriott and Firestone, 1983).  
I follow replication logic as one would consider in multiple experiments. Multiple cases 
enable comparisons regarding whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to a 
single case or consistently replicated by several cases (Eisenhardt, 1991). The logic 
underlying the use of multiple-case studies is the same. Each case is carefully selected 
so that it either predicts similar results (a literal replication) or predicts contrasting 
results but for anticipated reasons (a theoretical replication). Eisenhardt and Graebner 
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(2007:27) argue that “theory building from multiple cases typically yields more robust, 
generalisable and testable theory than single case research.”  
3.3.3 Case study selection   
In pursuing a case study design, although not sampling research, case selection based on 
specific criteria for inclusion forms an important part of the research design and is a 
critical design decision (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994; Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, 1991).   
Given the trade-off between the time constraints and depth of research, the selection of 
the firms was a critical element in the case study process. Eisenhardt (1989) and 
Pettigrew (1990) argue that researchers should consider choosing extreme situations 
which highlight a particular phenomenon being researched. Case selection, therefore, 
often relies on theoretical sampling to identify the outliers or maverick cases in response 
to the question, ‘What should we focus our attention on in order to develop our 
understanding of the phenomenon?’ Nevertheless, this does not rule out that cases can 
be emergent or self-selecting. 
Three considerations go into a purposeful sampling approach in qualitative research. 
They are: (i) the decision on whom to select as participants (or sites), (ii) the specific 
type of sampling strategy and (iii) the size of the sample to be studied. Who or what 
should be sampled can be conceptualised as sampling of four aspects (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2010): events, settings, actors, and artefacts. In addition, several levels of 
sampling were considered: organisation, individual managers and relationships, in that 
order.  
3.3.3.1 Case study organisations selection criteria  
The first step was to identify and select the type of organisations for a meaningful study 
of the phenomena of interest. In selecting potential companies for participation in the 
research, the multinational context was sought as the primary criterion. The extant 
literature provides little evidence of investigations of inter-subsidiary relationships at 
the corporate level of a subsidiary (i.e. those reporting to corporate or group HQ) and 
the parent company level (i.e. where the parent company of the subsidiaries is itself a 
subsidiary at the corporate level) within multinational companies (see Figure 3-4); 
however, this refinement of multiple hierarchical levels of subsidiaries is barely 
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delineated in the literature. This warrants an investigation at two different hierarchical 
levels of subsidiaries.  
Competitive/collaboration orientation  
From a theoretical sampling perspective, which simply means that cases are selected 
because they are particularly suitable to illuminate and extend relationships and logic 
among constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), my intention was to explicitly 
sample and compare organisations that professed a more competitive cultural 
orientation in their interunit relationships and contrast that with organisations that were 
more collaborative in their orientation. General research inquiries and informal 
discussions with consultants identified three multinational companies who would meet 
the competitive criteria. All three were contacted. One company remained particularly 
interested. However, a major restructuring of the organisation was announced, which 
meant that they regrettably declined the opportunity to participate in the research. The 
three companies that finally agreed to participate all publicly stated that they actively 
encouraged collaboration within the MNC. In eventuality, two of the three companies 
were in the early stages of moving from a competition-orientated approach to a more 
collaborative one and the third company was experiencing more internal competition 
than before while engaging in collaborative interactions and collegial relationships. This 
provided levels of variation and comparison that I was originally trying to secure. 
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Selection of the managers  
The literature indicated that accountability and reward for unit performance were factors 
in internal competition (Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000; Eccles, 1985). Nested 
performance measurement, therefore, suggested a sample of managers with profit and 
loss (P&L) accountability who managed a subsidiary either at the corporate or parent 
level would be appropriate. Thus, I selected managers that had P&L accountability for 
their units.   
Also, the selected informants needed to both compete and collaborate with their sister 
units at some level and at some point in their relationships, consistent with Luo’s (2005) 
typology that classified subunits according to the various levels of cooperation and 
competition with peer members. The request was therefore made to interview those 
subsidiary managers who were also perceived to have strong collaborative relationships 
and those whose relationships were more fractious and competitive.  
At that stage, it became clear in discussing potential access to relevant subsidiaries with 
the sponsors that many units were perceived to have multiple simultaneous relationships 
with different units and that these changed over time. Thus, the Luo classification 
became less clear to apply. Additionally, he also analysed coopetition from a focal 
subunit’s perspective with its peer subunits as an aggregated whole and therefore did 
not take into account specific inter-subsidiary relationships.  
As a result, rather than pre-selecting the subsidiaries according to Luo’s typology, the 
managers of the subsidiaries sampled, both corporate and parent,  were asked to identify 
with whom they collaborated and with whom they competed, both simultaneously and 
independently. The specific inter-unit relationships were subsequently categorised 
during the interviews according to their self-reported levels of competition and 
collaboration.  
Luo (2005) posits that cooperation is stronger in wholly-owned subsidiaries than in 
international joint venture or cooperative alliances.  The three companies selected had 
policies of 100% subsidiary ownership. However in EngConsult, the North American 
subsidiary, for historical and geographical reasons, was a joint venture. Nevertheless, 
this subsidiary was included in the sample as it operated as a significant and integrated 
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region within EngConsult’s organisation.  My sample therefore consisted primarily of 
100% wholly-owned subsidiaries. 
After the initial interviews were conducted at EngConsult, several other informants 
were sought on the basis of emerging themes, for example, recent acquisitions. The 
emerging themes influenced the final selection of informants from EventCo and 
PhotoCo as well. For example, the integration or lack of integration of acquired 
businesses into the MNC seemed to generate a level of competition owing to temporary 
overlapping skills and geographies. This potential theme was pursued in EventCo. In 
addition, the financial structuring of the acquisition agreement by way of an earn-out 
period had possible implications for inter-subsidiary collaboration. Identification with 
and affiliation to the acquired or acquiree company was also pursued, in addition to its 
impact on collaboration and competition. Emergent themes relating to the lack of 
integration and the provision of an earn-out condition were explored to identify whether 
they had an influence on subsidiary-level engagement in competition or collaboration 
with its sister units.   
In all cases, a small number of informants were selected from corporate/parent HQ to 
ascertain the nature of any influences on the inter-subsidiary relationships as defined by 
competition and collaboration.   
Theoretically, units can operate independently of each other within the MNC. The level 
of independence may require only basic interactions or communications, therefore, not 
having any necessity or willingness to interact with their sister companies. Subsidiaries 
(managers) who operated more independently, with lower levels of internal competition 
and collaboration, were also selected.  
Case Relationships  
As the study’s aim was to investigate the nature of coopetitive relationships (i.e. 
simultaneous relationships of competition and collaboration), the identification of these 
types of interactions emerged during the interviews when asked as per the interview 
protocol (see Appendix L, p.316).  
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I also chose to interview informants from multiple levels within the MNC. For example, 
managers at the corporate HQ, subsidiary (corporate and parent) and divisional levels 
were interviewed, providing multiple perspectives of the phenomena (see Figure 3-4).   
 
Figure 3-4: Sampling strategy 
Three cases organisations with embedded cases were selected in this study which would 
provide ample opportunity to identify themes within the cases as well as conduct cross-
case theme analyses. Having embarked on this approach, I was cognisant of the concern 
that the greater the number of cases being investigated, the more diluted the level of 
detail would be (Creswell, 2007).  
3.3.3.2 Access to organisations  
I was granted access to top management in EngConsult, EventCo and PhotoCo. The 
Chairman, (SBU) CEO and Group CEO in the respective organisations also became my 
research sponsors. In EngConsult, I was introduced to the Chairman by the account 
manager from Cranfield’s Customized Executive Development (CCED) unit. This 
introduction was the result of my initial approach to CCED to identify appropriate case 
study organisations after an unsuccessful, exhaustive effort to secure company 
participation through the CEO offices of the FTSE
3
 100. The CEOs of EventCo and 
                                                 
3
 Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 comprises the 100 most highly capitalised blue chip 
companies listed on London Stock Exchange.  
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PhotoCo were approached as a result of previously established personal contacts. All 
three company executives expressed interest in the research and felt that the study 
would be of benefit to their organisations. A formal proposal, outlining the objectives, 
involvement and potential outcomes of the research was prepared and forwarded to each 
potential sponsor. Upon reaching agreement to proceed, the criteria (Section 3.3.3) for 
informant selection and inclusion in the study were discussed.  
Research participants were then selected and invited by my key sponsors (Creswell, 
2007). Where possible, the sampling technique at the business unit level was applied in 
an attempt to capture one or more units engaged in the same collaborative or 
competitive interaction.  
A senior point of contact was also appointed by the sponsor to obtain access to relevant 
internal company documentation, additional access to other informants and as a person 
to whom I could direct questions of clarification during the research period.   
3.3.3.3 Research context  
The research contexts were primarily selected on the basis of an organisation being a 
multibusiness multinational headquartered in the United Kingdom and operating across 
and within multiple countries. Two of the organisations are public limited companies 
(PLCs), while the third is a privately owned professional services firm (PSF). This 
provides a significant variation in context. The inclusion of the PSF can enhance the 
study as few studies have empirically explored the phenomenon within a professional 
services context, with the notable exceptions of Boussebaa (2009) and Liedtka (1996). I 
consider the PSF as an example of an outlier MNC in that it is not a public limited 
corporation (plc) and as a privately owned firm, is not listed on the stock exchange. In 
Table 3-3, the three organisations’ profiles are compared. Each is described in more 
detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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Table 3-3: Case organisation profiles 
Case 
Organisations    
    
Profile  EngConsult  EventCo  PhotoCo  
Country of 
Ownership  
UK  UK UK  
Industry  Engineering and 
development 
consultancy  
Global events-led 
marketing and 
communications services 
business 
Products and services 
that support the capture 
of exceptional images 
Focus  Professional services  Services/Communication 
(B2B)  
Services/Products  
(Manufacturing and 
Wholesale—B2B/B2C)  
Business Model  Related diversification  
 
Multi-skilled, multi 
sector  
Related diversification  
 
Premium global events 
(brands)  
Related diversification  
 
Premium global brands  
Growth Focus  Organic & acquisition  Organic & acquisition  Organic & acquisition  
Business Units  4 regions, 13 sectors 10 business segments  3 divisions  
Geographic 
Diversity  
50 countries  18 countries  12 countries 
Employees 14,000+  5,500+  1,900+ 
Gross Revenue  
(2013)  
£1,215m  £793.9m  £143.1m 
 Operating Profit  
(2013)  
£56.1m £165.9m 
 
£17.9m 
 
Cultural Aspiration  
 
Collaborative  Collaborative  Collaborative  
Organisation 
Hierarchical Levels 
(included in study) 
Chairman 
Regional MD 
Business Unit MD 
Divisional MD 
Sub-divisional 
Manager  
Group CEO  
Corporate Centre Heads 
CEO businesses 
Group CEO  
Divisional Chief 
Executives  
Business Unit MD 
Parent HQ Functional 
Directors  
 
It is worth elaborating on the decision to include a PSF as a specific type of MNC as an 
outlier. PSFs offer additional context for subunits that transact with each other 
in/between at least two countries (Sundaram and Black, 1992). Despite their growing 
prominence in the world economy, PSFs have received little attention (Boussebaa, 
2009). The largest PSFs are ‘massive internal operators’ (Ferner and Edwards, 
1995:343) and often bigger and more internationalised than their manufacturing 
counterparts (Greenwood et al., 2006). Whereas manufacturing sector’s growth is 
reportedly slowing down, that of the professional service industry is accelerating 
(Greenwood et al., 2006). This contrast sharpens in the broader context of economies 
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moving away from capital-based industries towards knowledge-intensive ones (Mills 
and Ungson, 2001). PSFs, thus, deserve particular attention (Boussebaa, 2009).  
3.3.3.4 Access and ethical considerations  
Obtaining access to undertake empirical research on a topic that is sensitive and 
commercially confidential was challenging.  
Access to such sensitive processes, interactions and relationships of internal competition 
and collaboration at the top levels of an organisation would not normally be obtained 
without the creation of a certain level of trust and some form of reciprocity between the 
organisation and researcher (Pettigrew, 1990; 1992). At a minimum, all three 
organisations hoped to learn something from the research and expected useful feedback 
(see Appendix I, Figure I-1: Engagement process).  
In all three organisations, I worked closely with the appointed contact persons who 
coincidentally are responsible for promoting greater collaboration among all 
organisational units and individuals. Indeed, my research is collaborative in that I, and 
my key internal contacts, shared our development of knowledge in our respective roles 
as researcher and practitioner; we both participated as equals (Balogun et al., 2003; 
Reason, 1994). Such a stance promoted close access and permitted the key contacts to 
have earlier insights into the enablers and barriers of collaboration, thus supporting 
them in their collaboration initiative. I also felt that the benefits that can be returned to 
the organisation were not only the price of access but also an important responsibility, 
given the time and effort required and freely given from each company and their senior 
management. 
3.3.3.4.1 Semi concealed research  
At the beginning of the research, I was very conscious of how I would position the 
research with prospective companies in anticipation of their reactions to the topic I 
wanted to pursue. I did not shy away from the fact that I wished to study both the 
collaborative and competitive relationships between the SBUs and subsidiaries within 
the organisation. Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference in positioning what is of 
interest to the leaders of the organisation, which is enhancing their levels of 
collaboration, and being able to authentically retain the emphasis of the study. The 
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project proposals, presentations and interview protocol, all of which were provided at 
the meetings on the provision of access, clearly addressed both competition and 
collaboration. In support of the companies’ cultural emphasis on collaboration, the 
communications from the CEO’s offices contained only reference to ‘collaboration 
research’ in the email subject heading. The company and I were both open about the 
exact topic and rationale for the study. While this action could not be described as 
covert research, the communications did semi-conceal the full research inquiry at the 
introduction phase. Perhaps not so unusually, the aspect of partial concealment in 
relation to the positioning was requested in these instances by the companies and not by 
the researcher (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012).   
My initial fear and ethical doubts were that by presenting the study as collaboration 
research, I would be presented with a company image specific to the informants’ 
perspective, which would not address the ‘darker’ aspects of the subsidiary 
relationships. I was very clear to emphasise at the beginning of the research and in any 
communication prior to the interviews that the research and interview questions were 
about exploring instances of competition and collaboration as well as instances of 
simultaneous collaboration and competition. The research proposal was accepted in its 
entirety by the participating organisations and informants.  
For example, during the initial presentation and discussions in EngConsult, my key 
sponsor and contact acknowledged that internal competition existed and that it acted as 
a barrier to collaboration between the subsidiaries. Subsequently, the research was 
pitched to the leaders of the regional divisions as a study that would help the 
organisation become better at collaboration. During the interviews, I did not experience 
any reluctance by the selected informants in discussing internal competition between the 
subsidiaries as all of informants recognised it as an inherent part of organisational life.  
To counterbalance any concerns, prior to commencing the interview, I advised each 
informant of how the interview was structured and that it consisted of five sections: (i) 
strategic challenges and organisation structure, (ii) internal collaboration, (iii) internal 
competition, (iv) simultaneous collaboration and competition, and (v) perceptions of the 
company culture. I began the interviews by having them describe the business 
challenges they were currently facing and how they responded to those challenges. By 
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commencing with this topic, the senior managers were able to speak comfortably and 
began to feel at ease before I broached the more contentious questions.  
3.3.4 Summary of the section  
In accordance with my critical realist perspective and retroductive research strategy, I 
chose to use the multiple (embedded) case study approach (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 
1989) for both data collection and analysis.   
3.4 DATA COLLECTION  
Data were collected between August 2013 and June 2014, commencing with 
EngConsult during August–December 2013, followed by EventCo in October–
December 2013 and PhotoCo through May and June 2014. Prior to data collection, 
initial planning meetings were held with each company to schedule the activities and 
confirm the logistics of access to the informants, and make arrangements for access to 
in-house documents and intranets. Once the email invitations, with a copy of the 
original project proposal, had been sent by the respective company’s chairman, the 
group CEO or executive committee member, I contacted the informants to schedule the 
time, place or medium for the interview (see Appendix J, p.314 and Appendix K, p. 
315). 
As appropriate, the initial list of informants was expanded as specific information 
emerged during the interviews which required more understanding; for example, the 
group HR director of EngConsult was sought to elaborate on internal transfers and 
mobility policy, which early on in the interviews were perceived to be barriers to cross-
sector collaboration.   
 It is important here to acknowledge that all three organisations espoused an orientation 
towards collaboration. While every effort was made to secure access to organisations 
which espoused a more competitive orientation among its subsidiaries for comparison 
of polar types of cases (Pettigrew, 1988), I was unsuccessful in gaining final approval 
from the two organisations that were originally pursued and with whom I had several 
lengthy discussions. The reasons provided for the eventual decline to participate were 
similar in that both were about to embark on a period of significant organisational 
restructuring. As a result, they would not be able to provide the level of access required 
 80 
and did not want to distract the executives’ attention from the restructuring initiative by 
participating in the study at the time. This meant that the final three companies who 
agreed to participate were all driving collaboration initiatives to foster a more 
collaborative culture. However, they were all at different stages of implementation.  
The informants were ensured anonymity and their consent was sought so that the 
interviews could be electronically recorded. All 98 informants gave their consent and so 
the interviews were recorded and later transcribed verbatim.  
Data were collected primarily using semi-structured interviews, which were deemed 
appropriate to gain a rich and deep understanding of the interactions of competition and 
collaboration from the subsidiary manager’s perspective in an under-researched area 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
Because agents are separate from social structures, critical realists acknowledge the 
limitations of purely interpretive accounts of social action for uncovering a rounded 
understanding of reality of social structures (Smith and Elger, 2012:4). A key feature of 
critical realism is that it stresses a layered ontology to social reality. This means that 
interviews might not reveal real causes of action and present only a partial picture. But 
it also means that without conducting investigations into action as experienced by 
actors, it is not possible to get insights into the actual and empirical representations of 
action. Given the autonomy of actors from structures, we need to have some means of 
accessing the individual experience and interviews are one such method.  
A good deal of qualitative research has extensively relied on interviews as it is a highly 
efficient method to gather rich empirical data. The use of interviews, however, can also 
provoke a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction that the data are biased in which impression management 
and retrospective sense making are deemed prime culprits (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007:28). Johnson et al. (2007) also argue that interviews are not good at capturing 
micro behaviours and interactions and that in-vivo observation is an underused source 
of data. In this study, in-vivo observations become a less practical and feasible option 
when exploring interactions and practices within and between subsidiaries in 
geographically dispersed organisations.   
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The majority of the interviews were conducted over the telephone (see Table 3-4). 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2008:145) advises researchers to avoid telephone interviews, 
particularly if the researcher has never met the interviewee. Although I did not meet any 
of the initial interviewees prior to our telephone interview, I did not experience any 
resistance to answering any of the questions put to them, including questions pertaining 
to internal competition with sister subsidiaries. Thus, if researchers are able to establish 
a good rapport and trust at the initial contact stage, then even fairly unstructured 
interviews over the phone can be successful.  
The challenge of any interview data is best mitigated by data collection approaches that 
limit bias. A key approach was to use numerous and highly knowledgeable informants 
who view the focal phenomenon from diverse perspectives. These informants included 
organisational actors from different hierarchical levels, functional areas, groups and 
geographies as well as actors from other relevant organisations and external observers 
such as market consultants (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).   
Table 3-4: Interview medium 
Interviews   EngConsult EventCo PhotoCo 
Telephone  70 48 7 15 
Face-to-face  28 9 12 7 
Total no. of interviews  98 57  19 22 
I enhanced the effectiveness of my triangulation efforts by conducting interviews with 
the corporate management, in addition to operational and functional heads within the 
business units, subsidiary (divisional) managing directors across the three companies 
and obtaining further hierarchical perspectives at the sub-divisional and senior project 
management levels in the case of EngConsult. In total, I collected interview data from 
98 informants: 21 Group/corporate managers, 26 strategic business unit (SBU) 
managers, 37 subsidiary managers, and 14 functional/staff managers (see Table 3-5).   
Additional sources of data included company presentations, annual reports, selected 
documents and content from the companies’ intranet and knowledge management 
systems and internal discussions with the author of an internal development research 
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report on collaboration at EngConsult. Furthermore, two conversations were held with 
external consultants providing services to EngConsult on how the firm could enhance 
the level of collaboration across the firm. The collection of multiple data sources 
enabled the triangulation of evidence which “can improve the accuracy of the 
researcher’s judgments” (Jick, 1979:602) and “strengthen the grounding of theory” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 533).   
Alternative methods of data collection such as journal or diary entries by the SBU 
manager of the SBU and subsidiary relationships could have been adopted. While real-
time data may yield more accurate information, this approach calls for considerably 
more data management time (Tushman, 1979) and informant time, which was an issue 
for senior executives. Appointment calendars, telephone (Skype, interlink) records, 
emails and minutes of meetings could all provide socio-metric data; however, these 
methods would not have captured the history of previous relationships and explanations 
of events with the same efficiency. Observational methods were less appropriate as it 
was impossible to visit all country offices where the subsidiaries resided. 
All informants granted permission to record interviews. The interviews were 
subsequently transcribed within 48 hours by a transcription company (VoiceScript Ltd) 
or an independent transcriber, with whom confidentiality agreements were signed to 
ensure confidentiality of, restricted access to, and secure temporary storage of the data.        
Four PhotoCo interviews were not transcribed as above, but held as audio recordings 
within my NVivo folders using NVivo transcription tools. (See Table S-1, Table T-1 
and, Table U-1). 
A semi-structured interview protocol was prepared. All participants were briefed before 
the interview on the academic nature of the research, the support of respective sponsors 
and implications for collaborative efforts between organisational units within the each 
organisation. These safeguards encouraged informants to provide both positive and 
counterfactual evidence, as I report in the findings section.  
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Table 3-5: Informants per case organisation. 
Cases 
 
Business  
Level  
Organisational  
Roles 
Total 
No. by 
Role  
Total  
 
 
EngConsult Group HQ  
 
 
SBU /Regional  
 
Subsidiary  
Sub-divisional   
Chairman, Group HR  Director,  
Development Directors , Practice Managers  
Regional MDs          
Business Unit MDs     
Divisional MDs  
Sub-divisional/Senior Project Managers  
14 
 
 
18 
17 
8 
57 
EventCo Group HQ  
 
SBU Sub.  
Subsidiary 
Content, Marketing,  Operations 
Organisation Effectiveness   
Divisional CEOs  
Business Unit MDs  
Business Unit Functions (HR, Legal, 
Content )  
4 
 
5 
7 
3 
19 
PhotoCo  Group HQ  
 
SBU Sub. 
 
 
 
Subsidiary  
Group CEO, Group Business Development 
and HR Dir, Group CFO  
Divisional CEOs 
Divisional HQ Functions – Marketing, 
Procurement, Manufacturing, Finance, and 
Operations  
Business Unit/Distribution Managers  
Functional Staff  
3 
 
3 
11 
 
2 
3 
22 
Total    98 98 
The informants were asked to recall salient examples of interunit competition and 
collaboration in which the informant was directly involved in or observed first hand, as 
other people who are not directly involved may either have heard of what happened 
and/or know the principal characters involved (Symon and Cassell, 2012). The 
drawback of this approach is the inclusion of possibly distorted responses because of 
recall error, or self-serving responses (Patton, 2002).  
The informants were asked to describe the following: 
1. The background to the interaction, when and where  
2. What exactly happened in the interaction and why  
3. The reactions of the subsidiaries (managers) and the actions taken 
4. The outcome of the interaction  
The advantage of this approach is that real situations were discussed and thus, could 
provide genuine insight into the context, actual behaviours and outcomes adopted by the 
subsidiary in the interaction. 
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After each interview, I set aside time to reflect on and write notes about the general 
conduct of the interview, disposition of the informant and any themes or follow-up 
questions that emerged (see Appendix Q, p.325). A follow-up email was sent to all 
informants within 48 hours to thank them for their participation (see Appendix N, 
p.322) and confirmed the opportunity for a future conversation or contact by email (see 
Appendix O, p.323), should any elaboration or clarification of points discussed during 
the interview be required (see Appendix P, p.324). 
The interviews were triangulated using various other sources. For example, I had access 
to the intranets of EngConsult and EventCo to view specific documents and understand 
how the intranet was used for resource searches of specific collaborations, policy 
documents related to key performance indicators (KPIs), inter-entity trading agreements 
and performance management processes. I had regular contact with the key informants 
from each company, in addition to regular updates of preliminary impressions and 
subsequent findings from initial coding and interviews analyses (see Appendix R, 
p.327). When conducting research on international business, and sensitive topics such 
as internal competition, the challenges of gaining first-hand exposure to the interactions 
under study, instead of relying on informant accounts, were evident.  Individual 
accounts were the primary source when geographic distances precluded anything other 
than an individual account. The efforts to further triangulate emerging findings were 
corroborated by other informants within the organisation and face-to-face discussions 
based on the prepared interim findings reports with the company sponsors and 
nominated key contacts (see Figure 3-5). 
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Figure 3-5: Phases of data collection (Source: Author) 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS  
The data analysis approach adopted in the study is based on the principles of thematic 
analysis (TA) (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Boyatzis, 1998). As Maykut and Morehouse 
(1994:18) point out, “it is the task of the researcher to find patterns within the words and 
to present those patterns for other to inspect while at the same time staying as close to 
the construction of the world as the participants originally experienced it”. By choosing 
to conduct case studies, in addition to the understanding provided by an in-depth 
description of the case, a researcher can identify themes or issues and situations specific 
to study in each case. A complete findings section of a case study would, therefore, 
involve both a description of the case and themes or issues that the researcher has 
uncovered in studying the case (Creswell, 2013). The themes or issues in this study 
were organised and analysed within and across the case organisations for similarities 
and differences and presented as a theoretical model.   
Before outlining the process I followed to conduct a TA, it is appropriate to provide a 
brief overview of the computer-assisted software tool NVivo (QSR International Pty, 
Ltd. Version10, 2014) used to manage large datasets.   
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3.5.1 Qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) 
Computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) is the general term used 
to describe software packages, such as NVivo, which provide a researcher with a set of 
tools to analyse qualitative data. However, the use of a computer is not intended to 
supplant the traditional ways of learning from data but to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such learning. ‘Managing data’ from an organised storage system and 
the ease of material location allows for more time to focus on ways of examining the 
meaning of the data recorded. The tools used are also ‘method free’ in so far as the 
software does not prescribe a method but supports a wide range of methodological 
approaches. 
Concerns, however, exist about the impact of computerisation. The concerns centre 
around (i) distancing researchers from their data (ii) dominance of code-and-retrieve 
methods to the exclusion of other analytics, (iii) mechanisation of analysis and (iv) 
support for only grounded theory methodology (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). A greater 
fallacy is that the computer will conduct the analysis and draw conclusion. Coffey and 
Atkinson (1996:166) reiterate that: 
“No single software package can be made to perform qualitative data analysis in 
and of itself. The appropriate use of software depends on appreciation of the 
kind of data being analysed and of the analytic purchase the researcher wants to 
obtain on those data.” 
3.5.2 Thematic analysis  
Thematic Analysis (TA) is used to identify, analyse and report patterns (themes) in 
qualitative data (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, it often goes beyond these and 
interprets various aspects of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998). TA is suited to a wide 
range of research interests and theoretical perspectives. It can be a ‘contextualist’ 
method, as characterised by the perspective of critical realism (Braun and Clarke, 2006) 
in that it can report experiences, meanings, and the reality of the participants as well as 
capture the broader social context that impinges on the meaning that individuals make 
of those experiences. Thematic analysis can therefore be a way that works “both to 
reflect reality, and to unpick or unravel the surface of ‘reality’” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: 9). TA is useful as a basic and flexible method because it (i) works with a wide 
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range of research questions, (ii) can be used to analyse different types of data from 
secondary sources such as from media to transcripts of focus groups or interviews, (iii) 
it works with large and small datasets and, (iv) can be applied to produce data- or 
theory-driven analyses (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
Framed by my focus of inquiry and subsequent collection of data from interviews, 
meetings and focus groups, the responses gathered from the informants are not grouped 
by rigid, pre-defined categories. Rather, salient categories of meaning and relationships 
between categories were derived through the data itself by a process of inductive 
reasoning known as coding. The TA approach offers the means, whereby the research 
may access and analyse articulated perspectives, such that they may be integrated in a 
model that seeks to explain the co-existence and simultaneous subsidiary relationships 
of competition and collaboration. Luo’s (2005) integrated framework of inter-subsidiary 
coopetition guided the analysis in relation to identifying broad themes of content, 
determining factors and enablers of infrastructure. A template based on Luo’s (2005) 
framework was not created as it is limited to conceptual typology to internally 
configured determinants of coopetition. This would have restricted the fuller exploration 
of competition and collaboration within MNCs which I felt could temporarily blind me 
from other factors.  
The TA method involves breaking down the data into discreet ‘incidents’ (Glaser and 
Straus, 1967) or ‘units’ ( Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and coding them into categories.  
3.5.3 Familiarising with the data  
Immersion in the data is an essential part of the interpretive process. My review of the 
data and initial analysis began by listening to each of the recorded interviews. While 
listening, I made notes of my reactions to the responses I was hearing for the first time, 
in addition to revisiting the detailed notes and reflections captured on the completed 
contact sheet after the initial interview (see Appendix Q, p.325). Subsequently, I reread 
each interview transcript and made annotations in the margins for possible codes and 
then reviewed these against the existing notes taken from the listening process. The 
processes of listening, rereading and reflection helped sensitise me to the content and 
tone of the interviews. Now familiar with the data, I could begin to identify initial codes 
within which to structure the content of the interviews and documents (Patton, 2002). 
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After this first pass of the transcripts, I imported them and the secondary data into 
NVivo for further analysis.  
While aware of initial a priori codes from the literature, and Luo’s (2005) model, a 
template was not established as few instances in the literature investigated the 
simultaneous inter-subsidiary relationships of collaboration and competition. The 
emphasis in the extant literature relating to collaboration or competition reflected 
competition, collaboration and coopetition as independent variables of subsidiary and 
firm performance, and not dependent variables of identified antecedents.  
Thematic coding was complemented by process, causation and attribute coding (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Process coding, a method using gerunds (‘-ing’ words), captured 
actors’ (subsidiary and subsidiary managers) interactions and consequences.  
Causation coding methods extracted causal beliefs from informant data on not only how 
but also why particular outcomes came about. Causal attributions refer to the 
explanations each subsidiary manager gave for their and their unit’s behaviour, that of 
other informants and units and the events they observed or heard about from others 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Typically, causal connective phrases such as ‘because’, 
‘so’, ‘therefore’ and ‘as a result’ were used, while others only implied, rather than 
explicitly stating, a link. This method enabled a search for antecedents and mediating 
factors that lead to certain pathways. I was interested in attributions because of the way 
in which a manager explained an event could have influenced how they chose to 
respond in the interaction.  
The attribute coding method captured basic descriptive information such as the 
fieldwork setting, informant characteristics, subsidiary context and other variables of 
interest. This was particularly useful as the study had multiple informants across 
multiple sites and cases.  
Simultaneous coding was also used by applying two or more different codes to a single 
piece of text to indicate potentially multiple themes.  
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3.5.4 Searching for themes  
The next stage of the analysis centred on collating the codes into various themes and 
then gathering the data into each potential theme (see Figure 3-8). This also included the 
secondary data collected and the relevant literature during the analytical process. 
Relevant documents obtained manually or online through the company websites, 
intranets and the internet were also transferred into NVivo as a data source and coded as 
appropriate; for example: business unit plans from EngConsult were coded to ‘external 
context’  and ‘internal context’; employee survey results from EventCo, which reflected 
the perception of the organisation’s espoused culture of collaboration, were coded to 
‘internal context’; and recent organisation charts and the company’s annual report from 
EventCo were also coded to ‘internal context’.  
3.5.5 Reviewing themes  
‘Coding on’ involved breaking down the now restructured categories into subcategories 
to explore each of them to provide a more in-depth understanding. Exploration of 
divergent views, negative cases, attitudes and beliefs of the subsidiary or its various 
levels of management that might impact on the nature of the subsidiary relationship, 
was conducted (see Figure 3-6).  
 
Figure 3-6: Review of emerging themes 
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3.5.6 Defining and naming themes  
Data reduction, which involved consolidating codes from all three cycles into more 
abstract, philosophical and literature-based themes, was carried out to create a final 
framework of themes and used to explore their inter-relatedness for reporting purposes 
(see Figure 3-7).  
 
Figure 3-7: Inclusion of literature linked to emerging themes from the data 
3.5.7 Producing the report  
Phase 6 involved writing analytical memos against the higher level themes to 
summarise the content of each category and its codes and propose empirical findings 
against such categories (see Figure 3-8).  
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Figure 3-8: Example of analytical memo 
Consideration was given to what was said when looking at the content of specific 
clusters of codes. For example, in the definition of competition, subcategories such as 
‘healthy competition’, and ‘unintentional competition’ were included where, 
traditionally, competition is perceived negatively by managers. Consideration of the 
background information recorded against the participants was also reviewed. For 
example, the divisional managers as a hierarchical group were responsible and 
accountable for the unit’s performance, which was measured primarily by profit. The 
focus on profit attainment at this level was a primary factor leading to competitive 
relationships with other SBUs and subsidiaries. Primary sources were also considered in 
relation to the literature as well as identifying gaps in the literature (see Figure 3-7).  
Phase 7 involved testing the accuracy of the findings and further interrogating the data 
by drawing on relationships between themes, demographics, observations and literature.  
Phase 8 involved synthesizing the analysis to produce the findings report for each 
organisational case.  
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Table 3-6 links the stages and processes previously outlined, and conducted in NVivo, 
to the practical guidelines set out by Braun and Clarke, 2006.  Their six-step approach 
to conducting TA is displayed in the first column while the second column displays 
their corresponding application in NVivo. The third column shows the strategic 
elements of coding as I moved from initial participant led descriptive coding, to the 
secondary coding, which was more interpretive in nature and as such was both 
participant and researcher led, to the final abstraction to themes which is researcher only 
led. The fourth column shows the more iterative nature of the tasks as the coding, 
analysis and reporting proceeds towards conclusion.  
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Table 3-6: States and processes involved in qualitative analysis (adapted from Braun and 
Clarke, 2006).  
Analytical Process 
Practical Application in 
NVivo 
Strategic Objective 
Iterative process throughout 
analysis 
1. Familiarisation 
with the data  
Phase 1   
Transcribing data, reading 
and re-reading the data, 
noting down initial ideas. 
Import data into NVivo  
 
Data Management 
(Open and  hierarchical  
coding through NVivo) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Accounts 
(Reordering, ‘coding 
on’ and annotating  
through NVivo) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory Accounts 
(Extrapolating deeper 
meaning, drafting 
summary statements and 
analytical memos 
through NVivo ) 
 
Assigning data to refined concepts 
to portray meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refining and distilling more 
abstract concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assigning data to themes/concepts 
to portray meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
Assigning meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generating themes and concepts 
2.  Generating 
initial codes   
Phase  2  - Open Coding 
Coding interesting features 
of the data in a systematic 
fashion across the initial 
case organisation  
3. Searching for 
themes  
Phase 3  - Categorisation 
of Codes  
Collating codes into 
potential themes, gathering 
all data relevant to each 
theme, triangulation with 
key informants    
4. Reviewing 
themes  
Phase 4 – Coding On   
Checking if the themes 
work in relation to the 
coded extracts and data set  
- generating a ‘map’ of the 
analysis  
5. Defining and 
naming themes 
Phase 5 – Data 
Reduction 
Ongoing analysis to refine 
the specifics of themes, 
and overall storyline(s)  
6. Producing the 
report  
Phase 6 – Generating 
Analytical Memos  
Phase 7  - Testing  and 
Validating  
Phase 8  - Synthesizing 
Analytical Memos  
Final  opportunity for 
analysis, final analysis of 
selected extracts, relate 
back to research question 
and literature  - produce 
report of analysis  
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3.5.8 Within-case analysis  
Within-case analysis typically involves detailed case study write-ups for each case 
organisation. The write-ups are often simply pure descriptions, but they are central to 
the generation of insight (Gersick, 1988; Pettigrew, 1988) because they help researchers 
to cope early in the analysis process with the often enormous volumes of data. The 
overall idea behind the write-ups is to be intimately familiar with each case on its own 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As the primary unit of analysis, the inter-subsidiary relationship as 
described by the informants in terms of competition and collaboration, each case type of 
relationship was examined to determine the content of that interaction and the factors 
that influenced the nature of the relationship. The internal and external context of each 
case was described in detail to understand the impact of the external environment, as 
well as the internal structure including culture, on the coopetitive relationships within 
the MNC. This process allowed unique patterns of each subsidiary interaction to emerge 
before generalising patterns across the three MNCs.  
In the first instance, the case descriptions were presented back to the key sponsors 
within each company in a face-to-face meeting to ascertain the accuracy of the factual 
content, without interpretation, and review for any anonymity and confidentiality 
concerns. These meetings fostered further discussion and insight into possible 
interpretations.  
Having consented to the case organisation description, the key sponsors reviewed the 
case write-up on completion some weeks later and were asked to comment again on my 
interpretation of events and conclusions and again provide their consent for use in the 
thesis. All three companies provided their consent to proceed.   
After having analysed each respective case on its own using case description and 
within-case analysis, the final section of the chapter turns to the comparative analysis of 
the three case study firms. The analytical focus was on the detection of similarities or 
differences concerning structure, related processes, involved actors and the espoused 
tensions in the inter-subsidiary relationships within the three organisations.  
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3.5.9 Cross-case synthesis  
Cross-case analysis is driven by the reality that people are notoriously poor processors 
of information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The key to good cross-case comparison is 
counteracting tendencies of leaping to conclusions by looking at the data in many 
divergent ways (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  These tactics improve the likelihood of 
accurate and reliable theory, i.e. a theory with a close fit to the data (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Also, cross-case searching tactics enhance the probability that the researcher will 
capture novel findings that may exist in the data.  
Several tactics were employed.  Categories were selected and I looked for within-group 
similarities, coupled with inter-group differences. The categories initially followed the 
framework of Luo (2005) in terms of the content and determinants of inter-subsidiary 
coopetition and supporting (but not inhibiting) infrastructure.  Additional dimensions 
evolved during the data collection which were followed up by reviewing additional 
literature and subsequently included in the analysis. For example, many informants 
spontaneously talked about “tensions” that arose from the coexistence and simultaneous 
occurrence of intense competition, while collaborating, a question that was not initially, 
nor explicitly, included in the interview protocol.  A second tactic was employed in 
which I selected two of the case organisations i.e. those of EventCo and PhotoCo which 
are both MNCs but at different stages of maturity, and listed the similarities and 
differences between each pair. These two companies were then compared with 
EngConsult to identify what was similar in maturity and complexity of business 
operations and the impact, if any, that that had on relationships and tensions and how 
they were managed, i.e. what interventions were used. This tactic forced me to look for 
subtle similarities and differences between cases. The juxtaposition of seemingly similar 
cases by a researcher looking for differences can break simplistic frames; in the same 
way the search for similarity in a seemingly different pair also can lead to a more 
sophisticated understanding. The result of forced comparisons can be new categories 
and concepts which the investigator did not anticipate, for example, the evolution of 
MNC strategies of EventCo and PhotoCo expanded into multiple geographic regions 
and accompanying organisation designs, which appeared to influence the willingness 
and necessity of the subsidiaries to collaborate with others with less competition 
evident. A third strategy was to divide the data by data source.  This tactic exploits the 
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unique insight possible from different types of data collection. When a pattern from one 
data source is corroborated by the evidence from another, the finding is stronger and 
better grounded. For example, interpretations of events and relationships were 
corroborated by the different hierarchical levels, usually from a bottom up perspective. 
This was not the case usually when taking a “top down” perspective as in Event Co, 
where the SBU CEO’s perspective was that there was less competition in interactions of 
new product development. However, until a fair transfer pricing situation was 
established, the hierarchical level below still perceived the interactions to be a 
competitive irritant in addition to being a major barrier to future collaborations.    
Explanation building is a special type of pattern matching. Here the goal is to analyze 
the case study data by building an explanation about the case and gets closer to 
answering why the relationships, at one point in time, are the way they are.   
3.5.10  Quality criteria  
Case study designs need to maximize their quality through four critical conditions 
related to design quality: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability (Yin, 2009). Validity is a concern in any piece of research and refers to “the 
extent to which a research procedure can be considered to capture meaningfully its 
aims” (Dul and Hak, 2008: 291).  
 To address some of these concerns the following steps were designed and used in the 
study:  
(i) Construct validity: in case study research construct validity can be demonstrated 
through triangulating a number of data sources (e.g. intranets, interviews, documents 
and interim progress updates with key informants) that have been assembled as part of 
the case at the data collection stage, although this in effect may more appropriately  
address convergent validity (Jick, 1979). Construct validity is concerned more with how 
a variable has been operationalised. As such, the definitions of the constructs of 
competition and collaboration adopted in the literature were clarified in Section 2.2. The 
informants were asked as part of the interview to define and describe how the constructs 
are manifest within their organisations.  
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(ii) Internal validity refers to the presence of causal relationships between variables. 
While my research is primarily exploratory in terms of how subsidiaries both compete 
and collaborate within the MNC, and internal validity is not of concern to descriptive 
and exploratory studies, a portion of my research looks to the antecedents of inter-
subsidiary competition and inter-subsidiary collaboration to identify any underlying 
mechanisms that may facilitate (or inhibit) both interactions occurring simultaneously 
and what the content of those interactions are.  Therefore in the process of seeking how, 
I also sought explanations for why certain conditions were believed to lead to other 
conditions. This was helpful when I reviewed the patterns and addressed any rival 
explanations (Eisenhardt, 1989) that surfaced during the within-case and cross-case 
analyses.  
(iii) External validity defines the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalised. The external validity problem has been a major barrier in case studies. 
However, critics implicitly contrast the situation to survey research, in which a sample 
is intended to be generalised to a larger universe. This analogy to samples and universes 
is incorrect when dealing with case studies. Survey research relies on statistical 
generalisation, whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytic 
generalisation. In analytical generalisation, the investigator strives to generalise a 
particular set of results to some broader theory (Yin, 2009).  
(iv) Reliability: Within-case study research, transparency and replication have been 
suggested as key aspects of reliability (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010).  Replication can be 
achieved through multiple cases in multiple settings (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) as 
in this study. Further, Yin (2009) advocates a case study database. A database was 
developed and retained in an NVivo folder labelled “Data Collection Journal” (see 
Figure 3-9) which attempted to capture as many steps as possible in the research journal 
and was separate from all forms of raw data collected.  
Generalisability relates to the belief that theories must be shown to account for 
phenomena not only in the setting in which they were studied, but also beyond these 
confines (Bryman, 2001). Multiple case studies can use the logic of replication and 
comparison to strengthen conclusions drawn from single sites and provide evidence for 
other than their broader utility and the conditions under which they hold. The bounding 
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of the research to inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration in the intra-
organisational context of the multinational company limits the generalisability. Any 
transferability (Patton, 2002) in the interpretivists’ lexicon inferred in other settings can 
be provided by extensive background data and rich descriptions (Creswell, 2007) and 
leave it up to the readers to make their own comparisons.  
 
Figure 3-9: Data collection journal 
3.5.10.1 Personal reflection  
Because the researcher is the instrument in qualitative inquiry, it is also important to 
consider the experience, training, and perspective that I bring to the field. “The principle 
is to report any person and professional information that may have affected data 
collection, analysis and interpretation in the minds of the users of the findings” (Patton, 
2002:566). In terms of my own background and interests, I had comfort in my 
knowledge of the complexities of operating within an MNC and hence felt that I 
brought an immediate credibility to the research. My background also enabled me to 
quickly connect with my informants, in both understanding their business and 
interpersonal issues, and the complexities of the existing organisational designs and 
coordination requirements, as well as having empathy for the sensitivities of intra-
organisational relationships.  Furthermore, having reviewed the extant literature and 
conducted some initial exploratory interviews about the topic prior to the formal study, I 
could say with confidence that the topic of enquiry was of interest to organisational 
managers. However, I refrained from the role of the consultant but did offer my 
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observations and any relevant knowledge and experience that I had gained in my 
previous roles in large companies for discussion.  
3.6 SUMMARY  
A critical realist informed approach is more likely to ask causal questions, and to seek 
processes that produce causes, than are other approaches (Mutch, 2010).  By capturing 
the social actors’ experiences and accounts of their inter-subsidiary relationships 
(empirical), the study exposes the mechanisms (real) along with the interactions and 
outcomes (actual) through pattern seeking and comparative analysis.  
The choice of more than one case helps to identify cross –cutting patterns or demi-
regularities (Lawson, 1977) while at the same time signalling possible causes and the 
opportunities to follow them up through deeper analysis.  Uncovering the mechanisms 
involves establishing patterns of events from the analysis and interpretation of the data.  
Several iterations of the data are required to reveal fundamental generative mechanisms 
responsible for observed events that describe the multiple and dynamic simultaneous 
relationships of competition and collaboration between the subsidiaries within the three 
MNCs in this study.  
A critical realist approach is necessarily inclusive and incorporates the use of different 
data sources to reveal and explain patterns.  The pool of data gathered from the 
interviews conducted with a number of managers, at different hierarchical levels and 
from multiple subsidiaries, comprise a rich account (drawn from managers’ own 
descriptions and reflections about their competitive and collaborative interactions with 
other subsidiaries) in addition to other company documents and external data sources, 
and is intended to assist in maximising the learning from this study.  
Emergent patterns of coopetition revealed different patterns of inter-subsidiary 
interactions, which then led the researcher to retroductively consider how they might 
have emerged. The intention of this study is to offer an explanation of the inter-
subsidiary behaviours and relationships, motivations and underlying mechanisms that 
are more than just simple descriptions, which is consistent with the critical realist 
perspective (Sayer, 2010).  
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4 CASE ORGANISATION 1 - EngConsult   
This section gives a brief overview of EngConsult (4.1), the external context (4.1.1), 
and the internal context (4.1.2) relevant to the study.  
The description of the case organisation is followed by a within-case analysis (4.2) and 
presentation of the findings.  
4.1 THE ORGANISATION   
EngConsult is a global management, engineering and development consultancy serving 
the public and private sectors around the world. The Group was formed as the result of a 
merger of two well known international engineering consultancies in the late 1980s. 
Their diverse global consultancy works across 12 core sectors, ranging from civil 
engineering to international development. In 1996, EngConsult established a joint 
venture company to serve North America’s booming transportation market. Today it has 
a 51.6% controlling interest as reported in the 2013 Annual Report.    
The Group’s long-term strategy is to provide an all-inclusive engineering, management 
and development consultancy on a global scale through organic growth and planned 
acquisitions, accelerating their growth and international expansion. In order to meet the 
evolving needs of their customers, they are continuing to increase their geographic 
spread, expand their range of services and introduce new expertise. 
The Group is a privately owned company, one of the world's largest employee-owned 
companies, with over 14,000 staff. The Group perceives their ownership structure as 
enabling them to take the long-term view, acting in the best interests of their customers 
and staff. Their ownership and collective reward system promotes the achievement of 
the performance of the group. 
EngConsult operates all of its core businesses in several subsidiaries across Asia, 
Europe, America and the Middle East. It has principal offices in nearly 70 countries and 
projects in more than 140 countries (see Figure 4-1). Over 75% of the staff work on 
projects overseas.   
Adopting a collaborative way of working, both internally (and with external partners), 
their geographical and technical footprints combine to offer both local delivery and 
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international know-how to their customers and partnerships.  In-depth insight and 
understanding of the client’s business environment, stakeholders, goals and challenges 
at a local level is complemented by their global experience and learning.  
 
Figure 4-1: Regional map of worldwide office locations and staff of EngConsult @ 2010. 
(Source: Firm presentation - external document) 
4.1.1 External context  
The global economic slowdown that commenced in 2008 adversely impacted on the 
Group’s core markets, with lower market volumes and competitive pricing pressures. 
The company’s diversification strategy has created a broad base to their business, 
protecting the company from the ‘peaks and troughs’ as a whole against market 
fluctuations. For example, “the UK division grew in 2013 and continued to benefit from 
the government’s recognition of infrastructure as an engine of growth” (Annual Report, 
2013: 5) as other economies such as Australia began to weaken.   
4.1.2  Internal context   
In 2009/10, the Group redesigned the organisation from a globally coordinated sector- 
based organisation to a regionally structured one. The four regional business areas were 
established as: 1. Europe and Africa; 2. North America; 3. Middle East and South Asia; 
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and 4. Asia Pacific and Australia. The new structure effectively strengthened the local 
and regional management to be closer to the customer and positioned the Group to be 
better able to take advantage of future opportunities. However, it was clear that the 
continued implementation of the reorganisation in 2010 was going to be impacted on by 
the persistent economic recession. Double digit growth plans based on the opportunities 
foreseen in the regions were more conservative than planned.  Specific subsidiaries 
experienced short term pressures as governments sought to tackle their fiscal deficits by 
constraining investments in infrastructure.  
The four regions and 12 core businesses form a matrix and jointly bear the operational 
responsibilities of the Group. They operate with autonomy within the geographic and 
sector boundaries and policies determined by the Group Board. The businesses have 
entrepreneurial responsibility for their markets.    
EngConsult’s 12 businesses (e.g. TPN: Transportation) are sub-divided into 17 
Divisions (e.g. Health and Education) and geographic sub-divisions (e.g. South Central, 
US) with unit P&L responsibility. The Division is EngConsult’s lowest business 
planning unit.  Figure 4-2 shows the organisation chart at the regional, SBU and 
subsidiary level for EngConsult.  
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Figure 4-2: EngConsult - Organisation chart: Regions, SBUs and subsidiaries 
4.1.2.1 EngConsult regional organisations   
A brief description of the four regions (SBUs) and their subsidiaries follows. 
The configuration of Business Units, Divisions and sub-Divisions varies within the 
regions, with some being based on practice (sector) activities, some on geographical 
locations, and others being a hybrid that will work across practice and geographical 
boundaries (see Figure 4-2). Three sector units retained a global structure in order to 
preserve their specific global client relationships (e.g. power, oil and gas and pipelines 
in the energy sector). The implication of the decision to retain the previous global focus 
for both units is that the resources are retained and controlled within the respective units 
and not allocated across the new regional framework and profit units.    
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Europe, UK and Africa Region (EUNA) consist of seven SBUs (five sectors, one 
geographic, and one global unit) which represent approximately 55% of the Group’s 
revenue. This region contains many of the centres of excellence as the UK was the 
location of the original company with multi-sector skills. It incorporates both mature 
and emerging countries such as Russia and Africa, varying in economic, cultural and 
geopolitical challenges for its subsidiaries.  
North America (NASA) is a joint venture and the four business units (three geographies 
and one global sector - Pipelines) represent approximately 24% of the Group’s gross 
income. The region has previously shown strong growth but is recently being impacted 
on by a weaker economy and the impact of federal government liquidity problems.    
The Middle East and South Asia (MESA) region in 2009 represented about 20% of 
gross revenue and now, i.e. in 2014, represents 11% of the Groups gross income. The 
MESA region is comprised of three geographic regions (India, Pakistan and the Middle 
East) and one global business (oil, gas and petrochemicals). This region is extremely 
diverse, with political unrest affecting some Arab States and the stability of the region. 
Nevertheless, many new entrants have entered the region since the economic downturn. 
Pricing remains under pressure for all subsidiaries in this region.   
The Asia Pacific and Australia (APNA) region has increased from 5% of the Group’s 
gross revenue in 2009 to 10% gross income in 2013. The potential for growth and 
investment exists in NZ as the Australian economy has slowed in line with hard 
commodities. This region consists of four geographically based subsidiaries: Hong 
Kong/Macau, South East Asia, China/Taiwan and Australia/New Zealand.  
Table 4-1summarises the financial contribution of each region, comprised of sectors and 
geographies. The table identifies the 14 out of the total 19 SBUs included in the 
research. The remaining five SBUs were unavailable in the time frame available.   
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Table 4-1: EngConsult - Four regions and subsidiaries  
EngConsult 
Regions 
APNA MESA NASA EUNA 
Financial 
contribution (2013) 
10%  
of group’s gross 
income 
11%  
of group’s gross 
income 
24%  
of group’s gross 
income 
55%  
of group’s gross 
income 
Sector or 
geography 
Geography (3) Geography (3) &  
Global Sector (1) 
Geography (3) &  
Global Sector (1) 
Sector (5), Global 
Sector (1) & 
Geography (1) 
14 SBUs 
participated  
 
Australia/NZ,  
Hong Kong  
India, Pakistan, & 
Middle East  
Canada, East US, 
West US,  
Pipelines   
Europe, Russia & 
Africa,  TPN, 
W&E, PCM, B&I 
Note: TPN-transportation; W&E-water and environment; PCM-programme consultancy 
and management; B&I- building and infrastructure. 
4.1.2.2 Group practice leader roles  
At the time of regionalisation in 2009, Group Practice Leader roles were also 
introduced.  “When the company regionalised, it was recognised that someone would be 
needed to ensure that people and projects were joined up.  There was a perceived danger 
that regionalisation could create more silos.” (Source: Internal document)    
Furthermore, in 2013, EngConsult appointed a group practice manager for its building 
businesses who would also be responsible for promoting collaboration across the whole 
consultancy.  The Chairman of EngConsult said: “Group practice managers are a key 
part of EngConsult’s organisational structure.  The role [of the Buildings Practice 
Leader] will also channel emphasis on collaborative working driven by improved 
process and increased use of a common data base.” (Source: Firm website)  
4.1.2.3 Collaboration initiative  
Since 2009/10, the Group Board has consistently increased its focus on horizontal 
optimisation. Under the customer focus initiative of its Business Improvement 
Programme, the Board initiated the Collaboration Initiative. The goal is to foster 
horizontal collaboration between local business units and regional companies for the 
ongoing realisation of organisational growth and expansion.  Collaboration across 
business entities within EngConsult is “entirely compatible with improved performance 
of the individual entities as well as the Group as a whole” (Source: Internal Document: 
Practice Leader). 
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However, contrary to this initiative, the Group recognises that where hybrid activity 
across practice areas and geographic boundaries is present, there is potential for 
overlapping or duplicated investment in the development of markets, products and 
processes, in addition to commercial behaviour that may not fully recognise the benefits 
of collaboration. Furthermore, where separate business entities are carrying out work in 
overlapping practice areas, there is a potential for competitive behaviour. While this 
may be seen to drive innovation and energetic Business Development activity, the 
Group recognises that it may also drive unwillingness to share best practice, resources 
and customers. 
4.1.2.4 Demographic analysis  
The length of tenure of the SBU and subsidiary MDs reflects a stable professional base 
at the highest levels of the organisation (see Table 4-2) and retention of highly skilled 
professionals across the organisation. While averages are provided per cell in Table 4-2, 
the figures belie the overall range of tenure and professional expertise that resides 
within EngConsult for the sample of informants, which ranged from two to 39 years.  
The UK, which is now part of the EUNA region, was the original Headquarters for all 
Global Sectors prior to the regionalisation strategy.   
The core technical expertise resided in the UK HQ. Senior management /consultants are 
now dispersed across the four regions to build capability and capacity in each 
geographic region.  
  
 107 
Table 4-2: EngConsult - Length of tenure and time in role of senior management  
Demographics    APNA EUNA MESA NASA Group  
# Interviews by Region 
Total 
(57) 
8 21 6 18 4 
Average Tenure (Yrs) 
Avg. 
(19 yrs.) 
16 24 21 18 13 
Regional/SBU MDs (Yrs)   - 19 22 25 26 N/A 
Subsidiary MDs (Yrs)  - 7 24 21 13 N/A 
Average Time in Role (Yrs) 
Avg. 
(7 yrs.) 
4 4 14 7 2 
4.2 WITHIN-CASE FINDINGS    
4.2.1 Nature of relationships amongst the subsidiaries  
In the investigation of the relationship consisting of competition and collaboration 
between the subsidiaries, the data suggest that the nature of the relationships between 
the subsidiaries is experienced at different levels and locations within the firm. Different 
hierarchical levels within the subsidiary have a different perspective on the interactions 
necessary to collaborate and the desired outcomes of collaboration resulting from 
consideration of their own unit’s interests. Divisional and sub-divisional managers who 
are most closely tasked with running the businesses are focused on the profitability of 
their units but almost begrudgingly appreciate that on occasions, “they had to take one 
on the chin” for the good of the firm and for the long game. They struggled with the 
challenge of both collaborating with their counterparts, while focusing on achieving 
their financial goals.  
“For most people if you’re a divisional manager, like me, or sub-divisional 
manager, your focus is on delivering the budget you have set for the year, 
exceeding it if possible, and taking whatever actions are necessary to achieve 
that.  And if one of the actions you’re looking at is giving away some of it to 
someone else for the sake of collaboration, you’re going to think twice about it.” 
[D#3] 
“There are clashes, tension between the practices and the divisional 
managers….At the end of the day, if you like, I am the leader of the unit and I 
can decide…  When it’s global that gets a bit more difficult because you’ve got 
unit managing directors, regional managing directors, and potentially even the 
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group board involved in making those kind of decisions.  And it just makes it 
that much more difficult if the parties can’t agree between them.” [B#15] 
The findings also show that a focal subsidiary has multiple simultaneous relationships 
of competition and collaboration with their peers (see Figure 4-3). Using Luo’s (2005) 
framework to illustrate, the new EUNA region/UK subsidiary might be categorised as 
an “ardent contributor” (i.e. high collaborator, low competitor) of expert resources to 
subsidiaries within other regions; for example, the Middle East countries, South Asia 
and Australia and NZ. Historically the technical sector expertise was centralised within 
a UK HQ global structure but the expertise was dispersed when the firm became a 
regional organisation. However, not only do the sector units from the UK subsidiary 
contribute resources through collaboration with others, they now compete for access to 
new markets that were previously not of relevance. The UK sector subsidiaries are also 
viewed by specific subsidiaries, and act, as a competitor with other units in their attempt 
to expand into geographies, such as the European region (ERA), in order to protect their 
own level of profitability, due to the decline of the UK economy. This suggests that a 
focal subsidiary could be both an aggressive demander with one unit and an ardent 
contributor with another, thus indicating various levels of competition and collaboration 
in the coopetitive frame of that focal unit within the PSF network.  
(i) With region coopetition   
I also observed a greater level of collaborative interactions between the subsidiaries 
within their respective regions, with less interaction occurring across the regions (see 
Figure 4-3).  For example, within the European region, two subsidiaries overlap in both 
skills and market due to the retention of the acquired business as a single unit and not 
being split across the existing related business. The intensity of the interactions was 
subjectively evaluated based on the tone and language used by the informants when 
talking about the interaction (e.g. “the whole thing starts with people glaring at each 
other and their arms folded,” [B#20]) and was captured in the figure by using upper case 
lettering (e.g. C-) which represented a more tense and competitive relationship as in the 
case example between H&E and W&E. The overlapping skills in each of these units 
over time caused significant tension between the two units. The other symbols in the 
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figure are: c+ (lower case, lower level of collaboration) and x (an interaction but not 
noted as either competitive or collaborative).  
Two other coopetitive relationships were identified.  
(ii) Cross-region coopetition  
The data suggest that coopetitive relationships across the regions also exist – for 
example, TPN and the three subsidiaries (Middle East, India and Hong Kong). The 
coopetitive relationship results from post regionalisation survival as insufficient 
resources of the required capability exist within the newly formed regions to win project 
work. The three subsidiaries identified as both competing and collaborating all have 
requirements for more TPN expertise and therefore are dependent upon the TPN sector 
operating out of the EUNA region for access to these resources. However, TPN 
resources are also prioritised against within region requirements. The three subsidiaries 
are not only competing with TPN for resources, but as I will discuss later, they are also 
seeking these resources at reasonable trading prices. Furthermore the three subsidiaries 
are also in competition with each other for TPN’s scarce resources.  
 
Figure 4-3: EngConsult - Inter-subsidiary relationships 
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Canada C+ c+/c- x x C+ C+ C+
Pipelines C+/c- x C+/c- x
US East c+ C- C+ c+ x
US West C+ C+ x
Region: A/NZ , SEAsia C+ C+ C+
Australia/NZ x C+ C+ C+ C+ C+ C+ C+ C+ C+ C+
China x
Hong Kong C+ x c- c+/C-
SEA x
- Singapore x C+
 - Malaysia c+ c+ x c+ C+
Region: ME C+ C-
India c+ x c+ x x c+ x x C+/c- x x
Middle East x c+ C- C+/C-
Pakistan C+ C-
Oil & Gas (Global) x
Region: UK/Europe x C- C- C+ x x x x x x x x x
B&I c+ x c- C+/C-
ERA c+ C+ c- C+ C+/c- c- c-
PCM x x C+/C- x c- c- c- c- C+ c- C+
MCD c-
- H&E x c- C+ x x x C+/C- x C-
TPN x C+/C- x C+/C- C- C- C+ C+ x
W& E x x C+ x C+ x C+ C+ C+/c- C+ c+ c+ C+
 - ID C- x
 - Environment c+
Power (Global) C+ C+ C+/c- C+/c-
Region: Nth America 
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(iii) Global sector /regional overlap  
A further example of a coopetitive relationship exists between the global units who 
operate without the imposed boundaries of any particular region, i.e. between Power 
which is a global unit and the newly formed ERA subsidiary. A further example is 
highlighted between Pipelines global unit and Canada. Pipeline is currently operating 
successfully in Canada and while collaborating on projects, Canada can also see the 
potential to develop the same capabilities so that it can pursue pipeline related work and 
grow its revenue as a result. This, however, could potentially reduce Pipelines revenue 
stream by up-skilling Canada.   
The findings further highlighted that the relationship of a focal subsidiary with another 
changed over time in addition to having multiple simultaneous relationships of both 
competition and collaboration coexisting within the PSF.  
The nature of the subsidiary relationships changed over time due to changing conditions 
within both the external (e.g. from a prosperous to austere economy) and internal 
environment (from global sector to regionally coordinated transnational firm). External 
factors such as a challenging economy or the competitive environment of new entrants 
to the market raised the focal subsidiaries’ need for cost-effective resources. However, 
the respondents also recalled that when the economy was more buoyant, competition 
between the subsidiaries was tolerated by both HQ and their sister subsidiaries as there 
was a plentiful supply of work for all. Regionalisation changed the dynamics of 
previously established relationships under the global structure, creating competition as 
newly formed subsidiaries found themselves without sufficient resources to operate in 
the new regional divisional structure. This change in global structure led to units 
competing with other units with which previously they had long established 
relationships at the subsidiary and interpersonal level.  
I illustrate this with an example between a sector and geographic unit. ERA (a 
geographic unit) and Power (a global unit) now compete for business opportunities. The 
Power unit pursues opportunities independently, having retained their position as a 
global unit to service the global nature of their clients. The Power sector continues to 
build up capacity, capability and profit, without needing to collaborate with ERA. I also 
noted that the inter-subsidiary relationships were asymmetrical and influenced by the 
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capability and capacity of resources at their disposal and the difficulty experienced in 
gaining access to specialist resources for collaboration from other subsidiaries.  
4.2.1.1 Different hierarchical perspectives  
Within the subsidiary there were different hierarchical perspectives and focus on the 
content of the coopetitive relationship. Based on experience and position, the SBU 
CEOs encouraged collaboration as it was the right thing to do for the betterment of the 
firm. An understanding of the bigger picture helped the SBU CEO’s to fulfil their 
adjudication role and raise issues or tensions above and beyond the profit focus of the 
subsidiaries to what is the best solution for the customer and the shareholder.    
“As a Group Board member, not only the regional MD, my first responsibility is 
EngConsult and not the region.” [R#33] 
“The [Subsidiary] divisional managers will by nature always fight for their bottom 
line.” [G#55] 
“I believe culturally, because of the structure of the business, because of all these little 
tiny P&Ls that sit across the business, it makes it very difficult for individual sub-
divisions to be any way proactive in being collaborative when they feel that they are 
being threatened or are just looking at their bottom line locally, and so therefore will 
have difficulty in actually saying, yes we may share the profits, but if I only get 2% out 
of this big picture I need to get 10% locally because that’s the only way I can survive.  
And so therefore I believe there are a limited number culturally that understand and can 
accept a collaborative way of working, and I believe there are too many others that are 
in the position of (a) not wanting to because it’s actually affecting how they work (b) 
because they have to, because they’re looking after a P&L or (c) don’t actually 
understand the benefits of making it work.” [G#21] 
 “Equally the further down the pecking order you get, not everybody has access to the 
wider picture.” [B#23]  
4.2.1.2 Tensions and interventions  
The findings also identified tensions between the subsidiaries resulting from 
collaboration and competition. Collaboration was seen as an additional tension by those 
units in regions who were resource poor.  
Opportunities for collaboration on various projects and bids were sought after from 
other units to utilise slack resources. A unit’s request to collaborate, prompted by the 
need to increase its utilisation rate, was not always perceived positively by a receiving 
unit. The initiating unit believed that they were bringing significant resources to the 
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table for a particular opportunity but the receiving unit did not perceive the value of 
what was on offer because the capability was “overblown” [D#12] or actually not what 
the client wanted.  Residual tension existed within the collaboration resulting from the 
perception that the resources offered were “not necessarily their best: in fact, you 
probably got leftovers” [D#12]. Had there been another option for either party, the 
collaboration between the two subsidiaries may not have occurred.  
“They have no particular interest to put good resource into our project because whether 
they perform well or poorly, they’re still going to be able to charge us and pull in a bit 
of profit. So you have that tension all the time, that in a collaborative situation you don’t 
necessarily get the best team.” [D#12]  
“It’s TPN Division that does water but it’s, as I said, the transportation division that 
does everything. So they will basically compete for similar work in the same sectors.  
I’m not sure of the detail of how they work it, what clients they go for and how they 
avoid one another but straight away there’s a competition there and a tension there.” 
[D#12] 
“If you’re in a collaboration situation where actually for whatever reason you’re saying, 
right, we will collaborate with this team, but we’re not actually going to get any direct 
benefit out, it’s going to go to the group, that is where the tension comes in terms of 
trying to justify doing what you’re doing, which is perhaps impacted on your bottom 
line performance…..But it’s a really difficult one, the tension between the two.  As I 
say, if it works it’s fine because it’s not a problem, but if it doesn’t work there can be a 
tension between the two of them” [B#4] 
The reluctance of the Group to mandate practices and policies implies that HQ benefits 
from the flexibility that ensues.  However, the subsidiaries have to cope with the 
resultant level of tension that comes from an element of inter-subsidiary competition. 
The benefit, as opposed to the tension experienced, is not consistently perceived 
throughout the hierarchical levels.  
“Where there is occasional to frequent competition and I don't know where it sits, but 
there is tension, which does take management time to sort out.” [D#22]  
 “Folks at the senior level are saying that is good to have the tension, but the folks who 
are doing it do not think that the tension is good.” [S#54]   
Interventions were initiated to “sort out” the tensions and rebalance the levels of 
competition and collaboration between the units. These interventions ranged from 
simple dialogue between the competing subsidiaries to more structural interventions 
such as merging the competing units.  
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“I am at E grade --- a lot of people at E and F Grade kind of circumnavigate  ... pick up 
the phone” [S#54]  
 
“What we’re trying to do is these sorts of nitty-gritty disagreements and negotiations … 
and set out a broad set of principles in terms of what the parties will be getting out of 
any sort of collaborations of that nature. …we’ve been at this now for four and a half 
years [since regionalisation] and there are still many tensions in the business so let’s get 
the issues on the table: what does look like from your end of the telescope, and I’ll tell 
you what it looks like from my end of the telescope.” [B#23] 
4.2.2 Determining factors of competition and collaboration  
The data suggest nine determinants: four leading to collaboration and five to 
competition. 
Luo (2005) identified a unique set of antecedents for cooperation and competition. This 
was not the finding in this study, however, as the complex mix in the coopetitive 
relationship influenced the subsidiary interaction overall.  
4.2.2.1 Strategic interdependence 
Collaboration was driven by business need. This need was met by securing access to 
and leveraging existing and complementary resources located throughout the regions 
within the PSF. Collaboration between the subsidiaries was necessary due to the size 
and scope of the projects which required resources, in terms of both capacity and 
capability that were not within the individual subsidiary’s control.   
The decision to organise the firm along regional lines meant that specialist sector 
resources which were previously located within their respective global units, were now 
required to be dispersed throughout the regions. Hence, the level of strategic 
interdependence was high and now required each subsidiary to collaborate with a sister 
subsidiary if it wished to pursue larger, multi-sector projects required by regional or 
global clients.   
 “We need help, we need support and so if we don’t push out the collaboration mantra, 
then it will be to our disadvantage.” [B#23] 
 
“Because we’re divided geographically…and yet our clients are saying, we actually 
want you to be providing services from different parts of the globe. So our client base is 
driving the need for collaboration.” [R#40] 
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4.2.2.2 Top management commitment  
The importance of collaboration was constantly communicated throughout the firm by 
the Group Board and top management, and acknowledged as an important factor in 
achieving the level of collaboration and commercial advantage that it provides 
(EngConsult Internal Collaboration Report, June 2014).  
“You have to have the processes, you have to have the systems, but you have to have 
the leadership…and I don't know how else to put that, but if you don't have that it 
[collaboration] falls apart.” [R#41] 
“The other thing our hierarchy does is encourage collaboration. Leadership has to be a 
key factor, it definitely has to be. It’s got to come from the top.” [D#5]  
 
Collaboration was modelled by the leadership at the Business Unit and Divisional levels 
of the subsidiary.  
“We do everything we can just to lower the walls to get that collaborative support 
throughout. We talk about it at all of our meetings, the need for support and 
collaboration….. If I dug my heels in the ground and said we’re never going to 
collaborate with that unit in a month of Sunday’s, everybody would then follow my 
behaviours and it [collaboration] wouldn’t happen.” [B#4]  
 “They [our parent companies] know how to do some give and take and just as any 
parent would for their own children, that really sets a good example of how we need to 
work together. So it does come from the top down.” [D#7]  
However, at the same time, the senior management also makes it clear that each 
individual subsidiary must be profitable AND collaborative.  
“Now if we, as leaders, use the bottom line strictly as the only indicator or basis for 
incentives, then we as leaders aren’t doing the right thing regarding collaboration.” 
[B#3] 
Nonetheless, there was recognition from some leaders that the commitment to 
collaboration between the subsidiaries was easier to advocate from the top.  
“It’s easier from the top to say, “Let’s everyone collaborate,” than it is for someone 
managing a smaller group or sub division.  They have pride, they want to make sure 
they’re performing in the eyes of their leaders, and they want to be successful, and so 
there is tendency maybe on their part to hold on, to use their staff whether they’re the 
right ones or not to be less collaborative than they should be.  So what is getting in the 
way of collaboration?  I think it’s just the structure itself where we have to have a way 
to measure an area’s commercial performance.  So we have sub divisions, divisions and 
units, so obviously there is some kind of a structural wall between those.” [B# 3] 
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4.2.2.3 Trusted relationships 
Both at the inter-subsidiary and interpersonal levels, collaboration increased between 
the subsidiaries as a result of strong working relationships with trusted individuals with 
whom they had worked collaboratively on various projects over the years. Furthermore, 
if the collaboration were successful both were more likely to build on the relationship 
and engage in further collaborations with each other.  
 “So there’s a map or a network of relationships where I’ll get people calling me up to 
say, “We’ve got this opportunity,” and they’ll not call me because I’m the right guy 
that’s going to provide the solution for them, it’s because they know me and we know 
each other, and we’ve got the right relationship.” [B#16] 
“He obviously had a lot of contacts within the business, so when we needed a hand with 
certain staff he could talk to the right person and get the right person to give us the 
support and overview that we needed….I mean it is collegiate but there’s nothing that 
beats that personalised relationship and trust, it just makes it so much easier.” [D#50] 
On the other hand, where a lack of trust exists in the relationship from concerns about 
the subsidiaries capabilities or a prior broken commitment by that unit, the perceived 
risk of the collaboration is factored into the negotiated transfer fee from the selling unit. 
 “I saw the spreadsheet, and each people’s spreadsheet did not include just cost, they 
were cost with contingencies, and therefore they put in contingencies 'cause they don’t 
trust that unit to manage their part of the business properly.”  [D#43] 
On the other hand, competition between the subsidiaries and their subunits was shown 
to increase when: overlap of both markets and skills existed; subsidiaries and their 
subunits performance were publicly compared; individual subsidiaries pursued their 
financial objectives; and external economic factors challenged the unit’s survival. The 
external economic conditions of austerity, dwindling markets, and the need to compete 
locally for survival as a business, led to an increase in inter-subsidiary competition.  
4.2.2.4 Manager’s mindset  
At the individual level, the mindset or attitude of the subsidiary actor influences the 
nature of subsidiary relationships. The mindset is part of human nature and the make-up 
of the individual. The situational decision to compete or collaborate in a specific 
instance was influenced by whether the short term benefits to be gained from 
competition with another unit (e.g. increase of unit P&L) outweighed the longer term 
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benefits from collaboration, hence sacrificing the short term gain of competition for the 
longer term relationship with the organisation.  
 
 “Some of the best collaborations are because the people concerned just have that kind 
of personal attitude to cooperation, and they see that being maybe that’s just their 
modus operandi”….However, “if the attitude is I’m better than you.  I don’t need you 
for anything, or, I don’t have a willingness to collaborate, if that is the way they’re 
going to behave then that is the way they’re going to behave no matter how we’re 
organised.” [B#3]  
“I think competition is good, whatever direction it comes from. So if we’re trying to 
improve our capital employed or trying to improve our profitability, or trying to 
improve the number of awards we win or whatever, we show which divisions and 
which subdivisions are doing better than others.” [B#15] 
 
However, dissenting personal voices were raised as well as those who attached caveats 
to their comments.    
“There is nothing wrong with a good bit of competition. But it’s for the common good.” 
[B#10] 
“Internal competition I don’t see the need for it…you’ll always find a bit of it for good 
natured ribbing with each other, but spending too much effort on internal accounting is 
a distraction.”[B #38] 
“It is a wrong strategy for getting people to compete within the organisation for growth 
and for profitability.  It is not a competition.” [B#56]  
4.2.2.5 Market overlap 
The findings indicated that a growing, prosperous economy influenced the units’ 
willingness to tolerate market and capability overlaps (a state of internal competition) as 
plenty of work existed for everyone. When under-utilisation of people resources was 
prevalent during a period of economic recession, a unit attempting to collaborate can be 
perceived as competing for work and resources “by encroaching on another unit’s 
patch.” [G#52]  
“We get odd parties...working on somebody else’s patch and not declaring that they’re 
working on that patch..... [They have] not called that in to the local manager to find out 
does he know any local knowledge or what’s the situation here, and meanwhile the 
local office has gone off with a local partner and we’ve found that two EngConsult 
teams have been competing for the same work, and weren’t aware.” [D#5] 
 117 
4.2.2.6 Skills overlap 
Similarly, an overlap in the availability of the same specialists’ skills within different 
subsidiaries generated competition and tension when the subsidiaries sought to do 
similar work in the same sector. Examples of skills overlap were previously cited in 
Section 4.2.1. 
4.2.2.7 Performance comparison 
The subsidiaries were mindful of how well they were performing relative to the 
performance of other subsidiaries and regions which led to increased competition.  
“Everybody is driven, they’d like to be successful, they’d like to be more profitable than 
they were last year, and they’d like to beat the regions or the unit next to them. And I 
think that competition is there, and so every unit level director would like to do it better 
than the others in his region.” [D#53]    
The comparative analysis of performance against unit performance targets (see Table 
4-3) was publicly shared at Senior Management meetings and generated an increased 
level of competition between the subsidiaries.  The darker shaded cells in Table 4-3 
quickly identified the units that were under target against the risk indicator on the far 
left of the chart, grey shaded cells were within the standard and the white cells exceeded 
the targets.  
“I want to have better profit, commercially better thing, you know? But competition, it 
automatically reverts into competition when the other units see they are doing better, 
but making them a competition, that doesn't land you anywhere because there are side 
effects of that competition.” [B#56]  
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Table 4-3: EngConsult - 'Traffic light' monitoring of subsidiary KPIs  
End December 2013 
Risk Indicator Div 1 Div 2 Div 3 Div 4 Div 5 
Project profit vs. 2013 budget 
<85% ; 85% to 105% ; >105% 104% 130% 55% 110% 105% 
Overhead gain vs. 2013 budget 
<85% ; 85% to 105% ; >105% 63% 191% 234% 153% 159% 
Profit vs. 2013 budget 
<85% ; 85% to 105% ; >105% 96% 141% 122% 129% 121% 
Loss factor percentage 
>20%% ; 20% to 10% ; <10% 18% 20% 57% 25% 26% 
% Utilisation 
<82% ; 82% to 84% ; >84% 83% 83% 86% 87% 83% 
(Source: EngConsult internal document) 
4.2.2.8 Rewards and incentives  
The findings show that financial rewards and incentives were a consistent driver of both 
collaboration and competition between the subsidiaries. While all were strongly 
encouraged by the Group to collaborate and on occasions altruistically “take one for the 
firm” [D#4], their subsidiary’s performance was measured on own profitability. 
“Primary focus is to win the business, deliver the business, and satisfy the financial 
metrics to have a successful business, and that business being your profit and loss 
account….There’s no metrics at the moment which says, “and you have to collaborate, 
and you have to consider supporting others.” It’s very much you do what you can to 
deliver that P&L, get it done.” [B#18] 
While bonuses were allocated on the basis of overall firm performance, the allocation of 
shares was based on aggregated profit centres. The tension between unit and group 
profitability was clearly tangible.  
“On the one hand we’re all encouraged to collaborate together, work together for the 
greater good, but then I’m answerable on a month on month basis as to why I haven’t 
delivered my profit from a unit perspective.... if you’re in a win/win position then it’s 
fine because you’re collaborating and you’re both winning and getting benefit from it 
and contributing to the bottom line. If you’re in a collaboration situation where actually 
for whatever reason you’re saying, right, we will collaborate with this team, but we’re 
not actually going to get any direct benefit out, it’s going to go to the Group, that is 
where the tension comes in terms of trying to justify doing what you’re doing, which is 
perhaps impacted on your bottom line performance.” [D#4]   
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A subsidiary manager described the tension in terms of a basketball analogy.  
“… if you watch any of the American commentators on a basketball game and they’re 
chatting about the performance of the players, you’ll find they’ll spend equally as much 
time talking about the number of assists a player makes, as well as the number of 
baskets that he scores. And it’s possible to have the most valuable player on the court 
as the one who gives the most assists, the one that helps many of his team mates to 
score baskets.  The challenge in EngConsult is that we have very hard metrics for 
rewarding baskets, but we have very soft metrics, and in some cases no metrics at all, 
for rewarding assists. And the baskets are hitting your P&L and other KPIs which are 
really hard wired performance measures.” [D#23] 
A heightened level of tension was expressed at lower levels within the organisation (i.e. 
at sub-divisional and project management level).   
“There is real anger about being beaten up about utilisation and P&L.” [P#54]  
4.2.3 Internal structures and interventions   
The firm’s existing infrastructure supported both collaboration and competition between 
the subsidiaries. Structural mechanisms were put in place and interventions (see Table 
4-4) implemented to increase the level of collaboration which also served to manage the 
level of internal competition between the subsidiaries. As one regional MD pointed out, 
“[collaboration] won’t occur unless the environment and infrastructure is set up 
correctly for it.” [R#17]  
There were three notable elements: e-business technology; accounting systems; and, 
formal organisational roles. 
4.2.3.1 E-business technology 
E-Business and Information Technology (IT) were viewed as critical to increasing the 
subsidiaries’ opportunities to collaborate within and across geographic and cultural 
boundaries and time zones. Collaborations were made possible by software applications 
and online databases, intranet to facilitate the staffing of client projects, and linked, 
global telecommunications systems to quickly enable conversations and 
teleconferences.   
Corporate management systems, knowledge management systems, service delivery 
tools, IT infrastructure and standards all served to facilitate collaboration between the 
subsidiaries. 
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“We need to move, which we are doing at the moment, to better systems, in terms of IT 
infrastructure and systems, to support working in a collaborative manner. The thing is 
when you are trying to move large amounts of data around, and you are trying to 
respond quickly to the need whether they are client needs or our own needs you just 
need that sort of infrastructure.” [B#14] 
4.2.3.2 Accounting system 
It was not evident that the Group intentionally implemented structures or processes to 
encourage inter-subsidiary competition. Yet, the accounting system of profit allocation 
engendered significant levels of competition between units.  
“I think because we all have to measure the beans one way or the other there is the 
competing forces of everyone wanting to meet their bottom line, or their revenue 
projection. So that gets in the way of collaboration to some degree.” [B#1] 
“The accounting policy required trading agreements between subsidiary collaborations 
involving different countries and legal entities because of tax and statutory accounting 
regulations. Although many different inter-entity agreement templates were provided by 
Group to cover general principles and frequent scenarios, the firm did not impose any of 
them in the belief that the fairest way to progress the collaboration was to let the two (or 
more) willing parties ‘sort it out’.” [G#57]  
“The only way we could think of making it fair was to have two willing parties agreeing 
to a deal, but the downside of that was negotiation cost and time and other people 
spending weeks arguing with each other about what the deal was. And the relationship 
too, it can get frictional.” [G#57] 
While a win/win situation is possible for both collaborating units, it is not easy to 
represent the positive contributions of both parties in the accounting practices of 
EngConsult.   
“It’s very difficult to achieve a P&L representation of that win/win situation, and is 
sometimes impossible because sometimes you can have the local work accounted by the 
local company, and the international work accounted by the technical unit, but it’s not 
entirely the answer, not entirely satisfactory. There is no formal recognition for 
collaboration as such, unless that collaboration led to an increase in your net revenue or 
an increase in profitability.” [R#41]  
An element of game playing and self interest became evident during the transfer pricing 
negotiations, in the subsidiaries attempts to persuade another to collaborate.  
“Because there was profit to share; ensures that they get a reasonable slice of the cake in 
terms of doing the actual work and a chance to make reasonable profit. However, they 
may not have understood but [there was] also an element of con, in that they wanted to 
drive the supply cost down.” [B#4]  
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The lack of a more centralised decision making process was lamented at times by the 
subsidiaries where more clarity and mandated direction would have facilitated 
collaboration and balanced the level of competition generated by the firm’s profit-
centricity.  
“We’re not an authoritarian kind of company so there isn’t somebody on the group 
board normally who’s going to say, right, this is how we’ll do it, you, you, you and you. 
We don’t do that. We tend to be much more collegiate in the way that we operate.” 
[R#40] 
4.2.3.3 Formal organisational roles  
(i) Adjudicator  
When negotiations for staff resources and profit share which occurred during the project 
bidding phase reached an impasse, senior management or indeed Group Board 
management were asked to intervene and adjudicate.  Firm ownership by top 
management satisfied management’s self- interest in terms of rewards and incentives, 
and provided the mutual interest necessary to collectively encourage performance for 
the betterment of the firm. Thus, the Group Board was able to maintain the firm-wide 
perspective needed when adjudications were called upon in instances when subsidiaries 
were required for firm-wide or strategic reasons to sacrifice their own (financial) 
interests for the bigger picture and overall, longer term benefit of the firm.  
“I mean, although the profit motive is very high I guess when you look around sort of 
the Group Board level, or the leaders of the business, they’ve probably actually got to 
those positions because of their ability to manage interfaces and to actually… they 
probably stand out because they’re actually able to make profit but actually also not to 
go on the dark side in order to do it.  You know, they can do both you know.” [B#24] 
The Group Board’s perspective of overall group performance and profitability overrode 
the more focused commitment to the local P&L statement of a subsidiary manager. 
Although collaboration was enabled through the process of adjudication, relationships 
and trust were sometimes damaged in the process. This impacted on future 
collaborations between these subsidiaries.  
“I’d say, ‘Look, this is good business for EngConsult. If you’re incapable of coming to 
a sensible conclusion, this is how it’s going to be ….’ And that usually sorts it out. But, 
of course, you’ve lost to an extent then, because inevitably the whole thing therefore 
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starts with people glaring at each other with their arms folded and, you know, that’s not 
a good collaboration.” [R#20]   
(ii) Practice Leader 
Seldom were subsidiary leaders knowledgeable about every activity within their own 
subsidiary, let alone the totality of possibilities throughout the firm. The practice leader 
role was established to facilitate the awareness of opportunities and available resources 
within the technical sectors that cut across the regional structure; the practice leader has 
no P&L responsibility therefore is able to look at resources on a broader scale with 
relative neutrality.  
“So when our business went regional, we then split into four, the then Chairman 
decided that we needed these cross-cutting people.” [G#53]  
“They are a key part of the collaboration across the boundaries. The company did, 
wisely and quite rightly, provide the process and the mechanism.” [B#15] 
 
 
  
 123 
Table 4-4: EngConsult - Mechanisms and practices  
Conditions when: not enough (increase) too much (manage) 
 Mechanisms 
- interventions 
Mechanisms 
- interventions  
Collaboration Formalisation/standardisation  
- inter entity trading agreements   
- policies, systems and processes for 
project bids  
- E-business technology 
Lateral relations 
- global sector practice leaders 
Communication 
- dialogue  
- training, business meetings, social 
events, network gatherings 
Socialisation 
- management commitment 
- subsidiary identification 
- collaborative culture  
- one company identity  
- shared values   
- inter-unit transfers , job rotation   
- group-wide incentives  
Trust  
  
Control  
- prioritisation  
Competition Formal Structure  
- overlap of skills 
- flexible charters and boundaries  
Decentralisation 
- regionalisation strategy  
- subsidiary profit centricity  
- no central mandating of  practices  
Formalisation/standardisation  
- group-wide rewards and incentives  
- accounting policies of negotiated 
transfer price  
- peer performance comparisons 
Internal market-based mechanisms  
- no financial recognition of 
collaborations  
Transfer pricing mechanism  
 
Formal Structure 
- clarify charters and markets  
- merge competing units  
Decentralisation  
Formalisation/standardisation 
- established rules: notification of 
entrance in country   
- collective not individual KPIs  
- call together quickly  - sort it out 
Communication 
- dialogue 
Spatial separation  
- management role as adjudicator 
 
 
4.2.4 Content of competition and collaboration   
The content of inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition centred on each 
subsidiary ensuring that they had access to and utilisation of the necessary resources 
that they needed to pursue and win profitable business opportunities (see Table 4-5).  
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When skill sets within the subsidiary were limited by capability, complementarity or 
cost, collaboration with other subsidiaries within or across the regional areas enabled 
access to markets that they alone could not pursue internally (see Figure 4-4).  
Regional and sector expansion and growth were achieved through internal 
collaboration. Subsidiaries in the newly formed Middle East, Europe and Asia Pacific 
regions did not have fully developed capabilities necessary to pursue the available work 
in each of their regions as in the entrepreneurial nature of the subsidiary in Figure 4-4. 
They drew on duplicate and complementary resources and expertise available from the 
more mature subsidiaries such as the UK and joint venture partner in North America.  
“Strategically, we’re only going to be able to build the international base by leaning 
upon UK skill sets and reputation and track record” [B#24].  
 
 
Figure 4-4: EngConsult- Subsidiary requirement for resources (Source: Author). 
By collaborating with other subsidiaries and subunits, and leveraging complementary 
resources, whether as a buyer of resources or a seller of opportunities, the subsidiaries 
won business, built up their own capability over time, shared the potential risks 
associated with uncertain projects across subsidiaries and regions, and sought to 
increase their level of profitability. By collaborating they were able also to balance the 
tension between opportunity/risk and revenue/cost.  
“…we need to have a situation where all parts of the business are collaborating and 
working together, and the sharing of resource and capability is a two way flow. So it’s 
between mature units and businesses, it’s not all being sucked out of the UK but it’s 
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going to be a two-way [flow], because it’s not possible for the UK to support the rest of 
the world. The Middle East has been a classic example of having a huge market, lots of 
opportunity and not having the capability to attack it.” [B#8] 
“You can only win those on a collaborative basis ‘cause no one centre would be able to 
deliver those projects because in addition to the size of them, they’re also multi sector 
because there are a lot of different skills required, they’re not all, say, building bridges. 
You have every discipline, you have the civil structure and mechanical environmental 
contractual elements to these projects, and with a lot of resource required from all of 
those areas.” [D#12] 
Use was also made of lower cost resources existing elsewhere within the group (e.g. 
India for design drawings) to supply a certain element of the work involved in a 
particular project. If there was an opportunity to win a project in a country such as 
South Africa, where salaries were comparatively higher, the subsidiary looked at 
utilising resources from a lower cost country such as the Czech Republic. Rather than 
supplying all the resources from South Africa which made the fees too expensive for the 
project, the firm looked to supply certain elements of the work at a lower fee to be more 
competitive for that particular tender.  
In the new regional structure, specialist resources from other subsidiaries were often 
required from within or beyond their regions to win client business.  Occasionally, units 
would compete for business opportunities outside of their established boundaries by 
choosing not collaborate with another sector so that they might achieve their own key 
performance targets of staff utilisation and profit.   
As the subsidiaries became the new profit centres, efforts to gain financial recognition 
for sharing resources often became a point of negotiation and competition.   
All subsidiaries sought to maximise the utilisation rate of their staff, a KPI of subsidiary 
performance, which reported the measurement of staff time chargeable to a client. Full 
utilisation enhanced the subsidiaries’, and the Group’s, profitability. 
Tasked with growing their businesses and expanding their markets, and to bolster their 
own financial performance, the subsidiaries intentionally and opportunistically 
competed for opportunities that were beyond their charter or geographical boundary.  
“The way things are structured in EngConsult, you’re being very competitive if you’re 
looking for projects that other divisions can do, that’s really being very competitive.”  
[D#12] 
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Although potentially attractive opportunities for collaboration exist, a subsidiary may 
prefer to focus on their own clients and grow the necessary skills within their own unit. 
In this situation, the subsidiary refused to take on any additional resources needed, in 
part because this would negatively impact on their own utilisation rate and potential 
profitability, specifically if they were unable to effectively charge the new resources out 
for future work.  
“If you look at it competitively in order to meet those goals there may be a push to hold 
onto projects without offering or asking for support from others, even though they 
might have a better resource to do the work. You just may want to have your staff, our 
staff, working on it rather than some other’s staff.” [D#1]  
On a limited number of occasions, financial resources were sought for joint initiatives 
where two or more subsidiaries worked collaboratively to pursue an opportunity which 
was beyond their combined financial and resource capacity. Subsidiaries competed for 
access to limited Group funding as other combinations of subsidiaries also vied for 
limited Group support.  
Table 4-5: EngConsult - Content of collaboration and competition 
Content of Collaboration   Content of Competition  
Knowledge and resource sharing  
- bidding for large scale projects  
Market expansion [competing for potential new 
business area] 
Some cross-selling of services across sectors within 
region 
Corporate/ parent resources  
 Centres of Excellence :  
- Design - India and Czech Republic  
  
4.3 ENGCONSULT SUMMARY   
Content of competition and collaboration  
The content of inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition centred on each 
subsidiary ensuring that they had access to and utilisation of the necessary resources 
needed to pursue and win profitable business opportunities. In EngConsult the strategic 
orientation of the PSF highlighted a number of outcomes resulting from the 
relationships, however, healthy (medium) levels of competition were more 
advantageous than continuing high levels of competition for long term benefit (see 
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Figure 4-5). However, the aggregated view of the perceived organisational outcomes 
ignores each subsidiary’s circumstances.  
 
Figure 4-5: EngConsult - Perceived organisational outcomes (Source: Author) 
‘Forced’ collaborations were a natural outcome of the adjudication process when unit 
profitability was the source of tension. ‘Healthy’ competition was positively perceived 
as it can raise the game for everybody; high levels of collaboration were perceived by 
some subsidiaries as a threat to their unit profitability.  
Nature of inter-subsidiary relationships  
The within-case findings of EngConsult were presented in relation to the nature of the 
subsidiary relationships:  the existence of multiple relationships of competition and 
collaboration which changed over time dependent upon circumstances, for example 
organisational redesign and tensions within the relationships that emanated from 
balancing the requirement to grow and expand through collaboration, and access to and 
utilisation of internal resources to deliver the unit performance in profit terms. The 
source of tension was experienced by different roles at different levels within the 
internal market operating within EngConsult. One mechanism that enabled the 
management of simultaneous competition and collaboration was the separation of roles 
between SBU top management, as the adjudicator of disputes, and the subsidiary 
managers responsible for driving the growth and profit for the unit.  
The findings also indicated that there was more collaboration among the subsidiaries 
within regions than across the regions as under the new organisational design, the 
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regions had become the new profit centres.  Across regional interactions showed greater 
variation in the levels of competition and collaboration which depend on with whom the 
resources resided and the negotiated terms for the transfer or exchange of those 
resources.  
Antecedents  
External, organisational, subsidiary and individual manager antecedents highlighted 
salient determining factors in the coopetitive relationships. These are summarised in 
Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6: EngConsult - Salient determining factors of coopetition 
Salient Factors    
 
EngConsult: inter-subsidiary  coopetition  C+  C- 
External factors  
Economy  Efficiencies  ↑  
Market uncertainty Global design centres  ↑ 
Organisational factors  
Strategic Interdependence  Integrated -split of sector and geography  ↑  
- organisation design  
- strategic orientation  
Transition from global sectors to regions 
Transnational  
 
↑ 
↑ 
↑ 
- clarity of boundaries  Regional/sector boundaries     
Top management commitment  Top management commitment   
Collaborative culture  
↑ - 
Trusted relationships  Collegial, long term 
Professional identity  
Geographic identity   
↑  
Market overlap   Overlapping sectors   ↑ 
Skills overlap  Share knowledge  
Internal market for specialist resources  
↑  
↑ 
Performance comparison  Peer  comparison  
Best practices  
 
↑ 
↑ 
Rewards and incentives Group-profit share -SBU performance  
Subsidiary performance 
↑  
↑ 
Subsidiary characteristics  
Strategic vulnerability  Less resources for local requirements  ↑ ↑ 
Individual manager characteristics  
Individual mindset  ONE firm  
Healthy competition  
↑  
↑ 
Note: C+ = collaboration; C- = competition  
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Internal structure and practices  
Structural and relational interventions, practices and mechanisms were identified to 
facilitate or hinder the levels of competition and collaboration within the relationship. 
These were also identified as mechanisms to rebalance the relationship between the 
subsidiaries as a result of tensions that had reached a point where they were no longer 
tolerable to the subsidiaries involved or to the Group Board, for example, as in the 
Middle East business model of growth and limited access to local resources.  
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5 CASE ORGANISATION 2 – EventCo  
5.1 THE ORGANISATION  
This section provides a brief overview of EventCo, its organisational structure, the 
SBUs, the collaboration initiative and its internal systems and policies relevant to the 
study.   
EventCo is a leading global business media company and is engaged in the provision of 
live media and Business to Business (B2B) communications, marketing and data 
services. It informs markets and brings the world's buyers and sellers together at events, 
online, and in print, focusing on serving professional commercial communities as 
diverse as doctors, game developers, journalists, jewellery traders, farmers and 
pharmacists.   
The company operates more than a dozen businesses in three main segments: (1) events, 
targeting, distribution and monitoring (2) digital news and content services and (3) 
online marketing services, progressively focusing on its global portfolio of industry 
leading tradeshows (see Table 5-1). As such, the events segment provides face-to-face 
interaction by exhibitions, trade shows, conferences and other live events. Revenues are 
generated by exhibitors purchasing space at the tradeshows, through event sponsorship 
and attendee entrance fees. The digital news and content services segment provides 
communications products and services to professionals working in marketing, public 
relations and corporate communications or investor relations roles. This segment also 
helps identify target audiences and monitors how effectively customers’ messages have 
been communicated. The marketing services segment carries out campaigns on behalf 
of clients looking to enhance their branding, customer awareness, reach, and 
engagement or generate sales leads. Revenues are generated through advertising, lead 
generation services, organising events and building or managing community websites 
on behalf of clients.  
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Table 5-1: EventCo - SBUs  
Company Details  Events Businesses  Marketing 
Services  
Content  
Strategic Business Units 
(SBU)  
Events -Asia 
Events - 
Europe 
Events -
Tech 
Content News 
No. of Employees (5,500)  ~1300 ~2460 ~240 ~1500 
Domain of Focus  Geography Sector Sector Sector Sector 
Subsidiary HQs Asia UK US US US 
Financial contribution  
(2013) of group revenue  
58.3% 16.3% 25.4% 
5.1.1 Company history, ownership and structure  
Early in the company’s incorporation, it operated as a conglomerate of independent and 
diversified businesses. Units were very autonomous with a thin umbilical cord to the 
centre. SBUs were mainly self-sufficient with their own structure and P&L. Within the 
last 30 years, EventCo has owned and sold a wide range of media businesses. Much of 
where the company is today is influenced by a group that was once a ‘buy and sell’ 
organisation. Historically, there was no real interest in drawing out the synergies 
between the businesses. As such, culturally, there was no drive for centralisation or 
standardisation. The organisation, as a result, was becoming ‘siloed’ and management 
was constantly finding duplication of resources and common business challenges. There 
was no mechanism by which the SBUs could connect to each other for support or 
resolution. Top management was finding that there was “significant reinvention of the 
wheel.” 
Today, the interdependencies among the businesses are being exploited to take 
advantage of the emergence of a global economy, coupled with the shift towards digital 
media, which leads the company to believe that diverse geographic experience and 
infrastructure is advantageous (see Figure 5-2). It also provides the company with 
access to high growth opportunities in emerging markets and quality revenues from 
more mature markets (see Figure 5-3). 
A recent example of the more synergistic relationship between the businesses of events 
and content assets is shown in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1: EventCo - Synergistic collaborative relationships (Source: EventCo’s Annual 
Report, 2013)  
The company has grown organically and through acquisitions. In 2009, the company 
reported 61 bolt-on acquisitions in adjacent businesses or geographies. The majority of 
acquired companies are now integrated; however, full integration still does not mean a 
high level of centralisation. Only recently, in 2013, did the company establish an 
executive committee to coordinate the integrated activities among the various BUs. 
Consequently HQ influences the subsidiaries more, especially in facilitating the sharing 
of best practices. At the same time, HQ is providing its units with general support, such 
as finance, marketing and policies on people and culture. The company is also 
undertaking a major finance systems project to establish a common platform. This level 
of standardisation was unheard of in the earlier phase of the business where independent 
BUs operated. 
Subsequent to the arrival of the previous CEO, and under his significant influence and 
guidance, the company changed from a decentralised structure of autonomously 
operated businesses with units competing against one another, to a more integrated one 
in which businesses are increasingly influenced by standards and policies established by 
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the HQ. However, culturally, the CEO still encouraged a devolved authority, and not a 
centrist authoritarian style, thereby maintaining a high level decentralisation.  
5.1.2 Overview of divisions   
The events businesses, which consist of one geographically focused (Asia) unit and five 
market sector focused units, form a diversified portfolio which targets defined markets, 
has an inherent high growth outlook, focuses on globalising verticals and aggressively 
launches in emerging markets to establish the lead in relatively immature segments.  
 
Figure 5-2: EventCo - Global footprint (Source: Company presentation 30 Oct., 2012) 
The Asia division has 1300 staff and is located in 24 cities. In 2013, they held over 200 
exhibitions and conferences serving EventCo’s ten verticals: advanced manufacturing, 
built environment, fashion, health, ingredients, lifestyle, paper, technology, trade and 
transport, and other (Investor Day presentation, 20 June 2014).  
Continued growth is anticipated to come through existing exhibitions, adaptations of 
existing exhibitions in multiple geographies, other launches with focus on China, India 
and SE Asia and acquisitions. The 18 events acquired since 2010 have added 
approximately £41m to the 2013 revenue. Revenue at acquisition was £27m (52% 
growth). 
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Figure 5-3: EventCo - Systematic expansion by vertical brand  
(Source: Company presentation 30 Oct., 2012)  
The digital news and content business is a global provider of multimedia platforms and 
provides end-to-end solutions to produce, optimise, and target content—from rich 
media to online video and multimedia. It then distributes content and measures results 
across traditional, digital, mobile and social channels, using multi-channel, multi-
cultural content distribution and an optimisation network with comprehensive workflow 
tools and platforms. The business serves tens of thousands of clients from offices in 13 
countries (in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Asia-Pacific region) 
and has approximately 1,500 employees.  
5.1.3 Demographic analysis 
The average tenure of the informants was 14 years with three years in their role as a 
result of frequent reorganisations due to divestiture and acquisition activity.  However, 
the length of tenure among the five business CEOs ranged from six through to 25 years 
(see Table 5-2).  
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Table 5-2: EventCo - Informant demographics 
Demographics  Group Events
-Asia 
Events-
Europe 
Events-
Tech 
Content News 
No. of Interviewees by 
Division (i.e. SBU)  Total 
19 
3 2 4 3 3 4 
Average Tenure (years) Avg. 
14 yrs. 
10 13 15 18 14 16 
SBU  CEOs 
- 13 6 16 22 25 4 
Average Time in Role 
(years) 
Avg. 
3 yrs.  
3 5 5 1 2 5 
 
Figure 5-4 illustrates EventCo’s organisation chart.      
 
 
Figure 5-4: EventCo - Organisation chart as of November, 2013 (Source: Company 
documents) 
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5.1.4 External context   
The company has been exiting print and gradually reducing its exposure to declining 
margins in this medium, which has led to a number of disposals since its review of 
publishing assets in 2010. With the shrinking capability of publishing, it has reassessed 
the role of content within EventCo. Key findings of the Convention 2020 study
4
 found 
that respondents listed quality of content, interaction, technology and networking as the 
main drivers of an effective and exciting event. In the future, people in the communities 
that the businesses serve would not be just passive recipients of information, but 
participants in the conversations of those communities. Hence, a change in the business 
model was required to reflect the move away from one-time interactions to multiple 
occasions to create a community of like-minded professionals and industries. Industry 
threats were already coming from self-organising communities such as those on 
LinkedIn (a business oriented social networking service).  
Fundamentally, the company sought to establish deeper relationships with its customers, 
and engage with them in a new way which was not the same as selling the more 
traditional transactional relationship. The new model reflects the emerging process 
where customers want to build relationships with their customers and EventCo can 
provide the means to do that. 
Consequently, over time, the company is changing from being a publishing-led business 
to a global events-led marketing and communications services business. 
Further to the overall industry conditions described above, each subsidiary of EventCo 
operated in a specific external and local environment.  
The relatively strong economy in the Asian region facilitated favourable conditions for 
growth, while the subsidiaries operating in the UK and European regions were 
challenged by the significant slow-down in the economy and contraction in the market 
since 2008. The UK market began to look further afield for opportunities while 
reassessing the strength of their brands for development. 
                                                 
4
 Convention 2020 is a ‘strategic foresight’ study, launched with seed funding from the founder sponsors, 
International Congress and Convention Association (ICCA), (International exhibition for the worldwide 
meetings, events and incentive travel industry), IMEX and Fast Future Research. The study is designed to 
help all members of the meetings industry prepare for the decade ahead to ensure they stay competitive.  
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The top management recognised that most of the leadership in the exhibition industry 
globally was in the UK, even though the market was declining. However, most 
emerging learnings began technologically in America and moved eastwards. Typically, 
Asia has taken a second mover advantage as Europe and America ‘wrap it up in a bow’ 
for Asia. More recently, Asia has been innovating and transferring their innovations. 
The overall growth and innovation within Asia has led to an increased number of 
collaborations with other subsidiaries from Europe and the US. 
The marketing services businesses were predominantly traditional print businesses. All 
print content was being converted to digital content which required different skill sets. 
During the transition from print to online services, the businesses were concerned about 
the ‘cannibalisation’ of the print content and loss of alternative revenue. 
Businesses headquartered in the US market were largely focused within the US because 
of the size of the US market. There was little interest in collaboration from the US as 
they had sufficient resources and market size to meet their growth objectives. Therefore, 
the US businesses were perceived by those units outside the US as difficult to 
collaborate with.  
“The US are a nightmare. It’s just because they’ve got a massive domestic market. 
They’re in a highly competitive market, they’re not as events focused, they’ve tried it 
[collaboration] several times and it didn’t work and therefore they’re less responsive to 
it.”  [D#74]  
5.2 WITHIN-CASE FINDINGS     
5.2.1 The nature of relationships between the subsidiaries   
The findings suggested that the collaborative relationships existed between the SBUs 
and subsidiaries as a result of the Group CEO’s commitment to collaboration, following 
his appointment eight years prior. This commitment extended to him removing specific 
leaders who were perceived to be obstacles to collaboration.  As a SBU CEO asserted:  
“Removing certain people that were obstacles to collaboration was an accelerator for 
pulling down those silos.” [D#65]  
Existing silos within the previously independent events portfolio of businesses were 
softened as events SBUs sought geographic expansionary opportunities through joint 
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collaborations with complementary events businesses. However, relationships between 
European and Asia-based events and US media-related businesses remained strained as 
they struggled to identify and execute joint collaborations because of differences in the 
nature of their service product, size of market, customer base, and history of ineffective 
collaborative interactions.  
The lack of interaction between the previously autonomous brands further reinforced 
the picture of independently operating businesses and the realisation that greater 
efficiencies could be achieved through awareness and collaboration.   
“[The relationship between the two businesses is] like two friendly neighbours. Well, 
you live in your house, I live in mine, and we see each other … out on the street. We 
kind of know what’s going on in each other’s lives but the impact of one to the other 
isn’t direct and always meaningful.” [D#60] 
Recent transfers of senior members of management from one division to another led to 
greater awareness of potential synergies and opportunities for collaboration.  
Figure 5-5 shows that while there are examples of collaboration between subsidiaries, 
e.g. Asia and Europe-based events SBUs, and some intra-SBU collaboration with other 
geographies within the region or brand, there were fewer cross-SBU interactions 
reported.  
Subsidiary relationships not only changed as a result of the CEO’s emphasis on 
collaboration, but subsidiaries experienced multiple and simultaneous relationships of 
both competition and collaboration in the cross-sectional study (see Figure 5-5). 
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Figure 5-5: EventCo - Inter-subsidiary relationships 
For example, Events-Tech and Brand: Build (coded C+/C- in the matrix of 
relationships) were both competing and collaborating for a new business development 
opportunity where both felt they had the capabilities and know-how within their units to 
pursue this initiative. They were collaborating on building the portfolio in the 
marketplace and simultaneously competing to have ownership of the new business.  
Another instance of a simultaneous collaboration and competition interaction is 
highlighted between Events-Europe and Brand B and the development of a new venture 
of office design.  
“We’re collaborating on building as a business and the two of us sit on the same board, 
so we’re both trying to obviously push forward the [unit] strategy. We’re responsible 
for two different P&Ls.” [D#67 and D#74] 
“So we are absolutely collaborating in everything we do and yet one of the products that 
we have is competitive.”  [D#74] 
The relationship map also highlights other differences. Two of the four events 
businesses (Connect and Events-Tech) had significant online businesses based in the 
US, but Events-Asia and Events-Europe less so. When looking at the relationships 
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between Asia and Europe, they are mostly collaborative with little interaction with 
Connect and Events-Tech (both US-based businesses). 
5.2.1.1 Interpersonal coopetition  
While the inter-subsidiary relationship is the primary unit of analysis, the findings also 
identified examples of coopetition at the interpersonal level, thereby demonstrating a 
multilevel phenomenon.  
The nature of the relationship at the interpersonal level is captured by a subsidiary 
CEO’s comprehensive account of simultaneous competition and collaboration with his 
then colleague, in relation to achieving individual sales targets with the same customer.   
 “I was working with a colleague to put together a proposal to [Company Blue] which 
we were collaborating on before it was kind of trendy to collaborate on it. At the same 
time I had a $5 million goal to hit from this particular account, and my colleague I think 
had a $3 million goal to hit, and the budget was about $6 million, so something 
somewhere was going to give...but no we were definitely in both phases of 
collaboration and competition, So how we managed it … There was a sort of a personal 
trust[and]  an innate or a deep held belief that if we don’t do this we’re going to be 
talking about lower money anyway and that didn’t seem to be the right thing to do. 
A lot of it was about that interpersonal relationship and… the trust that we built on top 
of that. And then when it was clear there was going to be a winner and a loser, that we 
were able to articulate that it wasn’t about us or what we put together, it was about the 
client’s decision, and the client wanted more of one target than another, and that was 
just the way it was. And I think [my colleague’s] rationalisation at the time was, hey I 
got a million where I probably wouldn’t have got anything in the past, and you got five 
million and good for you, you’re the right product at the right place at the right time for 
this client.”[B#69] 
Their personal friendship and trust enabled them to explore alternatives to the 
competitive situation and to appreciate that if they both continued to compete, they may 
both miss their targets. In competing and collaborating simultaneously, however, “one 
has to be in a clear ascendancy. I think you can do both but not equal. I don’t think you can dial 
it up to 10 on competition and dial it up to 10 on collaboration and everything’s going to be 
great … I don’t think that is possible.” [B#69] 
However, not all informants recognised the phenomenon of having both a competitive 
and collaborative relationship due to the nature of their organisation design. The 
organisational boundaries of each SBU and subsidiary were clearly defined which 
tended to limit the occurrences of internal competition resulting from the overlap of 
subsidiary responsibility (charter) or the external market and customers.   
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 “I can’t think of an example where you’ve been collaborating and competing, because 
of our structure.” [G#62]  
5.2.1.2 Different hierarchical perspective  
The experience and hierarchical level of the CEO’s appeared to alter their perspective 
on the role of collaboration and competition in their relationships with other units.  
“There is a wide level of collaboration horizontally across the business in the upper 
echelons of our event management structure.” [G#62] 
“If you were talking to me eight years ago it would probably be very different.  I was 
less mature, I don’t think I intentionally undercut anybody or anything, but I probably 
was a little bit more controlling or possessive.  I think as you mature as an executive 
and a person, you get better with that.” [D#72] 
5.2.1.3 Tensions and interventions  
Tensions were generated in relationships where there was a high level of competition 
and apparent collaboration. For example, when a corporate subsidiary was tasked with 
introducing content platforms for the wider group, an SBU decided to “go it alone”, 
jeopardising both the cost benefits  and implementation schedule originally agreed 
upon.  When the tensions went beyond a tolerable level and were both adversely 
affecting the collaboration and the interpersonal relations such that they could not work 
together, the aggrieved unit required the issue “to be sorted out.”   
“So what they did was they will tell you to your face that they’re supporting you and they 
believe in what you’re doing, but what they do is they go round the back … and they start 
building up their own site, their event site and copying some of the things on your site … 
and they want to show that yours is a failure. And there was a team who were actively out 
to kill off the thing we were creating. And I took this to the CEO in the end because I felt 
that we were being stitched up.” [G#58] 
“No way is their relationship going anywhere in that situation. So either we stop working 
together … or, there’s a reset and we start again. I think in those situations given the 
desire for a collaborative approach at EventCo which is a good thing … most people 
choose to keep their job and that’s a good thing.”  [G#58] 
In the instance where one senior manager felt that their unit was “being stitched up” 
because the resultant tension from the competition for the development of the best 
technology platform was becoming impossible to manage, he took the issue up with the 
Group CEO for adjudication.  
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In other instances of tension that resulted from inter-subsidiary competition, the units 
got together and explored options for joint resolution.  If a joint solution for either the 
group-wide business or the customer was not satisfactory, the matter was raised to 
senior management for adjudication. The outcome of the discussions or adjudication 
was often to find a way to collaborate and combine their resources and knowledge on 
the continued development of the overlapping product. Alternatively a temporary 
decision was agreed upon until a longer term solution could be found.  
“This is resolved by sitting down and seeing what is best for the business that would be 
down to the relationship that I have with her and that would allow us to have a 
constructive conversation.” [D#74] 
Tensions also emanated from the lack of any corporate intervention when competition 
involved the overlap of internal responsibilities.  The units looked to the HQ to mandate 
certain areas of responsibility and processes which would facilitate greater collaboration 
or mitigate the level of competition. While the cultural context of collaboration was 
often insufficient, mandating was antithetical to the organisation’s culture.   
“Well there is a tension here about at what level do you mandate.  And we are not big 
mandators; some of us would like a bit more mandating.” [G#58] 
 “Now some of that is antithetical to a notion that’s held, because EventCo was a very 
decentralised company, to the notion of all these individual standalone businesses. 
They’ve been really run as independent separate businesses, in some cases because we 
bought these firms as acquisitions and never really fully integrated them at a technology 
level or a process or a systems level.” [B#68] 
Several types of tension were evident from the interactions of differing levels of 
competition. The News SBU perceived the tension generated by simultaneous 
competition and collaboration as a positive tension.  As such, News opted to put in 
differential performance and rewards to create this kind of tension between the 
subsidiaries rather than the current profit share programme.  
Tensions also occurred as a result of not addressing performance management issues 
within the collaboration. The data suggest that performance discussions were rarely held 
if one subsidiary was dissatisfied with the performance of another subsidiary in the 
relationship. For a unit to question the capability of another unit’s resource was 
considered challenging and to have the kind of constructive conversation necessary for 
improvement was deemed to be “non-collaborative”.   
 143 
The tension that occurred between the SBU and subsidiaries both competing and 
collaborating was not always viewed negatively. 
“So before I apply a little bit more of the competitive bar and start to raise that across all 
our geographical units or our internal business units, I want to make sure we sort of at 
least given them foundationally the elements of, you know, investment in order to get 
the common business process and a foundation and so a technology, etc.” [B#68] 
5.2.2 Determining factors of competition and collaboration  
Seven determining factors of competition and collaboration were identified: the external 
environment, trusted relationships, top management commitment, market and charter 
overlap, peer comparison, rewards and incentives and the manager’s mindset.   
5.2.2.1 External environment    
Changes in technology and customer preference indirectly impacted on the subsidiary 
relationships in terms of internal competition and collaboration. Prior to the advent of 
the online publications, the company was predominantly a print media business where 
content was king.  Historically, the print and events businesses had not collaborated 
well.  The business was being reoriented to be an events-led business with the company 
exiting from paper-based publishing to more on line support to complement the events 
portfolios. New skills were required within the online environment to support the 
physical production of events, conferences and shows.  
As a result, the dynamics between the events and media relationship changed. At the 
same time, there was a fundamental shift in the media businesses within the 
organisation. They were moving away from being a broadcaster to becoming one of 
many voices in the community of social media. The company no longer required a big 
team of journalists to write content; the lower cost model now only needed a few editors 
to promote and monitor content contributions by the external community. The 
involvement of the external event community transformed what was once a one-off 
event to EventCo to one of a longer term, ongoing engagement with the event 
community. The new business model required greater collaboration between events and 
media content units.  
“… the content operation within a business that is changing towards an event led 
business and for that mutual respect to build up.” [G#58] 
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5.2.2.2 Trusted relationships  
Collaborative relationships between the SBU and subsidiaries were strengthened as a 
result of personal relationships and trust that had developed over the years.  
 “We have a collaboration in Brazil, we have three collaborations in China, we have one 
in Singapore, one in Turkey, two in Europe, all in the space of 18 months … And again 
it’s come down to a lot of trust.”[B#69] 
 “We have to leverage this strong relationship we have to collaborate and sort of be 
honest, not only with each other, but with ourselves. I think it’s important to frankly 
spend time out of the office and get out of the zone that you’re in because what that 
tends to do is keep you in a bit of a silo.”[D#72] 
The stability of the top management team (see Table 5-2) enabled long-term 
relationships to develop even though relationships at lower levels of the subsidiaries 
were frequently disrupted because of the constant acquisition and divestiture activity of 
the organisation in a fragmented events industry. The processes of reshaping and 
reforming personal and unit relationships were vital in facilitating greater collaboration 
across the subsidiaries within the company in the new organisational climate.  
Job rotations and cross-divisional assignments were facilitated by the Group’s HQ to 
create greater awareness of each others’ businesses and collaborative opportunities with 
trusted partners. For example, the CEO Content was previously the CEO Tech. The new 
CEO Tech was the previous Head of News. Sharing the knowledge gained from these 
positions enabled further cross-business, cross-subsidiary linkages and exploitation and 
leveraging of existing capabilities across the Group.  
 “For the first time we have somebody who is both at a level within the organisation and 
who intuitively understands the value of News, and he’s really driving cross 
collaboration between the businesses.” [D#61] 
Significant importance and investment was placed on encouraging networking and 
socialising between the events-related businesses and between the subsidiaries within 
each business.  The events subsidiaries preceded each collaboration with a ritual known 
as “breaking bread” which facilitated the alignment of expectations and relationship 
building by understanding the other cultures involved when different from the dominant 
British and American cultures. Not only does the networking within and across the 
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subsidiaries encourage social interactions but the frequency creates awareness of the 
businesses activities and contacts to connect with when searching for information.  
 “We’re an events business, we’re a face-to-face business. So just by putting people 
together, so to bring a Chinese team together with a Dutch team and put them in a room 
together and talk about the project and talk about who’s going to do what and go out to 
dinner and share some wine and get to know each other as friends.” [G#62] 
5.2.2.3 Top management commitment  
The Group CEO sought to address the issues of ‘silos, reinvention of the business 
through a different type of relationship between the businesses, and deal with problems 
that stemmed from people and units with common challenges being unable to connect 
with each other. Collaboration, as a way of working, was incorporated into their 
corporate values, supported by collaborative practices and tools; for example, a Wiki-
based intranet and Group-level positions. Both interventions were introduced 
specifically to facilitate the sharing of best practices among the respective events and 
content businesses, encourage learning and create opportunities for collaboration.   
Collaboration was vigorously driven by HQ and SBU-CEOs within their subsidiaries.    
“Collaboration is very much supported and advocated by top management in London, 
and also by the CEOs. Collaboration is part of our culture, and you should have a good 
reason not to collaborate if there was an opportunity.” [B#63] 
 “I often refer to culture as the lynchpin to the success of companies. It’s often 
described by words such as collaboration, trust, transparency and belief. Across 
EventCo there has been huge progress in developing a culture which holds these 
values.”  [Divisional Strategic Announcement, April 2013] 
Their corporate values statements included the specific value of working 
collaboratively.  
“At [EventCo] we connect and work collaboratively to deliver exceptional results for 
our customers. Our teams and partnerships, locally and globally, allow us to explore 
different perspectives, to learn from each other and achieve great things together. 
 
What this means is:  
- We build and maintain strong working relationships  
- We foster partnerships and networks  
- We share and learn from each other  
- We show trust, honesty and openness”  
[Values Statement on Collaboration: Internal company document, accessed May, 2014]   
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Furthermore, EventCo specifically ask their employee population three questions 
relating to their perception of collaboration within their 2013 Global Employee Survey 
(see Table 5-3). In response to Item 33: “there is good collaboration across businesses 
and business units”, the information supports a level of interaction with Events Asia. 
The percentage is lower across the whole population within Europe and the Americas. 
The survey data also identifies that Executives respond more favourably to this question 
(67%), Senior Management (57%) and Middle and First Line Management (50%).  
Table 5-3: EventCo - Employee survey (2013) - collaboration  
 
The SBU CEOs expressed their disappointment that while the organisational emphasis 
on culture was positive and necessary, it was insufficient on its own to drive 
collaboration throughout the organisation. The organisation’s legacy of a competitive 
past was a barrier to collaboration as a result of too many political battles and 
behaviours such as position taking, lack of honesty, and protecting of own turf.  
Reliance on creating a culture of collaboration without additional, supporting 
infrastructure was perceived to be a barrier to inter-subsidiary collaboration. 
Conversely, top management’s enthusiasm to foster greater collaboration led to ‘forced’ 
collaborative interactions, ultimately resulting in under-explored opportunities, 
unsuccessful collaborations and tarnished relationships.  
“Sometimes we’ve tried to kind of force collaboration opportunities only to have to 
admit a little bit further down the road that maybe we’re kind of shoving a round peg 
into a square hole.” [G#62] 
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5.2.2.4 Manager’s mindset  
At an individual level, top management acknowledged that competition was part of their 
nature and that they drove themselves and their subsidiaries to achieve personal 
excellence. They had a natural propensity to compete, which influenced the 
relationships that they had with other subsidiaries. 
“I am competitive and I do like to win and be successful, but I do get a positive jolt 
when I help others as well, and I consider my organisation to be all one organisation, 
whether you’re talking about EventCo or [other SBUs ] or my own group. So I’m 
naturally somebody who enjoys working with others, but you know I would never take 
that as the priority over hitting numbers, driving business, being successful, ensuring 
people are paid well, keeping their jobs, etc.” [D#66] 
Other leaders did not perceive any benefits from competing.  
“I see it [internal competition] more as a disturbance and not good for our clients” 
[B#63]. “I really try to stay away from internal competition because I feel like it’s just 
not value additive to the whole.” [B#70]  
On the other hand, some CEOs described their individual propensity to collaborate as 
“it’s just part of who I am”, without ego, and led by example. 
“That whole issue on ego and absence of the ego is absolutely critical to be able to 
collaborate.” [B#70] “Ego’s always an issue; the people being secure with themselves, 
so they don’t feel they have to protect things and not share things; people not 
necessarily needing to have the entire spotlight.”  [D#72] 
Interestingly, one group executive commented on the generally positive perception of 
collaboration. Extending this observation he noted that:  
“Non-collaboration has a negative [connotation] attached that it doesn’t have for two 
independent parties.” [G#59]  
5.2.2.5 Market (and charter) overlap  
Market and charter overlap invoked a level of competition between the corporate 
subsidiaries (SBUs). A new business opportunity which explored the future of cities and 
brought together property owners, city authorities and technology companies, was 
served by two subsidiaries within different SBUs. Both legitimately claimed that they 
possessed the expertise and client base to provide the new market offering; a 
combination of building aspects or technology. Both subsidiaries knowingly overlapped 
during the development phase to create the maximum customer interest for the new 
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event and were left “to fight it out” [G#58]. With a focus on what was best for the 
customer, the two brand teams sat down and discussed with the client what their most 
important market was. On that basis, the two groups collaborated and eventually 
decided on where the business would reside by considering it from the customer’s 
perspective. They both advised the client to exhibit in a specific market.  
 “We’re collaborating on Europe-Build as a business and the two of us sit on the same 
board, so we’re both trying to obviously push forward the SBU strategy. We’re 
responsible for two different P&Ls.  And so she has one P&L, I have another and we 
have a show, in this case in energy, and we feel that it’s actually part of what we do and 
she feels its part of what she does. And we’ve launched a product, she’s got an existing 
product, she’s saying you’ve launched that, you’ve kind of cannibalised this.” [D#74] 
Internal competition resulting from the development of similar products more often 
occurred inadvertently. Considering the number of events, products and services 
developed by the company, this type of competition was rare due to the clarity of 
responsibility, e.g. brand ownership of the verticals within expanded geographies which 
reduced the potential for inter-subsidiary competition. Usually the driver of this type of 
competition was due to ignorance [D#74]; either a lack of awareness of existing 
products, which resulted from infrequent interaction, or the lack of foresight that a new 
product would have on a related and existing customer base. Senior management 
acknowledged that sometimes, however, this form of competition was more difficult to 
prevent with joint venture partners.  
When the subsidiaries realised that competition existed for the same customer, the 
situation most often led to the subsidiaries collaborating on the joint development of the 
market (or product) for the sake of the customer.  
 “We develop our products well, so that there is not too much overlap in products. So 
there’s no position in terms of saying the office in Hong Kong is running a business in 
say, South Africa and has got a P&L there, and also the business in the UK is going to 
start a business in South Africa and is going to start a P&L there. There is no 
competition because that just wouldn’t happen.”  [B#63] 
Subsidiaries were tasked with growing their own businesses by seeking opportunities 
for expansion in other established countries as discussed previously in relation to 
Events-Tech and India. This would occur by the brand initiating a request to another 
country to host the show, or alternatively in the case of India, the country would reach 
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out to the brand (Events-Tech) to become their host. Several factors would influence the 
decision to collaborate with a specific country.    
“Amsterdam has the brand for [X] and Turkey is very interested in growing its event 
business. However, government regulations are promoting [X] business in Vietnam and 
therefore the SBU responsible for brand [X] will make the decision as it is very clear 
and a known rule that the brands make the decisions. They will likely collaborate with 
Thailand initially to investigate the proposal and leverage the existing infrastructure and 
local knowledge to explore opportunities in Vietnam thereby. Thereby, Amsterdam 
makes the strategic decision to pursue Vietnam ahead of Turkey.” [B#73] 
Interestingly in this scenario the Turkish subsidiary is competing with Vietnam for the 
opportunity to grow their business with Brand X by collaborating with Amsterdam.  
Furthermore, by establishing an ‘internal’ joint venture in which brand X was exported 
through the InfraCo structure, and “double accounting”, any financial competition was 
removed. To explain the InfraCo structure, I take the example of the newly established 
base in Turkey. EventCo bought its first  business in Turkey to use as an InfraCo, a hub 
from which EventCo can bring other brands to Turkey and share the local knowledge of 
the acquired business on the variations of how to run exhibitions in Turkey, of which 
EventCo did not have experience.  
“When that first started happening, collaboration was falling foul because there were 
arguments about, ‘it’s my brand, you do it this way’, with Shanghai saying, ‘but this is 
China, you can’t do it that way.” [G#62] 
The Events and News businesses were sufficiently different that there was no overlap 
within the marketplace. In those cases, the SBUs and subsidiaries were not in 
competition.  
“I really don’t think of us as in competition with our sister companies. Our sister 
companies are so different from us.” [G#75] 
“News position within the business, as a non-exhibition industry element, doesn’t really 
compete with anything.” [D#66] 
5.2.2.6 Peer comparison 
Open comparison of subsidiary performance encouraged a level of competition between 
the units. 
 “[SBU CEO] certainly wouldn’t say that but... we want to be the most successful, the 
most profitable part of EventCo. We also want to be part of a very healthy, successful 
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EventCo, but at the same time there is a natural internal competitive [part] and I don’t 
think that is unhealthy.” [D#74] 
However, there were no “dunce caps” [G#58] for the comparisons made against the 
agreed standard of performance as measured by the subsidiaries’ KPIs. The comparison 
was motivated by corporate and SBU management to enable help to be offered to those 
subsidiaries who were struggling. The lack of performance in this context was 
confronted with frank, honest and open conversations. It depended on the tone in which 
the support was being offered, for example, “What can we do to help them be 
successful?” as to whether the intention of help was appreciated by the subsidiaries. 
Conversely, in the context of collaboration, leadership accountability for performance 
conversations was less clear. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, conversations of 
underperformance or issues relating to the capability and quality of resources assigned 
to the collaboration were perceived to be contrary to the spirit of collaboration, more 
akin to saying: ‘don’t look a gift horse in the mouth’.   
“Often there is a lack of honesty about people’s capabilities. But, because we are 
collaborating, no one’s allowed to say anything and I think therefore you need on one 
hand the respect for people to learn, but we need to be able to say that in this team 
Frank is a weak link … and that to be honest Frank needs to go and do something else.  
Because actually accepting that Frank’s not a problem means that other people feel, 
well if he’s allowed to get away with being hopeless, why am I committing to this?  
And all of those tensions that you would get in a physical team happen in a virtual 
team.” [G#58] 
Competition, in the form of comparison with another subsidiary, was generated as a 
result of the sense of identity created by the SBUs. The SBU leaders each built up the 
sense of pride for one’s SBU and as such the employees’ identities were tied up with the 
unit. 
“I think even though I said we’re a very flat structure and a very matrixed structure, 
there is no doubt that having the divisions - which we all agree is a terrible word 
because it implies divisiveness as opposed to collaboration - you can’t help yourself, if 
you’re associated with [SBU] then I think that occasionally drives some competition. 
It’s quite a challenge to build up culture and motivation within a division without trying 
to drive that division in competition with the other division, because obviously 
competition is one of the tools you can use to drive pride and enthusiasm, and yet not 
using that as one of your tools can be a bit of a challenge.” [B#73] 
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5.2.2.7 Rewards and incentives  
Performance incentives for the SBU CEOs comprise elements of individual, business 
and Group-wide performance. Incentives are based on KPIs, with targets varying for 
each business. Key metrics for each subsidiary (as a profit centre) relate to revenue, 
margin and profit. 
At the next subsidiary level in the structure, the overall SBU performance forms a part 
of the subsidiary incentive plans. 
“We do have [parent] company goals built in financially to our incentives. So a portion 
of my profit incentive plan is tied to the overall success of the SBU. So there really is a 
financial component and there is then very much an incentive for [CEO] and I to make 
the right decisions for the organisation.”  [D#65]   
As increasing revenue is a key metric in the incentive plans, every effort is made to 
achieve the targets set. The accounting policy of double counting revenues earned from 
inter-subsidiary and inter-SBU collaborations was perceived by senior management and 
their business leaders as positively contributing to greater collaboration. Full revenue 
and profits are calculated for each business involved in the collaboration. If this were 
not the case, it is unlikely that the number of collaborations would be as many, or 
happen as quickly. 
“I think [corporate] has done a very smart thing in allowing double counting of 
revenues towards incentive plans.  Before that …it was so hard to come to agreement on 
whether we should do it or not because there would be a bunch of staff time on one side 
and maybe a lot of risk on another, and you weren’t sharing the common financial 
goals. And, so it was … it would be purely altruistic or just absolutely top-down, “You 
will do this, or else!” It has definitely been a way to ensure that we get good behaviour 
and everybody feels like they’re on the same team and really there are no barriers, it 
removes barriers. There’s no reason not to do it if you both think there’s an idea worth 
doing.” [D#64] 
To illustrate the practice:  if Events-Tech has an IT event that another subsidiary wishes 
to develop for their country, for example in Mumbai, India, the Events-Tech team will 
work with the team on the ground in Mumbai by coming up with an agreed definition of 
the product, the size of the event, the proposed marketing of the event, the revenue goals 
and the level of financial contribution requested, if any. They develop a service level 
agreement (SLA) to capture the terms which reflect that Mumbai, India is using Events-
Tech’s brand and that their regional team is executing it. The two subsidiaries count the 
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revenue for it. There is no negotiation of how much expense is taken up by either 
subsidiary. There is no arguing about whether it is a 60/40 split of revenue earned. Both 
collaborating subsidiaries acknowledge that the double accounting policy “actually 
removes all the financial barriers to collaboration.” [D#65] 
 Recently acquired events businesses were an interesting case. Their willingness to 
collaborate was influenced by a negotiated “earn out” clause; a contractual provision 
stating that the seller of a business would obtain additional future compensation based 
on the business achieving certain future financial targets.  As the seller typically owned 
and operated specific events, they were indirectly incentivised to collaborate with 
different subsidiaries via their “earn-out” clause.  
“On the plus side if we bring in their business, and we actually leverage it and open up 
sister shows overseas, and those are envisaged by the earn-out arrangement, we can 
effectively be handing them extra money. So ... they are keen [on the collaboration] 
basically the earn-outs make people very short-sighted.” [G#59] 
Conversely, the seller of the business was also concerned that the buying company 
would load it with costs, resulting in driving profits down and the seller unable to 
maximise the “earn out” takings. The acquired businesses wanted to continue without 
too much interference from the new parent. The more they were required to participate 
in the parent’s cooperative and collaborative activities with uncertain returns, which in 
turn potentially limited their opportunity to sustain or increase their previous level of 
revenue generation, the less willing the newly acquired businesses were to collaborate.  
5.2.3 Internal structures and interventions  
5.2.3.1 Wiki-based intranet  
The intranet was used extensively to share information and knowledge across all 
geographies and businesses. It shortened the length of time taken for information 
searches by posing questions to specific or general community members. Communities 
of practice (CoPs) were established and dissolved via the Wiki-based communication 
and search tool.  Contests encouraged individuals and units to contribute and share 
information and best practices, and respond to requests for information. Status rewards 
drove the continued use of e-business collaboration tools. 
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 “The hub’s been a great tool for collaboration for demonstrating collaboration and for 
highlighting instances of collaboration.  It’s also been something that’s pulled the 
regional barriers down.” [D#65] 
Few standardised systems existed within EventCo and where they did, they were 
primarily to foster greater collaboration across the Group.  A group-wide ERP platform 
was being installed, and within the SBUs, sales and customer databases were installed 
to encourage greater collaboration through search opportunities and cross selling or 
client referrals.  
“We implemented Sales-force chatter for the entire organisation [SBU – parent 
company to leverage in order to learn, in order to report best practices, key wins, 
celebrate success, share [external] competitive information.  If somebody on the Media 
side or on the Events side sees that one of their peers is working with a company that 
they’re not working with, and can identify that there’s an opportunity there, they can 
collaborate and work on it together.” [D#72] 
The intranet and e-business knowledge databases were implemented and used for 
collaboration.  No mention was made during the study of their use for competitive 
purposes.   
5.2.3.2 Management accounting practice 
The company’s relatively recent adoption of the accounting policy of “double/shadow 
or mirror” accounting between the SBUs permitted the recognition of revenue and 
profits in both SBU and subsidiary P&L accounts when they were collaborating. This 
policy was attributed with the removal of many financial barriers to collaborating. It 
removed the flaws of the previous profit sharing approach which led to significant 
disagreements about staff time utilised or recognition of risk. The benefits were 
identified as “Less time was wasted trying to disentangle who did what … you can just 
get on with it” [D#74]: “I mean it’s kind of false, but … collaboratively, it changed 
things overnight.” [G#62]: “We consistently find that, unless we apply that rule, 
[collaboration] doesn’t work.” [B#16]  
The mechanism by which the collaboration is captured is through the ‘infrastructure 
company’ described in Section 5.2.2.4.  
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5.2.3.3 Formation of Executive Committee  
The formation of a broader Executive Committee (Exec Co) 18 months ago not only 
increased the interaction and communication among the leaders of the five SBUs but 
also began to dispel some of the distrust and silo behaviour that hung over from the 
company’s prior history.  
“That opens up a world of collaboration that never previously existed or really would 
have been too difficult to try and establish.” [G#76] 
“We’re some way down our collaborative journey and we all have very strong personal 
relationships around that table anyway, that actually coming together seemed extremely 
natural.” [G#62] 
5.2.3.4 Global events initiative 
Corporate HQ invested in the creation of two centralised units at HQ level to foster the 
identification and sharing of best practices across the sector and regional events and 
content businesses. The roles expanded to include coverage of all the events businesses 
so that there was some commonality and standardisation about how they were run and 
best practices shared across the divisions.  
The initiative was not without its detractors as some CEO’s of the subsidiaries 
perceived the corporate units to be competitively expanding their remits such that there 
was an overlap of responsibilities.  
“Thinking, why are you doing that, we’re doing that? They think well I’ll have a bit of 
your business as well, and that and that and that, so that I justify my existence here. It’s 
extreme internal competition.” [D#67] 
5.2.3.5 Adjudication process 
Top management of EventCo acknowledged that one of their roles was to adjudicate 
when requested to intervene in tensions resulting from internal competition between the 
SBUs. Their role was also to gauge when competitive tensions were escalating and 
becoming intolerable. Top management also intervened to move the issue forward to 
enable collaboration. 
“My role there is to go straight to [name], who’s my counterpart who runs that business.  
We’re going after the same exhibitor pot … we’re cannibalising, we need to stop it 
now” [G#58]. “I can play my part in ameliorating and forging stronger relationships 
between people in support of the CEOs who feel challenged.” [G#62] 
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“And so therefore the people higher up will step in and say, come on guys this is not 
going to do the company any good if you continue bickering over a certain element 
here. We want to make it work so let’s make it work together.” [D#66]  
5.2.3.6  Decentralisation  
Culturally, there was little enthusiasm for high level centralisation or standardisation. 
The Group CEO encouraged a devolved authority approach and not a centrist 
authoritarian style from the Head Office. He preferred not to control and mandate 
practices from the centre. However, too much autonomy was perceived to be a barrier to 
collaboration and created some competition. 
“You don’t want sort of top-down control, but I think a bit of mandating and a bit more 
rigour would give us more chance of being successful in an environment where we’re 
trying to foster collaboration. Whether it’s [competition] happening by accident or, 
people go off because there’s so much decentralisation here, do their own thing, we do 
need a bit of control over what we’re effectively spending the shareholders’ money on.” 
[G#58]  
On the other hand, centralisation, in the form of being told to do something, did not 
achieve collaboration either.  
“Are we doing it because [EventCo] have told us to?  Well that’s no good, don’t want to 
do it then, let’s do something else.” [G#59] 
Although decentralised, the clarity of each subsidiary’s charter and role within the 
organisation reduced, although did not eliminate, competition. There was also little or 
no overlap with the other units e.g. brand ownership of the verticals within expanded 
geographies, with the exception of the cases previously mentioned regarding new 
business development. 
“We develop our products well, so that there is not too much overlap in products. There 
is no competition because that just wouldn’t happen.”  [B#63] 
5.2.3.7 Standardisation   
Standardisation also remained antithetical to the prior ethos of independent standalone 
businesses. Within the SBUs at the subsidiary level, greater centralisation of efficient 
back office operations occurred through the standardisation of processes and practices.  
As more back office functions were integrated, greater interdependence occurred which 
required the subsidiaries to leverage existing resources and infrastructure in each of 
 156 
their geographies. This action supported both the growth of vertically branded events 
and the subsidiary in a specific geographic location.  
A SBU CEO stated:  
“I am not keen to have a lot of regional direction set for technology because I’d like to 
be able to consume, purchase, procure, and apply technology on a global level. I want 
there to be a global set of standards and objectives and processes that are then 
implemented and in respect to local laws, practices, customs, accounting standards if 
they are different.”  [B#68] 
5.2.3.8 Socialisation  
Numerous interventions were initiated by HQ and the subsidiaries to foster relationships 
with the belief that positive relationships stimulated collaboration when the right 
opportunity presented itself. However, to know when opportunities exist, the businesses 
needed to be aware of what their sister subsidiaries actual functions were. Through 
networking and the Wiki intranet, greater awareness of other areas and their products 
and areas of responsibility overcame instances of competition that occurred through 
ignorance of activities and lack of interrelatedness of the businesses.   
Geographic and cultural diversity were initial barriers to collaboration. To offset the 
challenges of communication and misunderstanding, EventCo supported face-to-face 
meetings, for example, sending people to various subsidiaries to participate in exchange 
programmes. The global leadership development programmes and senior leadership 
team meetings were seen as valuable networking and knowledge sharing opportunities 
and often the forum for the formation of long-term relationships. 
“I think doing the [development] programmes was a huge catalyst. Because all of a 
sudden you have people throughout the organisation that are meeting for the first time 
and are learning about the business that other people are coming from, getting to know 
each other, and what the roles look like. And then starting to work on projects together, 
which is unique because you have people literally from across the globe, and across all 
of our organisations, working together on a common goal. And you get to know each 
other that way and suddenly that really starts to trigger how we can leverage each 
other.” [D#75] 
While great efforts were made to socialise at senior levels across the organisation, at the 
interpersonal level, managers strongly identified with their professional and 
organisational identities. For example, news and events professionals not only had 
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different interests but also different cycles of work, which dampened collaborations 
between these subsidiaries. An extreme example is reflected in the following statement:  
“I don’t know what you’re doing in this company, EventCo should sell you.” They see 
it as, “I have enough on my plate trying to sell our own stuff. Why do I need to be 
bothered with selling press releases to our exhibitors?” [D#75] 
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5.2.4 Mechanisms and interventions 
A summary of the mechanisms and interventions that were identified in Section 5.2 to 
foster inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition are captured in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4: EventCo - Mechanisms and interventions  
Conditions when: not enough (increase) too much (manage) 
 Mechanisms 
- interventions 
Mechanisms 
- interventions  
Collaboration Formalisation/standardisation 
- ‘double accounting’ policy 
- internal joint venture 
- internationalisation strategy 
- established Exec Co  
- charter clarity and alignment 
- service level agreements  
- ‘forced’ collaborations 
Lateral Relations 
- event’s best practice initiative 
- content best practices   
Communication  
- E-business technology e.g. ‘wiki’ net  
- building relationships through 
training, business meetings, social 
events, network gatherings 
Socialisation  
- collaborative culture & values 
- inter-unit transfers, job rotation   
- one company identity  
Trust 
 
Control  
- prioritisation  
Competition Decentralisation 
- business/professional identity 
- product cannibalisation  
Formalisation/standardisation  
- evaluation of unit performance 
- no central mandating of practices    
Control  
- reluctance to mandate decisions  
- SBU profit centricity  
- peer performance comparisons 
Socialisation  
- foster subsidiary identity 
 
Formalisation/standardisation  
- adjudication &dialogue  
- clarify roles, charters and 
markets  
- collective rewards – profit share 
- ‘ONE’ EventCo  
Communication  
- swift action to pull subsidiaries 
together  
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5.2.5 Content of inter-subsidiary interactions of competition and 
collaboration  
The content of the subsidiary relationships of competition and collaboration is centred 
on the sharing of best practices, geographical expansion of vertical brands, new product 
development, the expansion or overlap of internal ownership and accountability of 
emerging business opportunities.  
 “The biggest living examples of collaboration at EventCo are the internal joint ventures 
which are driving our growth. We have a couple of examples in China, or in Asia of 
standalone events that are big and sizeable that Asia are running on their own but we 
have more examples of Asian shows growing which are in collaboration with one of our 
other businesses.” [G#62] 
However, as the coverage of primary and then secondary geographic locations 
increases, competition for customers is envisaged to emerge between the subsidiaries.  
“Certainly when you “geo-adapt” a lot then it does happen that customers have to make 
a choice. Do they accept that we do it here in Singapore or in Saigon or in Hong Kong, 
or in India? You could say there is competition there.” [B#63] 
Additionally, cross-business collaborations in the form of client referral activities and 
cross selling were accompanied by a level of competition. Both parties offered the same 
resource or competency to the same client but for different client purposes and cross-
selling opportunities were mostly thwarted because of the focus on meeting their own 
financial targets. 
“We get invited to a seat at the [client] table and begin to show EventCo as not as 
content or trade-shows or news independently but to begin to show EventCo as an 
integrated marketing services company with specialities in a number of areas.” [D#61] 
“And the worst thing is where, and this happened in this case, where people are literally 
going to the same customers and competing against one another undercutting one 
another.” [G#58] 
Competition between the subsidiaries existed when the development of new business 
areas overlapped or cannibalised existing products or services or when different 
subsidiaries perceived the prospective business opportunity to be an extension of, and 
therefore incorporated into, their current capabilities and charter (i.e. internal area of 
responsibility). The resultant charter and market overlap was temporarily tolerated 
through an understanding among the subsidiaries until the overlap was “sorted out”. 
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In other instances HQ tolerated the competition between the subsidiaries as in the case 
of the obsolescence of printed magazines and the adoption of online media services.  
“We [HQ] want some competition. I mean I think that’s different. If you set this up and 
say right actually you know what, we’re going to allow the children to eat the parents. 
…And there are circumstances where that’s okay where you think a product might die 
out and you want to incubate a new one.” [G#58] 
However, the lack of awareness at lower management levels within the subsidiary can 
also create temporary states of inter-subsidiary competition. 
“I have an interiors portfolio of shows and in one of those shows we’ve launched a new 
zone several months ago about office interiors. In London they run a series of shows 
also called by the same name, but they are for facilities managers, so it’s a completely 
different market and they launched an office zone and that event manager was like we’ll 
target all of the interior customers because …well, it’s a direct strike. My Group 
Director of that portfolio got sent a piece of marketing, and he was like what, hold on, 
we are head to head competing here.” [D#67] 
The outcome of the decision was resolved internally and based on the stronger brand 
before any impact was felt by the external customers.   
There was some competition between the subsidiaries for financial resources, parent 
attention and contribution, but there was no tension felt in these instances. This was 
natural and anticipated.   
 “It does become a little bit competitive because we all compete for resources and 
attention and contribution. The more contribution you make, the more highly regarded 
you are, the more closely you’re watched, I guess there’s some of that, but I don't know 
that we’re competitive within the same markets.” [D#61] 
“We’re always competing because there’s only a limited amount of opex and capex. So, 
everyone is always competing for the money.” [D#71] 
The organisational design of global vertical brands, and subsequent clarity of charter 
boundaries, limits the competition between the subsidiaries.  
“There’s no real competition between the three geographies [of Asia, European/US and 
US businesses] to be quite frank and only one which then strives to promote 
collaboration.” [D#66] 
As a sales organisation, sales were an area where competition was both fostered and 
expected.   
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“There were some areas of competition, I’d say they were largely in the sales arena of 
course where competition is fostered because sales people are largely coin-operated, 
and they’re incentivized on commission.  I’d say there is intra-company competition 
happening there because whereas the, say media sales people would be selling a product 
for $5,000 let’s say, the events people would sometimes sell them for $2,000, in some 
cases talking to the same client. So we were in some cases causing internal channel 
conflict.” [B#69]  
Table 5-5: EventCo - Content of competition and collaboration  
Content of Collaboration   Content of Competition  
New product/service development  Market expansion  
- competing for market expansion in 
potential new business area 
R&D in media products 
- Event (T)/Content /News  
Parent resources and attention  
Cross selling 
-  marketing campaign at tradeshows 
 
Understanding collaboration  
The findings from subsidiary management showed that they distinguished between 
collaboration and cooperation, which are often used synonymously.   
 “I think cooperation is, someone will come and ask you something and you say yes, I’ll 
do that…I’ll cooperate with that. Collaboration is if the two of us sat down and had a 
proper conversation - what you think we might achieve… There always has to be a 
desired outcome. There always has to be some kind of measurable success criteria … 
and milestones …and what I see sometimes is, collaboration being confused with 
cooperation.” [D#67]  
There was also evidence suggesting that the subsidiary management viewed 
collaboration and competition as orthogonal constructs and not on a continuum.  
 “There was tension between Asia and Miami because they were being run by different 
business units. They couldn’t get their act together to collaborate properly but where, I 
think that there’s change afoot now with this other potential acquisition, it will get 
sorted. …I don’t think they were competing; it’s just that they weren’t collaborating, 
because they’re all in kind of shipping, but they’re still different. And I don’t think that 
by not collaborating as well as they might’ve done, anyone lost a dollar or fought over a 
dollar. It’s just that there could’ve been a few more dollars if they had collaborated 
maybe.” [G#62] 
If there was non-collaboration between two distinct external businesses, interestingly 
one executive questioned whether it mattered if they collaborated or not, saying “when 
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you are sister companies in an organisation, there’s an underlying assumption that you 
should work together.” [G#59]  
5.3 EVENTCO SUMMARY 
Focus on competition and collaboration  
The content of the subsidiary relationships of competition and collaboration centred on 
the sharing of best practices, geographical expansion of vertical brands, new product 
development and the expansion or overlap of internal ownership and accountability of  
emerging business opportunities, in addition to competition for parent resources and 
attention.  
Outcomes   
Positive outcomes from collaborating with other subsidiaries were learning and 
appreciation of other units’ capabilities, understanding of geographic challenges, better 
collaborations, growth and international expansions and developing a sense of ‘it’s our 
sense of identity’, whereas competition raised performance and developed 
entrepreneurial ownership and behaviour.  
Nature of the relationships  
Multiple simultaneous relationships of competition and collaboration were less evident 
in EventCo as a result of the organisational design which separated the SBUs and global 
vertical brands. The SBUs developed collaborative relationships to pursue growth and 
global expansion of their brands within other countries with established infrastructures. 
The relationships with other subsidiaries changed over time as a result of external, e.g. 
government regulations or obsolescence of print media, and internal events e.g. change 
in strategic priorities, such as focus on events with media support. Tensions were 
generated as a result of competitive interactions between the subsidiaries and 
interventions by both HQ and the subsidiaries were introduced to rebalance the level of 
competition. 
As evidenced in Figure 5-5, groupings within PhotoCo showed natural collaborations 
for geographic expansion occurring among the Events SBUs as they were similar in 
nature and could easily combine their resources to support each other.  Traditionally, 
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there was little collaboration between the media and events professionals. With the 
changing emphasis of the group on the events portfolio, the dynamics between media 
and events were being “forced” to collaborate with their colleagues both within and 
across the subsidiaries. The US-based businesses also demonstrated less collaboration 
with their Asian and European colleagues. News had very little interaction with the rest 
of the Group as it was a different business with less in common and lack of 
understanding of the contribution they make to the Group.  
Determining factors of coopetition  
Eight determining factors were identified, although not unique to either collaboration or 
competition; external environment, rewards and incentives, management commitment, 
trusted relationships, external market and internal charter overlap, peer comparison and 
individual mindset.   
Significant structural elements and interventions were highlighted; accounting policy, 
wiki-based intranet, and formation of ExecCo, global Events and Content units, 
adjudication process, decentralisation, standardisation, and socialisation mechanisms.  
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Table 5-6: EventCo - Salient determining factors of coopetition  
Salient factors  EventCo: inter-subsidiary coopetition   C+  C- 
External factors   
Economy  Efficiencies  ↑  
Market uncertainty  Print/online   ↑ 
Organisational factors  
Strategic Interdependence  Split of geography and sector  ↑  
- organisation design (MNC) 
- clarity of boundaries  
Geographic expansion  
Global vertical brands  
  
Top management commitment  Top management commitment to collaboration  
Collaborative culture/shared values  
↑  
Trusted relationships  Long term, professional identity  
Geographic 
↑  
↑ 
Market overlap  Business development   ↑ 
Skills overlap  Share knowledge   ↑  
Performance comparison  Peer comparison of performance   ↑ 
  Best practices  ↑  
Rewards & incentives Group/SBU/individual   
- profit centre level  
↑ ↑ 
↑ 
Subsidiary characteristics 
Individual manager characteristics 
Manager’s mindset  One company  ↑  
  Healthy competition   ↑ 
Note: C+ = collaboration; C- = competition  
Mechanisms and interventions  
A significant amount of effort was put into ensuring successful collaborations and 
organisational integration through normative mechanisms, i.e. cultural values and 
socialising activities, both formally, e.g. global leadership development programme, and 
informally, e.g. use of wiki-net. Connections and networking is EventCo’s business and 
collaboration is how they put together events, which differs from the way the news and 
media sides of the business operate.  
While a single ‘one’ company organisational identity for EventCo can create a strong 
sense of identity to encourage greater collaboration, it can also give rise to conflicts 
with the entrepreneurial orientation of the company’s acquisitive heritage. Tensions 
existed between different professions which also presented a challenge for collaborative 
opportunities.  
There was little evidence of perceived, or experience of, internal competition arising 
from the need to be responsive to local demands. The subsidiaries were able to 
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collaborate and leverage local resources to establish or expand their businesses within 
the vertical brand.  
The double accounting policy mitigated any competitive financial barriers from cross-
SBU collaborations. Each SBU received financial recognition of their contribution of 
revenue and profit to the collaboration. Recent acquisitions still in their earn-out period 
post acquisition were encouraged to collaborate and expand as a result of the ease and 
recognition of financial performance.  
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6 CASE ORGANISATION 3 – PhotoCo   
The objective of this final case is also to explore and describe the interunit relationships 
of competition and collaboration at PhotoCo. A brief overview of PhotoCo is provided, 
followed by the findings of the within-case analysis. 
6.1 THE ORGANISATION  
PhotoCo, headquartered in London, England, designs, manufactures and markets 
broadcast video and photographic camera support equipment. It serves the broadcast, 
photographic and military, aerospace and government (MAG) markets. Geographically, 
the group’s operations are classified into four segments: the Americas, the rest of 
Europe, the rest of world, and the UK. For the end of the fiscal year 2013, 45% of the 
Group’s revenues by destination came from North America, with the remainder split 
between Europe (31%), Asia Pacific (18%) and the rest of world (6%). The company 
currently has a direct presence in 12 countries: Brazil, China, Costa Rica, France, 
Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, the UK, and the US. Geographic 
diversity enables the group to mitigate various risks associated with the over 
dependence on a specific market. It bestows PhotoCo with a wide customer base, strong 
brand presence and growth opportunities across different markets. The company 
employs approximately 1,800 people. 
Acquisitions are a key part of PhotoCo’s growth strategy. Over the last four years, 
PhotoCo has invested over £40 million in earnings enhancing acquisitions. The 
acquisitions supplement the company’s core growth and assure the ongoing expansion 
of its business, including new technologies, additional products and geographic reach. 
PhotoCo also seeks to capitalise on its existing market position by penetrating newer 
distribution channels such as consumer electronic stores and online platforms for its 
product offerings. 
The current group structure is organised into three SBUs (see Table 6-1). The fourth 
SBU retains its P&L for internal management reporting and reports directly into the 
broadcast division for organisational reasons.  
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The broadcast SBU is a manufacturer and supplier of specialised, high quality 
equipment for professionals engaged in globally producing video content for the media 
industry, i.e. broadcast, film and live events. Its products are distributed in nearly 100 
countries, either through dealerships or directly to the end user or corporate sector. The 
company has manufacturing facilities in four countries. 
The photographic SBU provides premium photographic and videographic equipment to 
both professional and non-professional users. The equipment primarily consists of 
camera support, tripods, equipment bags, lighting support, light emitting diode (LED) 
lights and lighting accessories. This side of the business has been driven by the rise of 
the digital single reflex lens (SLR) camera, where acquiring and sharing pictures and 
video clips is the new way of communicating and socialising. This has boosted the 
emergence of ‘pro-sumers’, i.e. consumers seeking professional quality equipment.  
The services SBU, which reports directly into the photographic SBU, provides services 
such as broadcast equipment rental and technical support to television production teams 
and film crews globally. This sector enables the company to closely monitor changes in 
technology and showcase their products. The division has a strategy to focus on events 
where higher levels of service are most needed. 
The MAG market is serviced by a separate SBU which provides high-definition 
microwave technologies and antennas for mission critical application. They continue to 
have significant contracts with law enforcement and defence sectors.  
At the SBU level, value is created by receiving feedback from end users, designing and 
developing innovative products and service offerings for their brands, sourcing and lean 
manufacturing, working with global logistics providers and setting up a global 
distribution and sales network to serve their customers and end users.  
Acquired businesses had typically not been integrated into the company immediately 
after acquisition, but were left to operate as independent, semi-autonomous entities, 
previously with little or no collaboration within or across sectors required or expected. 
Because of a lack of centralisation and a strong decentralised approach, there are few 
common systems and platforms established at this stage of their organisation 
development to effectively coordinate activities across the three divisions. At the Group 
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level, the Group creates value through setting medium-term strategies, budgeting and 
monitoring, governance framework and policies and people talent management. The 
Group’s finance division provides a centralised function for the divisions.  
However, since the appointment of the current Group CEO, greater collaboration is 
actively promoted between and within the divisions to exploit the anticipated synergies 
of the previously independent businesses.  
Table 6-1: PhotoCo - Corporate subsidiaries (SBUs) 
PhotoCo  SBUs Broadcast Photographic Services MAG 
Sector/Geography Sector Sector Sector Sector 
Market 
‘Provideo’ 
(B2B) 
‘Prosumers’ 
(B2C) 
Event services 
(B2C) 
Military, aviation 
and government 
Employees (~1,900)  ~800 ~800 ~200  ~100 
Financial contribution to 
group revenue (%), 2013 
45% 44% 1% 
Incorporated in 
broadcast figures 
6.1.1 External context  
Developments in technologies, to shoot photos and video and for viewing processing, 
management, storage and sharing, continually expand the scope of the photo and 
imaging world. Technical progress brings novel products and services with changing 
consumer habits and, consequently, changing markets for the photo and imaging 
industry. Over 4.4 billion capturing devices, including camera mobile phones, smart 
phones and camcorders, are being used globally. Connectivity between all types of 
imaging and the swift and easy exchange of images worldwide are characteristic of the 
current trend in photo and imaging technology.  
An increasing number of people are using smartphone devices to take photos and are 
not upgrading to previously used camera products. A significant challenge is to respond 
to the growth of the smartphone as a photographic device when a core part of the 
business of PhotoCo is ‘supports’, e.g. tripods, pedestals and bags, for traditional 
photographic equipment. The size of the device was effectively reflected in the price 
and as size decreased, the supporting devices became smaller. The ratio of the price of a 
camera to that of support remained proportionate. Logically, support products may also 
be provided at a lower price than before, impacting on the company’s margins.  
 169 
As a result of changes in the industry and consumer choices, traditional products offered 
by the two main divisions, broadcast and photographic, are converging. The 
consequence of this convergence is that the positioning of the products is being adjusted 
and the impact has led to a ‘collision in the middle’.  
Further changes in the photographic industry are impacting on PhotoCo. Traditionally, 
it has been dependent on mechanically engineered products but increasingly newer 
products are being developed with greater electronic and software components. 
However, the electronic components market is intensely competitive. It is characterised 
by short product lifecycles, continual performance enhancements, rapid adoption of 
technological and product advancements by competitors in the retail market and price 
sensitivity in the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) market. Many of the 
competitors operating across the categories and markets have greater marketing 
resources and brand recognition. In addition, continuous convergence of the markets for 
computing devices and consumer electronics has further increased competition. 
Furthermore, rising demand and cheap availability of counterfeit products in the 
electronic components market have the potential to adversely affect the company’s 
customer base and overall business of the Group. 
Economic conditions remained challenging in 2013. While seeking greater efficiencies 
and implementing greater cost control management, the company streamlined the 
business and restructured two of its three divisions into more integrated, functionally 
matrixed businesses. The restructuring consolidated activities in several countries (the 
UK, Israel and the US) and transferred a portion of their manufacturing capacity from 
the UK to an existing manufacturing plant in Central America.   
6.1.2 Organisation redesign  
The organisation redesign of the divisions from independent, autonomous businesses 
and subsidiaries (see Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2) to a global functional matrix was 
implemented to facilitate greater synergies between the disparate business entities 
within the divisions through greater collaboration. The implementation of the redesign 
was given greater priority than previous attempts as PhotoCo came under enormous 
pressure from not only new competitors entering the market but also economic 
uncertainty that pervaded both consumer and business confidence.   
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As a result of the changes impacting on the photographic division, the roles and 
expectations of the sales force were altered. The sales force had been stable in terms of 
tenure and were used to selling only one product. Now, the sales force were targeted 
and incentivised to sell multiple brands within the portfolio of the division. Thus, in 
addition to the scope of sales increasing, the product mix was expanded. A willingness 
to sell other products was necessary as was the individual salesperson’s capability to 
sell electronic products, in addition to more the traditional mechanical componentry. 
Significant investment in training and development was initiated to enable the sales 
force to upgrade their existing knowledge of a wider range of products. The personal 
time required to invest in and ensure a new sales administration system within the 
division, not across the divisions, was also installed to facilitate cross-selling of the 
aggregated range of products.   
Prior to the reorganisation, broadcast SBU was best described as a collection of 
independently managed businesses, each with its own CEO and individual centres of 
focus. The division was an amalgamation of independent businesses that had no 
particular necessity to talk to each other. One of the challenges of implementing the new 
structure of a divisional functional matrix (see Figure 6-2) was to encourage 
collaboration between the previously separate autonomous entities. Before the 
acquisition, the challenge was exacerbated because the CEOs of the businesses, who 
were the original founders or owners, were retained to independently grow his or her 
business, but as part of a larger Group structure. During the integration phase of the 
organisation redesign, some founders found the transition to greater collaboration to be 
too challenging, both for themselves and their businesses and, therefore, chose to exit 
the organisation. Notwithstanding, the divisional CEO remained committed to an 
entrepreneurial and collaborative culture, encouraging the sharing of resources to 
extract the potential synergies from within, and across, the division.  
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Figure 6-1: PhotoCo - Previous organisation chart as @ February 2014 
 
Figure 6-2: PhotoCo - Current organisation chart as @ June, 2014 
6.1.3 Demographic analysis  
The respondents from the Group and its three divisions represented in the study had an 
average tenure of five years in the company and had been in their current roles for less 
than five years (see Table 6-2).  
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Table 6-2: PhotoCo - Tenure and time in role  
Demographics  Total Broadcast Photographic IMT Group 
Informant Representation 
(No.) 
Total 
22 
7 11 1 3 
Average Tenure (Years) Avg. 
5 yrs. 
4 5 6 6 
- Group/SBU CEO 
(Avg. Years) 
- 8 5 6 6 
- BU/Div/Function 
(Avg. Years)  - 3 5 - - 
Time in Role (Avg. Years) Avg. 
4 yrs. 
2 4 3 4 
6.2 WITHIN-CASE FINDINGS  
6.2.1 Nature of relationships amongst subsidiaries 
The findings suggest that the current state of inter-subsidiary relationships reflects the 
historical position of autonomous decentralised businesses of competitive global brands. 
The businesses operated independently and remained coordinated by a corporate parent 
holding company, whose primary concern was for individual business profitability. 
Interactions between the SBUs were rare. However, the businesses were gradually 
moving away from independent operations. Under the new Group CEO and SBU CEOs, 
both corporate and parent subsidiaries were now strongly encouraged to interact more 
frequently to explore opportunities for, and engage in, cross-business collaborations to 
reap the gains from efficiencies and synergies. However, the inter-subsidiary 
relationships of collaboration were still relatively nascent within the organisation.  
For example, in the case of the IMT division, there was little interaction with the other 
subsidiaries as IMT’s unique market of MAG agencies meant that the subsidiary 
maintained greater self-sufficiency in relation to the other subsidiaries for national 
security reasons. No market crossover existed and opportunities for collaboration were 
restricted. Nevertheless, the subsidiary willingly sought opportunities to collaborate 
with her sister units in areas where there were no security restrictions. However, the 
outcome from little interaction between all the SBUs was missed opportunities to 
exploit existing technologies within the Group and increase access to existing channels 
for new product distributions. With encouragement from the Group HQ, the SBUs 
continued to increase their level of interaction.  
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“They are working together within the divisions. The business units working within 
divisions are working better.  I think the structure has been slightly broken down so we 
don’t just have business units with MDs and discreet P&Ls and discreet organisations, 
there is a lot more matrixes working within the divisions but between the divisions there 
is still not a lot[of collaboration].” [G#96]  
Through these interactions, each of the SBUs became more aware of cross-business and 
subsidiary capabilities and the possibilities for future, mutually beneficial, inter-
subsidiary collaborations. The subsidiaries nevertheless retained their focus on the 
achievement of their own SBU goals, performance and customers.    
The recent organisational changes within the SBUs, from business units with their own 
P&L to a functional matrix design, increased the level of cross-functional coordination 
and collaboration.  
“So we’re in the middle of all that transition.  So prior to that, there was no such thing 
as collaboration, even within broadcast.  The brands saw each other as competitors.  
Quite frankly, going back three or four years it didn’t matter because the margins were 
such, but suddenly as price margins get squeezed, it’s all about an efficient company to 
take advantage of the market.  We’ve only really been talking about collaboration in 
broadcast for just over a year and as I say, really between broadcast and photographic, 
only for the last few months.” [D#84] 
Technological innovations in the marketplace and changing customer preferences led to 
the convergence of two subsidiaries’ core products, creating internal competition which 
manifested into damaging pricing decisions (see Figure 6-3). Subsequent tensions 
resulting from the market-led competition between the two SBUs resulted in the Group 
CEO directing the subsidiaries to ‘sort it out’ in an effort to retain their respective 
margins and avoid cannibalisation and any customer confusion. While developing a 
joint response to the market issue, the SBUs were able to balance both a competitive 
and collaborative relationship, collaborating on the joint approach while continuing to 
compete to win customers at the crossover price points. However, the balancing of the 
coopetitive relationship was achieved by actors with different roles within the collective 
SBU interacting for different activities. For example, (see Figure 6-4) the sales force 
continued to compete on price while the marketing teams collaborated on providing a 
joint solution.  
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Figure 6-3: PhotoCo - Coopetition example of market convergence  
A more granular view of the subsidiary interaction enables the location of the tensions 
and management of the process over time, as illustrated in Figure 6-4.  
 
Figure 6-4: PhotoCo - Tensions in coopetitive relationship  
Having got together to sort it out, and jointly discuss ways to redress the market 
convergence triggering competitive tensions between the two subsidiaries, the two 
SBUs agreed to pursue joint development of new products in this market space, co-
 175 
branding of products,  clear cut-off points for pricing, and, a review of transfer pricing 
policies. In terms of relationship dynamics, the coopetitive relationship between 
photographic and broadcast changed from little interaction over new product 
development to one of high competition and low collaboration for four years, until it 
was no longer tolerable for the Group CEO and SBU CEOs, to lower levels of 
competition and increased  collaboration. As this example demonstrates, the coopetitive 
relationships were not static and careful management was practiced during this process.  
“So where we may be doing cross-division of projects in that crossover space, if you 
like, I think that needs to be something which needs to be carefully managed.  Again, it 
comes down to if there’s clear understanding of where that crossover is there’s actually 
firm agreement between each of the divisions exactly how we go to address that 
marketplace.” [D#78] 
6.2.1.1 Multiple relationships  
As discussed above, there was little interaction between the SBUs (Figure 6-5). Some 
collaboration occurred within the SBUs, particularly between the broadcast subsidiaries 
which retained recent acquisitions as entrepreneurial business units in contrast to 
photographic ones which merged businesses into divisional functional units. 
Collaboration occurred as a way of securing cost efficiencies such as the sharing of 
office space in the Japanese subsidiary. Previously, the broadcast and photographic 
divisions in Japan occupied different offices. The first successful collaboration between 
the businesses in the Japanese subsidiary was a joint marketing campaign for an 
industry exhibition which would otherwise have been developed independently. 
The interactions of the new functions, with the newly structured photographic SBU, 
were reported by the informants to have increased but still limited cross-functional 
interactions with the broadcast SBU occurred because of the lack of knowledge of who 
to approach and what type of collaboration was permissible. However, two significant 
and challenging collaborations were referenced by most informants between lighting 
products and support stands, products common to both SBUs but requiring different 
specifications for their individual markets. Little commitment to the specific 
collaborations (c+) were noted as they felt forced by the Group CEO, amidst a history 
of intense competition (C-) and lack of trust between the two SBUs (see Figure 6-5). 
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The collaborations did not achieve mutual financial gain nor profitably contributed to 
the Group performance.   
6.2.1.2 Hierarchical differences  
The study finds that there is a significant difference in how the collaborative element of 
coopetition is perceived and enacted by the SBU CEOs and subsidiary managers. The 
SBU CEO focused on the bigger picture of PhotoCo and the subsidiary managers on the 
profitability of their units.  
“It’s working again better at the top level, but it’s still that understanding at the lower 
level about the true value for the group rather than what’s in it for my particular 
division.” [B#78] 
“When you’re at the low end you’re still management anyway, but you’re in the sales 
and marketing part of it, actually, the driver for collaboration is less strong because you 
have very strong personal targets, but I think further up you have increasingly 
impersonal targets which are shared. So the drivers for collaboration I think become 
stronger.” [D#82] 
“I expect the divisional leaders to act with maturity and to get along and to go out and 
collaborate and find ways to work together with one another and just go and make it 
happen. At the end of the day it’s all about doing what’s right for PhotoCo and wave the 
flag and generate profits for us and make the collaboration work.” [B#90] 
“The people underneath me are tied to the division’s performance and therefore they 
have no interest in doing a deal that’s going to hurt their margin.”[B#90] 
6.2.1.3 Understanding of collaboration  
Behind the relationships are subtle differences in the understanding of actual words 
related to collaboration.  
“I think we have quite a good degree of co-operation but not much collaboration.” 
[G#89] 
“Collaboration so far has meant joint product development.” [D#91]  
“Collaboration is more of a value that you need to live.” [B#87]  
Collaboration was not always constructively considered, as collaborations had been 
perceived to be “forced” and not voluntary. The sense of enforcement resulted from the 
Group CEO’s insistence that the businesses investigate potential opportunities he had 
identified which utilised complementary skills or products. The two entities were “told 
to go work it out and make it happen.” [B#87] Even if a project had not been identified 
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by HQ, the expectation to collaborate was clearly conveyed to all. The subsidiaries 
knew “that they have to, somehow, on something.” [D#82]  
“I think historically collaboration was a bad word, I don’t think it was really ever used.” 
[D#84]  
“[Collaboration is] telling me to do something with this guy and I don’t want to.” 
[G#89] 
On occasions, subsidiaries were seen to collaborate enough to make sure that the SBU  
CEO and Group CEO were satisfied, which covered up a deep sense of distrust one 
subsidiary had in another. The perception at the interpersonal level was that they had 
“been stealing our market for years now. So, we kind of made all the right noises, but 
deep down our body language betrayed the fact that we really didn’t want to work 
together.” [B#90]   
In PhotoCo, through collaboration, the divisions achieved greater transparency on 
prices, quality and customer support and greater efficiencies by sharing costs and 
knowledge. While collaboration was mostly perceived as positive, the identified 
drawbacks of collaboration were related to the costs of organising and coordination. 
Furthermore, several collaborations (e.g. between the units responsible for lighting and 
support products) did not produce the level of financial success that was hoped for. 
Figure 6-5 shows that not all perceptions of coopetitive relationships were symmetrical 
(see also the example of broadcast and photographic lighting units). The photographic 
division perceived they were collaborating and yet, the broadcast unit considered the 
same interaction to be more competitive.  
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Figure 6-5: PhotoCo - Inter-subsidiary relationships 
6.2.2 Determining factors of collaboration and competition   
The antecedents of collaboration and competition between the PhotoCo subsidiaries 
were found to be the external environment, top management commitment, individual 
mindset, performance comparison and rewards and incentives.  
6.2.2.1 External environment   
“The Marketplace: So, to me, this is the core of it… which has a big impact on the 
business, on the organisation, the things we do, the approach to it.” [D#89]  
The challenging economic environment constrained the company’s resources which 
fostered a drive for efficiency. The divisions focused on joint manufacturing and 
process efficiencies through collaboration to achieve cost reductions to offset falling 
margins.  
The uncertainty and changing nature of the traditional market positively influenced 
collaboration as the subsidiaries sought to understand how they could position   
themselves for greater growth and share.  
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PhotoCo Corporate  x x x
SBU: Broadcast C+/C-
Finance x x x x x C+
HR c+
Sales& Marketing x x x c+
Distribution (Japan) x
Costa Rica Manufacturing C+
UK  - MARKET: Supports C-
US  - MARKET: Lights  c+/C- C- C-
US  -  MARKET: Batteries C+
SBU:MAG x x C+
Services  (US) C+ x
TD  (US) x x x x
SBU: Photographic  x C+/C- C+
Finance C+
HR c+
Operations & R&D
Sales & Marketing C- C+ c+ c+
Italy MARKET: Supports C+ C-
Israel MARKET: Bags C+/C-
UK MARKET: Lighting C+ C+
Distribution (US) C+ C+/C- x x x x
Distribution (UK) C+ x x x x
Distribution (Japan)  c+ x x x C+
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 “I think the market is dictating what we do with product innovation and how we 
address the markets and that’s … what’s driving us to make those changes.  We have to 
collaborate to understand how we keep our position or actually gain a better position in 
the marketplace.” [D#91] 
However, the convergence of the video mid-market led to the SBUs competing by 
going after the same market, engaging in competitive pricing and eroding margins. 
Historically, the SBUs and subsidiaries were left to fight it out but this eventually 
became an intolerable situation for both HQ and the SBUs.   
Armed with their new collaborative ethos, the two SBUs agreed to collaborate to work 
out how both might attack the mid-market for the benefit of each subsidiary and the 
Group. There was no framework in place to facilitate collaboration between the groups 
so a cross-divisional working team was established to lead the cross-divisional initiative 
(CDI). Through such collaboration, the SBUs believed they could also successfully 
prevent external competitors from acquiring market share and enable each subsidiary to 
take a more valuable share of the market.   
 “There’s been a huge leap forward in collaboration and that’s been established 
basically by a working team that’s called CDI, Cross-Divisional Initiatives, where 
representatives from photographic and representatives from broadcast regularly meet 
together to try and figure out how we attack that mid-market.” [D#84] 
The SBUs sought to leverage all company resources to drive down costs in periods of 
economic uncertainty and constrained profits. This business need prompted 
collaboration rather than competition.   
“At the end of the day it’s all about how do you meet the needs of the customer in the 
most efficient way?  If that means collaboration, then that’s great.” [D#78] 
“Collaborating to me is about two things; people need to see the value of it, and again 
we go back to different challenges.  When you need to be efficient and you need to 
search for value, you collaborate.  But you need to see value in it.  The structure in 
Israel has brought [x] million pounds of benefit - we needed it.  Did we have to do it? 
Yes.  So we did it.” [D#93] 
The market had both a positive and negative impact on the subsidiaries’ relationships 
and their willingness to collaborate with each other. The cross-over of specific products 
which resulted from technological development and changing customer needs drove a 
level of competition between the subsidiaries. This overlap became a strategic tension 
that needed addressing. However, in a more heterogeneous and prosperous marketplace, 
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both the HQ and the divisions tolerated, or chose to ignore, the competition resulting 
from the emerging overlap in the video market. Competition did not matter in a thriving 
economy.  
 “So to kind of net it out, the market’s driving us to compete between the divisions; our 
people are as a result kind of suspicious and kind of competitive.” [B#90] 
“It’s the age of the market has changed, the market has driven our respective products 
and product development into a competing type environment…. we try to meet in the 
middle but the way the market has evolved, it's forced us to be competitors for users and 
for customers.” [D#79] 
“We’re very much open about it and the overlap or competition is very small, if any, 
and we can really work it out locally.” [D#98] 
“We’re chasing some of the same areas in the market, you know, they have these high 
end products, we have those low end products that are actually competitive against one 
another in the market. I guess it’s hard for me not to say [we are] competitive ….in 
practice.” [B#90] 
“We have got an overlapping product; we have the same market and the same customer.  
That is competition.  We have got some of the same customers, so again it is market 
driven.  Competition is market driven and of course the competition that signals to me 
is useful, it is useful to have some overlapping because it maximises things but it can 
drive what it was in the past – total competition and no collaboration …If you compete, 
you don’t have the same priorities.” [D#93] 
6.2.2.2 Top management commitment   
The incumbent Group CEO formalised his commitment to, and inherent belief in, 
collaboration as a way of working by incorporating the principles of collaboration into 
their corporate values statements. Collaboration was defined as “we work better when 
we work together” (Group Annual Report, 2014) and the principle was expressed in 
process terms of being closer to colleagues and customers, celebrating achievements, 
sharing knowledge, pooling resources, testing ideas and supporting each other. The 
commercial value of collaboration was to exploit previously unrealised synergies and 
achieve cost synergies.  
“Collaboration does not come out of the drawer- just because somebody dictates - it 
comes out of a need, but you need to have a need and then you have to work on the 
organisation.” [D#93]  
Respondents uniformly agreed that progress had been made in moving towards a more 
cooperative, if not yet collaborative, organisational culture. The cultural emphasis was 
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sufficient to initiate discussions across the businesses, encourage more frequent inter-
subsidiary interactions and develop new relationships. From these interactions, 
awareness of other subsidiary capabilities and opportunities were learned about which 
could achieve economic benefits, such as current collaborations that included the 
rationalisation of procurement processes or consolidation of suppliers, in contrast to the 
competitive past.    
“Well it comes from competitive and is becoming collaborative.  It is up to us as a 
Group and management of the division to manage and get the balance and so on.  The 
transformation we did within the divisions, between business units and integrating 
them, is collaborating, and now people collaborate a lot.  They have got the same 
objectives.  They see the same value from the same things, and that is fundamental 
because if you believe in different things, you don’t collaborate.” [D#93] 
“Cross-divisional, I think the real success is that we have now completely demolished 
the barrier, so I think there is now full willingness and openness to collaborate. And our 
people cross-divisionally know who they are, which is already an achievement because 
in the past it wasn’t guaranteed.   We have created the right environment for further 
collaboration cross-divisionally where I think we have already some best practices in 
R&D, in operations, in product marketing.” [B#87] 
While there were opportunities to leverage and utilise existing technologies residing in 
the individual businesses, initially cross-SBU collaborations were initiated by the 
suggestion of the Group CEO to investigate potential opportunities. Later, the SBUs and 
subsidiaries began to initiate more collaboration independently of HQ.  
“I think [the CEOs] got together and agreed that it was time that we started having more 
in-depth meetings where we could share more technology, share more channels, share 
more components. So to my mind what’s going on right now, it’s pretty much driven 
from the divisions themselves and not from the top.” [D#84] 
6.2.2.3 Manager’s mindset   
At the individual level, subsidiary managers referred to their own, and other manager’s, 
propensity to collaborate as a characteristic of their personality: for example, “it’s just 
the way I am” which enhanced the individual manager’s willingness to collaborate.  
“I’d change the company’s culture and initiate collaboration at all levels in a 
heartbeat…You have something you’ve got to make happen and you apply all the 
resources rather than being myopically focused within your own discipline.” [D#95] 
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The individual manager’s attitude looked beyond the immediacy of their own self-
interests and reflected the motivation to cooperate and collaborate for the greater good 
of the Group.   
“At the end of the day it’s all about doing what’s right for PhotoCo and wave the flag 
and generate profits for us and make the collaboration work.” [B#90] 
“Am I worried about whether I get the credit for an action or do I accept that somebody 
else can get the credit for it, I really don’t care to get the right result? That is a big 
cultural change and some people will make it and some people won’t to be honest with 
you.” [D#82] 
“I think the only reason why somebody right now will collaborate within PhotoCo is 
because they are professional, you have had a sense of belonging to the organisation, 
and they have a growing market.  Again I also think that there is no real incentive to 
collaborate other than just it’s the right thing to do, and it’s the right thing to help your 
sister business but ultimately the entire group.” [D#79]  
Contrary to typically negative perceptions of competition, senior managers from across 
PhotoCo commented that a little bit of internal competition was not necessarily a bad 
thing.  
“Competition in the market in some ways in certain areas in not such a bad thing, 
because we’re going after this middle sector …and a little bit of competition is actually 
quite healthy because it means that we really are going to try and swamp that market 
and make sure the customer buys a PhotoCo product.” [D#84]  
However, the managers were quick to add that there was a healthy level of competition 
to be attained and that more than that could prove destructive to PhotoCo.  
“We’ve had competition between the divisions as to who’s producing the most revenue 
or the most profit and in fact the cost of the other division, so that’s not healthy 
competition.  The competition I’m talking about is where everybody stands to gain.” 
[D#95] 
Counterfactually, some senior management denied the need for any internal 
competition, claiming that they neither have the willingness nor the need to compete 
internally, irrespective of which SBU they were a part.  
 “I happen to believe a lot that competition should be only external and not internal.” 
[D#94] 
“But I would argue that in many cases the guys aren’t competitive enough. Our 
business, dare I say it, had decades of success without really trying and suddenly our 
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world has become competitive.  Well, why should I go and be competitive with my 
internal peers when I’m used to the business just coming to me anyway?” [D#82] 
On the other hand, the founders or owner-entrepreneurs of businesses that were recently 
acquired by PhotoCo, proved to be an initial barrier to collaboration at the post-
acquisition phase. The established SBU perceived them to be, not only, unwilling to 
collaborate but also competitive in their working. This was not necessarily reflected in 
their personal relationships.  
“We are independent entrepreneurs who have always run businesses by ourselves… I 
really don’t understand the benefit of working together and I am actually seen as more 
of a competitor, you know; let’s keep competing with each other. So we’ll have a good 
time when we go out to the restaurant but I will never tell you what I am working on 
and that’s it.” [B#87] 
In PhotoCo, competition was generated between subsidiaries when new business 
opportunities opened up that could be allocated to one or more equally capable 
subsidiaries. The subsidiaries would compete for expansion of their current charter (i.e. 
internal responsibilities) to incorporate new business potential into their current remit, 
thereby contributing to the growth targets set for the subsidiary. At this early stage of 
identifying a new opportunity, competition remained internal to PhotoCo rather than 
customer-oriented. However, as the business continued to grow and the question of 
internal boundaries remained a source of contention, the perceived overlap in the 
charters continued to be contested and drove competition between the subsidiaries. 
6.2.2.4 Peer comparison  
Both corporate and parent HQ created “healthy” internal competition between the 
subsidiaries by comparing and communicating each unit’s performance on common 
KPIs to inspire continuous performance improvement.    
“There is healthy competition as well as collaboration.  An example of that is up until 
now they’ve not seen what their respective performance levels are. Well, we’re just 
changing that now, so every month everybody will see how all the whole team has done 
against its objectives individually.” [D#84] 
However, the comparison of performance results was less of a driver of high 
competition between the non-entrepreneurial subsidiaries in SBU broadcast because the 
individual managers within the established units did not perceive themselves to be 
particularly competitive. This implies that the use of the mechanism will generate some 
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healthy, constructive competition within the subsidiary relationships to drive up their 
performance in relation to one another, but not so much that the competition becomes 
destructive.     
“How competitive: ‘we look at the worldwide numbers every day and we want to be 
high up in that list, because that’s a yardstick that we measure each other on.  Would 
that lead to any negative developments and things there, no we don’t... we’re not that 
competitive.” [D#80]  
“We have monthly meetings with the ops exec; we have monthly production and 
financial information shared with the ops exec, so they can see how each other are 
doing, so they can see what their sales are like, what their margins are like, what their 
cash generation is like, what significant issues they are facing.  So is there a bit of 
competition as a result of that?  I am sure there must be, but not in an open kind of way; 
I am sure one division will think they are growing better than we are, and those sorts of 
things.  But I think that’s just usual competition.  I suppose you can use that as a 
mechanism to encourage progress can’t you?  …So if you share what good things are so 
people can see that in a way maybe that adds a little bit of competition.” [G#92] 
“I think equally that … as soon as the market recovers a bit I will be able to raise the bar 
a lot in terms of being competitive, because you see in a growing market, competing for 
better results has a positive connotation.” [B#87]  
Comparison is about ‘us’ and ‘them’ and who the units identify with. The clarity of the 
internal boundaries and organisation structure within the SBUs clearly delineated each 
unit and therefore eliminated the overlap of charters and areas of responsibility inside 
PhotoCo, hence reducing or eliminating internal competition for the same customer.  
The notion of ‘us and them’ and the competitiveness that was generated by comparing 
one unit with another disappeared once the businesses were merged into a functional 
organisation. But as separate businesses there was competition.  
“…an organisation divided into business units, there can be some internal competition 
for resources amongst the business units, so the fact that we have eliminated the 
business units in fact seems to be a major help to the internal collaboration…. we did 
have some internal competition that I observed when we had the business units but now 
there are none [no business units], so there’s no competition anymore.” [D#94] 
“The R&D for bags and the other is the R&D for mechanical and electronic products, so 
they don’t have a lot of interplay or internal competition because they are doing very 
different things and the core competences are different.” [D#94] 
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6.2.2.5 Rewards and incentives  
The SBUs were evaluated, and their top management rewarded, on equal measures of 
each SBU’s performance and that of the total Group. Half was based on the 
achievement of annual targets set against the Group’s profit before tax, with the 
remainder based on personal achievement and that of the Group’s operating cash flow, 
generated as a percentage of operating profit. The key KPIs were revenue, operating 
profit, operating margins, and sales. These metrics drove some competition between the 
SBU’s to successfully achieve their own individual targets, driven also in part to gain 
the positive attention of the Group CEO by meeting or exceeding their profitability 
targets.  
SBU management also participated in a Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). Short-term 
decisions for the SBU were, therefore, balanced against the longer term gain for the 
group benefit. 
SBU financial performance remained an important focus, irrespective of group-wide 
rewards, because financial success for the SBU meant greater rewards for their 
subsidiary teams. An SBU CEO was mindful of the impact of the SBU’s performance 
as it enabled him to reward his own team’s performance, thereby creating conditions of 
competition with the other SBUs for access to a larger bonus pool.  
“Half of their bonus is group and half of it is division. But that’s only for the top person, 
and beneath that, the layer below, it’s all division, so they’re only incentivised on the 
division.” [G#96]  
At the sub-SBU level, the main focus was on meeting the SBU’s key performance 
objectives. Little attention or time, therefore, was dedicated to participating in 
collaborative efforts with other SBUs, which were viewed as over and above the 
performance requirement of the SBU, or where the returns were uncertain and therefore, 
contributing less financially than existing within-SBU projects. This reluctance to 
engage in any collaborative relationship with another SBU was further exacerbated 
when the expectation of the payback from any collaboration extended beyond the 
current annual review period and thus, would not positively contribute to their P&L 
within the 12-month accounting period.  
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“When you rank them [collaboration projects] ultimately in terms of immediate impact 
on our P&L, the benefits of those collaboration projects economically are smaller than 
some of the things that you need to address immediately in the business.” [B#87] 
“Given that business is tough, and we are all working very hard to deliver numbers, 
there is so much pressure to deliver sales numbers, to deliver profitability that the focus 
is very much on your own business.” [D#79]   
Contrary to their own SBU-only level focus and incentives at the subsidiary and 
functional level, the performance of recently acquired businesses that had not yet been 
fully integrated into the SBU, were measured on agreed upon financial targets as 
negotiated in their earn-out agreement. Furthermore, financial incentives also did not 
appear to provide a level of motivation for the entrepreneur to collaborate, as their 
motivation was oriented more towards the passion that they had for their product and its 
development. 
“If I’m an ex-owner and have got $10 million in the bank in another, so you’re going to 
give me an extra $10,000 if I collaborate? No, it doesn’t really drive it.  And even if I’m 
an engineer who earns $50,000 a year, is it really passionate for me, this project, or not?  
If it is then I’ll do it anyway and if it isn’t I’m not going to make much difference.  But I 
think that’s more the case in product development, which I think is one of the key 
things that we can differentiate ourselves on than in sales where probably it is more 
effective as a means of generating the right behaviour.” [B#90]  
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Table 6-3: PhotoCo - Salient determining factors of coopetition  
Salient factors    
 
PhotoCo: inter-subsidiary coopetition  C+  C- 
External factors  
Economy  ↑ 
Market uncertainty  Market convergence: traditional boundaries 
unclear  
 ↑
Organisational factors  
Strategic interdependence  Subsidiaries (divisions) 
-  merged BUs into functional matrix 
structure  
↑   
Top management commitment  Top management commitment to collaboration 
Collaborative culture/shared values  
↑   
Trusted Relationships   Professional/geographic  identity   ↑ 
Market overlap  Market convergence    ↑ 
Performance comparison  Peer comparison of KPIs    ↑ 
Rewards and incentives  SBU: group-wide/SBU performance  
Subsidiary: SBU performance  
↑  
↑ 
Subsidiary characteristics  
Recent acquisitions Impact on ‘earn-out’ provision  ↑ ↑ 
Individual manager characteristics  
Individual mindset  Good of the firm  
Healthy competition  
↑   
↑ 
Note: C+ = collaboration; C- = competition  
6.2.3 Collaboration barriers  
Diverting from the previous structure established in presenting the findings of the two 
cases, I present the findings which highlight the most salient barriers to establishing 
collaborative relationships within PhotoCo. It is important to note that they were not 
represented as drivers of a competitive inter-SBU relationship, but as hurdles identified 
by senior management to overcome the legacy of a highly acquisitive and competitive 
holding company and those that are preventing PhotoCo from achieving a more 
collaborative culture, designed to maximise efficiencies and synergies from the existing 
businesses within the MNC. The eight barriers are summarised in Table 6-4 and 
presented as structural and relational barriers to inter-subsidiary collaboration.  
(i) Holding company governance  
The lack of centralised shared systems and supporting structures in a holding company 
environment was perceived by the subsidiary managers to be a barrier to collaboration. 
Greater structural support for collaboration was required. While the level of autonomy 
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and lack of interference by the Group HQ was positively perceived by the subsidiaries, 
the lack of centralisation and standardisation of processes, standards and systems such 
as IT, finance, sales and procurement, and HR, were perceived obstacles to 
collaboration.  
Recent Group support had centralised the talent management and succession planning 
processes, which ensured that there were consistent policies, processes and initiatives to 
acquire, retain and engage the organisation’s best people.  
However, at the Group level, corporate HQ did not want to be seen as mandating 
collaboration or indeed becoming bureaucratic for fear of constraining the 
entrepreneurial businesses that were used to operating independently.  
As the company embarked on sharing manufacturing capability and conducting joint 
R&D projects for new product development, it was faced with underdeveloped 
management accounting systems, such as transfer pricing policies and practices for the 
transfer of manufactured goods across divisions. However, the company began to work 
on systems that would more transparently achieve fair financial recognition of each 
unit’s contribution to future collaborations.   
“We know the corporation all would be far more successful if we did that collaboration, 
if we sold the other division’s products. But…. they’re looking at it saying, why do we 
want to share that margin with you? We have the products through the other division, 
why do we want to take half the margin on that product?” [D#93]  
(ii) Collaborative capability  
Collaboration was a new way of working for PhotoCo and a level of uncertainty about 
how to collaborate was evident at the subsidiary level. Several managers stated that 
collaboration could be fostered if they only knew how to collaborate and be 
collaborative. The data suggests that the subsidiary leaders were looking for some 
guidelines on what was acceptable in terms of time spent on collaborating in 
comparison to their current accountabilities, as anything that detracted them from their 
own and the unit’s objectives could be challenged.  
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Table 6-4: PhotoCo - Structural and relational barriers to collaboration 
Barriers to 
Collaboration  
Form  Suggested cause (s) Illustrative quotes  
Autonomy and 
decentralisation 
Structural  Holding company 
governance  
“Just common accounting practises and principles so that when you look at a product P&L from any part 
of the company, you know exactly what you’re looking at…It’s been a case of let every division do their 
own thing.  We’re in a holding company at group level.” [D#84]  
Standardisation  Structural Lack of mandating of 
standard policies and 
investment in common 
infrastructure  
“What we’re keen to avoid is mandating collaboration or becoming bureaucratic about anything.” 
[G#89]  
“It is about processes because if you have companies working in a completely different way it is difficult 
to collaborate and to dismantle and put together the things that make them collaborate.” [D#93] 
Socialisation Structural Discontinued business 
(formal) meetings and 
social interactions 
(informal)  
“We really don’t do anything together as a group to really get to know each other or to understand each 
other, other than when we are in an intense or a pressurised business situation.  There are no company 
activities or company meetings where we are able to work together on something that is for the common 
goal.” [D#79] 
Organisational 
hierarchy 
Structural Perceived value 
(financial)  of 
collaboration  
“I think it’s working again probably better at the top level, but it’s still that understanding at the lower 
level about the true value for the group rather than what’s in it for my particular division.” [D#78]  
“The technical guys see no problem in collaborating in fact I was reminded of an opportunity in Central 
America sharing the factory. However, when management heard about it, what seemed like a good 
opportunity was actually a poor idea because of the lack of awareness of the cost structure.  [D#77]  
Time  Structural SBU reorganisation 
design  
“It’s difficult enough taking care of your own objectives or to-do list, other than now expanding out and 
trying to also collaborate and help others. “ [D#79]  
Collaborative 
capability  
Structural  Lack of know how or 
training on how to 
collaborate; ‘just do it’  
“We probably could foster more collaboration if we all had a general idea of who we should be 
collaborating with, how we can collaborate, and what's really accepted.  I think there is not a reluctance 
to collaborate.” [D#79] 
Identity and 
diversity  
Relational  ‘us’ and ‘them’ on 
geographic, cultural, 
professional and SBU 
bases   
“There’s still a sense the fundamental difference is [geographic brand A]: very high spec, very design 
orientated and stylish, and it feels [geographic brand B] was do it cheap and sell it high… I suppose the 
[geographic brand A] guys think, well you designed some cheap [products] for us but they’re not really 
very high quality and you’re damaging our brand potentially.” [G#89] 
Entrepreneurial 
mindset  
Relational  Entrepreneurial 
acquisitions; lack of  
trust  
“Entrepreneurs who build up small businesses really struggle to collaborate, challenging to get these 
guys to think differently and to be willing to be transparent and open with one another, to trust one 
another and to work together.” [B#90] 
Trust  Relational  Historical lack of trust  “Behind it there are years of mistrust and competition and there’s a lot of passive aggression of things 
that we’re saying that are going to be done and then probably don’t get done because people slow roll 
them.” [D#84] 
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(iii) Socialising   
Collaborations were inhibited by the lack of regular opportunities to formally and 
informally socialise with the other geographically dispersed subsidiaries. Their 
importance became apparent only when the Group cancelled the group-wide 
management meetings due to financial constraints. The lack of opportunities for getting 
to know one another inhibited collaboration but also the establishment of longer term 
trusted relationships. The relative newness of the senior management team (see Table 
6-2) only emphasised the importance of getting to know one another outside of intense 
or pressurised business situations.  Face-to-face interactions were important to develop 
relationships with members within and across the SBUs: “when we don’t spend time in 
the same room with each other we think of each other as enemies.” [B#90] 
Neither trust nor trustworthiness of individuals was mentioned in the relationships that 
currently existed between the various subsidiaries. The level of openness and 
communication was growing within the organisation but there was more 
communication and interaction required at the lower levels of the organisation. These 
levels did not have the benefit of interpersonal friendships that the top management 
team developed by working more closely together, and hence having more frequent 
interactions.   
The intranet provided a basic communication tool and provided an online space where 
news and announcements from the SBUs were collated, enabling employees to share 
more information and work better together.  The ‘hub’ was an example of a global 
communication tool which also provided access to a global training resource portal for 
all employees, facilitating an online community but not a face-to-face one.  
HQ was also enabling greater collaboration, and personal efficiency, through the 
creation of contemporary spaces in the work environment with upgraded technology 
and communication systems.  
(iv) Diversity and identity  
The geographic diversity and dispersion of units got in the way of efforts to collaborate. 
In addition to time zone and cultural challenges, the smaller, entrepreneurial companies 
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acquired by PhotoCo often operated with different business models and state-of-the-art 
technology compared to the more established PhotoCo businesses. While opportunities 
for learning existed from possible collaborations, the lack of familiarity and uncertainty 
became barriers to developing collaborative relationships.   
Other groupings of different identities inhibited collaboration. The SBU identities were 
borne along product, customer segment and branding lines. Different identities of 
culture, profession, function, and geography were found in all subsidiary locations.  
Relationships were more collaborative between actors when there was a greater degree 
of similarity along demographic and professional lines, such as alignment of interests, 
language, cultural understanding and professional roles.   
The new functional reorganisation within the subsidiaries now facilitated more frequent 
introductions to each division’s peers, creating opportunities for collaboration at the 
functional level across the SBU and geographies. Collaboration came easier from a 
logistics perspective because of the knowledge that a counterpart in the same function in 
another SBU knew about similar issues, albeit in a different context.   
“If I ask someone who has a job in the organisation which is reasonably similar to mine 
in terms of responsibilities and decision-making and stuff, it is easier to collaborate. If 
that job doesn’t exist and I have to speak with six different people, then it’s very 
difficult.” [D#94]   
However, the personal enjoyment of establishing new relationships and sharing best 
practices and issues with peers began to be prioritised over and above the actual 
business of the SBU. As one business leader put it, “they need to know that they also 
have an organisational identity with the division [SBU].” [D#95] The downside and 
implication here is that “we still have a business to run”. 
Furthermore, the newly acquired, fiercely independent and successful businesses were 
proud of their independent progress and as such succeeded in creating a strong sense of 
identity. Integration into PhotoCo and the protection of their brand challenged the short 
term willingness of the acquired company to explore opportunities for collaboration 
with other Group businesses.  
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(v) Time  
Time was the most consistently reported barrier to inter-subsidiary collaboration for the 
photographic SBU. However, this barrier was not mentioned by the broadcast SBU. 
When asked why this was the case for photographic, the response related to the 
additional requirements of the transitional period of the organisation redesign.   
(vi) Recently acquired businesses 
As part of PhotoCo’s growth and expansion strategy, acquisitions of smaller 
entrepreneurial businesses were intended to capture identified synergies through 
collaboration. However, the motivations of the two entities, the acquired and the 
acquiree, were not always aligned in the short term, post acquisition period. The 
Group’s expectation was that the autonomous businesses look for cost reduction and 
revenue generating synergies and exploit existing distribution channels and technology, 
creating successful collaborations.  However, without a history of cross-business 
collaborations within the Group and the historically minimal cross-SBU interaction, the 
acquired firms continued to operate independently during the earn-out period when the 
acquired company was not yet fully integrated in PhotoCo. Explorative attempts were 
made but were hampered by coordination challenges (e.g. lack of common structures, 
lack of a well developed network) which led to inefficient searches for opportunities 
incurring exploration costs of time and focus, and which interfered with their business 
objectives.  
(vii) Hierarchical level  
Subsidiary managers observed that collaborative relationships were operating at the top 
level of the organisation and that within the parent company, at the subsidiary 
functional (technical) level, collaboration was desired. However, subsidiary 
management stopped the proposed cross–SBU collaborations pursued by lower level 
technical staff due to a lack of their understanding of divisional cost structures. So, what 
seemed like a good opportunity for collaboration was lost, “the company stayed with its 
external provider as the company resources were too expensive for the interested 
subsidiary.” [D#77]   
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(viii) Historical distrust and competition  
The challenges to more collaboration between the SBUs at PhotoCo were the levels of 
low trust between the subsidiaries and resultant lack of motivation to collaborate. 
Communication was preferred at the factual level as integrity and trust were not high.  
In summary, PhotoCo had numerous structural and relational barriers inhibiting the 
development of trusting collaborative relationships between the SBUs and their 
individual subsidiaries.  There were few supporting structures to complement the 
cultural initiative towards greater collaboration and also counterbalance the current 
market and financial forces of the SBU P&L which fostered inter-subsidiary 
competition.    
6.2.4 Summary of mechanisms and interventions   
Interventions used by HQ and the subsidiaries facilitated and hindered collaboration and 
competition between the subsidiaries. Minimal interventions were HQ-led as a result of 
a preference for decentralised coordination. The subsidiaries sought greater 
centralisation to support common operational processes and systems that would enable 
greater collaboration.  
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Table 6-5: PhotoCo - Summary of mechanisms and interventions    
Conditions when: not enough (increase) Too much (manage) 
 Mechanisms 
- interventions   
Mechanisms 
- interventions    
Collaboration Formal Structure  
- SBU redesign to global, cross-
functional matrix  
Decentralisation 
Formalisation/standardisation  
- “forced” collaborations 
Lateral Relations  
- R&D cross-divisional initiative 
Communication 
- group wide Intranet   
 Socialisation 
- management commitment  
- foster  collaborative culture and 
shared values  
- inter-unit transfers  
- exit non-collaborative leaders  
 
Competition Decentralisation 
- product cannibalisation  
- non-mandatory practices 
Formalisation/standardisation   
- subsidiary rewards and incentive;  
- SBU/subsidiary profit centricity  
- “arm’s length principle “for 
internal transactions  
- peer performance comparisons 
 
Formal structure  
- clear roles, charters and markets 
- redesign independent businesses to 
global functional matrix   
Formalisation/standardisation  
- adjudication and dialogue  
- pull subsidiaries together quickly  
Lateral relations  
- joint product development  
 
6.2.4.1 Tension  
A certain level of tension between the units was perceived as a positive intervention 
between the subsidiaries. The judicious use of inter-subsidiary competition, while also 
actively promoting more collaboration, was not seen as contradictory by top 
management.  
“I always believe that there should be positive tension in an organisation; you have to 
keep people on their toes, you have to have them striving to do well, and therefore I am 
trying to constantly challenge them; challenge them in front of their peers, and 
challenge them to do well.  And to, again, give them every opportunity, whether it is 
financial-based compensation, recognition, just for the sheer pride of ownership of 
experience, to do well and show themselves in front of their peers.   
I think that way, that positive tension you put in an organisation …you get people to 
rise to the occasion.  And actually they see the value of the competition, and they also 
see the value of the collaboration, because then they see that they are less afraid to 
collaborate because they feel strong enough and they feel confident enough in their own 
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world that they can actually work with their other peers and make sure that it wouldn’t 
just undermine their own efforts.”  [B#97]  
However, both SBU CEOs acknowledged that the present time was not the right time to 
foster any additional competition between the subsidiaries. The risk of introducing more 
competition was higher than any benefit foreseen at this point in the company’s 
development.  
“I think the risk is higher than the benefit. If we were to compete more proactively with 
each other the risk would be significant. I try to explain this as I think today we have 
established or we’ve started to establish a very healthy environment where if the 
marketing organisation of the reciprocal division want to produce a new product in an 
overlapping territory, neither of the two can do it without a joint vision and consensus.” 
[B#87] 
The timing of introducing competition at the intra-subsidiary level was also important. 
Building increased levels of trust among the senior management team, to mitigate the 
prevalent climate of distrust from the recent past experiences, was necessary before 
introducing any further competition and tension into the existing relationships.   
 “So I would argue I think there is a place for that but only once you’ve reached a point 
where there’s trust and real maturity, I mean serious, serious maturity in the senior 
team, and an understanding of [team] principles. Once that’s in place, then you can 
introduce some competition that’s more at the level of let’s challenge ourselves to try to 
win out over the other guys, but I think that only works when all your systems are in 
place, everything’s really running well, that’s when you can introduce a little bit of 
that.” [B#90]  
“There’s a lot that can be done from the management point of view.  If management in 
each division took an interest in the others to a deeper level then you start to know the 
entire company’s business and then you look at each other more as colleagues and 
associates, rather than adversaries.  So the collaborative piece and the competition that’s 
inherent within companies in the first place that naturally exist then that becomes a 
more positive dynamic and that’s a healthy thing, but a lot of things have to be in place 
for that to happen.” [D#95]  
“If the group owns two competing brands then I would expect everybody in those 
brands to be mature enough to recognise its money from our one pocket into our other 
pocket. The customer wins and the group wins, so move on. So I don’t think it’s bad.” 
[D#91] 
By balancing both competition and collaboration, any tensions are offset by gaining 
greater efficiencies and realised synergies.  
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6.2.5 Content of inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition  
The focus of inter-subsidiary interactions of competition and collaboration described in 
the preceding sections can be summarised as shown in Table 6-6.  
Table 6-6: PhotoCo - Content of competition and collaboration  
Content of Collaboration   Content of Competition  
New product development  Market expansion 
- competition for sales in cross over market  
R&D  Parent company’s and Group CEO’s attention  
Cross-selling  
- marketing campaign at tradeshows 
 
Prior to the appointment of the incumbent CEO, there was no expectation of inter-
subsidiary (business) collaboration by HQ. The businesses were focused on their own 
requirements and opportunities. The subsidiaries were expected to run their own 
businesses and maximise their commercial success even if that meant brands and 
products competed against each other in the marketplace.   
The incumbent Group CEO clearly and forcefully put collaboration between the 
businesses on the Group-wide agenda.  
 “Until a year or so ago there was none [collaboration] within broadcast and there was 
very little between broadcast and photographic.” [D#84]   
The new focus on collaboration also coincided with the most challenging of market 
conditions and economic decline. Hence, the CEO’s drive for collaboration was also 
motivated by the need for more tangible outcomes in addition to the process activities of 
sharing resources, information, or technical knowledge.  
“It’s the two plus two is five, where you don’t subsume your goal, nor do you 
compromise but you achieve both and add on.” [G#89] 
The benefits of greater collaboration to achieve efficiency of operations (e.g. utilisation 
of shared space) and cost reductions (e.g. shared procurement) also benefitted the 
individual businesses’ as they satisfied their own need for profit attainment achievement 
in difficult economic conditions.   
Initially, as a manufacturing and distribution business, the primary focus of inter-
subsidiary collaboration within PhotoCo centred on cross-selling of multiple products 
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and brands within the SBU and latterly involved joint SBU new product development.  
In the design of new products, the company sought to leverage the relevant resources 
(i.e. both physical (factories) and knowledge (skillsets)) that existed within the Group, 
once opportunities for collaboration had been explored with the other division.   
The subsidiaries subsequently began to collaborate on the production of new products 
using shared manufacturing facilities other geographic regions.  
“We’ve already started looking at sharing components; I would very much like to build 
our next tripod in photographics’ factory… We could leverage all those things in our 
division and that will bring dramatic cost savings on what we’re currently doing.” 
[D#84] 
R&D was another area of collaboration identified by the subsidiaries.  
“So we’ve not quite yet sat down together from our different R&D departments to my 
knowledge and said right, we’re going to develop this product together from this 
concept, but what we have done is built on success where the market crosses over and 
expanded onto that success by sharing ideas, sharing product and production into those 
other markets.” [D#80]   
Opportunistically, the decision to collaborate achieved both a reduction in the cost of 
manufacturing for the subsidiary and leveraged the existing infrastructure within the 
country to take advantage of cheaper tariffs payable from within the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) trade zone rather than Europe.  Little adaptation of the 
brand and product for local conditions was required as the product is global in nature.   
Additionally, geographic expansion of the brands was achieved through greater 
collaboration between the subsidiaries, as they shared established office facilities in 
different countries of entry and leveraged the knowledge of the local office.  
Recent collaborations included joint attendance at industry trade shows and events. 
Traditionally the businesses participated in the same trade show but the event almost 
became territorial and competitive. Now, as a result of more frequent interaction and 
communication, “we know who our own customers are but they still trade with cross 
over customers… we talk about that quite openly.” However, “the spirit of collaboration 
has enabled those divisions to work together correctly.” [D#80]   
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6.2.5.1 Competing for customers and sales 
The subsidiaries competed with each other for new customers and sales. Sales 
competition was manifest in the pricing of cross over products.  When the economy was 
thriving, no one particularly cared about product crossover or any resultant internal 
competition between the subsidiaries. However, as the economy contracted, it became 
important to focus on product differentiation through the use of the pricing mechanism 
to ensure that competition for sales did not result in cannibalisation of cross over 
products as a result of inappropriate discounting.  
“Until a year ago it was a trade-off and nobody cared because we both grew despite the 
fact that we were competing. The external environment changes, now we need to care 
about it because we cannot afford, as we did before, to invest twice because there is no 
two growth, there is only one.  We were investing twice and we have two things, now 
we can’t afford to do it and therefore you have to strike a deal, a balance between the 
two changes.  So is it 50/50?  It is what the context enables you to do.” [D#93] 
As mentioned above, competition for customers was played out in participation at trade 
shows and events where each subsidiary, and in some cases unaware of each other’s 
participation, became territorial and competitive with regard to their own customers.  A 
similar sentiment was expressed in a different context “they’ve been stealing our market 
for years”.  This engendered a collective lack of willingness to engage with the other 
division and a desire to not be fully transparent about what they were doing.   
While cross-selling was seen as an opportunity for collaboration between the 
subsidiaries, it was also an area where competition between sales forces was fostered. 
Management specifically fostered ‘healthy’ competition between the sales groups to 
inculcate more of ‘an edge’ into the sales and distribution teams across the products and 
countries.   
6.2.5.2 Competing for resources  
Little mention was made of competition for resources. Internal competition for 
resources between the subsidiaries was perceived to be less relevant as the functional 
matrix structure was implemented and most of the independent business units within the 
SBU were eliminated and merged, with the exception of the recent acquisitions.  
Mention was made that the resultant functional interdependence supported greater 
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collaboration requiring them to work together, cross-functionally, to achieve their 
objectives which were previously individual product brand (business unit) oriented.  
“When different business units, there can be some internal competition for resources 
amongst the business units; the fact that we have eliminated the business units seems to 
be a major help to internal collaboration.” [D#94] 
Furthermore, there was some lobbying across the SBUs to control the procurement 
process for the Group as each SBU currently had their own list of preferred suppliers 
and product specifications. The results of initial collaborations to consolidate suppliers 
and reassess their manufacturing processes were financially positive.  
6.2.5.3 Competing for HQ attention  
The subsidiaries competed for HQ’s attention as the subsidiaries sought to be perceived 
more positively by HQ, based on their performance against key measures of growth, 
sales, and margin.  Competition for HQ attention and comparison of performance with 
another subsidiary exemplified that collectively the SBU and subsidiary managers 
wanted to demonstrate that their subsidiary was “the best”.  
“We are still trying to challenge us as a division to perform better than broadcast and 
they are doing the same. So I think that we are running to demonstrate to the group that 
we are delivering probably a better growth, a better growth in sales, a better growth in 
margin and so on.”  [D#35] 
“So there is definitely a non-zero amount of effort being spent on how we look better to 
London than photographic, and that is stupid.  I am sure whatever effort we expend in 
broadcast, my perception is they are spending at least five times as much in 
photographic on how they look better than broadcast.” [D#91]  
“Again if we have that maturity we can recognise sometimes it’s better to let go and 
focus on something else…But now it’s a little bit like two kids arguing for their parents’ 
attention, they get a little bit childish and they start fighting each other.  So one starts 
saying well she did, and the other one is saying well he did, etc.” [D#91] 
6.3 PHOTOCO SUMMARY  
Focus of competition and collaboration  
The newly appointed Group CEO and SBU CEOs were beginning to cooperate, and on 
occasions, collaborate to achieve greater efficiency and innovation in new product 
development. Competition between the SBUs was predominantly for market expansion 
and the Group CEO’s attention by uncompromisingly pursuing profit for their units.  
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Nature of the relationships  
Multiple relationships of independence, competition and collaboration coexisted 
between the subsidiaries as a result of external and internal factors. These relationships 
changed over time as the level of interaction increased between the subsidiaries e.g. as 
they progressed from being mainly independent and competitive, to tentatively 
engaging in collaborative opportunities. SBUs demonstrated their ability to sustain 
multiple relationships with the same and other units simultaneously. Irrespective of 
whether the instances of competition were inadvertent or intentional, there was a 
curiosity expressed by the SBU and subsidiary leaders to work together more. Further 
direction from the Group was sought regarding how and what was expected by the 
levels below the SBU.  
Antecedents  
Strategic interdependence is low in PhotoCo due to its recent history and current 
governance model as a holding company of entrepreneurial independent businesses.  
However, it was widely acknowledged that the company was making progress on 
fostering greater collaboration between the SBUs and subsidiaries. With an initial 
reliance on creating a collaborative culture change, the sub-divisional managers 
suggested that more structure in the form of common systems, policies and practice 
would support the drive for greater collaboration between the subsidiaries.   
Managed competition between the subsidiaries was recognised as a positive 
contribution to organisational performance - in fact, the generation of some tension into 
the organisation would suggest more competition. The belief that competition in 
moderation was a good thing encouraged the actual design of a certain level of tension 
to strive for performance.   
However, until a level playing field of collaboration was achieved, neither the divisions 
nor HQ consciously decided to inject any further internal competition at this stage. 
Changes in the external market place and economy have inadvertently created 
competition within the organisation which was managed accordingly.  
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Structures, interventions and mechanisms  
Few common practices or systems existed within PhotoCo. In fact, the lack of 
standardisation made collaboration difficult. Several barriers were identified: lack of 
centralised structure to develop group-wide processes and systems, a holding company 
HQ mindset, lack of collaborative capability, infrequent need to interact, geographic, 
cultural and professional diversity, a lack of time, acquisition and non-integration of 
businesses, historical distrust and competition.   
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7 CROSS-CASE FINDINGS    
After having analysed each respective case using case descriptions and within-case 
findings in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, this chapter presents the cross-case synthesis of the 
findings from the three case organisations.  The intention is to deepen understanding 
and offer insight into how, and why, subsidiaries conduct simultaneous interactions of 
competition and collaboration.  The chapter (i) compares and contrasts the content and 
antecedents of inter-subsidiary coopetitive interactions across the three different MNCs 
by highlighting differences and similarities that emerge and providing tentative 
explanations for the differences observed, (ii) provides a synthesis of the tensions that 
emanated from the inter-subsidiary interactions, and (iii) identifies mechanisms and 
interventions to manage the salient tensions.  The findings are presented under the 
headings of the three sub-questions posed for this study.  
Research Questions:  
SQ1:  What is the content of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration?  
SQ2: What factors or processes influence inter-subsidiary competition and 
collaboration?  
SQ3:  How do subsidiaries manage the inherent tensions arising from simultaneous 
competition and collaboration?  
7.1 CONTENT OF INTER-SUBSIDIARY INTERACTIONS 
The findings relating to the first sub-question are presented in this section: What is the 
content of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration?  
The content of the interactions of inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition 
consisted of resource acquisition, sharing, and utilisation. In the cases of EngConsult 
and PhotoCo, the resources were most notably tangible resources of product and people. 
In the case of EventCo, the primary resource exchanged was knowledge, which 
included operational best practices. Competitive and collaborative interactions also 
occurred for market expansion of new business and product development opportunities 
for the three MNCs (see Table 7-1).  
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7.1.1 Collaboration  
The subsidiaries of all three companies collaborated to share and utilise resources from 
elsewhere within the Group to pursue business opportunities. By collaborating with 
other subsidiaries they leveraged complementary resources, local knowledge and 
established infrastructure in geographies which were targets for expansion.  By 
collaborating, the subsidiaries balanced the tension between opportunity/risk and 
revenue/cost.   
The differences in content of the coopetitive interactions between the three MNCs 
reflect the tasks required of the different MNCs in order to conduct their business. 
While knowledge was explicitly shared in EventCo to provide networked marketing 
events to B2B customers, collaborations in EngConsult centred on sharing people 
resources to provide consulting expertise and in PhotoCo, physical components were 
exchanged to develop and manufacture products for their B2B and B2C markets.  
From a relationship perspective, voluntary collaborative relationships consisted of trust, 
respect and commitment. Broken commitments or agreements in previous interactions 
reduced the level of trust in the relationship. Some collaboration was “forced” by top 
management, irrespective of the state of the subsidiaries’ relationships, as the 
opportunity better served the Group’s interests by collaborating rather than the 
individual interests of the subsidiary. Forced collaborations did nothing to remove 
existing hostilities between the subsidiaries. The data also showed that forced 
collaborations were a way to have unknown businesses, who had not yet developed a 
level of trust through lack of interaction, explore synergistic opportunities by CEO fiat.   
7.1.2 Competition 
Competition was intense for access to and utilisation of internal resources. “I think the 
biggest competition we have is for resources” [EngConsult: D#36]. In the case of 
EngConsult, capable human resources with specialist knowledge were sought by 
multiple subsidiaries to support bids for large scale projects, creating competition for 
available resources. A request to a host subsidiary to release desired and limited 
resources was not always successful as the host subsidiary retained them for their own 
use.  The requirement to utilise and share internal staff resources for client project 
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related work was not a significant activity in EventCo and PhotoCo subsidiaries as any 
additional headcount requirement was resourced by external recruitment based on the 
growth of permanent business. Adding additional staff in EngConsult, before successful 
project bids were confirmed, exposed  the subsidiary to additional costs without having 
sufficient work to allocate or charge the costs to if the bid were unsuccessful. As 
professional staff utilisation and billable hours were important to assign to a particular 
project, permanent headcount versus utilisation and profit was a tension within 
EngConsult. 
Subsidiaries also competed for market expansion. Gaps in the market were identified 
and subsidiaries vied for the opportunity to provide their services or products to fill the 
gap. Without communication and updates of what related units were doing, subsidiaries 
found themselves in competitive situations, active in a similar market or developing a 
similar product. The study found that when two subsidiaries found themselves 
competing, inadvertently as the data implies, or intentionally, the subsidiaries discussed 
the implications for each party and agreed to ‘sort it out’ or continue with the 
competition if both were mutually benefitting without cannibalising each other’s 
services and products. However, when tensions strained the relationship and the level of 
hostility became intolerable for either one or both parties, there was another agreement 
to discuss the issue and ‘sort it out’. Some units did not perceive themselves to be in a 
competitive relationship with another subsidiary even though one of the parties 
perceived this to be the case.  
Table 7-1 summarises the content of inter-subsidiary coopetition, having subjectively 
interpreted the content according to varying levels of collaboration and competition, 
from both a structural and relational perspective.   
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Table 7-1: Cross-case findings - Content of inter-subsidiary coopetition 
Content of Coopetition   Structure  Relationships  
Lo Collaboration 
Lo Competition 
Sufficient own resources  
Recently acquired, not integrated  
 
Lack of trust 
Infrequent interaction  
Hi Collaboration 
Lo Competition  
Combining, leveraging resources  
Search for opportunities with formal 
and informal networks  
Clear  market and charter boundaries 
 
High trust  
Known to each other  
Hi Competition  
Lo Collaboration 
 
Market expansion 
Sufficient own resources 
‘Forced’ to collaborate  - 
organisation design  
Hostility 
Infrequent interactions  
Forced to collaborate- adjudication 
Hi Competition 
Hi Collaboration 
Market expansion  
Sharing knowledge, resources  
Temporary hostility re competitive 
activity  
Trusted relationships 
 
7.2 DETERMINANTS       
This section addresses the second research question:  What factors influence inter-
subsidiary competition and collaboration?  First, I present nine determinants in four 
categories: external; organisational; subsidiary; and individual.  While some 
determinants consistently influence either the competitive or collaborative elements of 
the coopetitive interaction, two organisational determinants (i.e. the internationalisation 
strategy and the pursuit of profit) demonstrate significant differences as a result of the 
underlying mechanisms and context. The determinants are summarised in Table 7-2.   
Structural mechanisms and enablers of coopetition are also identified and discussed in 
conjunction with the relevant determinant (see Table 7-4).    
The determinants are contingent in nature and are subject to both the external and 
internal contexts that the subsidiaries operate within. The salient determinants can also 
become the antecedents and influencers with which to alter the dynamic of the inter-
subsidiary relationship (see sections 7.4 and 7.5).  
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Table 7-2: Cross-case findings - Salient determining factors  
Antecedents  
 
EngConsult   C
+
  
C
- 
EventCo  C
+
  
C
- 
PhotoCo  C
+
  
C
- 
S 
D 
External Factors            
- economy  Efficiencies   ↑  Efficiencies  ↑  Efficiencies  ↑  S 
- market 
uncertainty  
Global design 
centres  
 ↑ Print /online   ↑ Video market   ↑ S 
Organisational 
Factors  
          
Strategic  
Interdependence   
Geographic/Sector 
(across SBU)  
↑   Geography/Sector  
(across SBU)  
↑   Global, functional 
matrix  
(within SBU)  
↑   S 
- MNC strategy  Transnational  
 
  ↑ Global; 
Multidomestic   
 ↓ Global; 
Multidomestic 
 ↓ D 
- boundary 
(charter) clarity  
Regional/sector 
responsibilities  
 ↓  Sector 
responsibilities  
  ↓  Product 
responsibilities  
  ↓ S 
Top 
Management 
Commitment  
Commitment to 
collaborative culture  
↑  Commitment  to 
collaborative 
culture  
↑   Commitment to 
collaborative 
culture  
↑   S 
Trusted 
Relationships  
Collegial, long term  
  
↑   Identity, long 
term  
↑   Newly forming  - - S 
-  unit of identity  Professional 
Geography(region)  
↑   
↑ 
Professional   
Geographic  
  
↑ 
↑ Professional  
Geographic  
Heritage   
 ↑ D 
Market Overlap   Sector overlap    ↑ Business 
Development  
  ↑ Market convergence    ↑ S 
Skills Overlap  Duplicate specialist 
resources   
  ↑ n/a    
 
n/a    
 
D 
Performance 
Comparison  
Peer  comparison      ↑ Peer comparison    ↑ Peer comparison    ↑ S 
      Best practices  ↑       D 
Rewards and 
incentives 
Group- profit share  
- profit centre level  
↑  Group/SBU/Indiv.  
- profit centre 
level  
↑  
↑ 
Group/SBU/Indiv. 
- profit centre level  
  
↑ 
D 
Subsidiary 
Characteristics 
          
- entrepreneurial  Resource levels low  ↑ ↑ Geographic 
expansion 
↑  Market expansion 
Recent acquisitions  
 ↑ D 
Individual 
Factors  
          
Manager’s 
mindset  
ONE firm attitude  
 
↑   ONE company 
attitude  
↑   ONE company  
attitude  
↑   S 
  Healthy competition    ↑ Healthy 
competition  
  ↑ Healthy competition    ↑ S 
  
Note:  C+ = Collaboration; C- = Competition  
 S = Similarities; D = Differences  
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External factors   
7.2.1 External environment    
The external environment of the subsidiaries encompasses competitors, customers, 
products, the geographical setting, economic, and socio-political climates that they 
operated in.  The data suggests that the state of the economy and market uncertainty, 
which reflect the speed of change in customer needs and preferences, are salient 
external antecedents of inter-subsidiary coopetition in this study.   
At the time of the study, most subsidiaries continued to experience an increase in the 
competitiveness of their markets, post the 2008 economic downturn. More prosperous 
markets like the Middle East  and China were faced with new external competitive 
entrants looking to exploit the opportunities that were limited elsewhere in the global 
market.  The increased level of external competitiveness placed significant pressure on 
product and service pricing, eroding both margins and unit profitability. Internally, 
within EngConsult for example, the level of market competitiveness was reflected in a 
subsidiary’s competitive quest for cheaper resources where the competitive aspect of the 
relationship focused on negotiating the lowest transfer price for the resources it needed. 
In PhotoCo, reduced spending on luxury items, and the convergence of the market 
(market uncertainty), led to competitive SBU pricing of overlapping products of the 
broadcast and photographic businesses.  
Prior to 2008, when the global economy was more prosperous, there was a greater 
tolerance for inter-subsidiary competition as heterogeneous markets were able to 
support multiple services and products. The costs of damaged inter-subsidiary 
relationships during these temporary, periodic states of intense competition were not 
overtly factored into any cost/benefit equation of sustaining internal competition; at the 
time more was to be gained, financially, by letting internal competition run. Awareness 
by the subsidiary managers of the reasoning behind the temporary continuance of 
competition resulted in the competitive relationships being less hostile, resulting in a 
healthy level of inter-subsidiary competition.    
On the other hand, the findings across all three MNCs indicated that the economic 
downturn and consequent resource scarcity encouraged the subsidiaries to greater levels 
 208 
of collaboration to achieve unit (and group-wide) profitability by seeking efficiencies 
and cost savings.  Those subsidiaries in more prosperous regions became targets of 
collaboration by other subsidiaries and, therefore, could choose with whom they wanted 
to collaborate.   
In summary, the nature of the inter-subsidiary collaborative and competitive 
relationships was contingent upon circumstances in the external environment (see Table 
7-3, for example, the economy and market uncertainty). As such, the nature of the 
coopetitive relationship (i.e. high or low competition or collaboration) was temporary, 
and subject to change, because environmental conditions would change.    
Table 7-3: Cross-case findings - External environment antecedents  
External  
Environment  
EngConsult Subsidiaries  
 
EventCo Subsidiaries  
 
PhotoCo Subsidiaries  
 
Weaker 
economies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stronger 
economies  
Fewer infrastructure projects  
Redundancies (specialists)  
Competitive pricing  
 
US East   
- low spend by public 
sector 
Middle East/Asia 
  - commercial terms 
challenging  
-  no local labour force  
 
 
Oil & Gas booming 
  - new entrants (lower cost 
options)  
China and Australia 
  - growing markets  
Travel to shows and 
events restricted  
 
Nth America 
- large domestic 
market  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 
- emerging market  - 
China 
- growing markets  
Hong Kong 
-  saturated  
Reduced consumer 
spending  
Competitive pricing  
Reduced product 
innovation  
 
Japan 
-  mature market  
 
 
 
 
 
China   
- knock off copies at 
lower cost  
 
 
 
Market 
Uncertainty  
European low-cost alternatives 
Scarce engineering resources  
Print obsolescence  
 
Market convergence of 
photographic equipment  
 
Organisational factors  
7.2.2 Strategic interdependence  
A specific aspect of the MNC strategies relates to the level of interdependence between 
the subsidiaries. The more interdependent and integrated the work of the subsidiaries 
were in regard to jointly solving problems, sharing resources and information, the more 
likely the subsidiaries were to collaborate. Because of the organisation design in 
EngConsult, which consists of specialist technical sectors sparsely located in multiple 
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geographies, and the nature of global engineering consulting work, strategic 
interdependence was high and required combinations of skills and available resources to 
win local, regional and international projects.  
EngConsult specifically required mechanisms to enable their professionals to freely 
share their knowledge among the technical sectors in order to avoid re-inventing the 
wheel and to provide the clients with access to the best knowledge available within the 
firm. The organisation was densely networked and sociable, with implicit reciprocity 
based on norms of being a good citizen.  
While an increased level of collaboration resulted from the evolving business needs and 
the complementarity of the subsidiary resources, in EventCo and PhotoCo each 
subsidiary had their own resources to pursue their objectives and hence remained 
relatively independent. Previously there were no requirements or expectations of the 
subsidiaries to collaborate in EventCo and PhotoCo. However, as highlighted 
previously, that situation changed in both MNCs with the external appointment of their 
respective CEOs.  
A particular case of independence between the subsidiaries existed between recently 
acquired business units and other subsidiaries. When, rather than whether, to integrate 
the newly acquired businesses was a dilemma for the corporate HQs.  As a 
consequence, the lack of integration and interdependence resulted in low collaboration, 
particularly during an earn-out period. An ‘earn out’ is a contractual provision stating 
that the seller of a business is to obtain additional future compensation based on the 
business achieving certain future financial goals. Previously, a newly acquired business 
in EventCo and PhotoCo was self-sufficient and autonomous and was held responsible 
for performance in its own country. Any proposal that would reduce its independence or 
compromise its sales and profit figures was treated with great wariness. However, the 
motivation to collaborate with sister subsidiaries increased if there was a financial 
contribution to their P & L which enhanced their earn-out provision. If the newly 
acquired businesses were burdened with additional costs of administration (and 
therefore potentially reduced profits), the acquired businesses were more reluctant to 
collaborate as discussed in section 5.2.2 and section 6.2.2.  Conversely, occasionally 
collaborative interest was thwarted by the established subsidiaries that were too busy on 
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their own initiatives. From HQ point of view, if  the MNC  promoted greater 
collaboration between the newly acquired and existing SBUs by allocating time, 
resources and operational adjustments,  more profit from the collaborations went to the 
owner/founder of the acquired company, potentially diverting resources and detracting 
from the existing businesses’ abilities to achieve their own objectives and profit levels. 
This scenario presented a tension for Corporate/parent HQ who were also espousing a 
more collaborative ethos, but appearing to step back for financial reasons; a financial 
justification not dissimilar to the tolerance shown for inter-subsidiary competition when 
there was a prosperous economy.   
The findings suggested that more frequent collaborations occurred among the regional 
subsidiaries/SBU than across the regions/SBUs in the three companies and more 
examples of internal competition were cited by the informants across the regional/SBU 
boundaries (see Figure 4-3, Figure 5-5, and Figure 6-5).  A possible explanation, which 
is elaborated on later, is that greater affiliation and identity with other subsidiaries is 
created by the organisational boundaries containing them. An additional explanation, as 
evidenced below, is that regions or SBUs were the profit centres containing the 
aggregated KPIs upon which the rewards and incentives were based.  
In summary, the greater the level of strategic interdependence, the more the 
subsidiaries collaborated. However, non-integrated acquired companies made synergies 
difficult to achieve when there was low interdependence, created in part by their ‘earn-
out’ provisions.  
7.2.3 MNC strategy   
The comparison of competition and collaboration between the subsidiaries across the 
three MNCs suggests that the varying inter-subsidiary relationships are influenced by 
the MNC’s organisational history and their respective strategies adopted for 
international expansion. Although not classified nor clearly delineated in the data, the 
findings suggest that different MNC strategies i.e. multinational, global, international 
and transnational (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1987) are operated by the HQ and parent 
companies (SBUs) within the three MNCs; for example,  in EngConsult, multinational 
/transnational strategies where local responsive, worldwide learning and multinational 
flexibility is required; in EventCo, global/international strategies where central brand 
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knowledge and capabilities are adapted; and, in PhotoCo, a global strategy of efficiency, 
where the subsidiaries are predominantly distribution channels.  
By breaking up the global sectors in EngConsult that were previously based in the UK 
HQ and driving growth into the regions, unintended consequences were created.  The 
newly formed regions and subsidiaries had insufficient resources. This increased the 
level of internal competition for limited specialist staff resources (for example, in 
section 4.2, the Middle East or ERA). The subsidiaries were not only competing with 
each other for skilled resources but they were also competing and negotiating with the 
UK subsidiary, the previous HQ, for lower costing of those resources to protect and 
grow their own subsidiary’s profitability.  The findings, on the other hand, also showed 
that those subsidiaries with insufficient resources were competing with other 
subsidiaries to collaborate on projects with the UK, or elsewhere within the MNC (see 
Figure 4-4: EngConsult- Subsidiary requirement for resources).    
The organisational evolution of EventCo and PhotoCo saw previously acquired 
businesses temporarily retained as independent businesses within the SBUs with little to 
no integration. New Group CEOs saw unrealised potential for synergies and encouraged 
greater interdependence between the SBUs and their subsidiaries. Collaboration was 
fostered, if not forced on occasions, and was the means by which EventCo and PhotoCo 
(and also EngConsult) could efficiently, and more cost effectively, expand into other 
territories. However, it was not easy to change the independent relationships that had 
been built up over a long history. A certain structure had been adopted and functions, 
authority and operations had been distributed among the different units in different 
countries. The reorganisation and new structural realignment was both time consuming 
and costly. 
The global internationalisation strategy of the MNCs minimised the level of competition 
as there was little overlap or ambiguity in the charters and responsibilities which were 
clearly defined by the global brand.  
Although all three MNCs supported a highly decentralised structure, the amount of 
coordination and structure necessary to support the organisational redesigns and greater 
levels of interdependence and collaboration was different across the three MNCs (see 
Table 7-4). Different coordination mechanisms e.g. formalisation, standardisation and 
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centralisation which were required to increase the connectivity between both the SBUs 
and their subsidiaries were evident across the MNCs. 
Coordination mechanisms and interventions   
Formal processes, guidelines and processes were well-developed within Eng Consult 
such that there was a level of standardisation and common understanding which 
facilitated collaboration between the subsidiaries, EventCo to a lesser degree and 
PhotoCo, hardly at all. In PhotoCo, as inter-subsidiary collaboration was a much newer 
way to work, there was minimal standardisation, centralisation or overall structural 
support, particularly in the commercial areas of transfer agreements for joint product 
development.   
Integrated and sophisticated intranet systems with telecommunications capabilities and 
video conferencing facilities began to eradicate the communication boundaries between 
the SBUs and subsidiaries in their various locations within EngConsult and EventCo. 
Global knowledge and work management databases were available and used frequently 
within EngConsult.  EventCo had recently established a group-wide wiki-based intranet 
while a basic informational system was utilised by PhotoCo to communicate and inform 
the various businesses and newly formed global functions.  
While the reporting systems were used by management for information and control 
purposes, there was no evidence of these systems were being used for competitive 
purposes between the subsidiaries. However, they were acknowledged as being of 
assistance in collaborative initiatives.  
 In summary, a global internationalisation strategy minimised the level of inter-
subsidiary competition due to the clarity and lack of overlap of organisational charters 
and responsibilities. The multinational, integrated networked strategy increased the 
level of interdependence and collaboration. However, inter-subsidiary competition 
increased in the multinational/transnational strategies due to subsidiary profit centre 
evaluation, lack of regional resources and interest in similar markets or customers.  
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7.2.4 Top management commitment  
A commitment to a more collaborative culture was initiated by the Group CEOs and 
espoused by top management. They strongly encouraged the subsidiaries to explore and 
act on collaborative opportunities with their sister units.  The commitment was 
described by the informants in EventCo and PhotoCo as moving away from the intense 
competition of their past that was fostered by their previous Group CEOs.  The present 
Group CEOs vigilantly enforced collaboration until new working relationships were 
established between the subsidiaries, although specific areas for collaboration were 
frequently neither specified nor clarified.      
The cultural change towards greater collaboration was supported by each Group HQ 
with the additional implementation of structural changes (e.g. provision of inter-entity 
trading agreements, formation of best practice groups or CDIs sponsored by HQ) and 
emphasis on influencing the mindsets of all employees.   
Specific global roles were introduced and sponsored by HQ, to further support the 
collaboration initiatives within EngConsult and EventCo.  
Practice (sector, content, events) leaders  
Formal best practice and technical specialism roles (e.g. global practice leaders in 
EngConsult, and HQ Global Event and Content roles in EventCo) spanned the entire 
organisation in their specific sector to gather and share best practices and identify 
opportunities for efficiency and collaboration with other subsidiaries and subunits.  The 
roles are akin to the internal boundary spanners (Wright, 2009) that refer to certain 
types of people who operate within organisations but cut across departmental, divisional 
or professional boundaries. The boundary spanning functions of exchanging, linking, 
facilitating and intervening (Wright, 2009) were supported by corporately funded 
positions which had no P&L accountability.   
PhotoCo had yet to formalise any such role, perhaps in part due to its current size of 
1,900 employees and lower level of integration.   
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Adjudicator role    
In this study, top management took on the mantle of adjudicator in situations where 
competitive tensions arose from perceived inequitable gains by one subsidiary over 
another in a potential collaboration. Adjudication philosophy involves a neutral party 
providing a ruling that parties would implement. The subsidiaries sought to use this type 
of intervention only when all other attempts to manage the tensions between themselves 
had failed. Examples of scenarios that resulted in competitive tensions included 
protracted transfer pricing negotiations between subsidiaries in EngConsult, pricing 
wars in PhotoCo and new product development ownership in EventCo. Tensions, 
although rarer, also emanated from inter-subsidiary collaborations (see section 7.4.1). 
The intention of adjudication was often to create a joint solution to the problem that 
would allow both SBUs to maximise their position for the future and enhance the 
group’s overall position of market share.   The decision or directed outcome of a 
“forced” collaboration was considered to be fair by the subsidiaries involved.   
“If they’re able to step back a bit and say this is good for whichever part of the business 
they’re from in the longer term, I might have to give up now to gain a little later, or I 
haven’t really negotiated the absolute best deal that I could have negotiated, but we’re 
all part of the same company then I think you can get going”. So it requires a lot of 
attitudinal flexibility by managers to see a bigger picture.”  [EngConsult: B#3]    
In summary, top management commitment to a collaborative culture increased the 
willingness of subsidiaries to look for and implement opportunities to collaborate. As a 
result, greater awareness and knowledge of opportunities and potential partners lead to 
increased collaboration.   
7.2.5 Trusted relationships  
Trust was necessary for subsidiaries to be willing to cooperate and collaborate. Trust  is 
“the subjective, aggregated, and confident set of beliefs about the other party and one’s 
relationship with her/him, which lead one to assume that the other party’s likely actions 
will have positive consequences for oneself” (Dietz and Hartog, 2006:558). However, 
when trust was lacking between the SBUs, collaborations proved difficult. In PhotoCo 
for example, the SBUs were new to the collaboration process. Earlier attempts at 
collaborating had been ill-prepared, and lacked clear expectations and identified 
outcomes. Consequently, because of the previously ineffective collaborations, hostilities 
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resulted with each SBU being perceived by the other as not trustworthy. Both SBUs 
were advised by the Group CEO to address the tensions and “sort it out”.  
Because of the lack of information about the competencies and reliabilities of potential 
partners, specifically in PhotoCo, developing a relationship with new subsidiaries took 
time and involved uncertainty. The stability and depth of the networks and relationships 
developed across the senior levels of the SBUs and subsidiaries of EngConsult enabled 
the firm to confidently state that senior management were only ‘three calls away’ from 
getting to the right connection within the firm of 15,000 employees.  This was in direct 
contrast to the size of PhotoCo (compare 1,900 employees) whose subsidiaries 
struggled to get to know each other or the capabilities that existed within each business.   
The strength of the inter-subsidiary relationships in PhotoCo was weaker, partially as a 
result of the new management team in place. The average length of tenure in the 
company of five years (see Table 6-2) was significantly lower at the senior management 
level than those of EngConsult and EventCo, at 19 and 14 years respectively. 
Furthermore, PhotoCo did not provide many formal opportunities to network and learn 
about other businesses as the expectation was that the subsidiaries would take the 
initiative.  In EngConsult and EventCo both informal and formal interventions enabled 
communication and networking, and created awareness of what other subsidiaries were 
doing and who to contact. These practices built trust and developed stronger 
relationships which fostered collaboration. 
However, the formal gatherings of the SBUs and their subsidiaries also signalled top 
management’s commitment to, and prioritisation of, sustained collaboration. Formal 
practices included executive steering committees, global leadership development 
programmes, and routines such as “breaking bread” in EventCo.  The cancellation of 
group-wide management and business meetings in PhotoCo, as a result of the 
challenging economic conditions, was lamented by senior management as they also saw 
these formal gatherings as opportunities to build stronger networks and develop better 
relationships with their senior colleagues, specifically with those from newly acquired 
businesses.  
The highly acquisitive strategy of EventCo and PhotoCo also meant that getting to 
know new businesses and new management was a constant challenge in their 
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organisations. In PhotoCo, their SBUs’ organisational redesign to a global, functional 
matrix at HQ was implemented to specifically facilitate greater collaboration and 
improve efficiencies and cost savings across the subsidiaries and within the SBU.   
Organisational identity     
Relationships continued to develop across the different social groupings of professional 
discipline and geographic cultures. Dominant cultures existed in all three companies: 
British in EngConsult; British and American in EventCo, and British, Italian and 
American in PhotoCo.  The national identities were further subcategorised into: (i) 
professional groupings, for example, in EventCo, where media and event-related 
subsidiaries traditionally had a competitive relationship from their different ways of 
working; (ii) functional groupings such as technical German manufacturing in contrast 
to Italian design style in PhotoCo; and (iii) engineering and management consultants in 
EngConsult. Identification with different groupings constrained inter-subsidiary 
interactions. Socialisation mechanisms and collaborative interventions were used to 
encourage networking to create awareness of the other businesses that were part of the 
same MNC. Porter (1985:372) drew attention to the fact that just because “an 
interrelationship is not being achieved [it] is not a reliable sign that it is not important”.  
The lack of relationship was seen as a missed opportunity as the more times the 
subsidiaries were able to interact, future, mutually beneficial collaboration opportunities 
and relationships were identified.   
In summary: trusted relationships, resulting from frequent interaction and longevity of 
relationships, increased the level of collaboration. The converse also has to be 
considered where frequent interaction and longevity can develop into a negative, 
mistrusting relationship.   Trusted relationships, and aligned identity, created openness 
for collaboration. However, ‘forced’ or new collaborations occurred even without the 
requisite levels of trust and were based purely on a transactional basis.  
7.2.6 Market (and skills) overlap  
Inter-subsidiary competition resulted from the overlapping markets and skills of the 
subsidiaries.  Market overlap occurred when the subsidiaries or SBUs were active in the 
same market. This happened because of either intentional encroachment on another’s 
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predefined market, geography or customer base, or when the subsidiaries found 
themselves inadvertently competing against each other for clients and sales, mainly 
through lack of information or awareness, changing market conditions, or ambiguous 
internal boundaries which were opportunistically exploited.  
Equally, internal competition resulted from overlapping skills, a factor which was 
particular to EngConsult. Consultant engineers with the same technical expertise existed 
in multiple sectors and in multiple geographical regions that had complementary 
resources and delivered a similar capability. While the duplication of skills provided the 
firm with the required flexibility for local, regional and global assignments, it also 
created internal competition between the subsidiaries.  A quasi-internal market operated 
for internal people resources. Even though the relationships and interactions are 
between horizontal peers, an internal ‘buyer’ had the opportunity to dual source 
identical services from multiple internal suppliers. Dual sourcing introduced additional 
complexity into the internal market, specifically with regard to decisions relating to 
pricing (variability), sourcing (competition) and control (subsidiary autonomy). I will 
expand on this point in Section 7.2.8 , in relation to the antecedents of profit and 
reward.  
Again, while none of this was of particular concern during a thriving economy, these 
issues became more of an irritant in a slower economy, where subsidiaries were 
struggling to make their numbers. Nevertheless, where boundaries were less rigid, the 
flexibility of being able to use lower cost resources enabled the subsidiaries to seek 
additional opportunities, thereby providing alternative options for growth.  
The organisational boundaries that defined the SBU and geographic remits provided a 
base of power as they got to know their customers and the local conditions of that 
geography. The subsidiaries were reluctant to see those boundaries altered. Boundaries 
were not only geographic or business related. Differences between professions and skill 
sets also represented boundaries which created internal groupings and identities. Cross-
subsidiary competition intensified when the differences between the groups were 
accentuated as in the examples of the duplicate skills and target markets of the 
consulting and international development subsidiaries in EngConsult, the professional 
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and consumer markets of broadcast and photographic SBUs in PhotoCo and the 
different national identities of the American and European SBUs in EventCo.   
In situations where the competitive relationship and subsequent performance was 
suboptimal as a result of the overlaps, and resultant competitive tensions were no longer 
tolerated by Group HQ or the individual subsidiaries, the subsidiaries sought a more 
compatible way forward. Where dialogue was initiated by HQ, SBU or the subsidiaries 
themselves to “sort out” their concerns, the SBUs collaborated to find a joint solution.  
The dialogue resulted in a recalibration of the coopetitive relationship and the 
interactions perceived to be less hostile.  
However, the occurrence of market overlap was less frequent in all three MNCs, as 
clear boundaries and responsibilities typically existed for inter-subsidiary interactions. 
Only when the external market changed, or new areas of business were developing, was 
there market overlap that generated internal competition.   
In summary, where market and skills overlap occurred, competitive interactions 
increased. The overlap in external market was customer facing. The clarity of market 
boundaries and internal responsibilities minimised this type of inter-subsidiary 
competition.  The overlap of skills, unique to the PSF in the internal market, was staff 
facing.  
7.2.7 Performance comparison   
Comparisons of performance among ranked subsidiaries fostered healthy competition as 
the comparison raised the level of performance against the standards for all subsidiaries 
within the group. However, the findings also indicated that the practice had unintended 
consequences in that it impeded mutually beneficial inter-subsidiary collaboration, 
leaving lowly ranked subsidiaries vulnerable.  The finding is most clearly illustrated in 
the examples of lower performing US East and the Middle East subsidiaries in 
EngConsult. As a result of their consistent underperformance against key metrics, and 
without the full context provided when presenting at group-wide meetings, their 
respective competence was questioned by other subsidiaries and consequently detracted 
from their perceived value as a potential partner. Other subsidiaries were less willing to 
collaborate with them. A cycle of decline (poor performance leading to poor perception 
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by others which meant less joint opportunities which lead to poor financial 
performance) was set in motion until the challenging conditions changed.   
In summary, intra-company comparisons of peer performance increased inter-
subsidiary competition. Questions of competence were raised about consistently lower 
performing subsidiaries which reduced their attractiveness to others for potential 
collaborations.  
7.2.8 Rewards and incentives  
The SBUs and subsidiaries were profit centres. Each subsidiary sought to maximise 
their own unit’s profit, revenue and margin targets to achieve their financial objectives 
and organisational incentives.  
Performance was evaluated on each individual subsidiary’s achievement of KPIs, with 
prominence given core financial measures of profit, revenue, margin, and in EngConsult 
only, staff utilisation. There were no financial measures for collaboration.  
In addition to sales of services and products to the external customer, SBUs across the 
MNCs developed and marketed their services to other internal business units through 
the utilisation of staff resources, brands for expansion or inputs into production/sales. 
The study found that while all three MNCs have standardised global financial reporting 
systems and processes for their subsidiaries, there is significant variation in their 
management accounting processes which negatively influenced inter-subsidiary 
collaboration and increased competition. The differences centred on the mechanism of 
accounting for internal transactions and transfer pricing.   
The internal horizontal transactions of exchange and transfer of services and products 
between the subsidiaries were accounted for by: (i) a transfer pricing system, supported 
by inter-entity trading (IET) agreements in an internal market, within EngConsult; (ii) 
“double” or “shadow” accounting, supported by SLAs and internal joint venture 
structures in EventCo, and (iii) application of arm’s length principles in PhotoCo.  
A transfer price is “a charge by one division (transferring divisions) to another division 
(receiving division) within the same organisation” (Terzioglu and Inglis, 2011:85). The 
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pricing mechanism regulates the allocation of resources, and in the case of EngConsult, 
the tacit knowledge associated with those resources.  
“Shadow” accounting is a form of accounting used for internal purposes where two sets 
of books are kept which recognises the full value of a transaction for both subsidiaries. 
It was noted in the within-case findings that the shadow accounting approach had a 
profound impact on the willingness of subsidiaries to collaborate. The barriers to inter-
subsidiary collaboration were removed overnight along with any financially competitive 
reason that previously would have inhibited the possibility of collaboration.  
The “arms-length” principle of internal pricing states that the amount charged by one 
related party to another for a given product must be the same as if the parties were not 
related. The “arms-length principle” requires all parties to make a profit as they would 
on the open market, which also requires some negotiation with the parties involved in 
the transaction. These negotiations form part of the competitive and collaborative 
relationships between the subsidiaries. The relationships in PhotoCo resemble market 
transactions (Uzzi, 1996), rather than collaborating subsidiaries, where trust was low 
and detailed information exchange was difficult. Corporate finance controlled the 
commercial ‘negotiation’ and provided the subsidiaries with the appropriate pricing.    
Because of EngConsult’s integration and organisational design, and the lack of own 
resources, the subsidiaries had to, more often than not, collaborate with others to 
achieve their KPIs.  Structural interdependence acts as an incentive for each subsidiary 
to be concerned with the performance of the other as it affects the total firm results. 
While the collaborations were largely voluntary they were also required out of necessity 
to enable subsidiaries to both bid for and successfully complete specific assignments 
that they could not complete on their own.  
Few operational and no financial measures existed to recognise instances of internal 
collaboration. Collaborations that did not also benefit the units P&L were questioned. A 
negotiation typically ensued to determine the commercial terms of the collaboration 
where both sought to achieve mutual benefit from the collaboration.  Although Group 
guidelines were made available to facilitate the negotiations of the inter-entity transfer 
of services, agreed allocation of profit and revenue often was a fractious and 
competitive issue. While recognition in all three MNCs was awarded for successful 
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collaborations and attempts by the subsidiaries, it was insufficient when the 
subsidiaries’ performance was primarily measured on financial performance. The 
negotiation created considerable tension between the two subsidiaries which was 
eliminated by the double accounting process established in EventCo.  
The move away from rewarding independent business units that existed within the 
photographic SBU of PhotoCo also removed the competitive element in the relationship 
relating to the pursuit of profits for rewards. The businesses were now measured on the 
collective performance of the SBU.  
In all three MNCs, it was only at the top management (SBU) level that group-wide 
incentives were shared.  Top management continued to evaluate the subsidiaries on their 
performance which simultaneously fostered a level of inter-subsidiary competition.  
This might explain why top management ably adopted the adjudicator role. The SBU 
management were able to look beyond the subsidiary barriers of unit profit, and 
altruistically exercise the bigger principle of doing what was right for the firm. As one 
top manager articulated “we all eat from the same trough”. Despite the significant 
structural barriers, another senior manager summarised the challenge in the following 
phrase: “you will always have a structure that you have to work around, but if the belief 
of how to work together is there - as a mindset - anything is possible.” [B#8].  
The SBU loyalties and incentives were focused on Group-wide performance making it 
less paradoxical to simultaneously encourage collaboration. However, as one SBU CEO 
in PhotoCo explained, he still wanted to do the best for his SBU as the incentives and 
rewards for his team continued to be based on the SBU performance.   
 Staff utilisation was a specific KPI within EngConsult which recognised the 
importance of staff as generators of revenue and equally, cost.  Competition for (staff) 
resources and the pricing of those resources featured strongly. Hiring internally often 
meant sharing revenue and profit. As HQ discouraged the use of external resources, the 
practice both encouraged and enforced collaboration between the subsidiaries as well as 
competing on both price and availability.   
In summary, group-wide incentives encouraged SBU collaboration. At the subsidiary 
level, rewards were based on unit performance which increased competition. 
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Management accounting mechanisms for the recording of profit influenced the 
subsidiary interactions to compete or collaborate when profit, revenue or staff utilisation 
positively contributed to their P&L. Dialogue and adjudication assisted when profit was 
foregone for the greater good of the MNC in collaboration. 
Subsidiary characteristics  
7.2.9 Entrepreneurial orientation   
The subsidiaries willingness to engage in collaborative relationships with other more 
resource-endowed subsidiaries demonstrated a reactive force to reduce their strategic 
vulnerability (for example, lack of capability in the subsidiary region or cannibalisation) 
in both their local market and own MNC settings. The strategic vulnerability of the 
subsidiaries was further heightened by being dependent upon others for resources, 
creating a competitive dynamic for the quantity and quality of people and more tangible 
resources with their sister subsidiaries.   
A proactive force in the dynamic between subsidiaries was evidenced by a subsidiary’s 
entrepreneurial orientation to advance its own competitive position - for example, 
EventCo’s willingness to collaborate with other geographic subsidiaries, utilising their 
existing infrastructure and local knowledge of sister subsidiaries, for brand expansion.   
In summary, a subsidiary has its own characteristics in terms of previous relationships, 
available resources, and location that will make it an attractive partner with which to 
collaborate. Proactive actions that satisfy only the subsidiary’s interests are perceived to 
be competitive.  
Individual manager characteristics  
7.2.10 Manager’s mindset    
Individual actors also accounted for characteristics that influenced the formation of 
inter-subsidiary relationships, contingent upon their beliefs about human nature, 
personality, propensity to, and attitude towards, competition and collaboration.  
While not universal, a positive disposition towards competition between the units was 
found amongst the SBU managers; competition was an inherent aspect of business 
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interactions and a broader aspect of human nature. Their accounts and examples 
identified the view that some level of competition was necessary to encourage a more 
positive dynamic of performance and the achievement of higher standards for the 
greater good of the MNC overall. At the subsidiary level, individual pride, career 
ambitions and the perceived status that resulted from ‘meeting the numbers’, overrode 
the desire to engage in difficult and potentially unprofitable collaborative initiatives.  
Personal relationships and trustworthiness of certain individuals made more risky, and 
entrepreneurial, collaborations easier to engage in.   
In summary, the mindset, attitude and experience of the SBU and subsidiary managers 
can induce competitive or collaborative inter-subsidiary relationships.  
7.3 ENABLERS  
HQ provided the internal structure to support the subsidiaries to collaborate and 
compete. The enabling structures were identified when discussing the determinants of 
either competition or collaboration, or both, and are summarised in Table 7-4. The table 
highlights the author’s assessment of the extent (high, medium or low, and yes or no) to 
which they were available within the company and whether they supported either 
collaboration or competition, or both. For example, in EventCo, the boundary spanning 
roles of global event and content roles facilitated collaboration by enabling the sharing 
of best practices and competition by peer comparison of best practices; PhotoCo 
provided few opportunities (L) for cross-subsidiary networking (socialisation).  
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Table 7-4: Cross-case findings - Enablers  
HQ  Structures  Coordination 
Mechanism  
EngConsult  (PSF)  C+ C- EventCo  C+ C- PhotoCo  C+  C- 
Standard 
-  systems  
 
Standardisation  Hi standardisation of 
processes and systems   - 
recognition of local 
conditions  
H - 
Best practices units 
leading to standardised 
systems within individual 
SBUs 
M - 
Lack of standardised 
systems across or 
within divisions  
L - 
-  processes  
 
Standardisation  Finance, Work Practices, 
Inter entity trading 
agreements ( IETs) , Talent 
Management  
H H 
Financial, Sales, 
Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM), 
SLA, Talent 
Management  
M L 
Finance,  Talent 
Management  
Customer and product 
management within 
SBU  
L H 
e- Business 
technology   
Communication  Fully integrated intranet, 
telephone systems and 
knowledge databases  
H L 
Wiki based intranet 
knowledge hub  M L 
Basic informational 
intranet  L L 
Management 
accounting 
policy 
Formalisation  Negotiated transfer pricing 
 
H 
 “Double” accounting 
H 
 
Arms-length principle  
 
H 
Boundary 
spanners 
Centralisation  Group Practice Leader and 
practice managers  
Y - 
Global Event & Content 
HQ roles  
Y Y 
CDI ( not HQ role)  
N - 
Adjudication - 
dispute 
resolution  
Formalisation  CEO/ Senior management 
adjudicator  H L 
CEO/Senior management 
adjudicator  M L 
CEO/Senior 
management 
adjudicator  
M L 
(In)Formal 
gatherings  
Socialisation  Global, regional meetings, 
development programmes 
(graduate schemes, 
technical specialist 
meetings)   
H - 
GLDPs, "breaking bread" 
meetings, rotational, 
exchange assignments,  
 Exec Co recently formed  
H - 
Limited cross 
socialisation  - newly  
formed cross divisional 
initiative   
L - 
 
 
Key:  H = High; M = Medium; L = Low  
 Y = Yes; N = No  
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7.4 MULTIPLE AND DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS  
The study found that, at the intra-organisational level, an SBU and subsidiary had 
multiple simultaneous relationships of competition, collaboration, coopetition and 
coexistence with multiple other subsidiaries within the MNC.  
Dynamic relationships  
Subsidiary relationships consisted of varying intensities of competition and 
collaboration at different times, and simultaneously across different activities. Evidence 
found that the relationships were dynamic and that coopetitive relationships were also 
applicable across multi-levels of actors (i.e. individual and organisational unit).  
Coopetition is not static  
Coopetition was not a static phenomenon. Simultaneous interactions of competition and 
collaboration occurred between the subsidiaries and changed and developed over time, 
moving back and forth from interactions of competition to collaboration and back again 
depending on internal and external factors (see section 7.2). The external, 
organisational, subsidiary and individual determinants of competition and collaboration 
created a certain dynamic of varying levels of competition and collaboration in the 
relationships. The dynamic of the existing relationship was also subject to change as 
other antecedents influenced the levels of competition and collaboration within two 
subsidiaries relationships. The nature of the interaction would change and a new 
dynamic in the relationship occur. The emergent nature of the relationships exemplified 
that they were neither designed nor “fixed” by an organisation chart but emerged from 
the circumstances in which the subsidiaries found themselves, in relation to each other.   
Coexistent relationships - acquisitions  
In the case of the recently acquired businesses, a coexistent relationship was established 
until it became salient through interaction with their new sister subsidiaries. This was 
not a case of ‘no’ relationship as the acquired businesses were often adjacent businesses 
to the MNC and had often had some prior external interactions. Other subsidiaries 
became aware of the new business’ existence within the MNC but they continued to 
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coexist and operate independently, neither in a collaborative nor competitive 
relationship, (knowingly) with other subsidiaries for a period of time.  
Asymmetrical relationships  
The study identified that it was possible that a subsidiary A was competing with 
subsidiary B but B was not aware of the competition, as in an asymmetric relationship 
(Tsai, 2002). This was typified in the example of EngConsult’s UK subsidiary which 
was in a stronger position than the regional subsidiaries that were seeking to collaborate 
to access specialist resources. However, the UK’s lack of interest in the collaboration, as 
they wanted to utilise the resources to meet their profitability targets, was perceived by 
the regional subsidiaries to be a competitive move to retain ‘their’ resources; the UK, 
however, did not perceive themselves to be competing; they were just not collaborating. 
The data support the contention that one party which is in the stronger position may not 
perceive itself to be competitive but the perception of the other party would be that it is.  
Sustaining relationships  
The level of vigilance required to promote and sustain collaboration within the 
organisational cultures surprised the Group and SBU CEOs who had failed to appreciate 
the impact of unit performance evaluations on collaborative interactions. The interplay 
between competition and collaboration was evident and impactful.   
In summary, inter-subsidiary coopetition was not a static state and in the study the 
relationships had varying aspects and levels of competition and collaboration.   
7.4.1 Inter-subsidiary tensions  
Tensions were inherent in coopetitive relationships.  A persistent level of competition 
existed between the SBUs as the performance systems evaluated the units on the basis 
of unit profitability.  For example, on one hand, centralisation and standardisation eased 
the challenges of collaborating with other subsidiaries; on the other hand, they created 
tensions due to the preferred decentralisation of the SBU, with little interference from 
the corporate or HQ parent. In all three MNCs, the corporate HQ did not favour 
mandating decisions from the centre and yet, on the other hand, the subsidiaries found 
that misaligned or disparate systems (e.g. accounting systems) discouraged them from 
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entering into collaboration due to lack of time, amount of effort or previous 
misunderstandings.    
Intense tensions were temporary and eventually managed. When the tensions reached an 
‘intolerable’ level, either the subsidiaries or HQ required the actors to “sort it out” and 
initiate an appropriate intervention to change the current state of the relationship (a 
process depicted in Figure 7-1).  The study identified a process of change as a result of 
tensions experienced by the two subsidiaries consisting of high levels of competition 
and low or weak collaboration.  The competitive tension changed the relationship 
dynamic until the next trigger prompted a re-evaluation or rebalancing of the 
relationship in a different context or in a different activity. The evidence suggests that 
the rebalancing will constantly occur, often with other units as well. While the example 
in Figure 7-1 illustrates an intolerable competitive tension, tensions emanating from 
strong/high collaboration can equally exist and become salient, which requires 
managing. For example, the lack of willingness to address underperformance in the 
collaboration (as in the EventCo example) created tensions between the subsidiaries 
which required an intervention to “sort it out” through constructive dialogue to change 
the status quo. The pattern persists depending on the interaction, activity and current 
status of the relationship. 
 
Figure 7-1: Example of changing inter-subsidiary relationships over time  
7.4.2 Different hierarchical perspectives  
Top management perceived the MNC to be ‘one’ company and were able to more easily 
encourage collaboration between the subsidiaries. It was the subsidiaries (profit centres) 
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who struggled with the tension resulting from both competing and collaborating; of 
managing the tension that existed between the subsidiary focus on profit and the 
collective requirement to collaborate in order to create value for the MNC. The more 
senior the managers, the more they were of a mindset to see the bigger picture and 
altruistically accept that collaboration was the right thing to do.  
7.5 INTERVENTIONS TO MANAGE TENSIONS AND 
REBALANCE RELATIONSHIPS 
Finding the right balance, as in a workable proportion of competition and collaboration, 
is a challenge for most managers (Teece, 1992). Interventions were used by the 
subsidiaries and corporate/parent HQ to adjust the levels of competition and 
collaboration in order to ease the more intolerable tensions. Table 7-5 summarises the 
interventions identified in this study to mitigate or enhance the tensions that arose from 
simultaneous competition and collaboration. These interventions are in addition to the 
antecedents which also influence the levels of competition and collaboration.   
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Table 7-5: Cross-case findings - Interventions to manage tensions  
Interventions  Source of tension  Led by  
HQ or 
Subsidiary  
Eng 
Consult 
Event 
Co  
Photo 
Co  
Dialogue – use of 
”voice” 
Issues of internal 
competition  
Performance issues  during 
collaboration 
Subsidiary Yes Yes Yes 
Formalisation of 
procedures  
- conflict resolution 
Intolerable competition  Corporate HQ 
Parent (SBU)  
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Merger of units 
Clarify boundaries 
 
Competition from lack of 
boundary /charter clarity  
Corporate HQ  
Parent (SBU)  
Yes   Yes  No  
Exit the non 
collaborative leader  
Unwilling to change 
personal orientation to 
collaboration  
Corporate HQ  
Parent (SBU)  
No  Yes    Yes  
Development of 
collaboration KPI   
Lack of financial 
recognition of 
collaboration in interaction 
Corporate HQ  Yes  No  No  
Adjudication – the 
bigger picture  
Unit versus group 
profitability 
Corporate HQ 
Parent (SBU) 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
7.5.1 Dialogue - use of “voice”  
 Dialogue was the main means by which the subsidiaries aired and managed tensions in 
their relationships with others. Their individual voice was also used to articulate 
intentions to lobby for positions within the MNC. While the option of avoiding or 
exiting a relationship was available for reasons such as dissatisfaction with the 
performance of a collaborating subsidiary or the existence of a more profitable 
opportunity, in highly interdependent organisations, the choice of non-collaboration was 
constrained by cultural norms and financial considerations.  
7.5.2 Formalisation of procedures  
Trading agreements and SLAs facilitated the structuring of dialogues regarding 
commercial arrangements prior to entering into a collaborative interaction. By 
addressing expectations and issues before commencing the specific collaboration, the 
negotiation mechanism provided a way to assess and build trust in the form of 
commitment, reciprocity and fairness of the specific interaction.  
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Formalised procedures for problem solving, decision making and conﬂict resolution all 
enhanced the perception of fairness in the processes that resolved disputes and allocated 
resources. Problems and tensions are resolved according to mutually agreed-upon rules 
and procedures, which encouraged subsidiaries to explore more risky collaborations 
with another subsidiary which they might not have previously considered.  
7.5.3 Merger of units  
The merging together of two competitive subsidiaries mitigated the level of competition 
and hostility resulting from overlapping charters of responsibility and external or 
internal customer segments. While general coordination of the combined units improved 
access to opportunities or the transparency of new business development initiatives, the 
underlying tension in the form of resentment remained, temporarily. An alternative 
interpretation was also explicated. By putting all the divisions under one leader, the 
intervention would facilitate collaboration. Although recombinant benefits are 
intriguing, emphasis on them has, as yet, to lead to theoretical predictions about cross-
BU collaborations (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). 
The logic of having the competing divisions report into one manager, however, is 
essentially limited by the processing capability of the manager even though there may 
be greater affinity with the unit over time. As I showed in EngConsult, one of the 
arguments for regionalising the PSF was that the overall organisation had become too 
big for one Group CEO to manage from the centre; therefore, the organisation was 
broken up into smaller units. Smaller units imply a greater number of boundaries or 
silos to navigate which potentially hampered collaboration efforts. However, the 
reorganisation in PhotoCo eliminated the business units and established a functional 
matrix, requiring greater collaboration within and across the functions. Initially, this did 
not, however, increase the level of collaboration across the subsidiaries within different 
SBUs.   
7.5.4  Exit the non-collaborative leader  
To facilitate collaboration between the subsidiaries, both PhotoCo and EventCo 
terminated the employment of managers who were specifically perceived to be non-
collaborative. Viewed by other senior management as also being competitive by ‘going 
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it alone’ and focusing solely on the performance of their own unit, the important 
consideration was that the manager would not, or could not, adapt to operating in a 
more collaborative way. The ultimate sanction in the more collaborative environment 
was dismissal from the organisation. In the study, this occurred more frequently among 
owner or founders of acquired companies whose previous success was based upon their 
own performance and skills which did not require this kind of time and resource-
consuming collaboration as part of a larger organisation. This structural mechanism 
could move the specific EventCo and PhotoCo subsidiaries away from being intensely 
competitive.   
7.5.5 Development of collaboration KPI  
EngConsult had begun to develop a financial KPI for collaboration to recognise a 
subsidiary’s contribution to collaboration that currently was not able to be captured in 
the accounting practices of the organisation or the commercial arrangements with 
another subsidiary. The lack of financial recognition was perceived as a major deterrent 
to certain collaborations. As explained, top management tended to forget the 
circumstances of a specific collaboration that extended beyond an annual financial 
accounting period. While this was not an issue for EventCo who ‘double accounted’ 
financial transactions in cross-SBU collaborations, PhotoCo was investigating ways 
other than ‘royalties’ to financially recognise new product and R&D collaborations.  
7.5.6 Adjudication – the bigger picture  
The subsidiaries were held accountable for the achievement of their profit targets which 
focused their attention on their own interests and short-term gain. To ensure that the 
group’s and parent company’s best interests were kept top of mind, top management 
intervened to adjudicate when the subsidiaries interests were damaging for the company 
in the longer term, whether through inter-subsidiary collaboration or competition.  
7.5.7 Summary  
This chapter presented the synthesis of the findings of inter-subsidiary relationships 
within the three MNCs by addressing the three research sub-questions.   
SQ1. What is the content of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration?  
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The study found that the content of inter-subsidiary collaboration involves the sharing, 
combining and leveraging of complementary resources and knowledge and inter-
subsidiary competition involves access, acquisition and utilisation of resources, and 
market expansion.  
The specific type of resources differed across the MNCs – whereby EngConsult and 
PhotoCo’s focused on sharing of resources for collaborative activities (Ensign, 2004) 
and explicitly attended to people and product (tangible) resources, respectively. 
EventCo attended to the sharing of knowledge (intangible) which was a reflection of the 
learning and sharing best practices orientation of their collaborative initiative for their 
business. The focus on tangible resources had implications for the transference of costs 
and pricing and physical and tangible resources were traded and exchanged in the two 
MNCs.  
 The second set of findings addressed the research question:   
SQ2: What factors influence inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration? 
The findings for SQ2 are summarised in Table 7-6.  The salient determining factors 
suggest a level of independence in their influence on inter-subsidiary coopetition. 
However, the influences are more interrelated and represent a more complex interaction 
among the factors.  
Table 7-6: Cross-case summary - Determining factors  
SQ2 Determining Factors  
 
External  
 External 
environment  
 In summary, the nature of the inter-subsidiary collaborative and 
competitive relationships was contingent upon circumstances in the 
external environment (see Table 7-3, for example, the economy and 
market uncertainty). As such, the type of coopetitive relationship was 
temporary, and subject to change.   
Organisational 
 Strategic 
interdependence  
In summary, as strategic interdependence increased, the more the 
subsidiaries collaborated. However, non-integrated acquired companies 
made synergies difficult to achieve when there was low interdependence, 
created in part by their ‘earn-out’ provisions.   
 Internationalisation 
strategy  
In summary, a global internationalisation strategy minimised the level of 
inter-subsidiary competition due to the clarity of organisational charters 
and responsibilities. The multinational, integrated networked strategy 
increased the level of interdependence and collaboration. However, 
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SQ2 Determining Factors  
 
competition increased in the multinational/transnational strategies due to 
subsidiary profit centres, lack of regional resources and interest in similar 
markets or customers. 
 Top management 
commitment  
In summary, top management leadership and commitment to a 
collaborative culture increased the willingness of subsidiaries to look for 
and implement opportunities to collaborate. As a result, greater awareness 
and knowledge of opportunities and potential partners lead to increased 
collaboration.  
 Trusted relationships  In summary: trusted relationships, resulting from frequent interaction 
and longevity of relationships, increased the level of collaboration. The 
converse also has to be considered where frequent interaction and 
longevity can develop into a negative, mistrusting relationship.   Trusted 
relationships, and aligned identity, created openness for collaboration. 
However, ‘forced’ or new collaborations occurred even without the 
requisite levels of trust and were based purely on a transactional basis.  
 Market overlap 
(Skills overlap) 
In summary, where market and skills overlap occurred, competitive 
interactions increased. The overlap in external market was customer 
facing The clarity of market boundaries and internal responsibilities 
minimised this type of inter-subsidiary competition.  The overlap of skills, 
unique to the PSF in the internal market, was staff facing. 
 Performance 
comparison  
In summary, intra-company comparisons of peer performance increased 
inter-subsidiary competition. Questions of competence were raised about 
consistently lower performing subsidiaries which reduced their 
attractiveness to others for potential collaborations.  
 Unit profit 
performance   
In summary, group wide incentives at top management encouraged SBU 
collaboration. At the subsidiary level rewards were based on unit 
performance which increased competition. Management accounting 
mechanisms for the recording of profit influenced the subsidiary 
interactions to compete or collaborate when profit, revenue or staff 
utilisation positively contributed to their P&L. Dialogue and adjudication 
assisted when unit profit was foregone for the greater good of the MNC.   
Subsidiary  
 Subsidiary 
characteristics  
In summary, a subsidiary has its own characteristics in terms of previous 
relationships, available resources, location that made it an attractive 
partner to collaborate with. Offensive, proactive actions to collaborate can 
be perceived as competitive.  
Individual  
 Manager’s mindset   In summary, the mindset, attitude, personality and experience of the 
SBU/subsidiary managers induced competitive or collaborative inter-
subsidiary relationships.  
The third set of findings addressed the research question:  
SQ3: How do subsidiaries manage the inherent tensions arising from simultaneous 
competition and collaboration?  
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The emergent nature of inter-subsidiary relationships was subject to varying conditions 
of the external and organisational environments and the characteristics pertaining to the 
subsidiary and mindset of the individual SBU CEO/ subsidiary manager.  
The findings show dynamic, multiple relationships of competition and collaboration 
between the subsidiaries that are influenced by the salient determinants, summarised in   
Table 7-6 and supported by enabling structures. The determining factors, with the 
exception of the external environment, are within the capabilities of management to 
influence.   
 Inherent tensions exist in coopetitive relationships.  The study found that there was a 
subjective level of tolerance to the levels of both competition and collaboration. In 
conditions when competition and collaboration were intolerable, appropriate 
interventions by HQ or the interacting subsidiaries were required to reduce the negative 
forces of the tension by adjusting the dynamic of the relationship and altering the 
different levels of simultaneous competition and collaboration. Interventions and 
mechanisms were identified that were effective in altering the dynamic of the inter-
subsidiary coopetitive relationships, thereby positioning coopetition as a dynamic 
process.   
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8 DISCUSSION, FURTHER RESEARCH AND 
LIMITATIONS  
Having provided a rich description and analysis of the findings and identified key 
themes and constructs of inter-subsidiary coopetitive interactions within each MNC in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I provided a detailed comparison of the salient themes and 
constructs of the three MNCs in Chapter 7.  Chapter 8 discusses and situates the 
findings in the relevant bodies of literature. Furthermore, I present a dynamic model of 
inter-subsidiary coopetition derived from empirical data as my main contribution to 
knowledge, before presenting additional contributions in Chapter 9. 
In section 8.1 I introduce a dynamic model of inter-subsidiary coopetition based on the 
cross-case findings of the previous chapter. In section 8.2 I revisit the typology of 
coopetition (Luo, 2005) in light of the findings and present the additional salient 
determining factors by explicitly taking account of the external environment, through 
the identification of additional antecedents of collaboration and competition and by 
adding an additional factor of top management commitment to regulate the balance of 
competition and collaboration. This section is discussed in light of SQ1 and SQ2 
regarding the content and factors that influence competition and collaboration which 
addresses the top right hand side of the model i.e. salient determining factors and 
content of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration (see Figure 8-1).  
Sections 8.3 – 8.6 are discussed in light of SQ3 which asks how subsidiaries manage the 
inherent tensions from simultaneous competition and collaboration and addresses the 
remaining elements of the model: triggering events, tensions, assess tensions, 
interventions and new coopetitive dynamic.  
In section 8.3,   the multiple dynamic coopetitive interactions found in the study are 
discussed providing a contrasting perspective to that of the focal subsidiary lens of Luo 
(2005).  In section 8.4 the discussion extends to the internal and external triggers of 
tension, leading to a general discussion of tensions and the question of balance when 
operating in dual social structures in section 8.5.  Section 8.6 discusses the interventions 
and mechanisms that both increase and decrease competition and collaboration. They 
also can be used proactively to both manage tensions that emanate from simultaneous 
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competition and collaboration and instil tensions to change the relationship dynamic. 
Finally, in section 8.7 and 8.8, I discuss three areas for future research and the 
limitations of this study. The chapter concludes with a brief summary.  
8.1 DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTER-SUBSIDIARY COOPETITION  
 “I liken it to going down a river in a canoe, you have to keep the oar in the water every 
single day and keep the canoe going down the centre.  The moment you take the oar out 
of the water, the canoe will run into the bank.”  [B#97]   
I offer a dynamic model of inter-subsidiary coopetition (see Figure 8-1) which 
integrates and augments Luo’s (2005) model of inter-subsidiary coopetition within an 
MNE (and is encapsulated within the large dotted box within Figure 8-1), empirically 
extends the model to include intra-organisational, inter-subsidiary coopetitive 
relationship dynamics (Bengtsson et al., 2010), and incorporates the notion of 
paradoxical tensions (Smith and Lewis, 2011) to inter-subsidiary coopetition. The 
perceived tensions are triggered by the dynamics of the current coopetitive relationships 
as well as internal or external events. The inherent and subsequent perceived tensions, 
delineated as ‘tolerable’ or ‘intolerable’, are assessed for action:  “sort it out” or 
temporarily retain the relationship dynamic.   
  
  
 237 
 
Figure 8-1: Dynamic model of inter-subsidiary coopetition (Source: Author) 
8.2 SALIENT DETERMININGFACTORS    
Luo (2005) portrays coopetition as a process, a mindset or a combination of competition 
and cooperation. His conceptually developed framework enhanced my understanding of 
a foreign subsidiary’s (and HQ’s) perspective of coopetition with regard to the content 
of coopetition, selected determinants and supporting infrastructure within the MNE.   
A focal subsidiary (i.e. either the SBU or the subsidiary as delineated in the study; see 
Figure 2-2) interacts with its horizontal peers i.e. other SBUs and subsidiaries and it was 
the horizontal interaction between two subsidiaries that was of interest in this study. 
Nevertheless, it remains important to understand the subsidiary’s position and 
circumstances, as each will have a bearing on how they interact with another subsidiary.  
My study found that the determinants listed by Luo (2005) omitted an important 
relational element in the interaction between the subsidiaries.  While at the inter-
organisational level, and not specifically at the inter-subsidiary level, Bengtsson et al. 
(2010) conceptually explored four relational patterns which create an arena for dynamic 
coopetitive interaction between competitive firms and inherent tensions in the 
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relationships between competing firms.  Although their work did not specify 
determinants of coopetitive relationships, both Luo (2005) and Bengtsson et al (2010) 
specified the content of the interactions. Two determinants of Luo (2005) overlapped 
with the contents of coopetitive relationships as described by Bengtsson et al.’s (2010); 
resource complementarity and strategic interdependence in the cooperative element and 
structural symmetry and market overlap for the competitive element of coopetitive. 
These were consistent with the findings in my study.  The implication is that there is an 
opportunity to bridge the relational gap of Luo (2005) with the conceptual work of 
Bengtsson et al. (2010).   
 However, first of all I discuss my findings in the light of extending Luo’s framework 
which may be augmented by (1) explicitly taking account of the external environment, 
(2) through the identification of additional antecedents of either collaboration or 
competition, and (3) by adding an additional factor of top management commitment to 
regulate the balance of competition and collaboration. 
In the external environment, host country conditions, e.g. a prosperous or austere 
economy and favourable or unfavourable government regulations, impact on a 
subsidiary’s ability to be externally competitive as they look internally for opportunities 
and resources. External circumstances may generate internal competition for resources, 
or may stimulate collaboration between subsidiaries as resources are combined to 
pursue opportunities that would have been unavailable to either subsidiary alone. 
Furthermore, in response to the global economic downturn, the subsidiaries increased 
their collaborative relationships to drive efficiencies and cost savings and therefore 
enhance their constrained unit and group-wide profitability. However, while Luo (2005) 
acknowledged the potential impact of the external context in terms of environmental 
complexity, hostility and uncertainty, the impact on either focal subsidiary’s level of 
competition or collaboration was not offered as a contingent factor. I add to the model 
shown in Figure 8-1 the impact of the external environment on focal subsidiary 
coopetition.   
Luo’s model proposed six determinants: three of competition (i.e. local responsiveness, 
market overlap and capability retrogression) and three of collaboration (i.e. strategic 
interdependence, wholly owned subunit form and technological linkage) but limited his 
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framework to an internal configuration perspective only.  My evidence confirms all but 
one of the factors (i.e. wholly owned subsidiary) but suggests other antecedents for 
collaboration (i.e. top management commitment and trusted relationships), competition 
(i.e. unit performance comparisons) and the manager’s mindset.  
These additional factors are discussed below.  
8.2.1 Top management commitment   
The Group CEOs’ leadership and commitment towards building collaborative cultures 
within their organisations requires a vigilant determination as “firms are complex social 
entities with their own inertia, culture and constraints” (Khoja, 2008). While 
collaboration was couched in terms of corporate values, e.g. “a better way to work”, 
cultural collaboration was instituted to address a business concern in each case. In the 
organisations studied, a collaboration culture was seen by the CEO as a way to 
overcome the temporary shortage of specialist resources in each newly established 
region, or mitigate the siloed and toxic effects from long-term, intense internal 
competition and reduce burdensome costs from duplication of resources in an 
economically challenging environment.  
A strong organisational culture comes from organisational cultural values, practices and 
strong social intra-organisational networks. However, practices deliver cultural change 
rather than values (Hofstede, 2001) and the practices of the three organisations were 
substantially different, even though all overtly valued collaboration. The underlying 
culture of the professional services firm relied on the ideal of collegial cooperation and 
reciprocity rather than reliance on structures of command and control.  
The role of leadership is often dismissed and questioned in terms of exactly what impact 
it may have on organisational outcomes (Meindl et al., 1985). Without the leadership 
and top management commitment of the CEO, the subsidiaries’ practice would be to do 
as they had always done, in these cases – compete, or coexist. This factor is missing 
from Luo’s (2005) typology.   
SBU CEOs who advocate a collaborative approach may motivate the subsidiaries to 
explore and develop opportunities together, but as the findings showed, the manager 
cannot overcome the numerous barriers from past operations by words and mindset 
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alone. As the change agent in Allred et al.’s (2011:151) case study aptly stated: 
“Collaboration is a two step process. You have to change mindsets. Then you can 
change structure. We have spent time changing mindsets. Changing the structure lies in 
the future”. The subsidiary management at PhotoCo and EventCo were also ready to 
move beyond culturally changing mindsets and were now advocating for more structure 
to facilitate collaboration.  
Corporate values informing leadership behaviour and a collaborative culture are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for effective collaboration in MNCs (Hansen, 
2009). While collaborative values may indigenously motivate the units to develop 
strong networks, the added inducement of collective rewards further endorsed this 
principle, but was still insufficient for collaboration to occur.  
Without management’s demonstrated commitment to collaboration, it is probable that 
competition between subsidiaries would be greater. Any Group-wide incentive systems 
are often insufficient to induce executives to collaborate when they are focused on the 
performance of their own unit (Martin and Eisenhardt, 2010). 
8.2.2 Trusted relationships  
Empirical and theoretical research in coopetition underscores the importance of trust as 
the foundation of collaborative relationships (Gulati, 1998). Furthermore, friendship has 
been found to enhance collaboration and mutual trust by reducing the hazards of 
opportunism and the need for elaborate formal governance structures (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Stuart, 2000). While most studies 
of the antecedents of intra-organisational collaboration have focused on employees and 
lower or middle managers (Rank and Tuschke, 2010) my qualitative research with top 
and senior management underscores the importance of socialising and providing 
opportunities for dialogue and the airing of tensions resulting from competition, 
collaboration and coopetition within their organisations. Trusted relationships and 
friendships sustain collaborative relationships even during periods of intense 
competition.   
Trusted relationships are also formed between subsidiaries with other organisational 
actors that are similar to themselves. A basic tenet of sociology is that actors prefer 
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homophilous affiliates and prefer to interact with others like themselves (McPherson, 
M., Smith-Lovin, L and Cook, J., 2001). As such, homophily constrains the formation 
of collaborative relationships with others who are different. Differences occur in a 
number of domains: geography, culture and profession (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1989).  
Social identity theory provides insights into the nature of the relationships between the 
SBUs and also between their subsidiaries. The structural categories of an organisation 
such as the various units, determine the form of social comparisons that are made (‘us’ 
versus ‘them’) which also has implications for inter-subsidiary competition.  
In large and diverse organisations, managers tend to identify more strongly with their 
immediate workgroups than with the organisation as a whole (Ashforth and Mael, 
1989). It would therefore follow that the top management group in my study would 
have a greater affinity with the broader organisation, their immediate workgroup being 
the executive team. While this affinity was supported by group performance targets and 
group-wide incentives, their focus remained firmly on their own SBUs profitability. On 
another dimension, Garcia, Gonzalez and Tor (2006) suggest that, at an individual level, 
people with high performance rankings have much less willingness to collaborate, even 
when such collaborations in the business context have the potential to maximise profit 
or some other benefit.  While notably these conclusions come from artificial situations, 
their partner characteristics would be taken into consideration either from a perspective 
of perceived influence (Rank and Tuschke, 2010)  or potential partner attributes of 
intellectual or social capital (Gnyawali et al., 2007).  The downside of  publicly 
comparing unit performance as I will discuss later, is that the image of those 
subsidiaries whose financial numbers did not show improvement over time as a result of 
marketplace conditions, became labelled as ‘nonperformers’ over time, thereby 
lessening the willingness of other organisational units to collaborate with them to win 
future business. The perception of them (e.g. subsidiary A) by other subsidiaries was 
that subsidiary A’s interactions were competitive, in that they were competing for 
survival.   
8.2.3 Peer performance 
Through the comparison of common KPIs of unit performance (e.g. profitability, 
margin or staff utilisation rates) with other corresponding units, subsidiaries were 
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enticed by the Group/Parent HQ to compete with each other.  Other studies have found 
that competition was also found to result from direct comparisons among functional 
units (Luo et al., 2006; Maltz and Kohli, 1996; Levitt, 1969) and in the accounting 
literature, Eccles (1983), this is stated even more strongly. “The criteria for performance 
measurement, evaluation, and reward stress comparison of business unit performance 
with a budget or plan, similar competitors, and even sibling units. The use of similar 
performance measures, for all units, generates enormous internal competition,” (Eccles, 
1983:152).   
Competition at the inter-subsidiary level is a manifestation of the social comparison 
process (Festinger, 1954; Tesser, 1988) and has generally been assumed to be greatest 
among rivals with similar attributes on relevant dimensions (Johnson and Johnson, 
1999).  
Rankings permeate popular culture which advances some understanding of the social 
comparison process. An upward comparison of one to another or who is better on a 
valued dimension, such as performance KPIs, can foster competitive behaviour (Tesser 
et al., 2000). In Festinger’s (1954:126) words, “competitive behaviour, action to protect 
one’s superiority, and even some kinds of behaviour that might be called cooperative, 
are manifestations in the social process of these pressures” to improve one’s standing in 
the organisation.  
In order for competition to occur, however, the social comparison must be important to 
the actor, and one significant factor is its relevance, as not all upward comparisons 
increase competitive behaviour. This provides a partial explanation of why some 
relationships are perceived as competitive and others not.    
Garcia et al. (2006:5) state that according to the self-evaluation model and related 
attributes hypothesis, “social comparison on a mutually relevant dimension (e.g. profit) 
with a commensurate counterpart (e.g. rival business or subsidiary) generates 
competition in a unidirectional drive upwards.”  In my study, profit is a relevant 
dimension for all the subsidiaries, exaggerated by the M-form, i.e. multidivisional, 
organisation design of the three MNCs. While “territorialisation serves to mitigate 
interdivisional competition in the product market, inter-divisional ‘competition’ for 
performance comparison purposes, in other respects, is possible,” (Williamson, 
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1975:140). My study would suggest that I have evidence at the inter-subsidiary level for 
the utility of a conception of social competition as distinct from instrumental 
competition (conflict of interest), consistent with the conceptual discussion of Garcia et 
al. (2006).   
8.2.4 Manager’s mindset  
The individual level of analysis is lacking in three related literatures of paradox, 
coopetition (Raza-Ullah et al., 2014) and ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). 
This thesis found that inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration was contingent 
upon the individual managers’ mindset, traits and personalities that they brought to the 
interaction. If the individual had a predisposition towards collaborating, they would find 
a way to make a collaboration work. This finding complements that of Geraudel and 
Salvetat (2014) who also found that the personality or predisposition to collaborate or 
compete impacted on the coopetitive relationships with another individual.  
Furthermore, the individual’s personality influences the extent to which an individual 
can accommodate the inherent tensions from both collaborating and competing with 
other actors or with the same actors involved in different activities (Brass et al., 2004). 
This is an important finding for inter-subsidiary relationship improvement as initiatives 
can be focused at the level of the individual to specifically foster collaboration as 
collaboration among the subsidiaries may be the result of prior collaboration among 
individuals (Brass et al., 2004). While this could equally be the case for competition, the 
former is more likely to be more actively pursued by management in a collaborative 
culture.   
Individuals, however, were subject to a cultural mindset shift towards collaboration, 
specifically for cross-SBU and cross-subsidiary collaboration (Knoll, 2008; Hattori and 
Lapidus, 2004; Leidtka, 1996) as it was evident that the willingness to collaborate did 
not come as part of everyone’s DNA. Those professionals who enter a PSF learn a 
process that enables them to assimilate the culture of reciprocity into their behaviour 
and mindset (Greenwood et al., 2006:179). While the professional service firms have a 
long tradition of operating in an environment of professional collegiality, other types of 
organisation provide their own set of normative guidelines in the form of corporate 
values.  
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8.2.5 Enabling internal structures    
Four different infrastructure elements that affected competition and collaboration, 
apparently equally, were indicated in Luo’s (2005) integrated framework. The systems 
were: the intranet, incentives, knowledge encapsulation, and coordination systems (see 
Section 2.8). He asserted that these same structures supported both competition and 
collaboration. In practice, my findings suggest that the configuration of these structures, 
in the face of environmental factors, preferentially encouraged competition or 
collaboration. 
The intranet was an essential tool for communication across the geographically 
dispersed subsidiaries of EngConsult, the PSF. The knowledge encapsulation systems 
were integrated and accessed through the intranet.  However, they neither increased nor 
decreased competition (or collaboration) between subsidiaries. The rewards and 
incentives system, however, directly influenced the levels of both competition and 
collaboration.  One would consider the reward system as a means or mechanism of 
strategy implementation rather than a structural characteristic per se (compare to Zhao 
and Luo, 2005:76, 82). The negotiations that involved the internal transfer pricing of 
services also influenced both competition and collaboration. The regional 
implementation increased competition whilst demanding collaboration through formal 
and informal channels.   
8.3 DYNAMIC COOPETITIVE RELATIONSHIPS  
The Luo (2005) model of inter-unit coopetition within an MNC was presented as both 
aggregative and static. Neither realistically portrays the experience of subsidiaries in 
this study as the interactions are neither determined nor fixed (a conclusion I share with 
Luo) as a result of internal and external factors and interventions that are used to 
manage the inherent tensions from simultaneous competition and collaboration.    
Before specifically focusing on SQ3 in this section: How do subsidiaries manage the 
inherent tensions in simultaneous competition and collaboration?, the focus of the 
discussion in the next two subsections centres briefly on the nature of the inter-
subsidiary relationships that were found in this study: (8.3.1) a subsidiary has multiple 
relationships; and (8.3.2) multiple forms of coopetitive relationships exist and change 
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which contribute to the tensions that are managed. Section 8.4 summarises the previous 
discussion in relation to Luo (2005) before proceeding to Section 8.5. 
8.3.1 Multiple relationships   
A focal subsidiary can engage in multiple, coopetitive relationships with other 
subsidiaries simultaneously within a densely integrated MNC network. The findings 
complement the case study findings at the inter-firm level, of networks of multiple types 
of horizontal relationships (i.e. competition, cooperative, coopetition and coexistence) 
operating between competitive firms. Multiple types of relationships were also found to 
exist between actors within the MNC.  
The paucity or abundance of coopetitive relationships was tempered by the level and 
clarity of the interdependence among the units and the size of the organisation which 
ultimately constrained the number of internal coopetitive relationships. Other studies 
proposed that coopetitive relationships as defined by Bengtsson et al. (2010) were rarer 
in MNCs where there were very well defined organisational boundaries and charters of 
responsibilities and therefore limited market overlap (Maurer, 2011; Luo, 2005; Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1998; Williamson, 1975).  While the size and amount of interdependence 
in the MNC may limit the number of coopetitive interactions, ‘pure’ dyads of 
competition or collaboration, of one actor with another, form what is referred to as 
‘contextual’ coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2010). This was evident within the MNCs 
and of interest to top management. An aggregate score of the mix of competition and 
collaboration between the subsidiaries was a way for one CEO to assess how far his 
organisation had moved towards greater collaboration, or in the case of EventCo, 
moved away from inter-unit competition. As one of the Group CEOs stated:  “But let’s 
say ‘here’ is ideal, you know a nice balance between competition and collaboration, 
what I don’t know is where you see us on that spectrum” [Group CEO, 2014]. Even the 
suggestion by Luo to empirically determine where a subunit falls in his typology and 
benchmark these levels with a corporate-wide average within the MNE ignores the 
dynamic aspect of the inter-subsidiary and interpersonal interactions of competition and 
collaboration and the strategic rationale for the current mix of subsidiaries’ positions in 
the typology.  
 246 
Therefore, aggregation of the subsidiary does not allow sensitivity to the interplay of the 
integral constructs of coopetition to emerge. For example, in quantitative studies of 
coopetition, the complexity of the interplay is portrayed as a simple multiplicative factor 
where the construct of coopetition is operationalised as a multiplication effect of one 
construct, competition, with the other construct, collaboration (see Luo et al., 2006). 
Developing an aggregate score to describe the propensity of a particular SBU or 
subsidiary to collaborate and compete disguises the dynamics and tensions inherent in 
many simultaneous yet different relationships. A qualitative approach to the study 
enabled a more in-depth exploration of the interrelationships of competition and 
collaboration within the context that they occurred and identified underlying 
mechanisms that can offer an explanation of inter-subsidiary coopetition.  
8.3.2 Multiple forms of relationships  
Within the coopetitive relationships different forms were evident.  
8.3.2.1 Coopetitive relationships  
The variations in the subsidiary relationships include different levels of both occurrence 
and intensity of competition and collaboration. Where coopetition is developed through 
mutual interaction between two or more entities (Tsai, 2002), a consideration is made as 
to whether coopetition occurs along one or two continua (Padula and Dagnino, 2007).  
On a single continuum, the implication is that if coopetition occurs it is represented as 
strong competition to strong cooperation. Therefore, in relationships where the level of 
cooperation is weak, relationships are more competitive. They will predominantly 
consist of more competition at the expense of collaboration, reducing levels of 
collaboration and cooperation.  When the informants described specific instances of 
competing and collaborating simultaneously with another subsidiary, they separated the 
competitive part of the relationship into one domain and the collaborative part in 
another. This finding lends support to Bengtsson et al.’s (2010) conceptualisation of 
processual coopetition where the competitive and cooperative parts occur between the 
same actors (individuals, groups, organisations or network) but across different 
activities.  
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However, the informants were as ready to articulate multiple, single, competitive or 
collaborative relationships with separate actors, both at the individual and subsidiary 
level, empirically confirming also that contextual coopetition occurs within the MNE 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010).   
8.3.2.2 Multiple horizontal relationships 
Moreover, it is possible that a particular relationship between two subsidiaries can take 
multiple forms: those being competitive, collaborative or both.  Empirical evidence was 
found at the intra-organisational level for a similar inter-organisational finding by 
Bengtsson and Kock (1999) that multiple horizontal relationships existed between 
actors. While their notion of the relationship was based on economic and non-economic 
exchange in business networks of external competitors, they identified four types of 
exchange relationships: collaboration, coopetition, co-existence and competition. At the 
intra-organisational level, where subsidiaries are profit centres and competition between 
the units is inherent within the MNC, a focal subsidiary is also engaged in multiple and 
different types of relationship.   
8.3.2.3 Horizontal and vertical relationships 
At the inter-organisational level, one can imagine that coopetition would occur between 
vertical relationships, which often contain economic exchange (Easton and Araujo, 
1994). An economic exchange is seldom the case in horizontal relationships as these 
relationships are built mainly on information and social exchanges (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 1999).  Little academic research to date has applied the concept of coopetition to 
‘vertical’ relationships, for example between customers and suppliers (see Lacoste, 
2012; Bengtsson and Kock, 1999, 2000). Adopting a key account perspective between 
firms, Lacoste’s (2012) case study challenges the prevalent view of normative, 
collaborative buyer-supplier relationships. It is in the key account’s interest to find a 
trade-off between collaboration and calling for competitive bids to optimise earnings. 
There are two potential implications for intra-organisational coopetition. One is to think 
of the vertical nature of coopetition between the SBU and its subsidiary or alternatively 
at the individual level of analysis, between the SBU manager and their employee. 
Perhaps the latter is the easier to conceptualise in terms of simultaneously competing 
with the boss for their job and collaborating on the subsidiaries’ success.  However, the 
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other consideration, which is perhaps more pertinent to this study of inter-subsidiary 
interactions, is to challenge the notion that horizontal relationships do not contain 
economic exchange.  
 MNCs also have internal customers and suppliers (Birkinshaw, Hood and Young, 
2005). This was manifest for example in the internal labour market (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1994) of EngConsult and internal suppliers of componentry in PhotoCo.  
A feature of internal markets is competition among subsidiaries for limited resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Conversely, Ensign (2004:132) suggested that 
“competition could conceivably emerge between organisational units [for] common 
resources.” This was the particular case when an internal market was created for 
duplicate resources available from multiple subsidiaries within EngConsult.  
Internal market structures consist of relatively autonomous units engaged in product and 
service transactions (Cerrato, 2006; Mills and Ungson, 2001). However, internal 
markets are not pure markets primarily because of the presence of an authority structure 
within the firm (Williamson, 1975). Because resources must be allocated to provide 
internal services, issues surrounding how they are measured, monitored and govern the 
exchanges between the different subsidiaries are of paramount concern to managers in 
these organisations (Mills and Ungson, 2001).  
The internal market challenges two assumptions of coopetition when applied at the 
intraorganisational level, which are: (i) horizontal relationships do not contain economic 
exchange (Maurer, 2011; Bengtsson and Kock, 1999) and (ii) that while the 
relationships between the subsidiaries may be hierarchically horizontal, they are in fact 
are more of a buyer–seller, customer –supplier relationship where a ‘quasi’ internal 
market (Cerrato, 2006) operates. As I highlighted in the case of EngConsult, economic 
exchange was negotiated within horizontal, inter-subsidiary relationships, suggesting 
that a buyer-seller relationship comprising of both competitive and collaborative 
elements rather than the traditionally viewed non-economic, horizontal relationship. The 
relationship remains paradoxical (Lacoste, 2012) in that a choice is implied between 
either a long term relationship with pre-selected suppliers (complementary resources 
from sister subsidiaries) and joint efforts to create value from non-economic benefits, or 
transaction-by-transaction approach designed to benefit from the best specific offers. 
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8.3.2.4 Asymmetrical relationships  
Relationships are not always symmetrical, i.e. experienced as equally competitive or 
collaborative by both parties. The fact that subsidiary A may consider subsidiary B a 
competitor does not automatically mean that subsidiary B perceives subsidiary A to be a 
competitor (Tsai, 2002; Chen, 1996). Similarly, if knowledge sharing is viewed as the 
proxy for collaboration, a subsidiary can share its knowledge without the other doing so 
in return (Tsai, 2002) which reduces the level of reciprocity often attributed to 
cooperative relationships. This one-sidedness is an attribute of cooperation more so than 
it is of collaboration. However, in more collaborative relationships, the asymmetrical 
nature is manifest as less commitment where commitment is a component of the trusted 
relationship (see section 8.4.1). 
8.4 SUMMARY  
In conclusion, Sections 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 discuss the findings of the research in relation to 
the factors and mechanisms that influence inter-subsidiary competition and 
collaboration. Luo’s (2005) conceptually derived framework of MNE coopetition offers 
a helpful but incomplete insight into the antecedents and content of simultaneous 
competition and collaboration.  By empirically investigating the phenomenon, this study 
identified additional salient causal factors over and above those of an internal 
configuration.  The portrayal and investigation of intra-MNC coopetition is enhanced by 
overcoming the omission in his framework to capture the influence of the focal 
subsidiary’s (and its manager’s) relationship with its peer subsidiaries.  
It is really only in relation to another subsidiary that the focal subsidiary’s relationships 
and subsequent interactions of competition and collaboration can be fully investigated 
as the focal subsidiary is influenced not only by existing structural factors, but also by 
historic organisational structures, subsidiary relations and interpersonal relationships 
that have persisted or changed over time. Furthermore, the research empirically shows 
that the subsidiary has not just one type of interaction but many, simultaneously, that 
are comprised of varying levels of competition and collaboration, contingent upon the 
expanded range of relational factors.   
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Attempting to apply Luo’s typology and classify a large number of foreign subunits into 
four categories by aggregating their interactions at any one point in time proved to be 
empirically challenging, as neither the focal subsidiary was consistently typified by only 
one category, but it was also shown to move dynamically between the categories within 
the typology, triggered by internal and external events. By taking the unit of analysis as 
the relationship and not the focal subsidiary, the research is able to explain and show 
how a more complex, dynamic, and less static, picture of coopetition emerges from 
within the MNCs. 
8.5 TRIGGERS THAT CHANGE RELATIONSHIPS AND CREATE 
TENSIONS  
The study confirms that changing external and internal conditions stimulates a different 
dynamic in the relationships and in terms of Luo’s typology moves the focal subsidiary 
from one coopetitive type to another. This is also portrayed in Bengtsson et al.’s (2010) 
model at the inter-organisational level, and thereby changes the levels of competition 
and collaboration between the subsidiaries. Consequently interactions or events may tip 
the relationship into one where the tensions created are intolerable for either subsidiary 
or HQ.  
8.5.1 External triggers  
Changes in the external market conditions led to changes in the relationships between 
the two subsidiaries (e.g. Middle East and UK) in EngConsult, print media and online 
technology in EventCo, and broadcast and photographic in PhotoCo. These events led 
to a progressive change in their business models which accentuated a competitive one to 
a more collaborative relationship, and hence a change in position within the typology. 
Internal conditions, e.g. organisational redesigns in PhotoCo, changed the nature of the 
relationships between the subsidiaries as the business units were merged into one SBU. 
I anticipate that as regions develop their capabilities and secure more local resources (as 
in the case of EngConsult), the relationships would tend towards greater self-sufficiency 
(i.e. low competition and low collaboration), reducing the business need for the level of 
collaboration required under the current circumstances. However, this would not be due 
to isolation of the subsidiary as explicated by Luo (2005), but rather to a lessening of 
the need to compete and collaborate for resources.  
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However, it is important to note that not all tensions are perceived negatively but can 
also be tolerated when information is shared about the rationale or when the interaction 
is not perceived to be competitive by either the subsidiary or HQ.  
8.5.2 Changes over time 
Our understanding of how and why coopetitive interactions between external 
competitors change over time as the coopetitive relationship develops is limited. Inter- 
and intra-organisational learning and the development of the external environment have 
been proposed as distinguishing mechanisms underlying the change (Dahl, 2014). In 
explaining the change in cooperative interactions, her conceptual study emphasises 
explicitly and tacitly agreed norms for cooperation (Ritala et al., 2009; Baldwin and 
Bengtsson, 2004; Bengtsson and Kock, 1999) and rules that are developed by 
competitors based on relationship-specific experiences (Holmqvist, 2004) to explain the 
existence of and change in coopetitive interactions.  
An empirical example is demonstrated in the study. While the change of orientation in 
culture provided a normative set of rules of interaction between intra-organisational 
actors in my study, the rules for collaboration were made more explicit through the use 
of inter-entity agreements and SLAs when collaboration was initiated. There was some 
indication in the study that the content of these agreements became more detailed in that 
more clarifying expectations and conditions were put in place as a result of the 
experience of previous, less successful collaborations, indeed suggesting that some 
learning had occurred.   
Inter-subsidiary competitors that operated outside of the cultural rules and formal 
policies, with intentionality, is an interesting area of research to explore within the 
coopetitive relationship. Often the actors found themselves in competitive situations 
through a lack of awareness of either the situation or subsidiary boundaries. This lack of 
intentionality is a weaker form of competition than one with intention. An observation 
from the interventions and mechanisms used to adjust the relationship dynamic was that 
rules (e.g. through normative integration, collaborative culture, advising the country 
head of another subsidiary of a visiting subsidiary’s presence before entering) were 
mainly put in place to prevent competition occurring (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005).  
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8.5.3 Establish new relationships over time  
At the intra-organisational level, I look to explanations of path dependency of social 
relations, i.e. prior linkages, which determine the formation of new linkages (e.g. Gulati, 
1998).  A series of mutual exchanges strengthens the quality of the relationship between 
the parties and builds up trust over time. Readiness for transdisciplinary collaboration 
tends to be higher among those who share a history of previous collaboration (Stokols et 
al., 2005).  The situation becomes similar to what Blau (1964) has characterised as 
social exchange relations. As Cook (1977) has argued, ﬁrm attachments or 
commitments often develop between exchange partners due to the investment made and 
the costs involved in establishing and maintaining the relationship. The attachment or 
commitment serves to prolong the exchange and tends to limit the mobility of exchange 
partners (Cook, 1977).  
8.5.4 Acquisitions  
A particular case of recently acquired businesses is noted in the study as the relationship 
may initially be one of mere coexistence with other established subsidiaries or the 
retention of a previous competitive or collaborative relationship prior to the acquisition 
by the MNC. “With stronger competition partners are forced to manage a complex, not 
fully trusting relationship that attempts to balance the oxymoron: collaborative 
competition” (Capron and Mitchell, 2013:101).  Collaborating with new partners and 
creating new relationships are necessary for acquiring critical resources and gaining 
external support (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Interventions are needed to introduce the 
newly acquired firms to the organisation and foster collaboration if some measure of 
competition exists with other adjacent or overlapping subsidiaries.  
8.6 CHALLENGE ACROSS HIERARCHY OF MANAGING 
TENSION 
In suggesting that the experience of coopetition in a subsidiary can be aggregated, the 
integrated framework (Luo, 2005) also homogenizes a subsidiary and the organisation 
of which it is a part. My investigation shows that the tensions generated by coexisting 
relationships of competition and collaboration reside at multiple hierarchical levels 
within the subsidiary. Coopetition is not understood and experienced uniformly within 
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the organisation. Many of the tensions noted in this study are manifest at the subunit 
(e.g. divisional) level within and across the subsidiaries. While Birkinshaw et al. (2005) 
contend, and my data supports, that the inherent tension between competition and 
collaboration can be easily managed by senior level executives (i.e. SBU CEOs in this 
study), my findings also suggest that it was more difficult for subsidiary divisional 
managers to reconcile the dilemma of needing to collaborate for disparate, and at times 
scarce, resources, or new product development, while being held to account for the 
profitability of their unit in comparison with others.  
While broader questions have been raised in the paradox and ambiguity literatures (see 
Smith and Lewis, 2011; Gupta et al., 2006) of where tensions arise, what the sources of 
the tensions are, and what the tensions consist of, to date, they have largely been 
ignored in the coopetition literature. A recent paper by Raza-Ullah et al. (2014) explores 
the emanating tensions that develop at three levels of analysis (i.e. individual, 
organisational and inter-organisational).  Grounded in illustrative cases and a paradox 
frame, they distinguish tensions which constitute both negative and positive emotions 
simultaneously.  Interestingly, their results propose that tensions in complex inter-
organisational network organisations are temporary, as competing project work comes 
to a natural conclusion, whereas in the simpler, more stable network the tensions were 
stronger and more permanent, impacting on individuals who were left to cope with the 
tensions themselves.  This proposition would be interesting to compare with the impact 
of tensions within the MNC which are purported to be longer standing and stable than 
external networks.  
8.6.1 Disaggregation of the subsidiary  
Further to the discussion in Section 8.3.1, there is a need to unpack the subsidiary in 
terms of tasks and actors to obtain a real sense of the complexity and emergent nature of 
the coopetitive relationships and the location of the tensions. By aggregating the 
subsidiary, a simplistic view of the complex organisational phenomena is presented.   
To separate the tensions, the mechanism of structural separation by role is in play as the 
actors at the SBU level within the MNCs fulfilled an overview role, enabling them to 
promote group-wide collaboration over and above unit profit concerns, whilst the 
subsidiary managers and their teams were largely responsible for attaining unit 
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profitability and competition with other subsidiaries for necessary resources. Spatial 
separation (Poole and Van de Ven 1989), across hierarchical actors, is a mechanism that 
enables the mitigation of tensions resulting from simultaneous inter-subsidiary 
competition and collaboration.   
My study confirms that subsidiary managers saw their roles as being profit centre 
managers, but also, that top management expected them to collaborate with their 
subsidiary sisters. The two roles at the subsidiary level were often in conflict, and 
generated strong emotions. When the situation was no longer tolerable in relation to 
other demands being made by the organisation, the two simultaneous requirements 
presented the subsidiary managers with a level of tension.  
Tensions relating to issues of competition were escalated for adjudication as a way to 
mitigate the tension in the system. Although fewer examples of tensions resulting from 
strong/high collaboration were cited in my study, e.g. performance management, 
undermining, broken trust as a result of broken commitments, other studies, referenced 
by Sytch and Tatarynowicz (2014), have highlighted tensions emanating from 
collaborative (inter)organisational ties, such as those related to violations of trust (Uzzi, 
1997), divergence of strategic interests (Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt, 2008) 
Williamson, 1985) and the appropriation of knowledge for self-gain (Khanna et al., 
1998). 
In managing the tension between competition and collaboration, initially subsidiary 
managers sought face to face dialogue with their counterparts when collaboration was 
being obstructed. If this failed, the subsidiaries fell back on established adjudication 
processes by seeking resolution by more senior management or HQ, as the HQ 
management were perceived to be both experienced in and holders of the firm’s wider 
interests. The adjudication role of top management reflected earlier work which 
identified that input of senior executives may be needed to resolve conflicts between 
personnel arising from interdependent divisions (Boulding, 1964). 
However, Birkinshaw (2001a:34) urges that “sorting it out” or “working through” 
(Smith and Lewis, 2011) is best left to the SBUs and subsidiaries. The example that 
Birkinshaw (2001a) cites of two SBUs eventually being able to divide their markets up 
so that each focused on its own core technology underlines his point that internal 
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competition is best managed without external judges or arbitrators.  By working this out 
for themselves, rather than having a solution imposed, they were more likely to make it 
work – which was critical given the need for collaboration and technology sharing 
between them.  
Nevertheless, as I found in the study, an adjudicator is necessary in such collaborations 
when a subsidiary’s profitability is at risk, and the other subsidiary is not prepared to 
“take one on the chin” in the short term, but be willing to accept that forgoing profit 
now will not be of significance in the longer term. Not only is the role of adjudication 
purposeful, but it is accepted by the subsidiaries as a way forward in all three MNCs. 
Ideally, an integrated solution for resolving conflict where both parties emerged as 
“winners” was ideal.  As Mary Parker Follet, mother of modern management, said “we 
should never allow ourselves to be bullied by an ‘either-or.’ There is often the 
possibility of something better than either of two given alternatives” (in Child, 
1995:90). This vision of something better is difficult to realise sometimes without the 
intervention of a third party.   
The internal competition life cycle (Birkinshaw, 2001a) changes one facet of the 
coopetitive relationship and, hence, facilitates movement in cycles of low to high 
competition and collaboration. I confirm that an episode of internal competition can be 
very short. It can be “stamped out” as soon as it happens (Birkinshaw, 2001a) because it 
is not tolerated by HQ or the subsidiaries, when the costs are weighed over the benefits. 
When it is tolerated by HQ and the subsidiaries, competition may last for a very long 
time, such as the situation in EventCo when the company allowed its online 
publications to coexist alongside its traditional print publications.   
Evaluating every case of internal competition on its own specific costs and benefits 
presupposes an intent and awareness by senior management which was not always 
evident in my study. In situations where subsidiaries found themselves “inadvertently” 
competing, as a result of circumstance or factors outside of the organisation, then a 
more conscious assessment could be made.  Nevertheless, in cases where an adjudicator 
was deployed and the best outcome was perceived to be a “forced collaboration”, the 
cost to future collaborations was typically not factored into any cost/benefit analysis of 
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terminating competition in an attempt to redress the balance between competition and 
collaboration.  
8.7 TENSIONS AND A QUESTION OF BALANCE  
Within the three MNCs we have seen that there are “colliding events, forces, or 
contradictory values which compete with each other for domination and control” (Van 
de Ven, 1992:178).  Contradictory forces of competition and collaboration which result 
in behavioural tensions (Das and Teng, 2000) have the potential to split apart 
relationships and cause irritations between entities (Fang, Chang and Peng, 2011).   
The literature suggests that attempts are made by actors to balance relationships (Stych 
and Tatarynowicz, 2013; Bengtsson et al., 2010). However, the term ‘balance’ is used 
differently and contains a subtle distinction that may foster confusion between the 
disparate strategy and coopetition literatures. A balance is a condition in which the 
strengths of the forces of competition and collaboration are at similar levels (Das and 
Teng, 2000) and the equal forces are sufficient to retain the balance so that the worst 
excesses of one over the other are avoided. A balanced situation therefore might lie 
anywhere between both forces being of low strength to both being of high strength.   
Sytch and Tatarynowicz (2014:586) use the term ‘balance’ in the context of social 
structures to describe exclusively collaborative or exclusively conflictual relationships. 
They state “multiplex dyads combining collaborative and conflictual relationships are 
unsustainable and evolve toward uniplex relationships, that of either collaboration or 
conflict, but not both.” This is in direct contrast to the coopetition literature, unless one 
considers the concept of contextual coopetition where unitary relationships exist 
between actors. Unbalanced structures are predicted to be unstable because they 
generate relational tensions among actors. Echoes of an “either/or” mindset are 
apparent, which does not represent all (coopetitive) relationships found within the MNC 
network of subsidiaries. However, this also indicates an ability to compartmentalise or 
separate the interactions between activities which mitigates the tensions and cognitive 
dissonance to which Sytch and Tatarynowicz (2014) refer. Once again, we have a subtle 
preferencing of terms: competition and conflict; cooperation and collaboration. This 
provides an interesting area of future research into exploration and reconciliation on 
many dimensions.    
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The conceptualisation of balance (i.e. 50/50, whether at low, medium or high, or unitary 
relationships) as suggested in the literature (Bengtsson et al, 2010; Sytch and 
Tatarynowicz, 2014), may not be the most beneficial combination between intra-
organisational units within the MNC nor in inter-organisational networks.  
The existence of strong competitive tensions, as the data show at the inter-subsidiary 
level, results in intense rivalry and dynamic interplay (Chen, Su and Tsai, 2007).  This 
finding contradicts Das and Teng’s (2000) contention that the same tensions found 
between firms of strategic alliances are not present in formal organisations. Competitive 
internal tensions resulted in strong hostilities (Bengtsson et al., 2010) when the 
subsidiaries perceived themselves to be competitors with their other subsidiaries (Porac 
et al., 1995). We can take each opposing force of competition and collaboration in turn 
as Bengtsson et al. (2010) have done and investigate the relational patterns that emerge. 
For example, they suggest that an interaction with weak cooperation presents a more 
dynamic scenario as the competitors for example attempt to establish trusting 
relationships to enable exploration and exploitation of opportunities with new partners.  
Again, conversely, an interaction where there is high collaboration, generally has fewer 
tensions, hence has a lack of dynamics due to alignment of trust, complementarity and 
strong ties.    
If I take Luo’s (2005) framework which refers to a focal subsidiary’s level of 
competition and collaboration, but not the dynamics of the relationship directly, and 
combine the propositions of Bengtsson et al. (2010) with the findings from this study, I 
find that tensions arise from high competition and that some considerable hostility 
exists between the subsidiaries. However, collaboration is also high in the ‘network 
captain’ quadrant of Luo’s (2005) typology, which suggests that in those activities of 
collaboration there was little tension and they did not fear they would be taken 
advantage of (Bengtsson et al., 2010). The interplay suggested by Bengtsson et al. 
(2010) is that the lack of dynamics in the collaborative interaction will not generate the 
anticipated benefits of coopetition. This is because the competitive dynamic overrides 
the collaborative force; the coopetitive balance and suggested dynamic effects of 
coopetition are likely to be lost.  
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In relation to the findings from this study at an intra-organisational level, I tentatively 
concur with Bengtsson et al.’s (2010) implications of their conceptual discussion that 
medium levels of coopetition create a more tolerable dynamic rather than the high/high 
combination of competition and collaboration. I equally argue that strong competition 
between the units is only a temporary phenomenon (Birkinshaw, 2001a), in a 
collaborative culture.  
Once intense competition exists and is identified and assessed by HQ or acknowledged 
by the subsidiaries, competition was managed to a more tolerable level by the use of 
interventions or strategies as portrayed on the left hand side of Figure 8-1. This would 
also lend support to Bengtsson et al.’s (2010) contention that moderate levels of 
competition and collaboration create a dynamic that is more sustainable over time. As I 
attempt to demonstrate in Figure 8-1, managing a ‘balance’ or rather an appropriate 
proportion of collaboration and competition for a given situation is not a static process 
(Bengtsson et al., 2010; Lewis, 2000; Evans and Doz, 1992).  This is in contrast to the 
static nature of the subsidiary typologies portrayed in Luo’s (2005) framework.  
I further propose that an equal balancing of the forces may not be the appropriate 
balance for subsidiary interactions when in fact an imbalance may create a more 
relevant dynamic at certain points in time under specific conditions. This framing would 
present a more strategic use of inter-subsidiary coopetition (Dagnino and Padula, 2002) 
to create business value as a result of the subsidiary interactions. In most cases within 
the MNC studies, the response to tensions that were creating a strong dynamic between 
the subsidiaries was a more tactical reactive response, even after there had been a 
prolonged, unattended-to level of competition between two subsidiaries as a result of 
market forces.  
Hakansson (1990) poses an interesting question about what happens if a company starts 
doing more to plan its inter-subsidiary relations.  Evidence suggests that several of the 
subsidiaries’ CEOs judiciously created tensions to increase the level of competition, for 
example, when the SBU CEO assessed that the subsidiaries were on a more level 
playing field after the PhotoCo reorganisation. Conversely, CEOs also fostered more 
collaboration to counter the effects of the regionalisation strategy in EngConsult. 
Nevertheless, these interventions gave the impression that they were more in reaction to 
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unintended and realised outcomes of a change in organisation design, rather than 
planned interventions.   
At the individual level, a unit manager who feels there is a power imbalance due to his 
greater dependency on the other unit may initiate conflict to try to correct this 
imbalance, such as when a buying unit sources a product internally that is a significant 
part of its cost of goods sold but in actual amounts is insignificant to the selling unit 
(Eccles, 1983:160).  
This study finds that interventions, practices and mechanisms were used in varying 
scenarios to move to greater competition or increased collaboration.  
The focus of the discussion to date has centred on the stronger dynamic of competitive 
tensions. Collaborative relationships also create their own tensions. When 
collaborations were frequent and easy, more competition was introduced by way of peer 
performance comparisons in order to create a different dynamic. When competition 
between the units began to generate strong tensions between the subsidiaries, for 
example as a result of blurred lines of responsibility, the decision was taken by HQ or 
the SBU to merge the two units. The imbalance created a change and relationships were 
changed (see the left hand side of Figure 8-1). The perspective proposed by Das and 
Teng (2000) is that a system will continue to evolve and be modified if internal factors 
are not in balance. When the balance shifts too much towards one force over the other, 
how might the subsidiary readjust the competitive or collaborative forces?   
What can be done when there is too much competition or not enough collaboration? In 
section 7.5, my research identified both structural and relational mechanisms and the 
interventions used to address inter-subsidiary tension.   
Managing tensions  
Several scholars have taken this work further forward; however, their focus has been at 
the inter-organisational or individual level between firms. Tidström (2014) investigates 
how tensions are managed in coopetitive business relationships by adopting Thomas 
and Kilman’s (1974) model of conflict to explain the options of avoidance and 
collaboration.  
 260 
More research is required at both the intra- and inter-organisational levels to increase 
our understanding of coopetitive dynamics (Bengtsson et al., 2010). In the future 
research section 8.7, I discuss how both the paradox and ambidexterity perspectives 
might inform how competition and collaboration might be balance apportioned (Luo 
and Rui, 2009; Gupta et al., 2006). The adjunct to this is that the subsidiary and the 
organisation might be best served by planned imbalance between competition and 
collaboration for a point in time. Is it the right dynamic and if not how can I change it?  
8.8 INTERVENTIONS AND MECHANISMS  
Table 8-1 summarises the mechanisms and interventions that can be applied by HQ and 
the subsidiaries to adjust the level and intensity of inter-subsidiary interactions and 
hence changes the dynamic between them (Bengtsson et al., 2010; Luo, 2005; Smith 
and Lewis, 2011).  The interventions were also used to proactively trigger new 
dynamic, adjusting heightened tensions that became intolerable for the subsidiaries 
and/or the organisation. Significantly fewer interventions and mechanisms were 
identified to decrease the level of collaboration. Surprisingly, several interventions were 
identified and available to management to proactively increase inter-subsidiary 
competition.   
Dialogue and communication form a key component of every relationship between the 
actors. The combined list of interventions identified in this study to both increase and 
decrease collaboration and competition when there is too much or not enough is also 
offered as a contribution to practice. 
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Table 8-1: Summary of all interventions and mechanisms (Source: Author)  
Conditions when: not enough (increase) Too much (manage) 
 Mechanisms 
- interventions   
Mechanisms 
- interventions    
Collaboration Formal Structure  
- SBU redesign to global, cross-
functional matrix  
Decentralisation 
Formalisation/standardisation  
- “forced” collaborations 
- contractual and relational 
contracts  
Lateral Relations  
- R&D cross-divisional initiative 
Communication 
- group wide Intranet   
- dialogue  
 Socialisation 
- management commitment  
- foster  collaborative culture and 
shared values  
- group identity  
- inter-unit transfers  
- exit non-collaborative leaders  
Centralisation  
- prioritisation  
Competition Formal structure  
- centres of excellence 
- flexible boundaries  
Decentralisation 
- allow product cannibalisation  
- non mandatory practices 
- autonomy  
Formalisation/standardisation   
- subsidiary rewards and 
incentive;  
- negotiation of pricing  internal 
transactions  
Socialisation  
- peer performance comparisons 
- group identity  
Internal market 
Formal structure  
- clear roles, charters and markets 
- redesign independent businesses to 
global functional matrix   
- merge competing units  
- spatial separation 
Formalisation/standardisation  
- adjudication  
- pull subsidiaries together quickly 
Communication  
- -   dialogue  - rationale and awareness 
Lateral relations  
- initiate joint product development  
Conflict resolution 
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8.9 FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study identified three areas that merit further investigation.   
8.9.1 Transfer pricing and its impact on collaboration  
First, I discovered that coordination was enabled by pricing/accounting mechanisms. 
The nature of the trading agreement between subsidiaries, the manner of its negotiation 
and its impact on inter-unit competition and collaboration merits examination.  
The financial system and recognition of revenue and profit are essential to the 
evaluation of the decentralised units’ performance.  When subsidiary and cross-SBU 
opportunities to collaborate do not positively reflect on the unit’s P&L, the willingness 
to proceed with the opportunity was questioned and perceived as a barrier to 
collaboration. Transfer pricing systems function in decentralised firms and influence the 
balance of sufficient autonomy for manoeuvre by the profit centre managers and 
integration of business activities for collaboration to occur between SBUs (van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 1994).  Further research placing less emphasis on the transfer price itself 
but on that which adopts a more integrated approach to the issue of coordinating and 
managing a decentralised firm (see e.g. McAuley and Tomkins, 1992; Spicer, 1988; 
Eccles, 1985; Grabski, 1985; Thomas, 1980; Watson and Baumler, 1975) would 
contribute to our understanding of inter-subsidiary interactions and coopetitive 
relationships.  While research has focused on the elements of the transfer price, 
consideration of the implications for cross-business collaboration have been less 
explored. Eccles’ emphasis on transfer pricing elements in a collaborative and 
competitive organisation does not extend to understanding the impact of transfer pricing 
elements on cross-SBU collaboration or competition, but acknowledges that “for 
collaborative organisations, the transfer pricing is most complex” (Eccles, 1983:157).   
The literatures of inter-SBU collaboration are quiet on the impact of transfer pricing as a 
structural mechanism that can either facilitate or hinder collaboration, and as an 
important mechanism for decentralised units.  “The transfer price is not primarily an 
accounting tool. Rather it is a behavioural tool that motivates managers to take the right 
decisions” (Anthony et al., 1992, in Cravens, 1997:131). The units’ profitability and 
willingness to collaborate is influenced by the transfer pricing process of: sourcing and 
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access of resources (colleagues), negotiated terms for staff utilisation within the PSF, 
revenue recognition, recovery of costs and overheads, and profit contribution for a 
specific collaboration. The transfer pricing arrangements can facilitate but also hinder 
inter-SBU unit collaboration.  
The study exposes some aspects of transfer pricing in multinational professional 
services and services/product/manufacturing organisations. However, further research is 
required to investigate how the principles of transfer pricing of products retain relevance 
for service firms, as most of the accounting literature is still focused on industrial 
manufacturing (Terzioglu and Inglis, 2011). Opportunities to investigate the behavioural 
impact of transfer pricing systems on the achievement of strategic objectives, where 
internal collaboration is a key component of the business model, are also required.    
The drive for, and recognition of, profit by the regional, business and divisional units  
through the system of transfer pricing of services has both a negative and positive 
impact on collaborative and competitive practices between the units within the 
professional services firm. Further research could look more at the opportunities to 
collaborate within a firm to further our understanding of the self-selection nature of 
collaboration (Ang, 2008), other than profit motivation.   
8.9.2 Triggers that change relationships….over time   
Second, relationships between subsidiaries change over time. Although several triggers 
were highlighted in the study, the triggers for such changes from competitive to 
collaborative relationships or vice versa within the coopetitive context remain 
underexplored. A longitudinal investigation of a number of specific relationships may 
help surface the underlying mechanisms that these triggers generate to facilitate change.   
There are significant challenges to overcome the history of relationships of competition.  
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1987) found in their study on Philips and NEC, among other 
MNCs, that where there was a distinct history of competition it was very difficult to 
overcome and create the environment where collaboration was perceived to have 
benefits. To overcome the level of distrust perceived by other subsidiaries, socialisation 
mechanisms and interventions were introduced to align and create a more homogenous 
organisation.   
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Furthermore, in MNCs that are highly acquisitive and equally divesting of businesses, 
unit and personal relations are constantly forming and reforming, organisational units 
shaped and redesigned, disrupting previously established interaction patterns and 
routines. Because of a rapidly evolving relationship between the two parties, different 
patterns of resources and knowledge-sharing interactions change as the relationship 
evolves (Bresman, Birkinshaw and Nobel, 1999; Doz, 1996).  To my knowledge, the 
literature has not explored the formation of coopetitive relationships in the post 
integration phase of mergers and acquisitions and offers an opportunity for further 
research.  
Furthermore, if I consider a newly acquired business, is there a progression of inter-
subsidiary interactions from the initial minimal interaction, to competitive interactions 
as a result of trying to secure their position in the new and complex MNC, and 
thereafter, to more collaborative ones within the MNCs? The acquired business 
becomes aware of the complementary resources and capabilities within the MNC, and 
hence potential opportunities for collaboration. Future research in this important aspect 
of business growth and synergy attainment is suggested.  
8.9.3 Experience of coopetition across the hierarchy  
Third, the experience of collaboration and competition across the hierarchy of senior 
managers varies. The locus of this tension between competition and collaboration is felt 
most profoundly at the subsidiary (divisional) level where responsibility for subsidiary 
performance and SBU profitability is held. How these tensions are managed requires 
further investigation. Poole and van de Ven (1989) suggest that paradoxical situations 
can be accepted (as at the top management level) or managed by temporal or spatial 
separation (e.g. between the SBU and the subsidiary over different activities) of the two 
elements, or indeed avoided. The possibility for managing simultaneous competition 
and collaboration warrants closer scrutiny by disaggregating the subsidiary and 
investigating interactions across hierarchical and multiple levels of analysis and tasks.   
The paradox and ambidexterity literatures are consumed with similar issues and may be 
a source of further insight when looking to address how the tensions of simultaneous 
competition and collaboration can be managed within the organisation. To be 
ambidextrous, for example, organisations have to reconcile internal tensions and 
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conflicting demands in their task environments (Duncan, 1976; Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008).  Structural mechanisms have been proposed to cope with the competing demands 
facing the organisation (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), while more latterly, leadership 
characteristics that enable organisations to manage and embrace the contradictions that 
they face have been explored (Lubatkin et al., 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005).  
As key leaders in organisations, top management play an important role in creating the 
context for the “both/and” of paradox and ambidexterity (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008), as my study similarly suggests for coopetition. However, I propose that top 
management, in terms of role modelling, is not just a supportive factor, but argue based 
on my findings, that the management commitment to a collaborative culture is a 
determining factor of intra-organisational collaboration (Lubatkin et al., 2006). Equally, 
the informants in this study were able to recount the opposite behaviour where the prior 
management of PhotoCo and EventCo, as diligently, fostered inter-subsidiary 
competition. 
A key argument throughout my thesis is that it is less a matter of trade-offs (either/or) 
between inter-subsidiary collaboration and competition but an understanding of the 
paradoxes (both/and) that exist in relation to the two, intertwined concepts, of 
competition and collaboration within the organisation and the importance of achieving a 
tolerable dynamic, rather than balancing the contradictory tensions. Gupta et al. (2006) 
raise an appropriate question in the context of organisational adaption research which 
actually asks: Should every organisation strive for a balance? This fundamental question 
again challenges the very notion of a “both/and” approach, and its benefits, which are 
positioned mostly as positive.  
These same issues and questions of the nature of the construct, paradox, tensions, and 
balance have recently become topics of interest in the coopetition field (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2014; Raza-Ullah et al., 2014; Tidström, 2014; Bengtsson et al., 2010; Luo and 
Rui, 2009). As a result of the empirical study conducted, these topics are also pertinent 
to my own research.  Again, the coopetition studies are focused at the inter-
organisational level. However, studies are beginning to bring into focus multiple levels 
of analysis, including the often neglected level of the individual, but more research is 
required within the organisation across organisational units. Raisch and Birkinshaw 
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(2008) reiterate that the level of analysis is vitally important because, as my study also 
suggests, choices about how to manage the tension at one level of analysis within the 
MNC are often resolved at the next level down. For example, the SBU can be 
‘ambidextrous’ in relation to inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration, where the 
subsidiary (divisional) and subdivision managers who were most closely tasked with 
running the businesses were focused on the profitability of their units.  They   
begrudgingly appreciated that on occasions when collaborating with another unit, they 
“had to take one on the chin” for the good of the firm and play the long game. 
Multilevel analysis (Bengtsson et al., 2010; Schilling and Phelps, 2004) allows the 
researcher to distinguish the level at which the coopetitive tension is held and the level 
at which it is managed in addition to investigating the transfer of concepts from the 
inter-organisational to intra-organisational studies and vice versa.  Detailed case studies 
can help to further understand the context of coopetition.  
The adoption of an organisational level of analysis has also prevented studies from 
shedding more light on the role of the individual level contingencies on collaboration 
and competition, in spite of the fact that relationships between subsidiaries are built at 
an interpersonal level (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Many recent calls for further 
research at the individual (manager) level of analysis have been made in coopetition 
(Luo, 2005), paradox (Lewis, 2000), dualities and ambidexterity (Raisch and 
Birkinshaw, 2008), relational pluralism (Sytch and Tatarynowicz, 2014) literatures. 
These aspects draw attention to the cognitive dissonance that individuals face when 
operating in dual structures, with competing demands made on them. An individual 
manager’s perspective enhances our understanding of MNE coopetition.   
8.10 LIMITATIONS 
Several limitations of this study are noted: the limitations can be categorised as those 
relating to the case organisations, and the time horizon of the study for a processual 
view of coopetition.   
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8.10.1 Case organisations  
Professional Services Firm  
It is possible that these findings on the professional services firm may have been 
dominated by the restructuring of EngConsult, and the embedding of the new regional 
design, as was the case with the new organisational design within PhotoCo. However, 
the very event of redesigning the organisations identified resultant tensions among the 
subsidiaries and subsequent changes in the dynamics of their previous relationships.  
Comparability of organisations 
Furthermore, inter-subsidiary relationships were studied in three organisations that 
differed in size and complexity. My results cannot be generalised to all types of sectors 
and environments without further research. For example, the antecedents of coopetition 
found may not hold in large public sector organisations owing to a different notion of 
financial accountability and only a national perspective. Additionally, the study was 
conducted in one type of professional services firm, that is, an engineering consultancy. 
Other PSFs (such as accountancy or law) with a narrower base of professional expertise, 
and therefore, a more concentrated focus, may differ.  
Collaborative orientation  
The three case study organisations actively encouraged collaboration between the 
subsidiaries and endorsed a collaborative culture. For these MNCs, collaboration was 
the favoured means of interacting, and achieving client and organisational needs at a 
time when efficiencies and synergies were required to reduce costs in challenging 
economic conditions and capture the benefits of acquired businesses. The comparison of 
collaborative and contrasting competitive MNCs may have provided more contrasting 
results in relation to coopetitive inter-subsidiary relationships and the interventions, 
mechanisms and practices adopted.  
8.10.2  Time horizon  
Cross-section perspective  
Relationships develop over time. This study, however, was conducted within a limited 
period of time within each MNC. A longitudinal perspective would enhance the 
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opportunities to identify the formation of coopetitive interactions between the 
subsidiaries and the impact of those on the inter-subsidiary relationships, specifically 
the interventions and mechanisms used to restate and rebalance relationships as a result 
of the tensions. This would require less reliance on informant recall and interpretation. 
A longitudinal view might also provide greater insight than this study was able to 
explicate into the challenges of changing an organisation from an internally competitive 
structure to one of collaboration (Johnson et al., 2006). Although a tentative processual 
view on coopetition was developed, the cross-sectional nature of the case studies 
requires caution in assuming causal relationships between the determinants and the 
behaviours based on the field study.   
8.11 SUMMARY  
This chapter provides an interpretation of the findings in Chapter 7, focusing on four 
salient factors—trusted relationships, peer performance, management commitment, and 
manager’s mindset—that were additional to the internal configurations proffered by Luo 
(2005). The enabling infrastructure identified in this study privileged collaboration, in 
alignment with the MNCs’ collaborative agenda. Tensions in the coopetitive 
relationship mainly resulted from subsidiary and group profitability decisions.  
The inter-subsidiary relationships of competition and collaboration were contingent 
upon the external environment and attributes of the subsidiary (e.g. resources available 
or host country conditions, past experiences with another subsidiary and who the 
subsidiaries identified with) and individual subsidiary managers’ mindsets. 
Additionally, peer comparison and skills overlap increased inter-subsidiary competition, 
while trusted relationships and a management commitment to collaborative culture 
increased the level of collaboration.  
Within the interaction, the dynamics reflected the strength of the tensions from the 
varying combinations of high and low competition–collaboration. The study identified 
mechanisms and interventions used by the subsidiaries and HQ to adjust the levels of 
competition and collaboration to an appropriate balance or proportion of competition 
and collaboration for the two concerned subsidiaries. The process of assessment and 
adjustment is continuous as the determining factors are subject to change and, therefore, 
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their impact on inter-subsidiary interactions will reflect a different dynamic. In other 
words, inter-subsidiary coopetition is not a static phenomenon.  
The proposed process of inter-subsidiary coopetition and tension management relates to 
a mainstream sequence of behaviours between the subsidiaries emerging from this 
study. It identifies the mechanisms of ‘assessing’ (i.e. tolerable or intolerable) and 
‘balancing’ (i.e. ‘sorting out’) the emergent and inherent tensions from simultaneous 
competition and collaboration, and a further mechanism of the management 
adjudication role to provide the necessary arbitration from emotionally laden 
negotiations. 
The proposed dynamic model of inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration is 
situated in the intraorganisational coopetition literature and has been extended to 
consider the emergence of tensions and their management, which reflect the dynamics 
of subsidiaries simultaneously competing and collaborating with multiple subsidiaries 
within the MNC. The model offers an explanation of how and why subsidiaries are able 
to both compete and collaborate with each other.  
By considering the subsidiary as one unit, it obscures the location of tensions within the 
units and limits the appropriate interventions and mechanisms available to the HQ or 
subsidiary to deal with the temporary or persistent nature of the tensions. The tendency 
is to eventually move to a dynamic that is more tolerable, which could mean a different 
combination than the 50–50 balance that is typically idealised. Tentative empirical 
support is offered for Bengtsson et al.’s (2010) coopetitive dynamics, where the most 
intense dynamics are eventually mitigated.  
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9 CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this next section, I first summarise the overall research effort by recalling the original 
research questions and the main results of my PhD thesis. I also clarify the study’s 
contribution to the literature on inter-subsidiary collaboration, competition and 
coopetition within MNCs. In section 9.3, I then restate the several contributions to the 
literature which my study’s findings allow me to offer. In section 9.4, I conclude with a 
number of managerial implications for corporate or parent HQ and subsidiary managers 
and leadership development practitioners.  
9.2 RESEARCH SUMMARY  
Inter-subsidiary coopetition is poorly understood theoretically and lacks empirical 
investigation in the MNC. In addition, coopetition in the MNC context of the 
professional services firm is underexplored. As competition and collaboration are 
paradoxical forces operating within the MNC, tensions arise within inter-subsidiary 
relationships. The location of these tensions and how they are managed within the MNC 
also lack empirical investigation.  
The research I conducted used the multiple-embedded case study approach to examine 
the overarching research problem of: “Why and how do subsidiaries simultaneously 
compete and collaborate?”  
From a theoretical viewpoint, I have positioned the thesis within the intra-organisational 
stream of coopetition research and have drawn heavily on collaboration, internal 
competition, inter-organisational relations, coopetition and MNC strategy research. 
To understand the construct of intra-organisational coopetition, I first explored the 
interactions of internal competition and collaboration between the subsidiaries within 
the MNC as separate constructs and identified the content of inter-subsidiary 
interactions of competition and collaboration. I then examined the relationships between 
the subsidiaries to identify instances of simultaneous competition and collaboration to 
validate that coopetition occurred between subsidiaries within the MNCs. The findings 
confirmed that subsidiary relationships were comprised of varying degrees of 
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competitive and collaborative elements and with different levels of intensity, which 
addressed the question of: “What is the content of inter-subsidiary relationships of 
simultaneous competition and collaboration?” 
The limited present literature on inter-subsidiary collaboration, internal competition and 
intra-organisational coopetition conceptually identified structural, relational and 
cognitive antecedents. Further investigation is required to empirically contribute to 
conceptual propositions.  The integrated model of coopetition within an MNE (Luo, 
2005) provided an initial framework within which to examine the nature of the 
influences on inter-subsidiary coopetitive relationships addressing the question: “What 
factors or processes influence inter-subsidiary relationships of simultaneous 
competition and collaboration?”  
Having identified external, organisational, subsidiary and individual subsidiary manager 
antecedents of inter-subsidiary coopetition and the content of the coopetitive 
relationships, the study explored the third sub-question: “How do subsidiaries 
simultaneously compete and collaborate and manage the inherent tensions in the 
relationship?”  
I have provided robust evidence that the subsidiaries spatially separate the simultaneous 
interactions of competition and collaboration. The findings show that coopetitive 
tensions are located in different hierarchical levels of the MNC and that coopetitive 
tensions are felt most strongly by the primary profit centre (subsidiary) managers at the 
divisional management level who are tasked with both inter- and intra-subsidiary 
collaboration and intra-SBU profitability. Not all tensions were equally experienced and 
perceived as tolerable or intolerable.   
The study addressed three questions, and in so doing, augmented Luo’s (2005) 
integrated framework of coopetition, and identified tensions resulting from the 
coopetitive relationship and the interventions and mechanisms to dynamically manage 
these tensions.  
9.3 SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE  
My thesis on the three case studies to elucidate inter-subsidiary coopetition offers a 
number of contributions to the literature.  
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9.3.1 Intra-MNC coopetition  
First, the main contribution pertains to the empirical examination within three different 
MNC contexts of Luo’s (2005) framework of intra-MNE coopetition. The contribution 
complements and extends the model by providing rich descriptions of inter-subsidiary 
interactions of competition and collaboration and hence, empirically confirming the 
content of the coopetitive interactions, although prejudicing collaboration. The study 
has shown that subsidiaries of an MNC simultaneously compete and collaborate to 
expand their market share and internal areas of responsibility, and acquire and share 
resources, to create efficiencies for profit maximisation.  
The second contribution to knowledge extends the factors that influence coopetitive 
relationships between subsidiaries. In addition to the supporting infrastructure and 
structural elements contained within Luo’s (2005) internal configuration, additional 
external, organisational, relational and individual factors were all found to influence 
inter-subsidiary coopetition. By omitting consideration of factors other than the internal 
configuration proposed, additional factors such as the external environment, internal 
relations and individual manager were overlooked.  
I have shown that the management commitment to a collaborative culture and the 
existence of trusted relationships positively influenced collaboration, while overlap in 
markets, and skills, together with business unit performance comparisons increased the 
level of competition between the subsidiaries.  
The third contribution offers a more dynamic networked model of inter-subsidiary 
interactions and relationships. Subsidiaries may have differing coopetitive relationships 
with multiple other subsidiaries simultaneously. These may be both competitive and 
collaborative and at varying levels (Bengtsson et al., 2010). This suggests that the 
typology of four differing levels and combinations of competition and collaboration 
presented by Luo (2005) will effectively change the categorisation of each subsidiary as 
a result of contingent factors operating over time. The coopetition model of Luo (2005) 
was presented as a static structural model and did not visually account for effects of his 
six determinants and subsequent movement of a subsidiary from one state of 
competition and collaboration to other states of coopetition.   
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As a result of movement into different cells of the typology over time, additional 
tensions of coopetition are experienced within the same and different subsidiaries.   
Building on the detailed evidence of how the corporate or parent HQ and subsidiaries 
purposefully manage the tensions emanating from coopetition inherent in the two 
different logics of interaction, Luo’s (2005) model is further extended to account for 
both the source of tensions and how these tensions are managed within the MNE.  
The research also modestly contributes to the coopetition literature, specifically at the 
intra-organisational level. It responds to recent calls for research in the areas of intra-
organisational coopetition (Walley, 2007), understanding the balancing of cooperation 
and competition (Tidström, 2014), identification of tensions and the dynamics of the 
coopetitive interaction (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014). I do this by offering a preliminary 
processual view of inter-subsidiary coopetition in response to calls for approaching 
coopetition from a process perspective (Bengtsson et al., 2010; Tidström, 2008; Yami, 
Castaldo and LeRoy, 2010).   
Although tensions were reported in the research, not all tensions were of sufficient 
intensity to trigger a significant change in the existing dynamics of the relationships. 
Tensions of lower intensity such as lack of perceived competition between the 
subsidiaries or openness with regard to the duration of competition were tolerated by 
both subsidiaries without negatively impacting on the current relationship. However, 
when specific tensions, either resulting from too much competition, or collaboration, in 
the relationship, became intolerable between the subsidiaries, a reassessment of the 
relationship was called for by the HQ or one or other of the subsidiaries to “sort it out” 
and rebalance the dynamic.  
In contrast to the perspective that a balance of competition and collaboration is 
desirable, the study presents an argument for imbalance and instability which generates 
necessary change to adapt to environmental or organisational factors (e.g. Das and 
Teng, 2003).  
9.3.2 Inter-subsidiary competition  
This research also contributes to our understanding of intra-organisational competition, 
a topic that has received little attention in organisational research (Birkinshaw, 2001b; 
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Kohn, 1986). Studies contributing to inter-subsidiary competition are limited and these 
concepts have not engendered sufficient empirical evidence to support them (Fong et 
al., 2007). By examining inter-subsidiary competition as an element of coopetition 
within three diverse MNCs, the numerous examples of competition provided by the 
study confirm the concepts proposed by Luo (2005). I further contribute to our 
understanding of top management’s belief in the positive value of internal competition 
(Becker-Ritterspach and Dorrenbacher, 2009). Purposeful adjustments were made to the 
levels of competition between and within the subsidiaries to optimise performance by 
top management, for example, through the use of peer performance comparisons. The 
study also contributes empirical evidence of the effect of performance comparisons on 
increasing competition between the subsidiaries; a form of competition distinguished by 
the social comparison of overall improvement for the good of the unit and the group, 
rather than a zero-sum game (Garcia et al., 2006: 2013; Burt, 1992). Confirmatory 
evidence of the types of interventions used by corporate or parent HQs to manage 
competition is also offered (e.g. Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005).  
Additionally, the study contributes to our understanding of internal competition within 
the professional services firm, suggesting that the importance of competition for internal 
resources is as important as external market competition, contrary to the conclusions 
drawn by Tsai (2002) for interunit competition in a national multi-business unit 
organisation. However, Tsai (2002) acknowledges that his findings may vary in 
different organisations, depending on their histories and strategic priorities. 
9.3.3 Inter-subsidiary collaboration  
As a result of a deeper exploration of the commercial arrangements in the professional 
services firm that precede inter-subsidiary  collaboration, I contribute to the 
collaboration literature by demonstrating a link between the inter-subsidiary  transfer 
pricing process for services and the willingness of the subsidiaries to collaborate with 
one another.  
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE  
My cross-case synthesis reveals that all three organisations were pursuing 
organisational strategies with a focus on greater collaboration between the subsidiaries 
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within the MNCs.  Correctly, a strategy of inter-subsidiary collaboration is not an end in 
itself. For subsidiaries, it is a forum which potentially facilitates access to globally-
dispersed capabilities, under-utilised capacity or leverages comparative advantages.   
Awareness of organisational history  
Each organisation and each subsidiary within that organisation, however, starts their 
journey of greater collaboration from a different place, as is reflective of their previous 
histories.   While aspiring to and advocating for more collaboration within the MNC, 
sufficient recognition of existing practice is required.  A review of both organisational 
structure and intra-organisational relationships is critical if a more collaborative 
approach is to be adopted and the intended outcomes are to be achieved as a result of 
the organisational change. Cultural aspirations alone are insufficient and require 
additional structural support and levels of standardisation of processes and practices to 
facilitate inter-subsidiary collaborations.  However, a blanket standard approach to the 
reorganisation will not be successful if the HQ fails to take account of subsidiary 
heterogeneity and size.  As such, it is important that HQ builds in the necessary 
organisational design capability to support the change in the organisation and anticipate 
and respond to organisational or external environmental factors. 
Mechanisms and interventions 
A conscious awareness of the determinants is necessary to enable the choice of what 
interventions management might apply. However, what can emerge is a confusing 
picture for corporate or divisional managers to select the appropriate interventions and 
mechanisms in order to achieve their desired coopetitive dynamics for the desired 
organisational outcomes. 
The new model brings hitherto unidentified additional elements into focus that affect 
the interaction of one subsidiary with another. Consideration of these new elements 
suggests a wider range of interventions available to managers wanting to either foster 
more collaboration or competition, or indeed manage intolerable levels of competition 
or undisciplined collaboration with other subsidiaries.  
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Manage the appropriate dynamic   
MNCs can proactively manage an appropriate mix of competition and collaboration 
between subsidiaries – but this can be difficult.  Even if a ‘50/50’ balance of 
competition and collaboration is measurable and achievable, it may not necessarily be 
the optimal solution for the subsidiary relationship or organisation (Graetz and Smith, 
2008). It is clear that the appropriate level of coopetition can only be achieved by 
looking at both competition and collaboration. Preferential dominance of only 
considering one approach without consideration of the other will be detrimental to the 
firm in the longer term (Loch et al., 2006).  However, maintaining a selected dynamic 
approach serves to motivate subsidiaries. The nature of the balance is contingent upon 
the task, relationship and the context. While structural mechanisms available to the 
manager can facilitate either competition or collaboration, and a competitive or 
collaborative approach, they are insufficient to manage the emergent relationships that 
emanate from inter-subsidiary and interpersonal relationships.  
‘Both/and’ perspective 
The senior management teams benefit from being aware of the opportunities and 
constraints of promoting a culture of collaboration while fostering inter-unit 
competition through internal accounting policies and incentive systems. Awareness of 
the dynamic interplay of Group Finance and HR systems appears critical. 
Only if MNC managers develop a thorough understanding of how subsidiaries actually 
interrelate and can possibly interrelate, can they take successful, purposeful action in 
this respect. Inter-subsidiary competition and collaboration may also have an impact on 
other variables of performance. If management is to achieve their desired ends, they 
need to evaluate the behaviour of their subsidiaries to align strategy, structure and social 
relationships (Li et al., 2007). 
Leadership development of ‘both/and’ thinking  
Successful leaders have the predisposition and the capacity to hold in their heads two 
opposing ideas at once and are creatively able to resolve the tension between these two 
ideas (Martin, 2007). An implication for leadership development and business school 
practitioners is to ask: How do organisations develop the capability of integrative 
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thinking or the “both/and” paradoxical mindset (Smith, 2014) in their subsidiary 
leaders, such that they are able to see the benefits of both collaboration and 
competition? How do business schools teach future leaders of MNC organisations to 
address the inherent tensions in such complex adaptive systems?  The pressure on 
managers is great to make “either/or” choices in the broadest sense without giving 
sufficient attention to the complexity and ambiguity of competing demands of different 
processes and relationships.    
Leaders create the context for this ambidexterity by being able to acknowledge and 
explore the competing demands of competition and collaboration, internally and 
externally.   
9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this thesis I have investigated the inter-subsidiary relationships of coopetition and 
compared them at the organisational level within three heterogeneous MNCs of varying 
size, complexity and industry sector. The results indicate a consistency of topics on 
which they compete and collaborate.  The study identified four categories of 
determinant: external, organisational, subsidiary and individual characteristics. Tensions 
are inherent in coopetitive relationships. I assessed the tensions to be tolerable and 
intolerable. For intolerable tensions, I found that HQ or the subsidiaries used 
interventions to alter the dynamic of the coopetitive relationship. The relationships were 
not static and evolved over time as a result of the interventions.  
I conclude this thesis by reminding myself that external competition is the typical 
orientation of MNCs; they compete with other firms for advantage (Porter, 1985). 
Within the MNC, although internal competition exists at many levels and competition 
can generate strong, if not hostile rivalry between actors (i.e. the subsidiaries and 
management), the efforts of coordination and collaboration will provide the firm with a 
competitive advantage. Equally, excessive collaboration can dull the innovative 
entrepreneurial and efficiency drives which can be enhanced through internal 
competition. In the end, when I consider all of the millions of interactions that happen in 
a year and form the relationships between subsidiaries and their sister units, the MNCs’ 
primary orientation is one of coordination and collaboration, interspersed with periods 
of intentional or inadvertent competition.  
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Appendix A Definitions of collaboration  
Table A-1: Definitions of collaboration 
Organisational Unit  
 
Author  (P)rocess 
(R)elation 
Definitions  
Firm  Gray, 1989 
P 
Process ‘through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore 
their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is 
possible.” (p.5) 
 Himmelman et al., 1991  
P 
“Most complex  process along a developmental continuum that includes networking , coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration (p. 4) 
 Kanter, 1994  P “Creating value” 
Strategic Alliances  Bengtsson and Kock, 
1999 
R 
“A horizontal relationship where relationships are built mainly on information and social 
exchanges.”    
 Miles, Miles and Snow, 
2006  
P 
“A process whereby two or more parties work closely with each other to achieve mutually beneficial 
outcomes (solving a problem, resolving a conflict, creating a new product or business, etc.) ... It is a 
much more complex and demanding process than cooperation... involves unpredictable outcomes, 
relies heavily on trust.” 
 
Ang, 2008   
P 
“Collaboration as voluntary cooperation between firms involving exchange, sharing, or co-
development of products, technologies, or services” (based on Gulati, 1998). 
 Gulati et al., 2012  
P 
“Cooperation: joint pursuit of agreed-on goal(s) in a manner corresponding to a shared 
understanding about contributions and payoffs” and, Coordination: “the deliberate and orderly 
alignment or adjustment of partners’ actions to achieve jointly determined goals.” (p. 537)  
Subsidiary/ 
multibusiness unit 
Liedtka, 1996 
P 
“Process of decision making among interdependent parties; it involves joint ownership of decisions 
and collective responsibility for outcomes.” (based on Gray, 1991) 
 Anderson et al., 1994  
P 
Cooperation, in this context, is synonymous with collaboration among different individuals, groups, 
or organizations, where all entities are engaging in non-competitive, mutually beneficial, win-win 
activities. 
 Schruijer, 2006 
P/R 
“Multiparty collaboration – the characteristic of an emerging or developing work system of people, 
who , because of their memberships of groups, institutions or social categories, come to work 
together on a largely self constructed task or problem domain”. Collaborative relationships are 
formed to address a concern, problem or opportunity - a formulated joint goal.  
 Blomqvist and Levy, 
2006  
P 
Collaboration capability:  “The actor’s capability to build and manage network relationships based 
on mutual trust, communication and commitment.” 
 Hansen, 2009  P “Working together for mutual benefit.”  To work together on a common task to provide significant 
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Organisational Unit  
 
Author  (P)rocess 
(R)elation 
Definitions  
help to each other.” 
 Martin and  Eisenhardt, 
2010  
P 
“Collective activity by two or more business units within a multi-business organisation to create 
economic value.” (p. 265) 
 Bilhuber Galli and 
Muller-Stewens, 2012  
P “A very positive form of working in association with others for some form of mutual benefit.” 
(based on Huxham, 1996:1)   Cooperation and collaboration used interchangeably.  
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Appendix B Definitions of competition  
Table B-1: Definitions of competition 
Organisational Unit  
 
Author  (P)rocess 
(S)tate  
(R)elation 
 
Definitions  
Firm  Osarenkhoe, 2010,  
S 
“A dynamic situation that occurs when several actors in a specific area (market) struggle 
for scarce resources, and/or produce and market very similar products or services that 
satisfies the same customer need.” (p.203) 
Strategic Alliance  Bengtsson and Kock, 1999 
P/R 
“Competition is traditionally defined as the conflicting and rivalling relationship 
between competitors.” 
“Competition is an interactive process where individual, and thereby organizational, 
perceptions and experience affect organizational actions, and thus affect interactions 
between competitors (e.g. Porac et al., 1989; Easton et al., 1993; Bogner and Thomas, 
1993). 
 Das and Teng, 2000  P/R “Pursuing one’s own interest at the expense of others.” (p.79 ) 
Subsidiary/ 
Multibusiness unit 
Chandy and Tellis, 1998 
S 
“Rivalry among business units or divisions for current and potential product markets and 
technologies, and for organizational resources.” 
 Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2001 
P 
“Rivalry for scarce resources” (p.1) “Parallel or overlapping activities inside the 
boundaries of the firm”; competes for rights to a particular technology or product charter 
and not just access of financial resources (p.22).   
 Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005 
S 
“State where there is duplication or overlap of activities within the boundaries of the 
firm.” (p.1)  
 Khoja, 2008 
S 
“Rivalry among business units or divisions for current and potential product markets and 
technologies, and for organizational resources.” (p. 12; based on Chandy and Tellis, 
1998).  
 Becker-Ritterspach and 
Dorrenbacher, 2009 
S Consists of different kinds of political games. 
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Appendix C Definitions of coopetition  
Table C-1: Definitions of coopetition 
Organisational 
Unit  
 
Author  (P)rocess 
(R)elation  
(S)tate  
Definitions  
Firm  Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1996 R 
“A relationship based on a value net of involved actors (suppliers, distributors, 
subcontractors, ‘complementors’, competitors) who collectively add value to one another’s 
organisations.” 
 Zineldin , 2004  
P 
“Have a common vision and goal regardless of the legal or organisational forms and 
borders…the partners are able and willing to cooperate and compete with each other on a 
basis of mutual commitment and trust, and a mutual sharing of information, risks and 
rewards ... non zero sum game.” 
 Oliver, 2004  
P 
Collaboration: occurs when firms work jointly on the development of products 
Competition:  exists in situations in which a set of organisational are providing the same or 
related products (based on Callon (1998:44).   
 Padula and Dagnino, 2007  
S 
“A multidimensional variable, which may assume a number of different values, especially 
when observed in an orthogonal structure between the two constructs of competition and 
cooperation.” (p. 38)  
 Chin, Chan and Lan, 2008  S “Coopetition is a revolutionary mindset that combines competition and cooperation.” 
 Bengtsson. Eriksson and 
Wincent, 2010  P/R 
“A process based upon simultaneous and mutual cooperative and competitive interactions 
between two or more actors at any level of analysis (individual organisational or other 
entities.” (p. 200) Through this interaction, over time develop a coopetitive relationship. 
Subsidiary/ 
Multibusiness unit  
Tsai, 2002 
P 
Competition: extent to which two units obtain resources from the same source (internal 
competition) AND extent to which two units offer similar products or services in the 
marketplace (external market) competition.” 
 Luo, 2005  P “A mindset, process or phenomenon of combining cooperation and competition.” 
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Appendix D Categorisation of competition, collaboration and 
coopetition literature (function/ intergroup level) 
Table D-1: Categorisation of functional literature 
Organisational 
Units 
Inter-unit Competition Inter-unit Collaboration Inter-unit  
Competition & Collaboration 
Coopetition  
Function/Inter-
Group  
 
Empirical  
Blake and Mouton (1961) 
Houston et al., (2001)  
Mottner and Ford (2008)  
Goette, Huffman, Meier 
and Sutter (2012)  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical  
Burt (1992)  
Empirical 
Tjosvold (1988)  
Tjosvold and Tsao (1989) 
Song et al  (1997)   
Jassawalla and Sashittal (1998)  
Jassawalla and Sashittal (1999) 
Ellinger, Keller and Hansen 
(2006)  
DeLuca and Atuahene-Gima 
(2007) 
Le Meunier-Fitz Hugh and 
Piercy (2008; 2007) 
Chen and Tjosvold (2008)  
Mena, Humphries and Wilding 
(2009) 
Cross , Gray, Cunnningham, 
Showers and Thomas (2010)  
 
Theoretical   
Kahn and Mentzer (1996)  
Mintzberg, Jorgenson, 
Dougherty and Westley (1996) 
Qureshi, Briggs and Hlupic 
(2006)  
Steward (2008)  
Shalk and Curseu (2010)  
Allred, Fawcett, Wallin and 
Magnan (2011)  
Empirical  
Luo, Slotegraaf and Pan (2006) 
Johnson, Hollenbeck, 
Humphrey, Ilgen, Jundt and 
Meyer (2006)  
Lin, Wang, Tsai, Hsu (2010)  
Seo, Shin, Choi, and Tawada 
(2010) 
Ghobadi and d’Ambra (2012)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical  
Deutsch (1949)  
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Appendix E Functional definitions of collaboration, competition and coopetition  
Table E-1: Functional definitions 
UNIT: 
FUNCTION  
Author  Process 
Relation 
 
Definitions  
Collaboration  Kahn and Mentzer, 1996  P 
 “An effective process, where departments work together willingly.” (p. 6-14) 
 Jassawalla and Sashittal, 
1999 
P “A method by which competing interests reach win-win outcomes.” 
Used interchangeably with cooperation among functional groups in new product literature. 
 Ellinger et al., 2006 P “Informal integrative work management approach that involve departments working together, 
having a mutual understanding, sharing a common vision, sharing resources and achieving goals 
collectively.” (based on Schrage,1990) 
“Inter-functional collaboration is an unstructured, informal communicative process that is 
dependent on people’s ability to trust each other, build meaningful relationships, and appreciate one 
another’s expertise.” (based on Mintzberg, 1996) 
 Sanders, 2003 P “An affective, mutual shared process where two or more departments work together, have mutual 
understanding, have a common vision, share resources, and achieve collective goals.” 
(based on Schrage, 1990; Stank et al., 2001) 
 DeLuca et al., 2007 P “The degree of cooperation and the extent of representation by marketing, research and 
development (R&D) and other functional units in the product innovation process.” (p. 99) 
 Mena et al., 2009 P “Working jointly to bring resources into required relationships to achieve effective operation in 
harmony with the strategies and objectives of the parties involved, thus resulting in mutual benefit.” 
(based on Humphries  and Wilding, 2004) 
Competition  Houston et al., 2001  P Competition: charter change. 
Collaboration: communication across units  
Coopetition  Luo et al., 2006  P “The degree to which departments compete both for limited tangible and intangible resources and 
for strategic importance, power, and department charter.” (Based on Levitt, 1969; Houston et al., 
2001; Maltz and Kohli, 1996; Ruekert and Walker, 1987). 
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Appendix F Empirical studies of factors that influence competition and collaboration   
Table F-1: Factors from empirical studies that influence collaboration and competition (Source: Author). 
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Appendix G Theoretical perspectives: potential applicability and limitations (Source: Author)  
Table G-1: Theoretical perspectives 
Theory 
/Perspective   
Orientation  Potential 
applicability to 
study  
Conceptualisation of 
the firm  
Notion of intra-
organisational 
relationships  
Limitations to study  
Transaction 
Cost Theory  
Cost oriented   Governance modes 
and mechanisms  
affect on outcome 
of relationships  
Transactions  Focus is on 
transactions not 
relationships 
Focus has been on vertical relationships of buy and sell 
or horizontal interfirm relationships.  
Agency 
Theory  
Cost oriented  Governance modes  
and mechanisms  - 
affect on outcome 
of relationships  
Nexus of contracts 
within the firm  
Principal(P) - Agent 
(A) ties  
Vertical application - not horizontal, A-A relationships.  
How does it explain a competitive exchange  - as 
agency theory is concerned with problems that can 
arise in any cooperative exchange  (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) in Labutkin, 2007 
Social 
Exchange 
Theory  
Cost oriented   Resource Exchange   Power and 
dependence; 
importance of 
personal commitment.  
Voluntary activity 
between two actors 
based on personal 
obligation and 
gratitude  
How does it explain a competitive exchange?  
Maximise benefit "forced" collaborations? 
How does it explain altruism where the unit takes one 
on the chin and the exchange benefit is not immediate, 
e.g. perhaps perceived as a "give and take" in the 
future. Actually what is the theories perspective on 
delayed gratification of the reward? 
Game 
Theory  
Cost oriented  Resource Exchange    How ought to behave 
in specific situations.  
No  general conclusions about how people behave in 
conditions of uncertainty  
Resource 
Based View  
Rent oriented  Resource 
Availability  
Resource Sharing  
Bundle of resources A means to acquire or 
gain access to 
resources  
Studies fail in giving further insights 
in how we get access to these resources and we create 
incentives for business units to share them by 
considering resource and knowledge related theoretical 
issues. 
Knowledge 
Based View  
Rent oriented   Resource 
Availability 
Resource Sharing   
Concentration of firm 
on specific knowledge  
A means to acquire 
information and 
generate knowledge  
 Focus is predominantly on sharing knowledge  - 
although knowledge as a scare resource ( competition)  
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Collaboration  Orientation  Potential 
applicability to 
study  
Conceptualisation of the 
firm  
Notion of intra-
organisational 
relationships  
Limitations to study  
Social Capital  
(Social Network 
Analysis)  
Rent oriented  Resource Exchange 
aspects: common 
aligned action, 
effective exchange  
Social actor embedded in a 
network of social 
relationships 
Social units with relatively 
stable patterns of 
relationships over time.  
(Tichy et al., 1979)  
Consists of structural, 
behavioural and cognitive 
elements  
 Ties are predominantly cooperative although Tsai 
(2002) investigated competitive linkages.  
(MNC) Network 
Theory  
Rent oriented  
- develop/ 
combine 
resources to 
enhance 
competitiveness  
 
 
Bridging the gap between 
market and hierarchy  
Characterised by 
strength/number of network 
ties and position of actors  
Limited insight into the competitive dimension of 
intraorganisational  relationships  (Maurer, 2011:95)  
Contingency 
Theory  
(Social 
interdependence 
theory)  
  Competitive and 
cooperative rewards 
structures   - nature of 
goals and task 
conditions 
 Internal structures designed 
to fit external environment  
   Considers best fit for either competition or collaboration 
(either/or). Limited value when considering both/and  
Paradox 
Perspective  
 Both/and in 
relationships of 
coopetition  - triggers 
and strategies to 
manage tensions  
 Paradoxical relationship of 
competition and 
collaboration that generate 
tensions within the 
relationship 
Lack of focus on antecedents of coopetition but 
consideration of tensions  
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Appendix H Sources of synergy and how units connect (links) (Source: Author) 
Table H-1: Sources of synergy 
Sources of Synergy  Value Creation (Synergies)  
How Units Connect  - Links 
How parents create value   Corporate Value Creation Strategies  
Martin and Eisenhardt (2001)  Goold and Campbell   (1998) 
Goold and Campbell  ( 2002) 
Goold and Campbell ( 2002)  
 
Bowman and Ambrosini (2003) 
 
Economies of Scope  
Benefit (in terms of efficiency) from 
sharing related and complementary 
resources among business units.   
Shared Know How  
Sharing best practices, leveraging expertise, 
pooling knowledge, sharing product/ 
market know-how. 
Select  Propositions  
The parent unit acquires units for less or 
disposes of activities for more than they 
are worth. 
Provoked learning configuration  
Elimination of organizational slack.  
Market Power  
Coordinate action and resource 
relatedness among business units’ 
conglomerate power. (Hill, 1985)  
Coordinated Strategies  
Aligning the strategies of two or more units 
by, for example, coordinating responses to 
a new competitor. 
Build Propositions  
The parent unit helps units expand their 
size and scope of activity by, e.g. 
globalization or product extensions. 
Encouraged learning configuration  
Encouraging SBUs to devote resources (time, 
funding) to innovation. Establishing dialogue 
across SBUs. 
Internal Governance  
Creation of a more efficient transacting 
environment than exists in the market - 
place exchange relationships inside or 
outside the firm.  
Shared tangible resources  
Creating economies of scale and 
eliminating duplicated effort through the 
sharing of physical assets or resources.  
Stretch Propositions  
The parent unit helps units improve costs, 
quality, or profitability by, for instance, 
setting stretch targets or providing 
benchmarks. 
Reconfiguring support activities  
Combined activities performed in similar ways 
across the units.  
 Vertical integration  
Coordinating the flow of products or 
services from one unit to another.  
Link Propositions  
(see How Units Connect )   
The parent unit helps units work together 
in ways they would find difficult if left to 
them. For example, it might centralize 
activities or alter incentives. 
Reconfiguring core processes  
Scale economies in core activities; tightly 
coupled to SBU activity. (Thompson, 1967) 
 Pooled negotiation power  
Economies of scope through common 
purchases or joint negotiation with 
stakeholders.  
Leverage  Propositions  
Parent unit finds ways to exploit a central 
resource e.g. brand, skill, patent, 
relationship, in new markets or new 
businesses. 
Leverage configuration creative  
Scope of the resource is extended into other 
domains or the resource is replicated (no causal 
ambiguity).  
 Combined business creation 
Fashioning new businesses by combining 
know-how from different units through 
teams, internal joint ventures, or other 
alliances. 
 Integration reconfiguration 
Coordinate and integrate resources and assets. 
Pool skills /resources with other SBUs. Cross-
divisional linkages to problem solve/ innovate.  
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Appendix I [EngConsult] Engagement Process  
Figure I-1: Engagement process 
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Appendix J Email to informants EngConsult  
 
From: Group Chairman [mailto:GroupChairman@engconsult.com]  
Sent: 06 September 2013 17:58 
To: Regional and Business Unit Managing Directors  
Cc: Chambers, Morgan; [Key Contact RS]  
Subject: Cranfield Research on Collaboration 
 
All 
 
Morgan Chambers, a researcher in organisational behaviour at Cranfield, is 
undertaking a piece of work on collaboration across a number of companies. 
 
I have agreed we will participate in the research as we could gain some useful insights 
on improving collaboration. There is no “cost” except for the interview time of our 
staff. 
 
Output will include observations of actual interactions in key business processes, an 
assessment of the effectiveness of collaboration, an understanding of opportunities for 
business efficiencies and suggestions for improved management practices to 
encourage collaboration.  
 
She would like to interview a cross-section of people (by phone or face-to face) who 
have experienced both good and bad examples of collaboration at various levels of the 
organisation, and your names have been proposed. Interviews will probably take about 
45 minutes.  
 
Candidates in other regions have been nominated, but if you think there are 
“counterparts” elsewhere who should be interviewed, or other people in your region, 
please let me know.  
 
She will commence in September and expects to work with us over a period of about 6 
weeks. 
 
[Name RS] has been selected as her “day-to-day” contact person, and [Name - 
Chairman’s PA] will help with appointments. Please copy RS on any correspondence. 
 
Thanks for your support 
 
[Group Chairman]  
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Appendix K Email to informants PhotoCo  
 
From: [NAME] [mailto:[Group CEO Exec Asst@ [PhotoCo.com]  
Sent: 11 March 2014 15:27 
To: Chambers, Morgan; Group CEO 
Subject: RE: Collaboration Research  
 
Hi Morgan 
 
Group CEO has agreed the letter should come from him. 
I will be sending out an initial email today to the Operational executives with the letter 
attached. First aim is to determine who exactly they wish to take part and whether they 
will brief their reports or whether the email will come directly from Group CEO. 
 
I will update you on the full list of participants as soon as they are confirmed. 
We can then start co-ordinating the various calls/meetings. 
 
Many thanks 
Group CEO Executive Assistant  
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Appendix L Interview protocol    
 
Introduction  
Thank you for agreeing to talk with me and participate in this research interview.  
There are a few things to cover off before we begin the interview.  
A. Confidentiality and anonymity  
 The research will be confidential and the findings will only be shared with 
faculty at Cranfield School of Management.  In addition nothing will be 
attributable to any one individual (or organisation – to be discussed and 
decided in advance).   
 We act in accordance with the University Ethics committee  
B. Can you please confirm that you are comfortable for me to record the interview 
for the purpose of working with the data after the interview?  
Also I will be taking notes during our conversation. Is that okay with you?  
C. The interview  will be approximately 60 minutes   
D. Research Question:  
 ‘How do the interactions of competition and collaboration between strategic 
business units (SBUs) impact outcomes as perceived by Corporate/Divisional 
Headquarters and the SBUs? ‘ 
The purpose of the research is:  
1. To explore the types of interactions between SBUs within a multibusiness, 
multinational organisation. 
2. Understand what CEO and SBU leaders mean by collaboration and get their 
perceptions and experience of what enables or hinders collaboration 
between business units within organisations   
3. Understand what CEO and SBU leaders mean by internal competition and get 
their perceptions and experience of how they manage or foster competition 
between business units within organisations  
4. To find out whether collaboration and competition coexist between SBUs 
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5.  To explore how  SBUs manage the coexistence of collaboration and 
competition  
6. What impact does this have on being able to be both innovative and 
efficient?  
Informed Consent  
Do you … 
- Agree voluntarily to take part in the research project being conducted by Ms 
Morgan Chambers which is also part of the requirements for my Doctorate at the 
Cranfield School of Management, Cranfield University.  
- Understand that the information which you supply is confidential and that it will 
be anonymised and only be used in the findings of the research.  
- Understand that you do not have to answer all the questions which may be put to 
you. The information which you provide will be held securely until the research has 
been completed (published) after which it will be destroyed.  
- Understand that the information which you provide will not be used for any other 
purpose.  
- Understand that you are entitled to ask for a debriefing session or a copy of the 
research at the end of the project.  
- Agree that you have been informed that you may withdraw from this study at any 
time and that any information which you have supplied will not be used for this 
research and any records held relating to your contribution will be destroyed.        
Do you have any other questions with regards to how the information is going to be 
used?  
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Appendix M Interview questions 
 
Questions:  
To get started, can you please answer a couple of biographical questions?  
 For the purposes of recording , can you say your name for the tape  
o What is your current role and title within COMPANY?  
o Who do you report to?  
o How long have you been with the organisation? in your current role?  
 
A. CORPORATE STRATEGY and ORGANISATION STRUCTURE  
 
 Will you briefly describe:  
 
[Corporate Strategy of [COMPANY] - address to corporate and BU leaders 
ONLY] 
 
i. the organisational structure  
(Probe: how does this support COMPANY’S current strategy?)   
 
ii. Your firm’s corporate strategy and the key strategic challenges that 
COMPANY   faces?  
 
[Business Unit Strategy]  
 
iii. Your business unit strategy and the key strategic challenges that your 
business unit faces?  
 
 
B. INTERNAL COLLABORATION 
 
 What do you understand the word collaboration to mean within COMPANY?  
 
o What other words or phrases would you use to describe collaborating? 
Working together?  
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o Do you make a distinction between the words cooperation and 
collaboration?  
 
 Can you describe a situation that best illustrates when you collaborated with 
another SBU  
1. SBU X  - directed to respond specifically to stated SBU to ensure 
interaction of the dyad   
2. SBU  Y - chosen by the interviewee  
 
 Who initiated the collaboration?  
o Why was this decision taken?  
o How was this implemented?  
 
 What were some of the personal or organisational factors that were in place 
that enabled (or got in the way of) this collaboration?  
o Was it always like this? Has it always been like this?  
o What changed? What triggered it?  
 
 What was the outcome?  
o What was the perceived value resulting from the collaboration between 
the SBUs?  
1. From the SBU perspective? Example?  
2. From the corporate/group perspective? Example?  
 
 Anything else you would like to add at this stage about your interactions of 
collaboration with another SBU? collaborations with other SBUs 
 
C. INTERNAL  COMPETITION 
 What does competition between SBUs look like within the organisation?  
o What other words or phrases would you use to describe internal 
competition?    
 
 Can you describe a situation that best illustrates an example of when you were 
in competition or competing with another SBU:  
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1. SBU X  - directed to respond specifically to stated SBU to ensure 
interaction of the dyad   
2. SBU  Y - chosen by the interviewee  
 
 Who initiated the competition?  
o Why was this decision taken?  
o How was this implemented?  
 
 What were some of the personal or organisational factors that were in place 
that encouraged (discouraged) this competition?   
o Was it always like this? Has it always been like this?  
o What changed? What triggered it?  
 
 What was the outcome of this interaction?  
o What was the perceived value resulting from the competition between 
the SBUs?  
1. From the SBU perspective? Example?  
2. From the corporate/group perspective? Example?  
 
D. COLLABORATION AND  COMPETITION  
 
 Does the execution of the current corporate strategy require that the BUs both 
collaborate and compete with each other 
 
 Can you describe a situation when you found yourself both collaborating with 
an SBU and competing with the same SBU over the same or a different issue? 
At the same time?  
o What were the circumstances around this?   
o How did you manage both interactions with the same business unit? 
o What organisational systems, practices and processes support or hinder 
these interactions happening at the same time….with the same business 
unit?  
o What were some of the factors involved in the decisions?  
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E. OVERALL  
Do you view your business unit as? 
 
A.   a collaborator with other business units?    
 
-   Which ones? 
 
- And on a scale of 1-7, how would you rate the degree of collaboration 
between the specific business unit and why?  
- where 1- not very collaborative to 7- extremely intense collaboration 
 
B.   a competitor with other business units?  
 
- Which ones? 
- On a scale of 1-7, how would you rate the degree of competition between 
specific business units and why?  
- where 1- not much competition to 7- extremely intense competition 
 
Culture  
 
How would you describe the culture of COMPANY? of your BU?  
(Probes: competitive, collaborative, bureaucratic, meritocratic, high 
performance…) 
 
 Anything else you would like to add?  
 Is there anybody else that you suggest I talk to?  
 May I follow up with you if there is anything that is unclear? 
Thank you. 
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Appendix N Thank you email  
 
Da: Chambers, Morgan [mailto:morgan.chambers@cranfield.ac.uk]  
Inviato: lunedì 9 giugno 2014 10:18 
A: [Name] G M; [Name] AP 
Oggetto: Research Interview: Grazie  
 
Dear Name GM and Name AP,   
 
Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you both for the research interview last week. I look 
forward to sharing the overall findings at the conclusion of the research.   
 
I also appreciate that I may contact you before the conclusion of the research, should there be a 
need to clarify any further points.   
 
Once again many thanks for your valuable time and insights.   
 
Best wishes  
Morgan  
 
 
Morgan Chambers 
Doctoral Researcher 
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Appendix O Follow up questions by email 
 
From: [mailto: [name]@[company].com]  
Sent: 30 March 2014 21:09  
To: Chambers, Morgan  
Subject: RE: Research Follow up Question Please  
 
 
Apologies Morgan on the late reply.  
 
To address your queries:  
- I believe I referred to “Upset Limit” in the sense that our assignment was to an overall 
agreed upon budget that we were not to exceed without client authorization. This 
assignment budget was split into appropriate budgets by discipline whose objective 
was to manage to their respective budget caps as well.  
 
- Although I can’t recall the specific context of the remark, I believe what I meant by 
“more often we are building grade separations involving rail “ in that there tends to be 
a priority given to replacing at-grade rail to road crossings over road to road crossings, 
which as you can expect are more often manageable with common traffic signal 
systems. In my experience within the Central Canada unit, this means the rail unit 
(CRA) and highways and bridges (CPI) must collaborate. Discussions occur quite often 
between CRA and CPI when strategizing personnel to designate for these assignments. 
Typically this depends upon the primary client; if the railway is dictating the need for 
the grade separation, the lead tends to be CRA. If the municipality or region (owning 
the road) dictates the need, CRA would typically take the lead.  
 
Hope this helps. If you need further clarification on these or other points raised, please 
contact me at your earliest convenience.  
Cheers  
Sr. Project Engineer 
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Appendix P Extended, follow-up lines of questioning  
 
From: [Name 1]  
Sent: 16 September 2013 16:48  
To: [Name 2]  
Cc: H; Chambers, Morgan  
Subject: Research on collaboration 
  
Hi [Name 2],  
 
[Chairman] has agreed that [EngConsult] will work with Morgan Chambers of Cranfield on a 
research project looking at Interactions of Competition and Collaboration between Strategic 
Business Units, which he has asked me to help co-ordinate. Protocols on confidentiality are 
included in the Cranfield proposal.  
Morgan has been doing some interviews and the subject of mobility has come up. She 
requested an interview with someone on HR side, and in view of the context and your 
presentation on Saturday, I wondered whether you might be able to spare a bit of time to talk 
to her. She is carrying out a comprehensive set of interviews including Regional MD’s and 
senior management, and is looking at strategic questions, so I thought that you would be the 
best person for her to talk to in the first place at least.  
Many thanks  
[Name 1]   
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Appendix Q [PhotoCo] Company contact sheet  
 
COMPANY CONTACT SHEET   
Contact Type:  In person     Site:  London Offices 
Visit:   M       Contact Date:  
Phone:        Today’s Date: Thurs., May 15th, 2014  
Written by: MC  
 
1. What were the main issues or themes that struck me in the contact?  
 Mergers and Acquisitions – acquisition process has been more complementary - and 
where those entrepreneurs have earn out clauses they have been more collaborative 
(pure speculation) than those who have previously been competitors.  
Organisation Structure - have taken away the P and L from the businesses - so that now 
rolls up as a matrix to the Division   
Trust in the capability of another division manufacturing product - … the motivation to 
make the product themselves ….some competition in terms of manufacture comes into 
play because it may damage the buying units brand and reputation.  
 
2. Summarize the information you got ( or failed to get ) on each of the target 
questions you had for this contact 
Question  
 
Information  
Biographical  
 
MBA under CB  
Corporate Strategy  
- levels of autonomy 
- external and internal 
challenges  
 
Greater interdependence created by formalizing a matrix structure 
within the Division across the BU  
Internal relates to how to move from a product led to consumer 
led organisation.  
External challenges are around changing technology - moving 
from mechanical product to electronic products. Hence have 
capability gap  and therefore try to acquire companies that have 
those skills  
Structure  
- collaboration  
- competition  
 
Board established to help sort out collaboration issues before they 
get up to Group CEO @ [photographic and broadcast].   
Organisation more international  - not transnational  - interesting 
he asked me on what level -  finances international  - resource 
sharing transnational ? Less interdependence, less integration? 
Definition/Understanding 
- Collaboration  
- Internal competition  
- SBU  
Subsidiary operating companies different from the organisational 
structure.  Are the key performance indicators based on the 
organisational units? 
Key Performance 
Indicators  
 
Cross selling of sales force - they are now selling multiple 
products rather than one. They use the specialist sales people for 
any in-depth information and to answer any technical or specific 
product information  
Anything else question?  
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3. Anything else that struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating or important in 
this contact?  
Less infrastructure in the organisation to promote actual collaboration - happens if at all 
at the budgeting process  
 
4. What new (or remaining) target questions do you have in considering the next 
contact with this site?  
HR Collaboration - consider where are the opportunities for collaboration - what would 
be of mutual benefit?  
[Name] Tired – jet lag, just come back from business trip– He is curious to learn about 
collaboration and how other companies manage it - he thinks it might be a product thing 
- not sure what he meant by that and have to go back to transcript.  
Raised an interesting question re the entrepreneurs when they have money in the bank. 
A reward is not going to be the decider to collaborate - they will collaborate because 
they want to - what is in it for them?  
[p] - A little bit of the case of “not invented it here”  
Sense of identity with the brand (and culture issues too) between Italy and North 
America. Nth America: 45 % of total business.  Is there anything like peer pressure to 
encourage group identity.  
 
5. DOCUMENTS Provided?   
Newly published full Annual Report /Organisation chart  
  
Does any of the literature talk to group identity in the literature review - talk about 
social capital.  
Also struck me that in Co3 across Divisions do not collaborate - wonder how they go 
about indentifying the opportunities - do they share common resources or knowledge to 
win work as in Co1 or - they will even cooperate , or collaborate, however, when they 
need to bring their forces together…what are the linkages and opportunities that are 
relevant to the organisation? 
On a product development level the resources are people, time and physical product - 
tangible material  
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Appendix R [EventCo] Interim update: Summary notes   
 
Notes from Review Meeting with ZP  
January 9
th
 2014  
[EventCo] Corporate Office  
Interim update report  
Action Items  
 Add into report reflection time of CEO to talk about collaboration  
 Collaboration and competition happen at different levels and over different 
things   
 Promised presentation due Mid March  
 Values of collaboration to be launched  
 Explanation of JVs - some ownerships of JV (x %) but for collaboration to be 
called JV - more like a geo-adapt.  
 Balance of spontaneity and flexibility vs. undisciplined and lack of purpose  
 Shared Hansen (2009) matrix - opportunities for collaboration with other 
business units - where are the synergies?  
 Add ExCo formation to presentation which structure ensures dialogue and 
identification of possible opportunities across Business Units/Subs 
 ZP says initiative feels  more like moving away from competition as opposed to 
moving towards collaboration  - based on previous history of company 
 Add quotes but need to ensure that not identifiable  
 Next meeting mid march with CEO -US  and Group People/Culture – present 
full results   
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Appendix S EngConsult informants  
Table S-1: EngConsult - Informants 
Informant Company  Location  Group 
Board  
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank 
you sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per 
interview 
1 EngConsult  US N 20/09/2103 Phone Y Y 00:56:35 Voicescript 8735 
2 EngConsult  UK N 06/12/2013 Phone Y Y 00:54:00 Alvine 6150 
3 EngConsult  UK N 12/11/2013 Phone Y Y 01:03:46 Voicescript 9718 
4 EngConsult  UK N 10/10/2013 Phone Y Y 00:55:01 Voicescript 8748 
5 EngConsult  UK N 06/12/2013 Phone Y Y 00:57:48 Alvine 6554 
6 EngConsult  Canada N 13/12/2013 Phone Y Y 00:59:13 Alvine 7353 
7 EngConsult  US N 25/09/2103 Phone Y Y 01:04:10 Voicescript 11484 
8 EngConsult  UK N 02/10/2013 F2F Y Y 00:52:28 Voicescript 10829 
9 EngConsult  US N 16/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:46:54 Voicescript 7520 
10 EngConsult  UK N 16/09/2013 F2F Y Y 01.33:42 Voicescript 22283 
11 EngConsult  US  N 16/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:08:02 Alvine 9706 
12 EngConsult  Ireland  N 11/11/2013 Phone Y Y 00:51:56 Voicescript 8903 
13 EngConsult  US N 17/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01.02:15 Voicescript 10740 
14 EngConsult  US N 16/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01.05:33 Voicescript 10867 
15 EngConsult  Australia  N 04/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:57:00 Voicescript 8104 
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Informant Company  Location  Group 
Board  
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank 
you sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per 
interview 
16 EngConsult  UK N 15/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:04:37 Alvine 10096 
17 EngConsult  UK N 29/11/2013 Phone Y Y 01:35:34 Alvine 12205 
18 EngConsult  UK N 29/11/2013 Phone Y Y 01:35:34 Alvine 10013 
19 EngConsult  US N 05/11/2013 F2F Y Y 01:04:38 Voicescript 11621 
20 EngConsult  UK Y 16/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:55:48 Voicescript 10071 
21 EngConsult  South Africa  N 25/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:07:44 Voicescript 9658 
22 EngConsult  UK N 21/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:06:15 Voicescript 9658 
23 EngConsult  UAE  N 16/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:01:43 Voicescript 8267 
24 EngConsult  UK N 22/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01.19:47 Voicescript 14568 
25 EngConsult  UK N 31/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:06:05 Voicescript 9150 
26 EngConsult  UK N 21/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:14:52 Voicescript 11033 
27 EngConsult  UK N 16/12/2013 Phone Y Y 00:39:51 Alvine 5443 
28 EngConsult  UK N 30/09/2013 F2F Y Y 01:02:17 Voicescript 10539 
29 EngConsult  UK N 02/10/2013 F2F Y Y 01:06:09 Voicescript 11185 
30 EngConsult  US N 16/10/2013 Phone Y Y 00:57:29 Voicescript 11939 
31 EngConsult  UK N 20/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:44:30 Voicescript 8566 
32 EngConsult  Malaysia  N 06/12/2013 Phone Y Y 00:27:10 Alvine 4182 
33 EngConsult  Singapore N 04/11/2013 Phone Y Y 00:52:58 Voicescript 6026 
34 EngConsult  Hong Kong N 26/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:59:30 Morgan 4768 
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Informant Company  Location  Group 
Board  
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank 
you sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per 
interview 
35 EngConsult  US N 25/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:12:18 Voicescript 9647 
36 EngConsult  US N 09/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01.09:33 Voicescript 9817 
37 EngConsult  UK N 03/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:02:27 Voicescript 10936 
38 EngConsult  Canada  N 04/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:50:00 Voicescript 8541 
39 EngConsult  India N 03/09/2013 Phone Y Y 00:59:00 Alvine  9806 
40 EngConsult  UAE Y 12/11/2013 Phone Y Y 00:51:29 Voicescript 9800 
41 EngConsult  US Y 31/10/2013 Phone Y Y 00:58:00 Voicescript 8608 
42 EngConsult  UAE N 13/09/2013 F2F Y Y 02.05.39 Voicescript 25748 
43 EngConsult  China N 06/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:16:00 Alvine 13806 
44 EngConsult  Malaysia N 18/12/2013 Phone Y Y 00:53:40 Alvine 6336 
45 EngConsult  Canada  N 05/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01.21:03 Alvine  13437 
46 EngConsult  Netherlands N 01/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:06:00 Voicescript 11336 
47 EngConsult  UK  N 22/11/2013 F2F Y Y 01:31:42 Voicescript 14343 
48 EngConsult  US N 03/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:52:55 Alvine 6669 
49 EngConsult  US N 06/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:08:41 Alvine 7630 
50 EngConsult  NZ  N 18/10/2013 F2F Y Y 00:53:40 Alvine  9917 
51 EngConsult  UK N 04/11/2013 Phone Y Y 00:52:58 Voicescript 9170 
52 EngConsult  India N 23/09/2103 Phone Y Y 00:44:31 Voicescript 8754 
53 EngConsult  China  N 06/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:04:00 Voicescript 12201 
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Informant Company  Location  Group 
Board  
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank 
you sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per 
interview 
54 EngConsult  US N 10/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01:06:41 Alvine 10352 
55 EngConsult  UAE N 23/09/2013 Phone Y Y 01.05:43 Voicescript 10558 
56 EngConsult  Pakistan  N 18/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:16:12 Voicescript 13173 
57 EngConsult  UK Y 22/11/2013 F2F Y Y 00:54:00 Voicescript 8742 
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Appendix T EventCo informants  
Table T-1: EventCo - Informants 
Informant # 
Company  Location  ExCo 
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank you 
sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per 
interview  
58 EventCo UK N 17/10/2103 F2F Y Y 00:59:29 Y 12825 
59 EventCo UK N 07/11/2013 F2F Y Y 00:55:09 Y 10460 
60 EventCo US N 29/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:07:50 Y 10612 
61 EventCo US N 26/11/2013 Phone Y Y 01:15:00 Y 8255 
62 EventCo UK Y 24/10/2013 F2F Y Y 01:06:58 Y 11204 
63 EventCo Hong Kong  Y 07/10/2103 Phone Y Y 00:44:05 Y 6185 
64 EventCo US N 17/10/2103 Phone Y Y 00:59:36 Y 9439 
65 EventCo US N 06/12/2013 Phone Y Y 01:00:04 Y 8255 
66 EventCo Hong Kong  N 19/11/2013 Phone Y Y 00:50:47 Y 7890 
67 EventCo UK N 24/10/2013 F2F Y Y 00:58:00 Y 11729 
68 EventCo US N 07/10/2013 Phone Y Y 
00:02:35 
00:54:28 
Y 9997 
69 EventCo US Y 11/10/2013 Phone Y Y 01:05:20 Y 12744 
70 EventCo UK/US Y 13//11/2013 F2F Y Y 00:59:23 Y 9768 
71 EventCo US N 17/10/2103 Phone Y Y 00:59:18 Y 10403 
72 EventCo US N 20/11/2013 Phone Y Y 00:47:00 Y 8005 
73 EventCo The Netherlands Y 08/10/2013 Phone Y Y 00:55:41 Y 8878 
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Informant # 
Company  Location  ExCo 
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank you 
sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per 
interview  
74 EventCo UK N 17/10/2103 Phone Y Y 00:01:26 Y 7769 
75 EventCo US N 16/10/2013 Phone Y Y 00:50:31 Y 9324 
76 EventCo UK N 07/11/2013 F2F Y Y 00:48:27 Y 7449 
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Appendix U PhotoCo informants  
Table U-1: PhotoCo - Informants 
 
Informant Company Location  Ops Exec 
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank you 
sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per interview 
77 PhotoCo Italy  N 06/06/2014 F2F Y Y 01:03:55 N Audio  - NVivo 
78 PhotoCo UK N 09/06/2014 Phone Y Y 00:43:29 Y 5905 
79 PhotoCo US  N 05/06/2014 Phone Y Y 00:47:44 Y 6121 
80 PhotoCo UK N 09/06/2014 Phone Y Y 00:58:51 Y 7839 
81 PhotoCo Italy  N 05/06/2014 F2F Y Y 00:44:55 N Audio  - NVivo 
82 PhotoCo UK N 09/06/2014 Phone Y Y 01:03:36 Y 8955 
83 PhotoCo Italy  N 06/06/2014 F2F y Y 01:03:55 N Audio  - NVivo 
84 PhotoCo UK N 09/06/2014 Phone Y Y 00:52:28 Y 7285 
85 PhotoCo Italy  N 06/06/2014 F2F Y Y 00:46:51 Y 6502 
86 PhotoCo Italy  Y 05/06/2014 F2F Y Y 01:19:47 Y 11646 
87 PhotoCo Italy  N 06/06//2014 F2F Y Y 00:44:48 Y 5017 
88 PhotoCo UK  Y 06/06/2014 F2F Y Y 01:09:41 Y 9581 
89 PhotoCo US Y 24/06/2014 Phone Y Y 01:18:49 Y 12180 
90 PhotoCo US N 06/06/2014 Phone Y Y 00:57:42 Y 7628 
91 PhotoCo UK Y 15/05/2014 F2F Y Y 00:40:40 Y 6704 
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Informant Company Location  Ops Exec 
Member 
Interview 
Completed 
Phone  
F2F 
Agreed to 
Record 
Thank you 
sent 
Length of 
interview 
Transcripts 
completed 
Words per interview 
92 PhotoCo Italy  N 06/06/2014 F2F Y Y 00:41:49 Y 6408 
93 PhotoCo Italy  N 06/06/2014 F2F Y Y 00:57:28 Y 7505 
94 PhotoCo US  N 06/06/2014 Phone Y Y 01:16:13 Y 8977 
95 PhotoCo UK  Y 15/05/2014 F2F Y Y 00:38:10 Y 5932 
96 PhotoCo US Y 04/06/2014 Phone Y Y 00:57:52 Y 8370 
97 PhotoCo Japan  N 06/06/2014 F2F Y Y 00:32:50 Y 3898 
98 PhotoCo Italy  N 05/06/2014 F2F Y Y 00:54:59 N Audio  - NVivo 
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Appendix V Content of competition and collaboration 
Table V-1: Content of competition and collaboration 
Content  EngConsult  
C
+ 
C
- 
EventCo  
C
+ 
C
- 
PhotoCo  
C
+  
C 
- 
Resources  acquisition and 
utilisation of 
people resources  
           
 -  lower cost  lower cost 
alternatives  
       manufacturing     
 -  knowledge  best practices 
(technical)  
   best practices 
(events)  
     best practices 
(low)  
   
 -  financial  sub-venture 
funding  
  acquisition 
funding  (low) 
     
HQ attention       HQ attention   
Market 
expansion  
regional sector 
expansion and 
growth  
   global expansion 
of vertical brands  
   global expansion 
of brands  
   
 - client referral  internal 
recommendation  
   internal 
recommendation  
   internal 
recommendation  
   
 - cross selling  very little     very little     distribution 
channels  
   
Charter 
expansion  
extend adjacent 
skills to 
retain/gain work  
   new business 
development  
    Product 
extension  
   
Note: C+ = collaboration; C- = competition  
 
